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AbstrAct
The present thesis aims to analyse the manner in which the ethnically and culturally diverse environment of Eastern Anatolia during the Hellenistic era 
has influenced the royal houses of the Mithradatids, Ariarathids, Ariobarzanids and 
Commagenian Orontids. 
The focus of analysis will be represented by the contact and osmosis between two of 
the major cultural influences present in the area, namely the Iranian (more often than not 
Achaemenid Persian) and Greco-Macedonian, and the way in which they were engaged 
by the ruling houses, in their attempt to establish, preserve and legitimise their rule. 
This will be followed in a number of fields: dynastic policies and legitimacy 
conceptions, religion, army and administration. In each of these fields, discrete elements 
betraying the direct influence of one or the other cultural traditions will be followed and 
examined, both in isolation and in interaction with other elements, together with which 
they form a diverse, but nevertheless coherent whole.
The eventual result of this analysis will be to demonstrate how the intersection of 
cultures and the willing appropriation by the ruling houses of what we might call, using a 
modern term, ‘multiculturalism’ has created a new, interesting and robust tradition, whose 
influence would endure well into the Roman era.
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i. GenerAl introduction
The present research aims to analyse the manner in which the apparently irreconcilable traditions of Achaemenid Persia and Greece are nevertheless present simultaneously 
in the institutions of three Hellenistic kingdoms, Pontic Cappadocia, Greater Cappadocia 
and Commagene and the way these have coalesced to create a new, hybrid tradition.
Many clarifications and definitions are necessary before even beginning such a 
study, but also a number of fundamental considerations: the motivation for initiating this 
project and whether it is theoretically possible. This issue will be illustrated with a case 
study, focusing on the manner in which sources portray Mithradates VI Eupator, designed 
firstly to underline the difficulties faced by Ancient History in general and by this study 
in particular and secondly to indicate a number of strategies used to overcome them. This 
introductory section will conclude with a few considerations about the usefulness of the 
present study.
i. definitions
I.1. Geographical span
Throughout this study, the phrase “Eastern Asia Minor” will be used to designate the 
territory in the Anatolian peninsula that was part of any of the following three kingdoms: 
Pontic Cappadocia, Greater Cappadocia and Commagene. 
While this definition may seem quite straightforward, it is by no means impervious 
to dilemmas, given that borders in ancient times were much more fluid than they are 
since the modern era. What to make, therefore, of regions only temporarily or partly 
included in the territories of these kingdoms? For example, parts of Paphlagonia were 
annexed to the Pontic kingdom at various times in history, but enough remained to form 
an independent – albeit weak – kingdom (Pol., 25.2.5-9; Iust., 37.4.1); Colchis was 
of extreme importance for the kingdom of Pontus, but only during the relatively short 
period when it was subjected to it, during the reign of Mithradates Eupator (Str., 12.3.1). 
Similarly, the Kingdom of Cappadocia included Cataonia only after it was conquered 
during the reign of Ariarathes III (Str., 12.1.2) and held certain parts of Cilicia, but only 
for a brief period of time (Str., 12.1.4).
The decision to include in the present research the three kingdoms of Pontic 
Cappadocia, Greater Cappadocia and Commagene was made based on the consideration 
that they formed a continuum in terms of cultural background (for reasons explained 
below, in the Geographical and Historical Overview) so the same will apply in deciding 
which regions to consider as relevant and which peripheral to our interest. Thus, for 
example, Paphlagonia, Cataonia or Armenia Minor were sufficiently integrated in the 
cultural network of the region to afford inclusion in the discussion throughout the period 
under scrutiny. 
Other regions have a clearly defined and fully independent cultural identity during 
most of the Hellenistic era, but were included at a certain moment in the statal structures 
of one of the three kingdoms and this period of dominion left behind an important 
legacy. Prominent examples are Tauric Chersonesos and Colchis: while the present 
study will not concern itself with their history for the better part of the Hellenistic era, 
the wealth of information they supply about the last stages of the Pontic rule will be of 
major importance.   
There are yet other regions that have been included in the territory of the said 
kingdoms in one form or another, but the occupation was so brief and the traces left 
behind so tenuous that they will not be considered in the present study. As mentioned 
above, an example of one such region is Cilicia, briefly held by Cappadocia. Another 
is Galatia, held in at least two occasions by Pontic kings1 (Pharnakes I and Mithradates 
VI Eupator) and the list may be expanded to include nearly all of Western Asia Minor, 
occupied by Eupator in the initial stages of the First War with Rome.  
I.2. Chronological span
The meaning of the phrase “Hellenistic times” in the present work also requires 
definition. While the conventional limits for this era are 323 BC (the death of Alexander) 
and 31 BC (Octavian’s victory at Actium), the study of Eastern Anatolia requires a certain 
amount of flexibility. 
The terminus post quem is the moment when these kingdoms were founded as 
independent entities, whether or not their rulers took the title of basileus. Thus, Greater 
Cappadocia is the oldest among them, with an autonomy gained as early as 330 BC, under 
Ariarathes I, former satrap of Dareios III. One sees, therefore, that this event precedes the 
death of Alexander and consequently the ‘official’ beginning of the Hellenistic era by some 
seven years. Although the independence of Cappadocia was subsequently lost to Perdiccas 
1 The ambiguity of the verb “to hold” is, in this context, intentional, as the process domination is not very 
clear: it might be military occupation, alliance, “vassalage”, or simply influence of a more powerful entity 
over a weaker one.
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and his protégé, Eumenes, the nephew and successor of Ariarathes I – also bearing the 
dynastic name of Ariarathes – was to make an energetic comeback and re-established 
the hold of the dynasty on the kingdom. Pontic Cappadocia is next in line, founded by 
Mithridates I Ktistes around 300 BC. Finally, Commagene becomes independent in 163 
BC, in the turmoil that followed the defeat of Antiochos III at Magnesia. 
However different in their foundation, these kingdoms ended up as part of the 
Roman state, either as the result of forceful annexation or upon the extinction of 
the dynasty. However, Rome’s influence in the area was felt so strongly even before 
this terminal point, that it managed to alter the entire mechanism of legitimising a 
monarch’s and a dynasty’s sway over a kingdom. Thus, when the Ariarathid dynasty 
of Cappadocia becomes extinct following the more or less direct intervention of their 
powerful Northern neighbours, they try in the first place to resort to the expedient of 
αὐτονομία, but after it was refused, they gave their blessing (and military support) to the 
one elected by the nobility, Ariobarzanes I (Str., 12.2.11). Roman interventionism was 
brought to a far greater level only two generations later, when Antony appoints kings 
as he sees fit. Strabon makes this point quite clear when talking about the last king of 
Cappadocia, Archelaos: “καὶ εἵλοντο Ἀριοβαρζάνην· εἰς τριγονίαν δὲ προελθόντος 
τοῦ γένους ἐξέλιπε, κατεστάθη δ’ ὁ Ἀρχέλαος οὐδὲν προσήκων αὐτοῖς Ἀντωνίου 
καταστήσαντος.” (12.2.11). It was not Archelaos’ belonging to a dynasty (although 
his grandfather had managed to contract a highly honourable, though extremely short 
marriage to Berenike IV, queen of Egypt) but quite simply the will of Marcus Antonius 
that put him on the throne. I would argue that this moment represents more than a simple 
dynastic hiatus and calls into question the very principles of monarchic rule as they had 
operated along the centuries (cf. infra, n. 58). It is, therefore, more cautious to exclude 
Archelaos’ reign from the present investigation. Much the same applies to Dareios, 
son of Pharnakes II, who is appointed king of Pontus by the same Antony. Although in 
his case there is an obvious dynastic continuity, his rule may also be excluded for the 
simple reason that the information available – little besides a short notice in Appian2 
– does not offer much evidence for characterisation. Although established in the same 
rather arbitrary manner by Rome, the rule of Antiochos IV in Commagene (38, 41-
72) deserves closer scrutiny. Also in his case, the dynastic ties were evident. What 
we know about Antiochos IV and his general policy makes him a continuator of his 
ancestors and justifies his inclusion in the present research. Furthermore, in the limited 
2 APP., Civ., 5.8.75: “ἵστη δέ <Ἀντώνιος> πῃ καὶ βασιλέας, οὓς δοκιμάσειεν, ἐπὶ φόροις ἄρα τεταγμένοις, 
Πόντου μὲν Δαρεῖον τὸν Φαρνάκους τοῦ Μιθριδάτου, Ἰδουμαίων δὲ καὶ Σαμαρέων Ἡρῴδην, Ἀμύνταν 
δὲ Πισιδῶν καὶ Πολέμωνα μέρους Κιλικίας καὶ ἑτέρους ἐς ἕτερα ἔθνη”.
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field of dynastic representation such a striking monument as Philopappos’ mausoleum 
in Athens is of great enough importance not to be ignored. I consider, therefore, the 
following dates as appropriate markers of the end for the states: 47 BC for Pontus, 36 
BC for Cappadocia and 72 AD for Commagene. One sees, therefore, that the Battle of 
Actium, fateful though it was in other respects, does not offer a suitable landmark for 
the end of the Hellenistic era in the whole of Eastern Anatolia. 
I.3. “Achaemenid” and “Greco-Macedonian”
I will consider Achaemenid all the traits in various fields such as the army, religion or 
dynastic principles identified in the official documents issued by the Achaemenid Empire 
(from inscriptions in Old Persian to papyri in Aramaic), whether or not they represent 
an inheritance from previous Mesopotamian powers, Iranic tradition or Achaemenid 
innovation. Under the same heading will be considered those traits designated by foreign 
sources (most notably Greek: Herodotos, Ktesias and others) as being of Persian origin, 
unless, of course, there is data that suggests the author was misinformed or misinforming. 
Thirdly, common features of the organisation of such states as Armenia and Parthia, 
related only through their real or constructed descent from the Achaemenid Empire, will 
be labelled as such. While basically the terms „Achaemenid” and „Iranian” will be used 
quite loosely and will generally be used as meaning the same thing, they will, at times, 
be used stricto sensu: Achaemenid to mean things that characterise the said monarchy 
and implemented by its administration, Iranian to mean traits more likely to have been 
introduced slowly and silently by the very fact of living in the same area with Iranian 
tribes, of which the Persians were but a rather small branch.
The Greco-Macedonian traits may be defined as features that may be found primarily 
in the Macedonian kingdom under the Argeads and the Antigonids, but also in the other 
Successor states, like the Seleukid and Ptolemaic Empires (provided, of course, that these 
cannot be explained by the common Achaemenid background), as gathered from the rather 
extensive collection of treatises concerned with politics by philosophers such as Aristotle, 
rhetoricians such as Isocrates or collectors of miscellaneous philosophical thought such 
as Diogenes Laertios, from official documents issued by these kingdoms (inscriptions, 
papyri etc.) or from historical works such as the Histories of Polybios.3 It is only with 
great difficulty that one might operate the distinction between what is Greek and what is 
Macedonian in a certain trait. For example, increasing monetisation of society is promoted 
in Asia by Alexander and his successors and may thus be deemed “Macedonian”, but 
3 For a brief, but useful synthesis of Greek political thought relating to monarchy, cf. Virgilio, 2003, pp. 
17-30. See also an older, but informative account in AAlderS, 1975, in particular pp. 17-38.
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it is undertaken using Greek standards (the Attic drachm) and invariably promotes the 
use of the Greek language.4 This is the reason why I prefer the otherwise cumbersome 
compound “Greco-Macedonian”.
One major difficulty in interpreting certain traits as stemming from either of the 
two traditions is represented by the fact that there are phenomena which originated 
in one culture, but were transplanted, adapted and expanded in another. One example 
will illustrate this case fairly clearly: the Royal Pages and the Friends of the king were 
initially Persian institutions, but they were adopted by Argead Macedon5 and acquire 
increasing importance throughout the Hellenistic period. The institution of the philoi, 
for example, while retaining a certain fluidity according to the preferences of the king, 
becomes hierarchical and rigid in as much as the Friends of a deceased king would expect 
to maintain their position under his successor as well. Such cases need to be analysed on 
an individual basis and they will be judged as mirroring one tradition or another only in 
those instances where documentation allows a clear characterisation. Continuing with 
the example given above, it will be considered that in Pontic Cappadocia the institution 
of the philoi reflects Macedonian influences, due to the fact that there are indications of 
hierarchy among the Friends and that the titles they bear match those present in other 
Hellenistic kingdoms. 
ii. the motivation
Why is it important to study the reflexes that the two traditions, the Achaemenid 
and the Greco-Macedonian, have left in Eastern Anatolia? One easy answer would be 
“Because a systematic study in this area has yet to be produced.” Scattered observations 
can be found in every important work in the field, but no one has, to my knowledge, 
attempted to piece them all together. However, it is not an inexorable horror vacui that 
represents the inspiration for this task.  Rather, it is fascinating that two worlds, so 
different if we are to believe what the Greeks constantly claimed ever since the time of 
the Median Wars, have managed to find a modus vivendi, even an osmosis. Perhaps the 
two were not so different, after all. Traces of interaction between these cultures have 
been identified very early, well before the Median Wars, and continue to show up well 
into the Parthian era, being identifiable from mainland Greece to the heart of the Iranian 
plateau. However, this investigation will not focus on the two cultural centres, but 
4 The issues of Ariarathes I with Aramaic legends are a notable exception, but might very well be satrapal 
issues, not independent Cappadocian.
5 MoMigliAno, 1975, p. 132. 
General Introduction 12
rather on a particular area of interaction: Eastern Asia Minor. This “frontier study” will 
prove, I believe, at least as fruitful as that of the two centres (taken either separately or 
conjointly), providing results that will illuminate the study of the entire phenomenon.6 
This should not surprise: individuals living within a culturally uniform environment 
adopt it unquestioningly in most cases, while individuals having contact with different 
traditions are forced to make a more or less conscious choice between them. Defining, 
discovering or even fabricating an identity in this context becomes thus a complex 
phenomenon and a rewarding object of study.  
iii. theoreticaL considerations
This invites the question: to what extent is it possible to observe the historical 
phenomenon represented by this identity-shaping process? Why pursue the observation in 
the first place? And do the conclusions possess any degree of epistemological validity? The 
articulation of the methodological observations presented below, many of which will represent 
nothing more than stating the obvious, is nevertheless necessary, as even the obvious tends to 
become obscured when confronted with certain aspects of Ancient History.
III.1. The Purpose of History
The purpose of this study, and ultimately the purpose of history itself, is to facilitate 
empathy, to make a past event or nexus of events intelligible to modern man. In a charming 
book, written with all the pathos one could expect from a historian who believes his craft lies 
at the crossroads between science and literature, Neagu Djuvara describes the process thus:
Historical writing cannot spring primordially from reasoning. It blooms initially 
from a moment of illumination, a spiritual, emotional meeting with another human 
being, even separated by centuries and continents. 7 
What separates, then, the diligent historian from the inspired novelist? In Djuvara’s 
own opinion, not very much, given that, according to his final observations, the test of 
perennity is passed more often by “the Poet” than by “the Historian”.8 This concern for 
the opinion of posterity, however, can become quite detrimental, as it is not very far from 
the ciceronian judgement that, although history is ‘magistra vitae’, the teacher of life 
(CiC., De Orat., 2.36), it remains a helpless ancillary to the higher art of rhetoric. 
6 Stretching the comparison a little, it is in the same way that psychology, by investigating the border 
between the “normal” and the “abnormal” produces results that illuminate both.
7 djuVArA, 2004, p. 57. His style is elaborate and highly idiomatic, and therefore the translation I have 
attempted is much drier than the original.
8 ibid., p. 137.
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While not denying the purpose of facilitating empathy with human beings separated 
by us through time, the opposite view with regard to the role of posterity as judge of value is 
favoured in the English speaking countries, where Collingwood, for example, notes that:
 
Every new historian, not content with giving new answers to old questions, 
must revise the questions themselves ; and—since historical thought is a river 
into which none can step twice—even a single historian, working at a single 
subject for a certain length of time, finds when he tries to reopen an old question 
that the question has changed.9 
The same idea is further developed by John Lewis Gaddis,10 who persistently likens 
history to sciences such as astrophysics or palaeontology, which deal with non-repeatable 
events. The argument is, rightly to my mind, that history is fundamentally a science,11 
and tied consequently to the present by two aspects. One is the ever-changing body 
of evidence it must take into account and outside whose borders it is never allowed to 
step:12 being at all times fragmentary, this foundation only allows a “work in progress” 
approach to emitting conclusions. The other is the inescapable connection between the 
historian-observer and the concerns of his own times, which consciously or not bring 
different questions and different methods to the attention of different generations. For 
example, historians at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th often 
made “race” an important factor in their analysis; after the 1960s studies regarding the 
status of women or sexuality began to emerge; nowadays, in an increasingly globalised 
society, we are concerned with cultural interaction and hybridity. Veyne was thus too 
optimistic to say ‘On ne voit pas ce qui empêcherait en droit les esprits de se mettre 
d’accord sur l’impérialisme séleucide ou sur mai 1968, à part le manque des documents’ 
(Veyne, 1971, p. 192).  
This view might appear to invite a radical scepticism with regard to the validity 
of history as scientific discipline (and, implicitly, with regard to the meaningfulness of 
9 Collingwood, 1946, p. 248.
10 gAddiS, 2002.
11 Contrary to Veyne’s opinion, that history is primordially a narration ‘Les histoires racontent des 
événements vrais qui ont l’homme pour acteur, l’histoire est un roman vrai’ (Veyne, 1971, p. 10). This 
view, however, would conflate historical writings and journalistic pieces, both of which focus on human 
activities and strive for objectivity.  
12 ‘History has this in common with every other science: that the historian is not allowed to claim any single 
piece of knowledge, except where he can justify his claim by exhibiting to himself in the first place, and 
secondly to any one else who is both able and willing to follow his demonstration, the grounds upon which 
it is based.’(Collingwood, 1946, p. 252).
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undertaking the present study), but in fact, it merely recommends prudence. Asking the 
question ‘Is there such a thing as true history?’, which articulates the fundamental question 
of the “critical philosophy of history”,13 Djuvara mentions two criteria that must be met: 
verifiability within the theoretical system (of general logic, of general knowledge in the 
field or of the particular study undertaken) and verifiability against the evidence. 
III.2. Verifiability within the Theoretical System
Verifiability within the theoretical system is elusive. The principles of logic are 
relatively clear and prevent, to give but one example, ‘inappropriate generalisation’: 
from the true statements that Mithradates VI Eupator was a Pontic king and minted 
abundant bronze issues, one is not justified to derive the statement that all Pontic kings 
have done the same. Also, consistency within the body of the same work ought to 
be achieved with a minimum of attention from the author. However, the reference to 
generally accepted historical knowledge proves much riskier, as this communis opinio 
is far from immutable. For example, among North American archaeologists the “Clovis 
First Theory”, the theory which professed that the Clovis population was the first to 
have penetrated the Americas, was nearly a dogma, which influenced and restricted 
all research in the field of prehistory, deeming it useless to dig below the 11,000 BC 
threshold. However, new finds, both genetic and archaeological seem to finally disprove 
this view held for nearly half a century. Thus, fresh perspectives, new interpretations or 
recently discovered pieces of evidence can change radically previously accepted theses, 
which brings into question the other major criterion: verifiability against evidence. 
III.3. Verifiability against evidence
Evidence, in the field of historical research, represents any item surviving from 
the past that carries intelligible and relevant information. For example, cave paintings 
represent evidence in so far as the history of weapon-making is concerned, for they depict 
scenes of hunt with harpoons and bows. They do not represent, however, evidence in so 
far as the history of religious ideas is concerned, for they either do not contain the relevant 
information or this information is unintelligible to us. This underscores a major difficulty: 
there is no such thing as bare evidence, for evidence is – and should be – permanently 
subjected to a process of interpretation. In a similar manner, at the Delphic oracle, Pythia’s 
ramblings required the mediation of the priests in order to be understood.
13 This discipline which concerns itself with analysing and providing the epistemological fundament for 
the methods historians use and is thus distinct from the philosophy of history, the branch of philosophy 
which concerns itself with identifying “laws” of historical development that have guided the course of 
history and will necessarily shape the future of mankind. The latter has, understandably, aroused the 
displeasure of professional historians, whose study is fundamentally that of the singular and unique events: 
‘L’historiographie a affaire à des phénomènes qui ne se répètent pas’ (Cizek, 1998, p. 81).
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The evidence pertaining to the Ancient World at the disposal of the historian is 
primarily of three types: archaeological, epigraphical and literary. Archaeological evidence 
– such as remnants of amphorae or objects of art, to give but two random examples – 
represents the most trustworthy evidence available, often candid and unfiltered through 
the judgement of future generations. It is, unfortunately, also the most silent type of 
evidence, requiring the most effort of interpretation and placing into context on the part of 
the historian. The epigraphical evidence is also a direct link between the ancients and us. 
Though far more articulate than archaeological evidence, the latter lacks, nevertheless, the 
fundamentally candid character of the former. The last type of evidence taken into account 
here, the literary one, is the most treacherous. Historians of the past – for they represent 
the bulk of documents included in this category – have offered their contemporaries a 
digest of events, resulting at times from a lengthy process of documentation, including 
interviews with eye witnesses, at other times from a less arduous process of compilation 
of earlier works. This digest of events is more often than not clear, easy to follow and 
not infrequently enjoyable to read. Herein lays the greatest trap – that modern historians 
might take at face value what their predecessors have left behind. It is this situation, 
only in art, that Plato criticised so vehemently in his Politeia, 598.b: an imitation of an 
appearance (“φαντάσματος […] μίμησις”) can hardly aspire to represent the truth. 
III.4. Scientific Theorising and ‘Truth as Correspondence’
The process follows to a good extent the theory of scientific development as outlined 
by K. R. Popper.14 Translating neo-Darwinian theory into epistemological terminology, he 
states that a multitude of hypotheses or theories are devised as tentative answers in order 
to solve a posited problem, much like genetic mutation attempts to deal with changes 
in the environment. If a theory manages to solve the problem, it is accepted as valid, 
i.e. it survives, but only for a period of time, after which the inevitable happens and a 
new fact is discovered which falsifies this theory, i.e. proves it to be wrong. Under these 
circumstances, a new set of theories appears, out of which the fittest will pass the test of 
survival, the one accounting for all the facts the previous theory took into consideration, 
plus all the facts it could not. 
In the context of Ancient History this vision about the evolution of problems and 
theories does have its value, but special attention must be given to the critical point of 
“problem-solving”: when is it that a problem is considered to be solved? In chemistry, 
for example, a science of repetitive events, a theory solves a problem if the outcomes 
it postulates are verified in numerous experiments as actually happening. In history, 
14 PoPPer, 1999, pp. 3-22.
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however, as in palaeontology, sciences of non-repetitive events, no such experiment can 
be run. Instead, according to Gaddis, the researcher conducts a thought experiment,15 
running in his mind a scenario. A theory will then be considered valid, or as “solving 
a problem” if a number of different historians, with different backgrounds, different 
views and different personalities perform the same thought experiment and their results 
are reasonably close to each other’s. 
It is important to note that there is one important criterion which is gracefully side-
stepped: that of truth. Truth, however, viewed as an immutable, absolute value – almost 
in Platonic sense – is impossible to achieve through the scientific, falsifiable theorising. 
Instead, what Popper and others propose is the notion of ‘truth as correspondence’. In 
everyday life, it is ‘true’ that which corresponds to facts: the statement “Britain is an 
island” is considered true if one can see that Britain is a mass of land surrounded on 
all sides by water, and thanks to navigators since Antiquity and nowadays to satellite 
photography, this is amply demonstrated to be, indeed, the fact. In chemistry or physics, 
‘truth’ can, likewise, be ascertained through observation. What about history?
III.5. Facts in History
In history, ‘correspondence to facts’ is harder to achieve, due to a paradoxical 
situation: facts elude us completely. The problem is present with the same acuteness 
in Modern History as in Ancient History. Take, for example, the account of an eye 
witness, obtained through an interview. He or she only perceived a small segment of 
what constitutes a ‘fact’, such as the Romanian Revolution of 1989: some watched it 
broadcast on television, so only experienced what the cameras could catch; others were 
present in Bucharest, but not in Timişoara; some were in the Palace Square, but not in 
front of the University. What he or she perceived in those moments is distorted by the 
emotional tumult of the moment, by rumours or fears: there were numerous sightings of 
‘terrorists’, and many shots were fired at them, but among the victims no terrorists could 
be found. Furthermore, these partial perceptions are then altered through the mechanisms 
of imperfect human memory and are contaminated by hindsight: the heroes of the day 
are now viewed as plotters and even condemned for their participation in the events, as 
happened very recently with generals Victor Atanasie Stănculescu and Mihai Chiţac, and 
this, in turn, shapes the narrative our hypothetical eye witness is likely to offer today.16 
15 gAddiS, 2002, pp. 39-41.
16 This contradicts again Veyne, who, after describing a fairly similar scenario, concludes with a 
defense of human objective knowledge: ‘Il demeure que tout ce que les substances hommes font 
dans la rue, de quelque manière qu’on les considère, est parfaitment objectif.’ (Veyne, 1971, p. 
58) However, it is not the objectivity of events that is problematic, but that of human perception, 
particularly in the heat of action. 
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Thus, even such recent events, or ‘facts’, are inaccessible to us in their raw form: 
they are mediated by accounts or material proof. The same applies to Ancient History as 
well: our only window towards the facts is represented by the evidence discussed above 
(cf. supra, pp. 12-13). What renders the situation more difficult, however, is the scarcity 
of evidence, archaeological, epigraphical and literary.    
Again, this situation needs not cause despair, but merely invite caution. That we 
do, in fact, have access to past events or at least to essential aspects of past events is 
proven by criminology, for example. The task of the historian, then, is to discriminate the 
facts, then establish the theory making sense of them. ‘Discriminating the facts’ consists, 
in fact, of isolating errors: again, applying Popper’s ideas, by eliminating demonstrable 
errors or falsities in the body of available evidence, we come closer to delineating a set of 
‘true’ facts, which then, in turn, serve as the reference point for ‘true’ theories. 
III.6. Analysis of Evidence
The critical test which must be administered to the ‘inimical’ evidence is, borrowing 
a term from J.L. Gaddis,17 that of consilience. 
*
Internal consistency is the first form of consilience to be sought, in case the piece of 
evidence under scrutiny is a narrative text. If contradictions appear within the body of the 
same work – which is a fairly rare occurrence – a problem arises which must be resolved. 
An example from the Bible will illustrate this point very well. Between Gen., 1:20 and 
2:19 in the Septuagint there is a clear contradiction: in the former, God creates birds from 
the waters; in the latter, He creates them from the ground. Thus,
Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός Ἐξαγαγέτω τὰ ὕδατα ἑρπετὰ ψυχῶν ζωσῶν καὶ πετεινὰ 
πετόμενα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς κατὰ τὸ στερέωμα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτως. (Gen., 1:20)
but
καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς ἔτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς πάντα τὰ θηρία τοῦ ἀγροῦ καὶ πάντα τὰ 
πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἤγαγεν αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸν Αδαμ ἰδεῖν, τί καλέσει αὐτά, καὶ 
πᾶν, ὃ ἐὰν ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὸ Αδαμ ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, τοῦτο ὄνομα αὐτοῦ. (Gen., 2:19)
This contradiction has been perpetuated in the Latin Vulgate and henceforth in 
the King James Bible. The team which produced the translation published in the ‘New 
International Version’ eliminated this problem by translating the first verse in the form 
‘And God said, Let the water teem with living creatures, and let birds fly above the earth 
17 gAddiS, 2002, p. 49.
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across the expanse of the sky’. 
This illustrates the basic strategy when coming across lack of consilience within the 
body of the same work: resolving the conflict in favour of one version, by demonstrating 
the alternative to be an error. In our example, it happened to be an error of translation 
from the original Hebrew, but other types of errors may conceivably occur: from faults 
of manuscript transmission, to simple, perfectly human slips on the part of the author, 
particularly in vast works, composed sometimes over decades. 
*
Wherever possible, independent sources will be compared, on the presumption 
that if they agree, that particular detail has a higher chance of being true. The issue of 
independence, however, is particularly thorny in the Ancient World, where extensive 
quotations from previous works are not a mark of plagiarism, but of deference. Much 
philological knowledge has been invested, particularly in Germany, in the field of 
Quellenforschung, with mixed success: while in some cases it helps draw convincing 
links, in others it merely leads to dead ends. One must always wonder, therefore, if two 
concurring sources are truly independent. 
There are numerous instances, however, when sources do not concur. It is sometimes 
possible to identify cases in which both sources are (partially) correct, but more often than not 
the historian must decide which source is more likely than the other to correspond to reality.
For example, it is well known from the second Book of Livy’s Ab Urbe condita that 
Porsenna never managed to conquer Rome: terrified after the Mucius Scaevola incident, 
he sends ambassadors to Rome to negotiate a peace, after whose conclusion, he leaves 
the Roman territory: ‘his condicionibus composita pace, exercitum ab Ianiculo deduxit 
Porsinna et agro Romano excessit’ (T.liV., 2.13.4). Yet, a century later Tacitus seems 
convinced Porsenna had, in fact, conquered the City: 
Id facinus post conditam urbem luctuosissimum foedissimumque rei publicae 
populi Romani accidit, nullo externo hoste, propitiis, si per mores nostros liceret, 
deis, sedem Iovis Optimi Maximi auspicato a maioribus pignus imperii conditam, 
quam non Porsenna dedita urbe neque Galli capta temerare potuissent, furore 
principum excindi. (tAC., Hist., 3.72)
The decision in this context requires much careful deliberation. Everything must be 
taken into account: the reason why a certain author writes a book, the meaning of a certain 
detail in its context, the general reliability of one author by comparison with another, how 
many other independent sources corroborate the information presented, possible sources 
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of the information and their own reliability and the list could be extended further. In 
the example offered above, given Livy’s purpose of glorifying Rome at every possible 
occasion, he is more likely to have preferred an embellished version of the story than 
Tacitus is to have concocted a denigrating one. Livy could have written the glorifying 
version himself, but he may also have recorded a legend. In this case, both he and Tacitus 
rely on oral tradition, a mutable and untrustworthy witness at best. However, while it is 
clearly conceivable that a capitulation would be glossed over in subsequent tales, the 
opposite phenomenon – describing a victory as a defeat – is very hard to imagine. It is 
therefore more probable that Tacitus’ version corresponds more closely to facts and has, 
therefore, more chances of being ‘true’.
*
It is not only lack of consilience, however, which should arouse the suspicions of the 
historian. Too much consilience should also be regarded with circumspection. This indicates 
the likely existence of a single authoritative source for all later views: a historian so highly 
esteemed that later writers adopt his views unquestioningly, such as Polybios, for example; 
or the ‘official’, state-sanctioned version of events. Needless to say, the danger is that these 
trend-setting authorities are biased, and are thus unlikely to lead us to a ‘true’ set of facts. 
Perhaps the best defence against such traps is the age-old common sense: reason, 
personal experiences of the historian and the accumulated experience of generations 
which offer us an insight into what is possible and probable that another human being or 
group of human beings could have done. There is always a danger that a historian will 
commit anachronisms, applying to a certain age – in our case, to Antiquity – evaluative 
criteria borrowed from other eras, including the modern one. Yet the risk is balanced by 
the observation that human nature has not changed, or has changed only superficially, i.e. 
in terms of technological evolution. For comparison, one may turn to the development of 
language, which according to recent studies seems to have become a fully functional tool, 
very similar to what we now proudly call ‘modern languages’, some 40,000 years ago.18 
In the following pages, I will attempt a brief excursus through a selection of the 
surviving texts (the list is not meant to be exhaustive, but merely illustrative) surrounding 
one of the pivotal personalities of Eastern Anatolia in Hellenistic times – Mithradates VI 
Eupator. I will use this case study to better illustrate the difficulties faced by the researcher 
in disentangling the truth or the semblance of truth from the jungle of information under 
very harsh conditions: the personality of the king dominates his times, so exaggerations 
will be numerous; his external policy brought him into conflict with the Romans, the big 
18 jAnSon, 2002, pp. 3-5
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winners of the Antiquity, whose point of view dominated historiography for millennia, 
so vilifications will abound; his own perception-creation machinery strived to present 
him as a complex personality, so misunderstandings will not lack; finally, his almost 
peripheral position in relation to the Mediterranean, this true ‘central nervous system’ of 
the oikoumene, made him an easy target for preconception-spinners.  
iv. whose mithradates?
IV.1. Internal Sources
Unfortunately, the nature of Mithradates’ involvement with Rome has made it so that 
few examples remain today of accounts of his life which treated him favourably or at least 
dispassionately. We know that among his courtiers there were men of letters and of these, 
some must have written histories. The most famous of them, Metrodoros of Scepsis, might 
offer us a profile of such a man, although it is by no means certain that he tried himself the 
historical genre. A Mysian by birth, educated most likely in Athens, he found his fortune in 
Chalkedon: he married a local wealthy girl and may even have obtained citizenship there. 
He courted Mithradates VI while Fortune still smiled upon the king, and was rewarded 
with a high judicial status (in all lilelihood ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνακρίσεων) and with the position of 
ambassador. On this occasion, he acquitted himself less then honourably of his duties, as he 
seems not to have hesitated in betraying the Pontic king in favour of Tigranes. Sometime 
afterwards, nevertheless, an indiscretion of the Armenian king made it so that the Scepsian 
lost his life.19 A learned man, albeit of doubtful loyalties, Metrodoros made remarks in 
his writings about the geography and ethnography of Northern Anatolia,20 which is not 
uncommon in historical prose and was nicknamed “the Roman-hater”,21 which may indicate 
that he was quite vehement in the treatment of the Eupator’s foes and, consequently, quite 
favourable – even adulatory – to him. This should warn us that even if we did possess an 
extensive piece by him that treated the historical context of the day, in all likelihood it 
would carry as much propaganda as the pro-Roman histories, the difference being merely 
the target of insults. As it happens, however, no such work survives today, neither by 
Metrodoros, nor by any other literate at the Pontic court. 
The few texts emanating from the Court or from people in the proximity of the court 
are preserved in occasional inscriptions. Those preserved in the so-called ‘Delian heroon’ 
(ID, 1569-1574) are too schematic to allow a thorough analysis at this point. Much more 
19 This biographical sketch is based on Str., 13.1.55 and Plut., Luc., 22.2-5.
20 Str., 11.5.1; Plin., 8.36; Plin., 28.78.
21 Plin., 34.34: ‘Metrodorus Scepsius, cui cognomen a Romani nominis odio inditum est’.
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rewarding is the ‘Diophantos inscription’ (IosPE I2, 352) set up by the Chersonesitans 
following the successful campaign of the Pontic general against the barbarians in the 
Crimean Hinterland, sometime in the last decade of the 2nd century BC. Here, young 
Mithradates is portrayed as energetic and animated by generosity, as he leaves no call for 
help unheeded, even if it comes at a very bad time, at the beginning of winter (v. 18); as a 
lover of justice, since he punishes the perfidious Pairisades (v. 43); finally, as a great king, 
crowned by eternal glory after his victory over the Scythians through the agency of the 
capable Diophantos (vv. 26-7). Given the context, grateful for having been liberated from 
the Scythian pest and eager to please their new de facto master, it is not surprising that the 
Chersonesitans painted the portrait of the king in such bright colours.
*
The largest cohesive body of information about Asia Minor in Hellenistic times 
and at the same time the closest thing to an internal source about Eupator’s reign we now 
possess remains Strabon’ Geographika. This is a crucially important source, for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, Strabon has intimate know-ledge of the geographical area and its oral 
traditions, having been born in Amaseia and having, to his own confession, travelled 
widely and seen things for 
himself: in 2.5.11 he claims to 
have travelled from Etruria to 
Armenia and from the Euxine 
to Ethiopia. He is particularly 
well informed with respect to 
Eastern Anatolia. Thus, in his 
description of Cappadocian 
Comana, he invokes his visit 
there (Str., 12.2.3) or in his 
account of the rites performed 
by the Persian magi, he 
claims to have witnessed 
them, again in Cappadocia (Str., 15.3.15). Secondly, his family connections make 
him privy to information only available to the close collaborators of the king: Strabon’s 
grandfather was in a position to hand over to Lucullus fifteen strongholds (Str., 12.3.33); 
his great-uncle, Moaphernes, was the king’s friend and governor of Colchis (Str., 11.2.18) 
and one of the few to remain faithful to the old king to the bitter end (Str., 12.3.33); his 
great-great-grandfather was Dorylaos, nicknamed ‘the Tactician’, a close collaborator of 
Figure I.1. Strabon’s Family Tree
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Mithradates V Eupator (Str., 10.4.10); his great-grandfather’s cousin, also called Dorylaos, 
attained the position of High Priest of Comana (Str., 12.3.33), being thus ‘second to the 
king’. Thirdly, he sees things from a vantage point, having a clear perspective of the entire 
trajectory followed the king’s career, because he is writing in the Augustan period. There 
are three main theories regarding the date at which the Geography has been written. One 
is endorsed among others by Anderson,22 stating it has been created in two stages – the 
first finished in about 7-2 BC, the second being a revision undertaken in the early years 
of Tiberius’ reign. This hypothesis no longer enjoys favour among scholars. The second, 
advocated mainly by Pothecary,23 argues for a relatively brief period of composition, within 
the chronological span of Tiberius’ reign (AD 17/18 - 23). The third theory is proposed by 
Clarke and Bowersock,24 contending that the process of writing this work was continuous 
and took several decades, from as early as 7 BC to about 23 AD.  
While doubtlessly of great importance, Strabon’s account must be read with 
a number of important caveats in mind: he writes specifically for a contemporary 
audience,25 made up of statesmen and educated men,26 who have an interest in the current 
state of affairs. He emphasizes in the introduction the practical usefulness27 of his work 
for statesmen and generals, who do not and need not have antiquarian interests. That is 
why the historical sketches he inserts are presented in order to illuminate an aspect of the 
present. Moreover, Strabon is likely to have omitted from his geographical account items 
he had already discussed in his now lost Histories. Furthermore, in the Geography there 
are some differences between his treatment of Asia Minor and the treatment he offers to 
other regions of the oikoumene, which suggests Books 11-13 have been written with a 
certain agenda in mind. Desideri28 believes Strabon is consistently trying to emphasize 
the importance of the contribution brought by Asia Minor to the world in terms of culture, 
attempting in a way to demonstrate it is by no means a periphery of the Greco-Roman 
world. One must be on guard, therefore, because this intention might distort, ever so 
slightly, his description of the area.  
Mithradates VI Eupator is a character who appears in numerous passages of the 
Geography, and is endowed with a complex personality, sometimes even contradictory, 
22 AnderSon, 1923.
23 PotheCAry, 2002.
24 ClArke, 1997; BowerSoCk, 2000.
25 “ὅ τι δ’ ἂν διαφύγῃ τῆς παλαιᾶς ἱστορίας, τοῦτο μὲν ἐατέον (οὐ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τῆς γεωγραφίας 
ἔργον), τὰ δὲ νῦν ὄντα λεκτέον.” (Str., 12.8.7).
26 Str., 1.1.22.
27 “τῆς γεωγραφίας τὸ πλέον ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰς χρείας τὰς πολιτικάς.” (Str., 1.1.16).
28 deSideri, 2000.
General Introduction 23
a man almost larger than life. His first appearance is in the guise of a civilising hero, 
who, alongside Alexander, the Romans and the Parthians, has done much to expand the 
boundaries of the known world. 
There is a perceivable sense of admiration for the king in those passages where 
his campaigns against the barbarians in Crimea are described.29 This is, however, 
counterbalanced by the observation that these campaigns were ill-intended, as they were 
simply a preparation for the war on Rome.30
The king is capable of organising successful campaigns, crowned by outstanding 
victories, such as the one obtained on the river Amnias against Nicomedes (Str., 12.3.40), 
but also disastrous ones, such as the one concluded with the defeat at Orchomenos (Str., 
9.2.37), Moreover, he is outgeneralled by Pompey (Str., 12.3.28). 
The king is extremely generous towards friends, but also brutal in the extreme with 
them at the slightest suspicion of betrayal: such happened with Dorylaos and his relatives31 
or with Metrodoros, who is rumoured to have died on the order of the king.32  
His ruthlessness (besides his bad luck in the conduct of the war with Rome) incites 
some of his collaborators to defect, but his personality is strong enough to command the 
loyalty of others even in the hour of defeat (both cases are illustrated in Strabon’s own 
family: Str., 12.3.33). 
Eupator is a true euergetes, showing his generosity towards a number of cities and 
sanctuaries, such as Sinope (Str., 12.3.11), Amisos (Str., 12.3.14) or the Artemision at Ephesos 
(Str., 14.1.23). At the same time, however, he – unlike the Romans – despises the freedom of 
Athens (Str., 9.1.20) and appears to bring nothing but destruction to the cities of Asia Minor 
which happened to stand in the way of his troops (Str., 10.5.4; 12.8.16; 13.1.66).  
Eupator reigned over vast territories, many of which he had acquired himself (Str., 
29 “οἱ δὲ Ῥωξολανοὶ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Μιθριδάτου τοῦ Εὐπάτορος στρατηγοὺς ἐπολέμουν […] καὶ ἐδόκουν μὲν εἶναι 
μάχιμοι, πρὸς μέντοι συντεταγμένην φάλαγγα καὶ ὡπλισμένην καλῶς τὸ βάρβαρον φῦλον ἀσθενὲς πᾶν ἐστι 
καὶ τὸ γυμνητικόν. ἐκεῖνοι γοῦν περὶ πέντε μυριάδας πρὸς ἑξακισχιλίους τοὺς Διοφάντῳ, τῷ τοῦ Μιθριδάτου 
στρατηγῷ, συμπαραταξαμένους οὐκ ἀντέσχον, ἀλλ’ οἱ πλεῖστοι διεφθάρησαν.” (Str., 7.3.17).
30 “Αὕτη < Χερρόνησος > […] ἠναγκάσθη προστάτην ἑλέσθαι Μιθριδάτην τὸν Εὐπάτορα, στρατηγιῶντα 
ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ μέχρι Βορυσθένους βαρβάρους· ταῦτα δ’ ἦν ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους παρασκευή.” (Str., 
7.4.3). While criticism of Mithradates’ behaviour is not immediate, the fact that Strabon mentions these anti-
Roman intentions, in accordance with the accusations brought by Roman propaganda (see, for example, 
Appian’s narrative - the discourse of the Bithynian ambassadors at the start of the First Mithradatic war: 
APP., Mithr., 13 or the Dardanos conference between Sulla and Mithradates APP., Mithr., 57) does put them 
in a negative light.
31 “εὐτυχοῦντος μὲν δὴ ἐκείνου συνευτυχεῖν καὶ τούτοις συνέβαινε, καταλυθέντος δὲ (ἐφωράθη γὰρ 
ἀφιστὰς τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὴν βασιλείαν ἐφ’ ᾧ αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καταστήσεται) συγκατελύθη καὶ τὰ 
τούτων καὶ ἐταπεινώθησαν”, Str., 10.4.10
32 “ὁ <Τιγράνης> δ’ ἄκοντα ἀνέπεμψεν αὐτὸν <Μητρόδωρον> τῷ Εὐπάτορι, φεύγοντι ἤδη τὴν προγονικήν, 
κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὁδὸν κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον εἴθ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως εἴθ’ ὑπὸ νόσου· λέγεται γὰρ ἀμφότερα.” 
Str., 13.1.55
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12.3.1-2) and his riches were almost fabulous (Str., 7.4.6; 12.3.31), but his subsequent 
conduct made it so that his fame was greatly diminished. Thus, what makes the city of 
Dardanos worthy of remembrance is the peace concluded here between Sulla and himself: 
significantly, he is the second, inferior party of this contract.33 
He is the representative of a highly respected dynasty, and even impostors claiming 
descent from him are assured an honourable position, even as kings: such happened to 
Archelaos (Str., 12.3.34; 17.1.11) or to Mithradates of Pergamon (Str., 13.4.3). At the 
same time, Eupator was responsible for reducing the dynasty to insignificance34 and his 
dispute with the Romans eventually made it so that his realm was taken over by them, 
much like Cleopatra’s (Str., 6.4.2).
Thus, one sees in Strabon’s treatment of Eupator – on the one hand admiration for having 
outdone his predecessors in extending the boundaries of his kingdom, protecting the interests of 
Greeks, or practicing evergetism and, on the other hand, reproach for unwisely starting the war 
with the Romans, which ultimately brought the downfall of his kingdom and that of his dynasty 
– the reflexes of Strabon’s own family interests and the position of his intended audience.
IV.2. External sources: Greek authors
Writing in the mid- and late 1st century BC, Diodoros of Sicily was a contemporary 
of Mithradates Eupator, studying in the relative calmness of Alexandria. A bookish 
man, he patched together information he gathered from very diverse sources, to create a 
monumental work in forty books. For the books we possess in more or less complete form, 
his sources are often transparent (Ktesias, Herodotos, Hieronymos of Cardia, Polybios 
or Poseidonios). Unfortunately, not the same could be said about the last books, which 
contain the bulk of information about the Mithradatic Wars, and of which we possess 
but disjointed fragments. While the very title of his work would lead us to believe he 
relied exclusively on written documents – books, in particular –, it is not inconceivable 
that he also used oral sources. After all, between the Ptolemaic and the Mithradatid court 
there had been numerous contacts, not the least of which was the arrival in Alexandria of 
Archelaos, who pretended to be a son of Mithradates VI and who reigned Egypt for about 
six months (56-55 BC), as husband of Berenike IV, until killed while battling the forces 
of A. Gabinius, the Roman governor of Syria, though unfortunately any speculation about 
who may have been his immediate source on Pontic affairs is hazardous. 
33 “ἐνταῦθα δὲ συνῆλθον Σύλλας τε Κορνήλιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμὼν καὶ Μιθριδάτης ὁ κληθεὶς 
Εὐπάτωρ, καὶ συνέβησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ πολέμου.”, Str., 13.1.28
34 “Μιθριδάτης ὁ κτίστης προσαγορευθεὶς κατέστη τοῦ Πόντου κύριος, καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὴν διαδοχὴν 
ἐφύλαξαν μέχρι τοῦ Εὐπάτορος”, Str., 12.3.41. It is relevant that Strabon ignores Pharnakes II, which can 
only mean that he does not see him as a ruler of any significance.
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If he did use a source close to the Pontic court, it would explain the treatment 
received by the king in the Bibliotheke, which varies between neutral and slightly 
appreciative. Thus the first bit of information we receive is that he has his greatest 
palace in Sinope, which must be therefore his capital (diod., 14.31.2). He appears next 
in the context of the Social War, when his aid is requested by the rebellious Italians 
(diod., 37.2.11). The author refrains from making any judgement as to whether the 
king’s negative answer stemmed from prudence or from lack of foresight. Diodoros 
is careful to mention the existence of more stages in the king’s difficult relation with 
Rome. While in 14.31.2 he is simply “Μιθριδάτης ὁ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους διαπολεμήσας” 
(the preverb δια– may indicate here either that the battle was of very long duration, 
almost permanent, or that the battle was fought to the bitter end), in 37.2.12 he is the 
unwilling target of Roman avarice.35 Finally, after being defeated by Sulla, he is turned 
into an ally of Rome.36 The personality of Mithradates is not devoid of royal charisma: 
even though his troops are inferior in quality to their opponents, his presence among 
them inspires much zeal (diod., 37.28.1). At the siege of Cyzicos, he has the courage 
to abandon royal decorum and expose his person to danger by descending into a pit to 
meet with a centurion who had promised to betray the city (diod., 37.22b.1).
Given the fragmentary state of the narrative focusing on Mithradates, it is unwise 
to formulate any definitive conclusions about Diodoros’ view of the Pontic king and how 
this view was influenced by the circumstances in which the historian lived and worked. 
Suffice to say that there must have existed sources at least neutral to the king, if not 
altogether favourable to him, that our historian took the trouble to record, helping us in 
the process to gain a more nuanced picture of the era.
*
A very important account is provided by Memnon of Herakleia, who wrote a 
large monograph on the history of his home town throughout the Hellenistic times. 
It only survived in a reasonably detailed summary made by the 9th century Byzantine 
patriarch and polymath Photios. It is impossible to date his work with precision, but the 
nature of his histories is obviously apologetic: the main purpose of our author seems 
to be to excuse the Heracleotes of any anti-Roman attitude they may have appeared 
to show, particularly during the wars Mithradates waged against the Romans. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Pontic king is portrayed as a menacing villain.   
35 “ἀντιποιουμένων πολλῶν ἐνδόξων τυχεῖν τῆς κατὰ Μιθριδάτου στρατηγίας διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν 
ἐπάθλων.”
36 “Σύλλας γάρ, […] Μιθριδάτην σύμμαχον ποιησάμενος καὶ παραλαβὼν αὐτοῦ τὸν στόλον ἐπανῆλθεν 
εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν.” (diod., 38/39.6.1)
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Throughout the account, Mithradates is seen as a persistent murderer, from 
childhood to his old age. He started by killing his mother and brother,37 he murdered 
his nephew (MeMn., 22.1) and had his own wives executed (MeMn., 30.1). No wonder, 
then, that he also instigated the butchery of all Italians in Asia (MeMn., 22.9). He is a 
formidable and intimidating foe, and the Heracleotes naturally fear him (MeMn., 26.2), all 
the more so as he leads innumerable hosts.38 He is a capable general, to whom Tigranes 
entrusts the leadership of the Armenian troops (MeMn., 38.6), and a very cunning plotter, 
succeeding in overpowering the city of Heracleia without striking a blow.39 Mithradates 
is an unabated despot, and he treats the Chians cruelly (MeMn., 23.1). As a consequence, 
any self-respecting Greek will abandon his cause as a matter of course.40
The purpose of the histories – explaining why the inhabitants of Heracleia were compelled 
at times by constraining circumstances to take a stance unfriendly to Rome – determines 
therefore the main characteristics of Eupator, the one responsible for exerting such pressures 
on the city: he is a complete alien to the Greek and Roman world, an oriental despot, almost a 
latter-day Xerxes. Needless to say, one must treat this account with the utmost prudence. 
*
Appian of Alexandria flourished in the 2nd century AD, belonged to the 
equestrian class and obtained a high position in the Roman administration of Egypt. 
In his Mithridatika, the Pontic king is a cruel despot, with immense resources and 
evil intentions. His first extended description is found in the speeches delivered by 
ambassadors before the Roman commanders in Asia just before the outbreak of the 
First War. Bithynian envoys portray him as a plotter and a murderer, making unrelenting 
preparations with a view to fighting not only his neighbours, but Rome herself (APP., 
Mithr., 13), while Pelopidas, the Pontic envoy describes him as a ruler over both Asia 
and Europe, over Greeks and barbarians alike, and enjoying the friendship of the most 
important rulers of the East (APP., Mithr., 15-16). 
In victory, he is most cruel: he executes Aquilius by pouring molten gold down his 
throat (APP., Mithr., 21); masterminds the massacre of Italians in Asia (APP., Mithr., 22); 
37 “Φονικώτατος δ’ ἐκ παιδὸς ὁ Μιθριδάτης ἦν· τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν τρισκαιδεκαέτης παραλαβών, μετ’ 
οὐ πολὺ τὴν μητέρα, κοινωνὸν αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς τῆς βασιλείας καταλειφθεῖσαν, δεσμωτηρίῳ 
κατασχὼν βίᾳ καὶ χρόνῳ ἐξανάλωσε, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέκτεινε.” (MeMn., 22.2).
38 “Ταῦτα μαθὼν Μιθριδάτης παραγεγονότος αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ συμμαχικοῦ, ἄρας ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τῇ Ἀμασείᾳ 
πεδίου διὰ τῆς Παφλαγονίας ᾔει, πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας στρατὸν ἐπαγόμενος.” (MeMn., 22.6).
39 “Ἐκεῖ δὲ διὰ τὸν χειμῶνα διατρίβων Λάμαχον τὸν Ἡρακλεώτην, φιλίαν ἔχων πρὸς αὐτὸν 
παλαιάν, καὶ μαθὼν ἄρχειν τῆς πολιτείας, πολλαῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν εἷλκεν ὥστε παρασκευάσαι 
αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει παραδεχθῆναι. Ἔπεμπε δὲ καὶ χρήματα.” (MeMn., 29.3).
40 “ Ὁ δὲ< Μουρήνας > μὴ θέμενος τῇ πρεσβείᾳ #καὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις, Ἕλληνες ὄντες καὶ τὸν βίον 
φιλόσοφοι, τὸν Μιθριδάτην μᾶλλον διέσυρον ἢ συνίστων$ ὥρμητο ἐπὶ τὸν Μιθριδάτην.” (MeMn., 26.1).
General Introduction 27
treats harshly the inhabitants of Chios for a personal grudge (APP., Mithr., 25 and 46-47); 
murders the Galatian tetrarchs (APP., Mithr., 46). In defeat, however, he behaves almost like 
a coward, being intimidated by Sulla during the Dardanos conference (APP., Mithr., 58).
Throughout the account, the king acts as a suspicious despot, punishing harshly all 
those he caught in the act of treason or merely suspected of plotting, be they friends (APP., 
Mithr., 48; 90; 102) or even members of his own family (APP., Mithr., 64; 107). He even 
ordered his wives killed, not because they were guilty of anything, but so they would not 
fall into the hands of the Romans (APP., Mithr., 82).
The Oriental odour of his personality is ensured by numerous references to his 
appointing satraps over conquered regions (APP., Mithr., 21), sacrificing to Persian 
gods (APP., Mithr., 66 and 70), defying the gods of Greece, in particular Persephone, by 
continuing the siege of Cyzicus (APP., Mithr., 75-6), being surrounded by eunuchs and 
mysterious healers, such as those Agari of Scytian stock who cure him using snake venom 
(APP., Mithr., 88) or by the exotic tortures he uses to punish deserters (App., Mithr., 97).
The obituary, however, containing the final assessment of Mithradates’ personality 
(App., Mithr., 112) puts him in a completely different light. The nobility of his race is 
underscored, as is his personal bravery and physical strength, his resourcefulness and 
energetic nature and his patronage of Greek letters. 
The contrast between these apparently conflicting portrayals can be explained quite 
easily. Appian needs to explain how, as a consequence of the Mithradatic Wars, Rome 
ended up ruling a significant portion of Asia. Thus, in the initial stages, Mithradates is cast 
into the role of ruler of the East, with all the traits enumerated above. As soon as he ceased 
to be a threat, however, he became a trophy, whose virtues only serve to enhance the 
glory of his victors. Appian’s stereotypical portrayal of the Pontic king must be therefore 
handled with the greatest care.  
*
The view Plutarch had about Mithradates does not seem to be very coherent, for 
the traits of the king vary according to the work in which he is portrayed. In the ‘Parallel 
Lives’, he is present to various degrees in four narratives: Sulla, Lucullus, Pompeius and 
Sertorius. While in the last of these he makes but an episodic appearance, being little 
more than a prop to underscore the noble character of Sertorius, who refuses to concede 
him Asia (Plut., Sert., 23.4-24.2), in the other three narratives his character is sketched in 
much more detail. He is the epitome of the oriental despot: wealthy beyond belief (Plut., 
Sulla, 11.2; 16.2-3; Luc., 7.4-5; 18.1; Pomp., 32.8; 42, 2-3), leader of immeasurable hosts 
(Plut., Sulla, 11.2-3; 15.1; Luc., 7.4), plunders holy sites (Plut., Luc., 13.4), disposes 
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arbitrarily of the lives of those around him, such as his sisters, wives, sons or sick and 
wounded soldiers (Plut., Luc., 18.1-4; Pomp., 32.3, 37.1), behaves like a tyrant in the hour 
of glory and like a coward in the moment of crisis (Plut., Sulla, 23.6; Luc., 17.2; 31.7). 
From this point of view, there are many similarities between Plutarch’s and Memnon’s 
portrayal of Mithradates.
However, in the so-called ‘minor works’, Mithradates is freed from the restrictions 
demanded by these topoi, only to be integrated in other literary motifs. Thus, in the 
‘Womanly virtues’ he is almost a herodotean character: haughty in the hour of glory, 
but once exposed to danger becoming wiser and even compassionate (Plut., Mul.Virt., 
259.A-C). There is even a partial overlap with the well-known tragic scenario from 
Sophocles’ Antigone: Mithradates, however, does not follow in Creon’s footsteps and by 
his conduct shows himself to have evolved from the stance of tyrant to that of true king: 
ὁ δ’ Ἐπορηδόριξ κατακοπεὶς ἄταφος ἐξεβέβλητο, καὶ τῶν φίλων οὐδεὶς 
ἐτόλμησε προσελθεῖν· γύναιον δὲ Περγαμηνὸν ἐγνωσμένον ἀφ’ ὥρας 
ζῶν [τι] τῷ Γαλάτῃ παρεκινδύνευσε θάψαι καὶ περιστεῖλαι τὸν νεκρόν· 
ᾔσθοντο δ’ οἱ φύλακες καὶ συλλαβόντες ἀνήγαγον πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα. 
λέγεται μὲν οὖν τι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῆς παθεῖν ὁ Μιθριδάτης, νέας 
παντάπασι καὶ ἀκάκου τῆς παιδίσκης φανείσης· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς 
ἔοικε τὴν αἰτίαν γνοὺς ἐρωτικὴν οὖσαν ἐπεκλάσθη καὶ συνεχώρησεν 
ἀνελέσθαι καὶ θάψαι τὸν νεκρὸν ἐσθῆτα καὶ κόσμον ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνου 
λαβοῦσαν. (Plut., Mul.Virt., 259.C-D)
Another instance in which the Pontic king shows himself above common human 
beings is his privileged relation to the divinity, in particular Dionysos, as he repeatedly 
and miraculously survives lightning strikes (Plut., Quaest.Conviv., 624.A-B).
Plutarch’s greatest vulnerability (and one he seems perfectly aware of) is that, 
focusing on making a point, he is often uncritical in his use of sources. For example, 
when narrating the story of the Roman generals, he uses the documents they had issued 
themselves (such as Sulla’s own Memoires or Lucullus’ report to the Roman Senate41); 
when he is interested in exploring the connections between a regal person and a god, he 
seems to be using materials provided by courtly propaganda.
*
The account of Pausanias will focus, quite predictably, on the impact the Mithradatid 
Wars had on Greece. Without exception, the traces left behind by the Pontic soldiers 
41 Plut., Sulla, 14.6; Luc., 1.3; 26.6.
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are those of destruction and desolation. Mithradates is introduced bluntly as a barbarian 
king: “Μιθριδάτης ἐβασίλευε βαρβάρων τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον τὸν Εὔξεινον.” (PAuS., 
1.20.4) and this discourse of alterity will be perpetuated throughout the account. If any 
Greeks join his cause, they are the lowest and most foolish Hellas has to offer.42 Eupator is 
a patron of murderers and robbers (PAuS., 3.23.2), but he and his henchmen are eventually 
punished by the divinity.43 
While the individual bits of information – such as the presence of Mithradatid 
troops at a certain location and their eventual defeat at the hands of the Romans 
– are in all likelihood accurate, other pieces of information, such as details 
about the conduct of soldiers and interpretations regarding motives, intentions 
and responsibilities have probably been contaminated by Pausanias’ anger at 
encountering the traces or memories of past destruction in his beloved Hellas and 
must therefore be thoroughly questioned. 
*
Aelianos the Sophist records a most unusual piece of information about Mithradates: 
Μιθριδάτης ὁ Ποντικὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φρουρὰν καθεύδων ἐπίστευεν 
ἧττον καὶ τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοῖς δορυφόροις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡμερωθέντας 
εἶχε φύλακας ταῦρον καὶ ἵππον καὶ ἔλαφον. καθεύδοντα οὖν ἐφρούρουν 
αὐτὸν οἵδε οἱ θῆρες, εἴ τις προσίοι τάχιστα ἐκ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς αἰσθανόμενοι. 
καὶ ὃ μὲν τῷ μυκήματι, ὃ δὲ τῷ χρεμετίσματι, ὃ δὲ τῇ μηκῇ διύπνιζον 
αὐτόν. (Ael., Nat.Anim., 7.46). 
On practical grounds, it seems quite hard to believe in the literality of this 
guardianship by a bull, a horse and a deer. If one remembers, however, that the Pontic 
coinage minted under Mithradates Eupator did, in fact, feature quite prominently the 
stag and the (winged) horse, one is tempted to think twice before discarding this account 
as utterly fantastic. Given that that these three animals enjoy a special relation with the 
Anatolian Great Mother, it is perhaps not far-fetched to surmise that the initial story told 
that the king was under her protection (perhaps in her Cappadocian hypostasis, Ma: cf. 
infra, pp. 131-132), through the agency of these three sacred animals. Aelian may have 
42 “οὗτος ἀνέπεισεν Ἀθηναίους Μιθριδάτην θέσθαι Ῥωμαίων ἐπίπροσθεν. ἀνέπεισε δὲ οὐ πάντας, ἀλλ’ 
ὅσον δῆμος ἦν καὶ δήμου τὸ ταραχῶδες· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὧν τις λόγος, παρὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐκπίπτουσιν 
ἐθελονταί.” (PAuS., 1.20.5)
43 “τὸ μέντοι μήνιμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ διέφυγεν οὔτε Μηνοφάνης οὔτε αὐτὸς Μιθριδάτης· ἀλλὰ […] 
Μιθριδάτην δὲ ὕστερον τούτων ἠνάγκασεν ὁ θεὸς αὐτόχειρα αὑτοῦ καταστῆναι, τῆς τε ἀρχῆς οἱ 
καθῃρημένης καὶ ἐλαυνόμενον πανταχόθεν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων· εἰσὶ δὲ οἵ φασιν αὐτὸν παρά του τῶν 
μισθοφόρων θάνατον βίαιον ἐν μέρει χάριτος εὕρασθαι.” (PAuS., 3.23.5)
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rationalised the story, reducing it to yet another instance of royal paranoia.   
*
Galenus, one of the great medical writers of Antiquity, seems to have been 
interested in one aspect alone of Mithradates’ life: his experiments with poisons and 
their antidotes.  Thus, mentions of the mithridation, a panacea, are very abundant in a 
number of treatises, dealing with the composition of medicines or antidotes. The king 
is presented as a great personality (“Μιθριδάτην ἐκεῖνον τὸν μέγαν πολεμιστήν 
[...]”, gAlen., Theriac., 14.283) and inspiring love, at least to his daughters, who 
decide on their own to commit suicide with their father.44 The story about how he met 
his end, forced to use a sword due to the burdensome effectiveness of his antidote is 
a recurrent one. One description of an experiment is particularly disturbing, however: 
ὁ γάρ τοι Μιθριδάτης οὗτος, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ καθ’ ἡμᾶς Ἄτταλος, ἔσπευσεν 
ἐμπειρίαν ἔχειν ἁπάντων σχεδὸν τῶν ἁπλῶν φαρμάκων, ὅσα τοῖς ὀλεθρίοις 
ἀντιτέτακται, πειράζων αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις ἐπὶ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὧν 
θάνατος κατέγνωστο. (gAlen., Antid., 14.2). 
In a post-Holocaust world, such disrespect for human beings – whatever their social 
or racial status – in the name of medical science is nothing short of monstrous, but Galenus 
seems to comment the incident quite calmly. Clearly we are dealing here with a semi-mythical 
account, based entirely on oral tradition, as Mithradates is not known to have written a book 
about his scientific exploits (unlike, for example, the last of the Attalids, Attalos III Philometor 
Euergetes). One must be therefore be extremely careful before taking this account at face 
value and comparing Mithradates with Josef Mengele or other modern monsters. 
*
Mithradates in the “Roman Histories” of Cassius Dio is mostly present as an effigy 
of the worthy opponent. True enough, he has a history of mischief towards the interests 
of Rome, instigating the Thracians to plunder Greece down to Zeus’ temple at Dodona 
(CASS. dio, 30-35.101.2) and he instigated the murder of all Romans in Asia (CASS. dio, 
30-35.101.1), but even this crime pales in comparison to Sulla’s treatment of his own 
compatriots in the context of the Civil War.45 
44 “πιὼν < Μιθριδάτης > τὸ φάρμακον καὶ πολύ γε αὐτοῦ λαβὼν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἀπέθνησκε, τὰς δὲ 
θυγατέρας πάνυ βουληθείσας αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν φιλοστοργίαν συναποθανεῖν πιούσας τὸ αὐτὸ φάρμακον 
ταχέως ἀποκτανῆναι” (gAlen., Theriac., 14.284)
45 “ἀλλ’ αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀνεβέβληντο, οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι κατεσφάγησαν καὶ ἐς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐρρίφησαν, ὥστε τὸ 
τοῦ Μιθριδάτου πολὺ δεινὸν νομισθέν, ὅτι ποτὲ πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ Ῥωμαίους ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ 
ἀπέκτεινεν, ἐν βραχεῖ πρός τε τὸ πλῆθος καὶ πρὸς τὸν τρόπον τῶν τότε φονευθέντων νομισθῆναι.” 
(CASS. dio, 30-35.109.8)
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The king has a magnetic personality and commands the loyalty of his subjects 
when he returns from exile (CASS. dio, 36.9.2). Even his former mercenaries, who 
had served the Romans during his exile, are eager to side with him at the first 
opportunity (CASS. dio, 36.9.3). The slaves, also, to whom he had proclaimed 
freedom, join his cause (ibid.). 
Mithradates is endowed with great personal courage and amazing physical prowess, 
in spite of old age, riding forward to meet the enemy and receiving a wound in the process.46 
Undeterred by this incident, he continues to lead his armies in the field, receiving another 
severe wound.47 
He has a sense of royal dignity which no hardship manages to tame, even bordering 
on hybris.48 Even in the midst of the greatest distress, he does not lose hope and conceives 
bold plans, dreaming to take the battle into the heart of the enemy territory.49
Mithradates had proven himself worthy of the royal title (“σοφώτατος ὁ Μιθριδάτης 
ἐς πάντα τὰ βασιλικὰ”, CASS. dio, 37.12.2). An extraordinary man, almost a Romantic 
figure avant la lettre, he meets with a fitting end, equally extraordinary.50 
The nature of these generally sympathetic comments is partly explained by the 
fact that Dio, a native of Asia Minor, may have felt somehow proud of his ‘neighbour’. 
Another explanation might be that in the age when Dio writes, from the time of Caracalla 
to that of Alexander Severus, the legacy of Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic 
monarchies which succeeded him was being re-evaluated and finally incorporated 
in the political universe of Rome. Alexander and his imitators had by now become 
acceptable role-models for Roman emperors, and this may have prompted Dio to create 
an idealised portrait of the Pontic king, among whose qualities virtus / ἀρετή and 
maiestas seem to be quite prominent. 
*
46 “καὶ […] ἀνάλωσαν ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὁ Μιθριδάτης […] τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀναστρεφόμενος (καὶ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τὰ 
ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονὼς ἐμάχετο) λίθῳ τε ἐπλήγη” (CASS. dio, 36.9.5).
47 “καὶ πασσυδὶ ἄν σφας διέφθειραν, εἰ μὴ τῶν Ῥωμαίων τις πλασάμενος ὡς καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Μιθριδάτου 
συμμαχίδος ὤν [...] προσῆλθέ τέ οἱ ὡς καὶ εἰπεῖν τι βουλόμενος, καὶ ἔτρωσεν αὐτόν.” (CASS. dio, 36.13.1).
48  “ὁ Μιθριδάτης αὐτὸς μὲν οὐχ ὑπεῖκε ταῖς συμφοραῖς [...] εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ σφαλείη, συναπολέσθαι τῇ 
βασιλείᾳ μετὰ ἀκεραίου τοῦ φρονήματος μᾶλλον ἢ στερηθεὶς αὐτῆς ἔν τε ταπεινότητι καὶ ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ 
ζῆν ἤθελεν.” (CASS. dio, 37.11.1-2).
49 “τῇ βουλήσει πλέον ἢ τῇ δυνάμει νέμων ἐνενόει [...] πρός τε τὸν Ἴστρον διὰ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἐλθεῖν, 
κἀντεῦθεν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐσβαλεῖν· φύσει τε γὰρ μεγαλοπράγμων ὤν, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν πταισμάτων 
πολλῶν δὲ καὶ εὐτυχημάτων πεπειραμένος, οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀτόλμητον οὔτε ἀνέλπιστόν οἱ εἶναι ἐνόμιζεν.” 
(CASS. dio, 37.11.1).
50 “Μιθριδάτης μὲν δὴ ποικιλωτάτῃ ἀεὶ καὶ μεγίστῃ τῇ τύχῃ χρησάμενος οὐδὲ τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου 
ἁπλῆν ἔσχεν· ἐπεθύμησέ τε γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ βουλόμενος, καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτεῖναι σπουδάσας 
οὐκ ἠδυνήθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν φαρμάκῳ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ξίφει αὐθέντης τε ἅμα ἐγένετο καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἐχθρῶν ἀπεσφάγη.” (CASS. dio, 37.13.4).
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The often jocose nature of Athenaios’ Deiphosophistai will bring to the fore 
a different aspect of Mithradates’ personality. In various sections of this great 
work, Eupator is seen in continuity with other royal figures, such as Seleukids or 
Ptolemies, in the performance of kingly duties. Thus, he dutifully befriends men of 
letters, such as Athenion (Athen., 5.48) or the seer Sosipatros (Athen., 6.61). He 
possesses immense wealth and this transforms him into an effigy of tryphe. Thus, 
he starts a contest of drinking and eating.51 He wins it, thus displaying royal arête, 
and confers the price upon the runner-up, displaying thus royal magnificence. His 
generosity is mentioned in another context as well: the inhabitants of Arykandis 
put their hopes in him to clear them of debts (Athen., 12.35), but we do not know 
whether Eupator actually met their fairly insolent demands. When at the height of 
his glory, he casts a truly magnificent figure: a vivid impression of that is offered 
through a fictitious discourse of Athenion (Athen., 5.50). He is sometimes harsh, 
as when he punishes the inhabitants of Chios.52 Interestingly enough, even this 
incident fails to put him in a bad light, as he is seen to act as nothing more than an 
agent of Nemesis.53 
The relative sympathy enjoyed by Hellenistic kings in general in the “Banqueting 
sophists” may be responsible for Athenaios’ mild stance with regard to certain aspects of 
Mithradates’ conduct. While this represents a very useful exercise, allowing us to view 
the king through the eyes of a sympathetic court, one must also be on guard to spot any 
instances in which the author may have glossed over serious incidents. 
IV.3. External sources: Roman authors
In the work of Cicero, Mithradates acquires diverse attributes and roles, according 
to the immediate purpose of the orator. While he is at all times a hostis, and even “hostis 
in ceteris rebus nimis ferus et immanis” (CiC., Verr., II.2.51), he oscillates between 
cowardly tyrant and worthy opponent. Thus, when the discourse demands him to step 
into the shoes of the arch-enemy of Rome, so as to excuse, for example, the less than 
courageous conduct of a fellow Roman, or to allow the appointment of Pompey as a 
general, Mithradates exercises cruelty against the toga-bearing Romans, wherever he 
51 “Νικόλαος […] Μιθριδάτην φησὶ τὸν Ποντικὸν βασιλέα προθέντα ἀγῶνα πολυφαγίας καὶ πολυποσίας 
ἦν δὲ τὸ ἆθλον τάλαντον ἀργυρίου$ ἀμφότερα νικῆσαι. τοῦ μέντοι ἄθλου ἐκστῆναι τῷ μετ’ αὐτὸν 
κριθέντι Καλαμόδρυι τῷ Κυζικηνῷ ἀθλητῇ.” (Athen., 10.9)
52 “Νικόλαος δ’ ὁ περιπατητικὸς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ὁ στωικὸς  ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ἑκάτερος τοὺς Χίους φασὶν 
ἐξανδραποδισθέντας ὑπὸ Μιθριδάτου τοῦ Καππάδοκος παραδοθῆναι τοῖς ἰδίοις δούλοις δεδεμένους, 
ἵν’ εἰς τὴν Κόλχων γῆν κατοικισθῶσιν” (Athen., 6.91)
53 “οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἀληθῶς τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐμήνισε πρώτοις χρησαμένοις ὠνητοῖς ἀνδραπόδοις τῶν πολλῶν 
αὐτουργῶν ὄντων κατὰ τὰς διακονίας.” (Athen., 6.91)
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happens to meet them54 and he is responsible for the criminal act of having killed all 
Romans in Asia55. However, when Cicero’s task is to acquit a man accused of rapine in 
the same province of Asia, the orator strives to offset the guilt of Mithradates and focus 
more on the complicity of the Greek cities in the process (CiC., Pro Flac., 57), who even 
had the impertinence to deem him their saviour.56 Then, when the immediacy of the war 
disappeared, Mithradates remained solely a trophy obtained by Rome, and the glory 
of the victor could only be augmented if an occasional good word was said about the 
valour and huge resources of the king. Thus, in Pro Murena, he is considered to have 
been, beyond doubt, Rome’s greatest foe,57 while in Pro Archia, his confrontation with 
Lucullus is fully worthy of a great epic poem (CiC., Pro Arch., 21).  
Given the nature of Cicero’s discourses, each delivered with a particular purpose, each 
placed in a different context and each demanding a different approach, it is hard to determine 
what Cicero truly thought about Mithradates. It is even harder, therefore, to extract those items 
which ‘correspond to facts’ and could bring modern historians closer to the ‘true’ Mithradates.
*
Pompeius Trogus, whose Historiae Philippicae have reached us, unfortunately, 
only through the work of a 4th century AD epitomiser, Iustinus, treats Mithradates in 
surprisingly favourable fashion: ‘cuius <Mithridatis> ea postea magnitudo fuit, ut non 
sui tantum temporis, uerum etiam superioris aetatis omnes reges maiestate superauerit’ 
(iuSt., 37.1.7). The greatness of Mithradates is recognised even by the skies, which send 
forth a comet to signal his birth (iuSt., 37.2.2-3). 
The king may appear at first sight to be brutal, murdering his sister-wife (iuSt., 
38.1.1) and his nephew (iuSt., 38.1.10), but the former gesture is in fact an act of justice, 
as it punishes her for attempted poisoning, while the latter is an act of martial cunning, 
for by eliminating the leader of the opposing army, he wins the victory in the least risky 
manner for his own men: “incertum belli timens consilia ad insidias transfert”. 
54 “Facilius certe P. Rutilium Rufum necessitatis excusatio defendet; qui cum a Mithridate Mytilenis 
oppressus esset, crudelitatem regis in togatos vestitus mutatione vitavit.” (CiC., Pro Rab., 27)
55  “delenda vobis est illa macula Mithridatico bello superiore concepta quae penitus iam insedit ac nimis 
inveteravit in populi Romani nomine, quod is qui uno die tota in Asia tot in civitatibus uno nuntio atque una 
significatione <omnis> civis Romanos necandos trucidandosque curavit” (CiC., Pro Leg. Man., 7)
56 “Mithridatem dominum, illum patrem, illum conservatorem Asiae, illum Euhium, Nysium, Bacchum, 
Liberum nominabant. Vnum atque idem erat tempus cum L. Flacco consuli portas tota Asia claudebat, 
Cappadocem autem illum non modo recipiebat suis urbibus verum etiam ultro vocabat.” (CiC., Pro 
Flac., 60-61)
57 “Atqui si diligenter quid Mithridates potuerit et quid effecerit et qui vir fuerit consideraris, omnibus 
quibuscum populus Romanus bellum gessit hunc regem nimirum antepones.” (CiC., Pro Mur., 31) Further 
considerations about the importance of Mithradates and, by ricochet, of those who defeated him are made 
in subsequent sections (CiC., Pro Mur., 31-34). 
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In a substantial discourse (iuSt., 38.4-7), Mithradates encourages his soldiers in 
a number of ways, from highlighting the weakness of Rome to underscoring his own 
qualities. He wages a just war, as he had been wronged in a number of occasions by Rome 
(iuSt., 38.5.3-10); moreover, the Romans are responsible for the war, which started due 
to their atavistic hatred of kings, around which their entire foreign policy revolved (iuSt., 
38.6.1-8); the nobility of his birth is far superior to that of any Roman (iuSt., 38.7.1); and 
his previous victories recommend him as an excellent general (iuSt., 38.7.4-5). 
This last point reminds the reader of the comments made in Book 37, namely that 
he had managed to vanquish the previously undefeated Scythians, a feat neither Zopyrion, 
nor Cyrus, nor even Philip had achieved:
“Ad regni deinde administrationem cum accessisset, statim non de regendo, sed 
de augendo regno cogitauit. Itaque Scythas inuictos antea, qui Zopyriona, Alexandri 
Magni ducem, cum XXX milibus armatorum deleuerant, qui Cyrum, Persarum 
regem, cum CC milibus trucidauerant, qui Philippum, Macedonum regem, fugacem 
fecerant, ingenti felicitate perdomuit.” (iuSt., 37.3.1-2)
It would be interesting to determine the source Trogus used for this information. 
One possibility is that his uncle, a cavalry officer in Pompey’s army during his Pontic 
expedition, may have come into contact with local informants, and he may have 
passed on the information he had gathered to his nephew. Another possible source 
is his father, who specialised in the affairs of the East and served under C. Caesar 
(Augustus’ adopted son, according to Arnaud-Lindet,58 and not the dictator C. Iulius 
Caesar). Yet another possibility is that Trogus used a Greek source, having close 
connections with the Pontic court. As previously noted, even though this perspective 
is likely to have been contaminated by royal propaganda, its major value resides in 
the fact that it documents a different point of view from the ‘mainstream’ pro-Roman 
opinion and offers an insight into what the Mithradatid court wished to publicise. 
*
Velleius Paterculus, a contemporary of Tiberius, writes of Mithradates with a sense 
of awe. The Pontic king is introduced with the following comments:
Mithridates, Ponticus rex, uir neque silendus neque dicendus sine cura, bello 
acerrimus, uirtute eximius, aliquando fortuna, semper animo maximus, consiliis dux, 
miles manu, odio in Romanos Hannibal […]. (Vell. PAter., 2.18.1)
58 In note 20 to his translation of Book 43, published on-line, at: http://www.forumromanum.org/literature/
justin/trad43.html (retrieved 04.08.2010).
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While the king is defeated on numerous occasions, by Sulla, Fimbria (although the 
adverb ‘forte’ does diminish to a good extent this victory: Vell. PAter., 2.24.1), Lucullus 
(‘saepe multis locis fuderat’, Vell. PAter., 2.33.1) and Pompeius (‘memorabile [...] 
bellum gessit’), his ability to recover is extraordinary (Vell. PAter., 2.37.1). The final 
comment made by the historian is that Mithradates was the last proper king, apart from 
the Parthian monarchs.59 
The account of Velleius Paterculus is not very rich in factual details, but is 
nevertheless important in so far as it attests a certain perception of Mithradates in Rome 
nearly a century after his death, in which his crimes against the Romans in Asia are not 
yet forgotten, but his towering personality inspires admiration. This appears to be the 
beginning of a mythologizing trend, which will slowly but surely reduce the memory of 
Mithradates to a few striking facts and associate his personality with the extraordinary.  
*
Plinius Maior, the great encyclopaedist, did not intend to write history. Therefore, 
he does not treat Mithradates in a consistent and structured manner. In his work, the 
anecdotic, the unusual detail takes precedence. Thus, he notes that the king reigned 
over twenty two nations and spoke as many languages: “Mithridates, duarum et viginti 
gentium rex, totidem linguis iura dixit, pro contione singulas sine interprete adfatus” 
(Plin., 7.88). He courted the medic Asklepiades of Prusa and, unusually, the man 
scorned his legates and promises (Plin., 7.124). The story of the mithridateion, the royal 
antidote, could not be ignored either,60 even though Plinius himself is sceptical about 
its composition61, which seems to be based more on ostentation than on proper reason 
and experiment. He punishes the avarice of Aquilius by pouring molten gold down his 
throat. While the act is cruel, the comment “haec parit habendi cupido!” (Plin., 33.49) 
seems to place most of the responsibility on the shoulders of Aquilius himself. The 
king has fabulous wealth, for he can afford to possess a silver statue of his ancestor, 
59 “Mithridates, ultimus omnium iuris sui regum praeter Parthicos.” (Vell. PAter., 2.40.1) The point made 
here by Paterculus is that Mithradates did not owe his royal status to the intervention of Rome, drawing 
thus attention to the mechanisms of legitimacy that had functioned in the East for centuries and granted to 
a king iure sui greater majesty.
60 “trita cum aceto aurium dolori. in sanctuariis Mithridatis, maximi regis, devicti Cn. Pompeius invenit in 
peculiari commentario ipsius manu conpositionem antidoti e II nucibus siccis, item ficis totidem et rutae 
foliis XX simul tritis, addito salis grano: e<i>, qui hoc ieiunus sumat, nullum venenum nociturum illo die.” 
(Plin., 23.149)
61 “Mithridatium antidotum ex rebus LIIII componitur, inter null<a>s pondere aequali, et quarundam rerum 
sexagesima denarii unius imperat<u>r, quo deorum, per Fidem, ista monstrante! hominum enim subtilitas tanta 
esse non potuit; ostentatio artis et portentosa scientiae venditatio manifesta est.” (Plin., 29.25)
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Pharnakes, and one of himself, besides many chariots of silver and gold (Plin., 33.151) 
and a collection of gems and cameos (Plin., 37.11). All things considered, Mithradates 
was the greatest king of his age: “maximus sua aetate regum” (Plin., 25.5).
It is interesting to see Mithradates reduced here to a number of anecdotic traits, 
collected by Pliny partly from books, partly from the oral tradition. If they have something 
in common, it is the extraordinary, the larger-than-life aspect, which becomes Mithradates’ 
most persistent epithet.   
*
Aurelius Victor included Mithradates in his De viris illustribus, a list of illustrious 
men that shaped the history of Rome. The presentation is sketchy and again the anecdotic 
permeates the presentation. Thus, the king is of extreme vigour, both mental and physical: 
“magna ui animi et corporis” (Aur. ViCt., Vir. Illustr., 76.1). Thus, he can drive a six-
horse chariot and can speak no less than fifty languages. His authority is so great, that on 
his command, every Roman in Asia is put to death, while his personality is so powerful, 
that his would-be assassin, the Gaul Bithocus, is terrified by the king’s fierce looks and 
tries to leave, only to be recalled by Mithradates:
Mithridates […] in turre obsessus uenenum sumpsit. Quod cum tardius 
combiberet, quia aduersum uenena multis antea medicaminibus corpus firmarat, 
immissum percussorem Gallum Bithocum auctoritate uultus territum reuocauit et in 
caedem suam manum trepidantis adiuuit. (Aur. ViCt., Vir. Illustr., 76.7-8)
In spite of his doubtless royal charisma, Mithradates is defeated on numerous 
occasions by Sulla, Lucullus and Pompeius. 
It is interesting to note that in the space of nearly three centuries that separate 
Aurelius Victor from Plinius Maior, some of the king’s attributes expand. For example, the 
number of languages he speaks more than doubles. This is a feature of oral tradition and 
is indicative of how the legend of Mithradates lived on in the Roman consciousness.  
IV.4. Asking the right questions
It can be easily noted that between the numerous sources discussed above, 
there are both common elements and dissimilarities. A number of facts are indicated 
(Mithradates was king of Pontus, had expanded his kingdom, launched an invasion 
of Greece, was defeated by a number of Roman generals, committed suicide etc.) 
and many opinions are expressed (he was the greatest king of his age or even of all 
ages; he was a cruel tyrant etc.). Some historians even attempt to trace his motives 
and intentions (he is animated by hatred towards the Romans, he bears a grudge 
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against the Chians etc.). It is quite hard to isolate fact from fiction in this avalanche 
of information, almost invariably presented to the readership as true. 
The question remains: even after proceeding with the necessary prudence, even 
after seeking the necessary consilience, as discussed above, can we be sure to have 
come any closer to the ‘true’ Mithradates? I believe we can, to a certain extent, and 
the analogy with criminology is very useful here. With respect to determining facts, 
neither criminology nor history strive to determine more than the essential traits, or 
outline of events. The motivation of the thief, his fears, his thoughts in the act of 
theft may be completely inaccessible to any other human being, but certain essential 
aspects of the act itself can, nevertheless, be determined with the aid of informants, 
such as when it occurred or who performed it. In a similar manner, we may never be 
sure from our testimonies what Mithradates felt during his meeting with Sulla, or 
what his initial hopes may have been, or if he was indeed terrified by Sulla’s response. 
We can be reasonably certain, nevertheless, that Sulla had defeated the Pontic troops 
in a number of occasions and that, subsequently, the two did conclude a peace. 
Again in common with criminology, an ‘oblique’ approach to the available 
testimonies is very likely to conduct the historian to a true fact, for even heavily biased 
sources contain items corresponding to reality, otherwise they would become utterly 
unintelligible.  One may take, for example, one of the most fervently anti-Mithradatic 
sources discussed above, Memnon. In 30.1, Mithradates is said to have decided the death 
of the royal ladies: “Οὕτω Μιθριδάτῃ τῶν πραγμάτων περιφανῶς ἀποκεκλιμένων 
τῶν τε βασιλίδων γυναικῶν ἡ ἀναίρεσις ἐπεποίητο”. One may believe or not that 
Mithradates himself, despairing of the future, took this cruel decision. On the other 
hand, one may be reasonably certain that there existed, indeed, a number of royal ladies 
– wives, concubines and sisters of the king – who lived in one place. While this text 
may or may not be useful in determining the character of the Pontic king, it is very 
useful in determining whether the Pontic kings practiced polygamy.  
It is here that similarities between history and criminology end. While for the 
latter establishing the true facts represents the ultimate purpose, for the former facts 
are merely bricks, which are then interconnected in a hopefully resistant edifice.  
v. the usefuLness of the project
The result of investigations within the field of Ancient History is necessarily a 
hypothetical construct, to be sure, but a construct that is informative about a particular 
period and about human nature in general. 
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This brings us to the usefulness of this study in particular. Firstly, it is relevant to 
the field, as a synthesis. While there exist excellent studies about cultural exchanges 
in the Ancient World, about the transformation and adaptation of Persian structures 
by the new Hellenic kingdoms, and abundant literature on Mithradates VI, a synthesis 
focusing on the interplay between the Persian and Hellenic traditions in Eastern 
Anatolia has – to the best of my knowledge – yet to be produced. 
Secondly, it is useful outside the strict domain of Hellenistic history as a 
study of osmosis and of the manner in which this broad process is influenced by 
the willful intervention of authorities, in particular royal figures. In the context of 
multiculturalism and diversity that characterises the modern world in general, and the 
European Union in particular, a study of how cultures interact, how local traditions 
adapt creatively to globalisation is not completely devoid of use. 
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ii. A GeoGrAphicAl And historicAl
overview of eAstern AnAtoliA
As mentioned in the General Introduction, the geographical scope of the present thesis will be represented mainly by Eastern Anatolia. It is the purpose of the following 
pages to draw a necessarily sketchy picture of the region, in order to provide a background 
for the subsequent analysis.
i. GeoGraphicaL Limits
While the borders of states in Antiquity were characterized by a good degree 
of fluidity, as a consequence of military, diplomatic or even commercial activity, it is 
nevertheless possible to draw a fairly clear line of separation between the regions that will 
make the object of the current investigation and those that fall outside its scope. 
In the following chapters, the focus of investigation will be represented mainly 
by “Eastern Anatolia”. In Figure II.1, the regions that comprise this relatively broad 
Figure II.1. Eastern Anatolia: Regions
geographical designation have been highlighted. The core of the region is represented 
by Pontic Cappadocia, Greater Cappadocia and Commagene. By virtue of similarities 
in terms of geographical features, ethnic composition or historical development, other 
regions will also be included in the analysis, such as Paphlagonia, Colchis, Lesser Armenia 
or Tauric Chersonese (not included in Figure II.1). 
ii. GeoGraphicaL characteristics
The most prominent geographical feature in the landscape of the regions enumerated 
above is represented by the two large connected chains of the Pontic and the Taurus 
Mountains, one of block-faulted, the other of folding origin, but marked also to a good 
extent by volcanic activity1. 
Although slightly different geological forces have contributed to the elevation 
of these converging chains, their activity has produced similar results in terms of 
aspect – almost parallel strings of peaks separated by deep valleys –, and in terms of 
underground deposits – metal (iron, copper, silver, gold etc.) and valuable building 
materials (such as marble or basalt). The ancients divided these chains into segments, 
calling them by different names: Olgassys, Paryadres and Scydises, or Taurus and 
Antitaurus (see above, Figure II.2). 
1 BridgeS, 1990, pp. 152-153.
Figure II.2. Eastern Anatolia: Geographical features
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The long, narrow valleys that cross the mountains (most of them arranged neatly 
on latitudinal lines, although there are a number of major corridors that intersect 
them at almost straight angles) form ideal passageways for streams that develop 
into major rivers. One of the most important rivers of the area is the Euphrates, 
which, once released from the grasp of the Antitaurus, opens up into the fertile plain 
of Mesopotamia. Another important river is the Halys (today’s Kızılırmak), which 
carves its way through the tufa that covers the Cappadocian plateau and flows into the 
Euxine. Inside the broad arc described by the Halys, there is the hydrographic basin of 
three shorter rivers, the Skylax (Çekerek Irmağı), the Iris (Yeşilırmak) and the Lykos 
(Kelkit Çayı). Unlike the Halys, whose salty waters are of little use for agriculture, 
these last three form an alluvial plain of almost legendary fertility: in Antiquity, the 
area alongside the Iris and the Lykos was named Khiliokomon (“Thousand Villages”), 
which points to the abundance of agricultural production so praised by Strabon,2 
which remains unchanged even today.
Another geographical feature of great importance is the vicinity to the Black Sea. 
Its shores are fairly abrupt and only narrow strips of flat land separate mountain from sea. 
Aside from the major benefits afforded in terms of transportation and fishing (cf. infra), the 
Euxine has an important influence on the climate of its neighbouring regions. Thus, Pontic 
Cappadocia, although further North than Greater Cappadocia, enjoys much milder weather 
and significantly higher rate of rainfall, with obvious consequences on the vegetation. 
iii. economic situation
The economic landscape of Eastern Anatolia is shaped in equal measure by physical 
and ethnic factors, as different cultures exploit the environment following their specific 
know-how. The purpose of the following lines is to provide an overview of the main 
resources available, while the issues of property, wealth and their relation to power will 
be analysed later, in Chapter ‘Power Structures and Wealth Distribution’.
III.1. Agriculture
Agriculture is, not surprisingly, a very important segment of the economy, if not 
the most important, and a number of regions receive praise for their general fertility, such 
as Themiskyra, Melitene or Commagene. Grain production appears to occupy the most 
important place, but other cultures also receive notice in the most important survey of 
the area to survive, namely Strabon’s, such as millet and sorghum, which are abundant in 
Themiskyra (Str., 12.3.15). Fruit-bearing trees are also an important element of the flora 
2 Str., 12.3.39.
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and they are present in Themiskyra (Str., 12.3.15), Melitene (Str., 12.2.1) or Cataonia 
(Str., 12.2.2). The Augustan geographer is particularly careful to record the presence of 
those plantations which from the Greek perspective represent landmarks of civilisation,3 
vine and olive. These are present in Phanaroia (12.3.30), Pontic Comana (12.3.36), 
and particularly in Melitene, which produces the Monarite wine, said to rival its Greek 
competitors (12.2.1).
Animal husbandry represents another segment of agriculture that is well developed 
in Eastern Anatolia. The preferred animals seem to be bovines and sheep. Even royalty 
appear to be involved in this activity, from Strabon’s statement that the kings of Cappadocia 
preferred Mazaka as their capital due, among other things, to its pastures: “Ἀφυὲς δ’ 
οὖν κατὰ πολλὰ τὸ τῶν Μαζακηνῶν χωρίον ὂν πρὸς κατοικίαν μάλιστα οἱ βασιλεῖς 
ἑλέσθαι δοκοῦσιν, ὅτι τῆς χώρας ἁπάσης τόπος ἦν μεσαίτατος οὗτος τῶν ξύλα 
ἐχόντων ἅμα καὶ […] χόρτον, οὗ πλεῖστον ἐδέοντο κτηνοτροφοῦντες” (Str., 12.2.9) 
Special mention is made of the region Gazelonitis, where sheep are bred with wool so soft 
it must be protected with leather coatings (Str., 12.3.13). Horse rearing may be included 
in this sector of the economy, animal husbandry, although horses do not seem to be put 
to lucrative uses, being reserved, on the contrary, for war. Cappadocia was famed for its 
horsemen and their mounts,4 as was Lesser Armenia or Paphlagonia.5 Amisene is also 
mentioned as providing good pasturage for horses (Str., 12.3.39). 
III.2. Fishing
The Euxine was famous in Antiquity for 
the quantity and quality of the fish it produced. 
A possible cause for the luxurious fauna may be 
represented by the number of great rivers flowing 
into it, such as the Danube, Don or Kuban, whose 
deltas offer excellent breeding conditions. 
The periodical migration along the coast 
of large schools of tunny, which in turn attract 
dolphins, has created ample opportunities for 
fishing from the Tauric Chersonese to Byzantium. 
Some places, nevertheless, were better positioned for this activity and Strabon 
mentions Pharnakeia and Sinope6 as having the most advantageous location. The 
3 For Strabon’s cultural agenda, cf. supra, pp. 21-22
4 Cf. infra, p. 154, n. 43.
5 Xen., Anab., 5.6.8.
6 Str., 12.3.11; 12.3.19.
Figure II.3. Sinope coin: SNG BN 1483
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importance associated with this business is made patent by the presence of a sea 
creature (a dolphin, to be precise) on the independent coinage of Sinope, as seen in 
Figure II.3.
Once caught, the fish was processed: chopped and salted, it was either pickled 
with herbs in ceramic jars, dried in the sun or smoked. It was thereafter either consumed 
locally (Xenophon, in the course of his expedition, finds such pickled dolphin slices 
in the settlements of the Mossynoikoi: Xen., Anab., 5.4.28) or exported to the 
Mediterranean market, which seemed to appreciate it greatly: Diodorus informs us that 
a jar of Pontic pickled fish was sold for as much as three hundred drachms in Rome 
(diod., 31.24.1). Evidence for the lively fish-processing industry and subsequent trade 
with fish is represented by an abundant archaeological record: fishing equipment,7 vats 
designed for salting,8 amphorae with specific, wide-mouth design9 or even amphorae 
with fish remains found in the context of shipwrecks.10 
III.3. Timber processing
Timber in Antiquity represented a major asset, as wood was indispensable not only 
for military purposes (building warships and artillery pieces), but also for any construction 
project. So important, in fact, that one of the reasons mentioned by Strabon for choosing 
the otherwise inhospitable site of Mazaka as capital of Cappadocia was the availability of 
wood from the nearby Argaios Mountain (Str., 12.2.7).
According to Strabon, the Bithynian and Paphlagonian coast as far East as Sinope 
afforded excellent timber for ship-building (Str., 12.3.12, confirmed by theoPhr., HP, 
4.5.5), which usually means mountain pine and fir. That, however, seems not to have 
been sufficient for Mithradates VI. He preferred Colchis as his naval construction site 
(Str., 11.2.18), possibly due to the fact that in Colchis other indispensable materials, 
such as linen and pitch, were also readily available, whereas in Pontus they would 
have needed to be imported.
Coniferous trees were not the only ones to be present and utilised in the area. 
Again according to Strabon, maple and mountain-nut from Sinopitis were excellent 
for furniture (Str., 12.3.12), as was the boxwood from the region of Amastris (Str., 
12.3.10). To what extent these products were exported in the Mediterranean or remained 
in the basin of the Black Sea remains very hard to determine, given the rarity of literary 
sources and the easily understandable absence of archaeological finds.
7 højte, 2005, pp. 135-138.
8 ibid., pp. 141-156.
9 Opaiţ, 2007.
10 lund & gABrielSen, 2007, p. 164.
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III.4. Mineral wealth exploitation
Anatolia seems to have been a centre for metallurgy from the earliest times, 
doubtlessly as a result of the richness of underground deposits present there.
Iron ore was particularly abundant, from the Paryadres Mountains, in the region 
inhabited by the Chalybes (it is significant that the Greek word for “steel” or “hardened 
iron”, χάλυψ, seems to have been derived from the name of this tribe), to Commagene, 
“ubi ferrum nascitur”.11 
Other important deposits included copper, lead, silver and even gold. It is unfortunate 
that the ancient sources sometimes restrict themselves to mentioning the presence of “mines” 
in the area, without being any more specific. Thus, Strabon describes very briefly Kabeira: 
“ἐν δὲ τοῖς Καβείροις τὰ βασίλεια Μιθριδάτου κατεσκεύαστο καὶ ὁ ὑδραλέτης καὶ τὰ 
ζωγρεῖα καὶ αἱ πλησίον θῆραι καὶ τὰ μέταλλα.” (Str., 12.3.30) Unfortunately, modern 
exploitations in the vicinity only include bentonite and diatomite, neither of which seems to fit 
the Greek μέταλλον. Copper, lead and zinc deposits have been identified at various distances 
(60-80 km) from modern Niksar, but none so easily accessible that would fit the phrasing 
“ἐν τοῖς Καβείροις”. This illustrates the difficulties encountered when attempting to match 
ancient mining sites with metal deposits known and worked at the present time.
11 CIL IV, 30947: “Iovi Optimo Maximo / Dolicheno ubi ferrum nascitur / C(aius) Sempronius Rectus / 
cent(urio) frumentar(ius) d(onum) d(edit)”. The same formula appears in CIL III, 11927 or CIL XIII, 07342b.
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From Strabon’s account we know of other minerals that were extracted in the 
region: one is the ruddle (Greek μίλτος, Latin rubrica), a reddish pigment that was 
useful, according to Plin., 33.115, for painting ships12; the other is realgar (an arsenic 
sulphide: Greek σανδαράκη, Latin sandaraca), which was used, again according to Pliny 
the Elder (34.177) mostly as medicine. As a cruel irony, Strabon describes the horrendous 
conditions in which slaves laboured to extract realgar from Mountain Sandarakourgion 
(“Realgar-mine mountain”).13
III.5. Construction materials and semi-precious stones
Strabon insists on a number of occasions on the availability of stone fit for 
construction at a number of sites in Eastern Anatolia. Indeed, the geology of the area, 
marked by volcanic episodes (cf. supra) had created ideal conditions for the formation of 
such rocks. Marble, for example, one of the most sought-after materials for its hardness 
and pleasant appearance, can be extracted at various sites, such as Pharnakeia, Nyssa, 
Mazaka or Melitene. 
Semi-precious stones have also been found and extracted, particularly in 
Cappadocia. In 12.2.10, for example, Strabon informs us that crystal and onyx was found 
by the miners of Archelaos (reigned 36 BC-17AD) around the Galatian border. Also in 
Cappadocia one could find small white stones that looked like ivory, from which sword 
handles were made, as well as large panes of lapis specularis, a transparent stone, which 
were apparently exported with profit. 
III.6. Trade
Trade is a very lively activity in the area and the following lines do not attempt to 
exhaust the subject (that would certainly be impossible), but rather to offer a few brief 
indications about the general axes of commerce that helped integrate the area in the wider 
geographic context. 
The geography of the area dictated the main overland trade routes. The main North-
South axis connected the port Amisos on the Euxine with Amaseia in the fertile Iris valley, with 
Mazaka across the Halys and, through the Cilician Gates, with the Cilician ports and Eastern 
12 Cary (CAry, 1949, p. 155, n.1) supports the view that this mineral is not the cheap pigment rubrica, 
but rather the more expensive cinnabar. While this is not entirely impossible, the hypothesis is rendered 
unlikely by the fact that in modern times mercury – a crucial component of cinnabar – is all but absent in 
Cappadocia, while iron – which forms the basis for the ochre pigment ruddle – is fairly common.
13 “τὸ δὲ σανδαρακουργεῖον ὄρος κοῖλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῆς μεταλλείας, ὑπεληλυθότων αὐτὸ τῶν 
ἐργαζομένων διώρυξι μεγάλαις· εἰργάζοντο δὲ δημοσιῶναι μεταλλευταῖς χρώμενοι τοῖς ἀπὸ 
κακουργίας ἀγοραζομένοις ἀνδραπόδοις· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ ἐπιπόνῳ τοῦ ἔργου καὶ θανάσιμον καὶ 
δύσοιστον εἶναι τὸν ἀέρα φασὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς μετάλλοις διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς τῶν βώλων ὀδμῆς, 
ὥστε ὠκύμορα εἶναι τὰ σώματα. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐκλείπεσθαι συμβαίνει πολλάκις τὴν μεταλλείαν διὰ 
τὸ ἀλυσιτελές, πλειόνων μὲν ἢ διακοσίων ὄντων τῶν ἐργαζομένων, συνεχῶς δὲ νόσοις καὶ φθοραῖς 
δαπανωμένων.” (Str., 12.3.40)
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Mediterranean. There were three main West-East axes. One connected Bithynia, Paphlagonia 
across the valley of the river Amnias, the agricultural heartland of Pontic Cappadocia 
represented by Khiliokomon, Gazakene and Phanaroia and thereafter, through the valley of 
the Lykos, Lesser Armenia and Greater Armenia. The second followed to some extent the 
route of the Persian Royal Road, connecting the Aegean shore to Phrygia, Cappadocia and its 
capital, Mazaka, crossing the Taurus through the valley of the river Melas and finally reaching 
Northern Mesopotamia by crossing the Euphrates near Melitene.14 The third connected Cilicia 
and Northern Syria with Mesopotamia by crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma.
Trade was active in all these directions, but the best documented one is that taking 
place within the Euxine, followed by that taking place in Eastern Mediterranean. The items 
traded have various degrees of visibility in the literary, epigraphical and archaeological 
sources. In general, it appears that this area is an exporter of raw materials. To the resources 
mentioned above (representing, naturally, but the most important in a list which could 
have been greatly expanded) one should probably add slaves. Slave trade was apparently 
quite well established, with Sinope and Amisos functioning as important markets, 
intermediating between the Hinterland and the large slave emporia of the Mediterranean, 
such as Delos or Rhodes.15 On the other hand, Eastern Anatolia appears to have been a 
keen importer of fine wares, from oil and wine to fine pottery and jewellery.16 
The importance of these trading links consists not merely in creating a degree of 
prosperity in the area, but perhaps more importantly, in integrating Eastern Anatolia 
in a complex system where ideas and culture in general travelled the same routes as 
commodities and money.
iv. ethnic composition
IV.1. From the dawn of history to the Classical Age
The Anatolian peninsula has been for millennia a corridor used by hominids and 
humans travelling from one continent to another. It is not surprising, therefore, that many 
14 The description of the route taken by the Royal Road in Cappadocia as given by Herodotus at 5.52 is 
fairly confusing: “ Ἐκδέκεται δὲ ἐκ τῆς Φρυγίης ὁ Ἅλυς ποταμός, ἐπ’ ᾧ πύλαι τε ἔπεισι, τὰς διεξελάσαι 
πᾶσα ἀνάγκη καὶ οὕτω διεκπερᾶν τὸν ποταμόν, καὶ φυλακτήριον μέγα ἐπ’ αὐτῷ. Διαβάντι δὲ ἐς τὴν 
Καππαδοκίην καὶ ταύτῃ πορευομένῳ μέχρι οὔρων τῶν Κιλικίων […]. Ταῦτα δὲ διεξελάσαντι καὶ διὰ 
τῆς Κιλικίης ὁδὸν ποιευμένῳ τρεῖς εἰσι σταθμοί, παρασάγγαι δὲ πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ ἥμισυ. Οὖρος δὲ 
Κιλικίης καὶ τῆς Ἀρμενίης ἐστὶ ποταμὸς νηυσιπέρητος,  τῷ οὔνομα Εὐφρήτης.” Many scholars (Calder, 
Dilleman, Levick and others) have taken the reference to Cilicia as an indicator that the road veered South 
through the Cilician Gates, passing through Tarsus. However, it is clear from Strabon’s description of 
Cappadocia that “Cilicia” was also the name of a Cappadocian district, which had Mazaka for its capital. 
Cf. FrenCh, 1998 for a more accurate description of the route.
15 AVrAM, 2007.
16 erCiyAS, 2006, in particular pp. 67-115, dealing with the Amisos Tomb.
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ethnic groups have left their mark on the history of the place. The peninsula represents 
one of the early seats of Indo-European colonisation – a theory even identifies it with 
the elusive Indo-European homeland,17 though it has so far failed to meet wide scholarly 
approval.18 Yet the first written documents have come to us from a Semitic population – the 
Assyrian merchants who had come from Mesopotamia eager to trade their fine wares for 
raw materials, in particular metallic ores, and who had formed some 21 settlements, both 
large and small, of which archaeologists have uncovered only three, all located within the 
basin of the Kızılırmak: at Kültepe (the most important of them), Boğazköy and Alişar.19 
The political importance of these colonies, which – according to the information yielded 
by the tens of thousands of clay tablets discovered on site – appear to have formed a 
loose federation, has varied in the space of roughly two and a half centuries from their 
establishment to their destruction.20 Most of the time, they seem to have been content 
maintaining a lucrative neutrality to all the local powers, but there were times when they 
were under attack or were subjected by these,21 as happened when the Kussaran dynasty 
– of uncertain ethnicity – established practically a hegemonic power, dominating the 
princedoms from the Pontic Alps in the North to the Cilician shores in the South. 
Great though it was, the power of this dynasty seems to have been short-lived and the 
empire of the Hittites, one of the oldest Indo-European nations, rose in its stead.22 The Hittites 
have developed their own powerful civilisation and spread their influence over large parts 
of the peninsula. The heart of their kingdom was the plateau around Hattusa. Their presence 
is attested in many places: urban settlements which continued to exist well into the Roman 
Era, such as Gazzuira, in which one may recognise the later Gazioura; sacred centres or 
17 renFrew, 1987, revised in renFrew, 1999 to make Anatolia the home of the Pre-Proto-Indo-Europeans, 
who then migrated in the Balkans area.
18 Renfrew stated in his 1999 study that Anatolia represented the homeland of the Pre-Proto-Indo-
Europeans, who lived there around 7000 BC, and who migrated by 5000 BC to the Balkans, to become 
there Proto-Indo-Europeans. He correlated this movement with the spreading of agriculture in Europe. The 
glottochronological study undertaken by Gray and Atkinson (grAy & AtkinSon, 2003), which sets the date 
of the initial Indo-European divergence between 5,800 and 7,800 BC, seems to support his view. However, 
a glottochronological study, which relies on the assumption that core elements of language are replaced at 
a steady, universally-valid rate of about 4% per millennium, is not entirely trustworthy. Moreover, genetic 
studies based on the mitochondrial DNA (passed on by mother to offspring) such as riChArdS, 2000 have 
indicated that Near-Eastern migration into Europe occurs mostly in Paleolithic and Mesolithic, with a 
marginal Neolithic contribution, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis of an entire Indo-European 
population – including not only men, but also their women – migrating into the region at the time of the 
agricultural revolution. 
19 orlin, 1970.
20 This timespan would be extended if one believed the historical tradition according to which King Sargon 
of Akkad (~23rd century BC) defeated the ruler of Purushanda (South of the wide salt lake ) after Akkadian 
merchants in the latter’s kingdom complained about various forms of oppression.
21  For the relations between the Assyrians and their Anatolian neighbours, cf. orlin, 1970.
22 BryCe, 2005.
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‘sacred cities’ such as Kummanni, Nerik or Zippalanda which seem to be continued by the 
‘temple estates’ in the Classical Age; or patterns of territorial control involving a fortified point 
entrusted to a nobleman, controlling a certain rural area and the interconnecting roads.23 The 
Hittites, though they represented the hegemonic ethnic group, were not the only important 
people in Anatolia. The Kaska to the North, the Haya (ancestors of the Armenians) to the East, 
the Hurrians to the South-East and the Luwians to the West represented mighty foes. 
Once the mighty Hittite kingdom crumbled in the 12th century BC, its place was taken by 
other civilisations: between the 11th and the 7th century BC, one may notice a steady expansion 
of the Phrygian influence towards the East, which may or may not have been accompanied by 
an actual population influx,24 which is then broken off in the 7th century by the great Cimmerian 
invasion from the North-East. The Cimmerians campaigned vigorously throughout Anatolia, 
but with the exception of certain toponyms and a few burial grounds25, they seem to have left 
little behind them. In the wake of the Cimmerian horde, other empires vied for influence over 
Eastern Anatolia. For a while, the Halys formed the boundary between the Median and the 
Lydian Kingdoms,26 which were in turn replaced by the Persians.  
IV.2. Ethnic composition in Hellenistic times
IV.2.1. The (Leuco)Syroi
For the Greek writers of the Classical period, Eastern Anatolia is “the land of the 
Syrians”. Thus, Pindar, as early as the 5th century BC, states that the Amazons (whose 
abode was Themiskyra, in the region of Amisos) led a “Syrian hoast armed with broad 
spears”27; Hecataios appears to place the cities of Chadisia and Teiria in the land of the 
‘Leucosyroi’28; Herodotus mentions that those who inhabit Cappadocia are called ‘Syrians’, 
but sometimes, for added precision, he also uses the term ‘Cappadocian Syrians’29; a 
certain Maiandrios (apparently a Hellenistic logographer from Miletus) hypothesized that 
the Eneti, allies of the Trojans, had come from the land of the Syrians and that those 
Eneti who did not join the expedition lived on to become Cappadocians30; Apollonios of 
23 MAtthewS, 2004.
24 CreSPin, 2001.
25 SuMMerer, 2005, p. 136.
26 hdt, 1.74. rollinger, 2003 disputes, nevertheless, the idea that Asia Minor was under direct Median control.
27 As quoted by Strabon: “αἱ Ἀμαζόνες Σύριον εὐρυαίχμαν δίεπον στρατόν”, Str., 12.3.9.
28  FGrHist. 1.200-201. Stephen of Byzantium appears to be quoting Hecataios’s work “Asia”.
29 “<Ἅλυς>, ὃς ῥέων ἀπὸ μεσαμβρίης μεταξὺ Συρίων τε καὶ Παφλαγόνων ἐξιεῖ πρὸς βορέην”, hdt., 
1.6; “Καππαδόκαι, τοὺς ἡμεῖς Συρίους καλέομεν”, hdt., 5.49; “Οἱ δὲ Καππαδόκαι ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων 
Σύριοι ὀνομάζονται”, hdt., 1.72; “ῥέων ἄνω πρὸς βορέην ἄνεμον ἔνθεν μὲν Συρίους Καππαδόκας 
ἀπέργει, ἐξ εὐωνύμου δὲ Παφλαγόνας”, ibid.
30 Str., 12.3.25.
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Rhodes called the coast around Sinope ‘Assyrian’31; Pseudo-Skymnos states that Amisos 
is “a city in the land of the Leukosyroi”32; later, in the Imperial Age, Lucian of Samosata 
would use for the inhabitants of the area the term ‘Assyroi’.33 It is, however, Strabon’s 
testimony that is the most ample and possibly the most trustworthy: he repeatedly calls 
the Cappadocians ‘Leukosyroi’34 and even attempts to explain the ethnonym in a rather 
literal fashion, distinguishing between the brown-skinned Syrians who live South of the 
Taurus and the white-skinned Syrians who live in Asia Minor.35
The universal agreement between ancient authors that the inhabitants of 
Cappadocia are ‘Syrians’ cannot be explained away as a literary convention or topos, 
and must reflect an ethnic reality: a significant Semitic element must have been 
present.36 Rollinger,37 on the other hand, supports another interpretation, namely that 
31 APoll., Argon., 2.946.
32 Periegesis, 956.
33  luC., DSyr., 33; ibid., 56. While the terms Syroi and Assyroi are used interchangeably in Greek since the 
beginning, reflecting pre-Greek particularities of pronunciation found in Asia Minor (cf. rollinger, 2006b), 
by the end of the Hellenistic Age the terms had separated their semantic area. Lucian is either willingly 
reviving archaic uses (which, being an exponent of the Second Sophistic, is by no means unexpected), or 
reflecting the pronunciation of his home region, Commagene. 
34 Str., 12.3.5; 12.3.9; 12.3.12; 12.3.24 etc.
35 Str., 12.3.9. For a more detailed discussion of the passage, cf. infra, pp. 53-54. 
36 Thus, Frye, 1992.
37 rollinger, 2006a, pp. 81-82.
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the Cappadocians are of Urartean origin. His argument is based on the assumption 
that the Greeks, in naming the locals ‘Σύροι’ and their country ‘Συρία’ must have 
used a term borrowed either directly from them or from their commercial partners in 
the area. He then argues, perhaps rightly, that the Greek term “Συρία” could be traced 
back not only to ‘su+ra/i’, which in Assyrian documents designates Assyria (thus 
supporting the view that Cappadocians were of Semitic origin), but also to ‘sù+ra/i’, 
which is used in Assyrian documents to describe Urartu. Even though linguistically 
this hypothesis appears to be very sound and is very seductive by sheer ingenuity, there 
is a major objection, of historical nature: it postulates a massive Urartean migration 
in Asia Minor, for which there is absolutely no corroborating evidence.38 Rollinger’s 
hypothesis is also disproved by circumstantial evidence, such as aetiological myths. 
Thus, in a scholium to Apollonios’s verses 2.946-94839 it is mentioned that Sinope 
had in fact been brought to the Pontic shore by Apollo, from Syria, and that from 
their union a son was born, by the name Syros, whose name would be perpetuated 
by the inhabitants of the place. A myth with a similar implication is narrated by 
Arrian,40 in which the Assyrians in Cappadocia change their names to Cappadocians 
out of respect for Kappadox, the son of Ninyos, son of Ninos, the mythical founder 
of Nineveh. 
However, a number of differences between the Semites of Anatolia and those 
living South of the Taurus range are hinted at in the sources. For example, Strabon 
states that the Cappadocians are fairer-skinned than the inhabitants of Syria and this 
explains the particle ‘Leuko-’ attached to their ethnonym. To what extent this observation 
corresponds to reality remains debatable, but even if it does not represent a simple 
topos and is based on actual observations, this phenomenon should not be interpreted as 
definite proof of distinct ethnicity, as climatic factors may also serve as an explanation. 
Given the presence of the Semitic element, one would expect the Cappadocians 
to speak a Semitic language, which could only be reinforced by the use of Aramaic as 
administrative language during the time of Persian rule (as demonstrated, for example, by 
the legends of coins struck in the area in Classical and early Hellenistic times), a habit which 
was continued even during Hellenistic and Roman times. The evidence, however, is far 
38 Even Rollinger is aware of this difficulty: “wie dieses Συρία weiter nach Westen nach Kappadokien und 
in den Halys-bogen wanderte, bleibt uns im Detail verbogen”, ibid.
39 “Αὐτίκα δ’ Ἀσσυρίης ἐπέβαν χθονός, ἔνθα Σινώπην / θυγατέρ’ Ἀσωποῖο καθίσσατο καί οἱ 
ὄπασσε / παρθενίην Ζεὺς αὐτός”. Cf. SuMMerer, 2005, p. 132, n. 21.
40 “καὶ τοὺς Καππαδόκας δὲ οὕτω ποτὲ ἱστορεῖ λέγεσθαι, ἐν οἷς φησι Καππαδόκα παῖδα Νινύου, 
ἐφ’ ὅτωι Ἀσσύριοι μεταβαλόντες τὸ ὄνομα Καππαδόκαι ὠνομάσθησαν”, Fr. 2b156. F.74.
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from clear. For example, Basil’s testimony about the language of the Cappadocians is hard 
to interpret:after talking about the way in which a person of Mesopotamian origin is forced 
by the nature of his mother tongue to offer the doxology (a short praise of the divinity) by 
introducing it with the conjunction ‘and’,41 he adds “Καὶ Καππαδόκαι δὲ οὕτω λέγομεν 
ἐγχωρίως”. While this “We too, as Cappadocians, speak in the same manner in our native 
speech” may be interpreted as an admission that Cappadocians speak Aramaic or a dialect 
closely related to it, it may also be understood as simply pointing that the Cappadocian 
language, whatever its origin, shares this doxological peculiarity with the Aramaic language.
On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that Cappadocians did not speak 
Aramaic. Thus, in describing the Cappadocian people, Strabon states that “οἱ δ’ οὖν 
ὁμόγλωττοι μάλιστά εἰσιν οἱ ἀφοριζόμενοι πρὸς νότον μὲν τῷ Κιλικίῳ λεγομένῳ 
Ταύρῳ κτλ.” (Str., 12.1.1), suggesting that the Taurus represented the separation point 
between two distinct linguistic areas. In support of this view, G. Neumann42 analysed 
the slender evidence for the language used in historical times by the Cappadocians and 
drew the conclusion that it represented a descendant of the Hittite. One might also add 
that the names quoted by Strabon as being shared by Capadocians and Paphlagonians 
(Bagas, Biasas, Aeniates, Rhatotes, Zardoces, Tibius, Gasys, Oligasys, Manes) or the 
other names that have been preserved in the epigraphic record (Iazemis, Sagarios, 
Maidates etc.) contain items that are not analysable in the Semitic framework, being, 
most of them, of distinctive Indo-European origin (Thracian, Iranian, etc.). 
None of these factors taken individually is sufficient to disprove the idea that the 
Leukosyroi were Semites. Thus, Strabon merely states that those who live on either 
side of the Taurus do not speak exactly the same language, but this does not exclude 
the hypothesis that they spoke different dialects sharing a common origin; Neumann’s 
study does not constitute irrefutable evidence that the language used in Classical and 
Hellenistic times by Cappadocians is a continuation of Hittite and is not simply a 
Semitic dialect with Hittite loans, because it is the nature of scholia to focus on the 
unusual and omit the usual; finally, the onomastic argument is also weak, because on 
the one hand, names represent an area that is much more dynamic than language as a 
whole and suffers to a much higher degree the influence of contiguity with a different 
cultural/linguistic entity and on the other hand Semitic names are not absent from the 
41 “Wj de\ e)gw¯ tinoj tw½n e)k Mesopotami¿aj hÃkousa, a)ndro\j kaiì th=j glw¯sshj e)mpei¿rwj 
eÃxontoj, kaiì a)diastro/fou th\n gnw¯mhn, ou)de\ dunato\n e(te/rwj ei¹peiÍn tv= e)gxwri¿% fwnv=, kaÄn 
e)qe/lwsin, a)lla\ dia\ th=j kaiì sullabh=j, ma=llon de\ tw½n i¹sodunamousw½n au)tv= fwnw½n, kata/ ti 
i¹di¿wma pa/trion, a)na/gkhn au)toiÍj eiånai th\n docologi¿an profe/rein.”, (De Spiritu Sancto, 29.74).
42  neuMAnn, 1961, pp. 28-33. A more detailed discussion of the passage may be found in jAnSe, 2002.
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record: the Anisa inscription alone (MbBerlin, 1880:646) seems to provide at least three 
examples (Abbas, Balasopos and Sasai).43 
However, when considered in conjunction, the image they seem to convey is that of 
a population speaking a language that may or may not be of Semitic origin, but which is 
certain to contain at least some Hittite elements; which uses names that are preponderantly 
non-Semitic; which might have differed in terms of facial features from their Southerly 
neighbours; but which at the same time designates itself with a word with clear Semitic 
implications, ‘Σύρος’ or ‘Λευκοσύρος’. The situation is not unlike that of the Franks or 
the Bulgars, who settled in certain regions as the ruling elite and subsequently became 
assimilated by the ruled population, though they lent their name and a number of linguistic 
particularities to the newly created ethnic group.
The exact significance of the distinctive particle “Leuko-” has yet to be explained 
in a satisfactory manner. Strabon’s explanation is fairly blunt: 
 
For up to this date the Cappadocians are called Leukosyroi, while those on the other side 
of the Taurus are called Syroi. Compared with those on this side of the mountain range, the 
latter have a tanned complexion, whereas the former do not.44 
While some modern authors tend to take Strabon’s explanation at face value,45 
there is another possible explanation, namely that the colour would have geographical 
rather than physiognomic implications. Schmitt46 has identified four colours that would 
be associated with the cardinal points: black for North, blue for East, red for South and 
white for West. This system applies very well to the otherwise hard to explain “coloured” 
seas: the Black Sea47 in the North and the Red Sea to the South. Thus, the opposition is 
not between “white / pale” and “black / tanned” Syrians, as Strabon seems to believe,48 
43 Lipiński, 1974, pp. 184-191.
44 “καὶ γὰρ ἔτι καὶ νῦν <Καππάδοκες> Λευκόσυροι καλοῦνται, Σύρων καὶ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ Ταύρου 
λεγομένων· κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ Ταύρου σύγκρισιν, ἐκείνων ἐπικεκαυμένων τὴν χρόαν 
τούτων δὲ μή”, Str., 12.3.9. Similarly, the lexicographer Hesychios has under the lemma Λευκοσύρος the 
explanation “Βαβυλώνιος λευκόχροος”. 
45 Thus, rollinger, 2006a, p. 82.
46 SChMitt, 1996.
47 Around the name of the Black Sea there has been a lively debate. Cf. VASMer, 1921; MoorhouSe, 1940; 
Allen, 1947; MoorhouSe, 1948; MitChell, 2002; weSt, 2003. Today, however, the derivation of the Greek 
Ἄξεινος from an Iranian term meaning “black / of dark colour” reflected in Avestan as axšaēna seems well 
established.
48 Modern research in genetics demonstrates a surprising continuity of communities in ancestral realms 
(thus, among others, SYKES, 2002), so a look at the inhabitants of modern Turkey and Syria is not as 
inconclusive as it may appear at first hand, and this will reveal no abrupt discrepancies in terms of skin 
colour between the two communities. Moreover, recent studies seem to suggest the genetic makeup of 
modern Turks is not substantially different from their Near-Eastern neighbours, with a high occurrence rate 
of the haplotypes J1 and J2 (average 33%): cf. CinniOğLu, 2003. 
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but between “Western” and “Southern” Syrians. 
According to the geographic colour-code, one would therefore expect a reference to 
the existence of “red Syrians” South of the Taurus. It is conceivable that the Phoenicians 
were just that. The term φοῖνιξ in Greek initially described the colour bright red and not 
infrequently the etymological connection is established with this colour by virtue of the 
prosperous trade with purple dyes the Canaanites would develop in historical times, but 
this might be, again, a simplification on the part of our sources. 
IV.2.2 Other ethnic groups
While the Leukosyroi seem to represent the majority of the population in the 
region, there are numerous other ethnic groups in the area that forms the object of the 
current investigation. To the North-West lived the Paphlagones, a warlike nation, proud in 
Xenophon’s time for their cavalry, which made them peers of the Persians themselves in 
this respect (Xen., Anab., 5.6.8) but who had become by the end of the Hellenistic Age the 
victims of their more powerful neighbours, Pontus and Bithynia (Iust., 37.4). 
To the North-East, we have knowledge of numerous ethne, like the Mossynoikoi, the 
Tibarenoi, the Chalybes49 and many others, tribal communities surviving in relative isolation, 
generally in mountainous areas. We might never know much about the ethnicity of these 
tribes, given that we have little information about them and the little we have is sometimes 
stained with clichés and exaggerations. For example, Xenophon’s Anabasis is a precious 
source and the ethnographic account it contains is most of the times credible, but even he 
goes as far as claiming the Chalybes wield huge 6 metre long pikes (the famed Macedonian 
sarissa was no more than 5 metres long), while being adamant they are light infantry who 
often stop to chop the heads of fallen enemies (5.4.7; 5.4.15-16). The Mossynoikoi in his 
description are the epitome of otherness, doing in public what people normally do in private, 
such as having intercourse with women, and in private what other people normally do in 
public, such as singing or dancing (5.4.34), which reminds one of the topos going back at least 
as Herodotus’ description of the Egyptian other. They could be descendents of the Hittites 
or of their perpetual enemies, the Kaska, or they could represent enclaves of later invaders, 
like the Cimmerians. There are hints to support this last hypothesis, though admittedly one 
could not build a very solid case. Firstly, the Aeschylian verse “Χάλυβος Σκυθῶν ἄποικος” 
(Septem contra Thebas, 728) seems to indicate such a tradition, given that the Cimmerians 
were believed to have been exiled from the area North of the Black Sea. While some traditions 
consider the Cimmerians and the Scythians completely distinct, even violently opposed (hdt., 
49 Mossynoikoi: hdt., 3.94; Xen., Anab., 5.4; Str., 12.3.18; Tibarenoi: hdt., 3.94; Xen., Anab., 5.5; Str., 
12.3.28; Chalybes: hdt., 1.28; Xen., Anab., 4.7; Str., 12.3.19, but he mentions that in his time they were 
more commonly known as ‘Chaldaioi’.
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4.1), others see them as one and the same group (the neo-Babylonian texts use the same 
word, Gimirri, for both tribes),50 which may explain the phrase of the tragic poet. Secondly, 
Xenophon is amazed by the skin of certain Mossynoikian children, which is extremely white 
and decorated with tattoos of floral design, which cannot fail to remind one of the spectacular 
Pazyryk tombs, where the Scythian chieftains have intricate tattoos with zoomorphic and 
floral designs. However, one may not rule out the possibility that these mountain tribes may 
represent some other ethnic group, whose story can no longer be reconstructed.
IV.2.3. Significant minorities: Greeks and Iranians
Two minorities deserve special attention. One is the Greeks who have founded 
numerous settlements along the shores of the Black Sea. Though few in number, the 
Greeks represent one of the most influential communities in Eastern Asia Minor, both 
before Alexander, when they appear to have solid economic and political ties with the 
non-Greek populations of the Hinterland51 and after the Conqueror, when Greeks are 
copiously attested around the royal figures. The other is the Iranian element, which 
is most visible in the case of local aristocracy and in its observance of Achaemenid 
traditions, reflected not only in onomastics, but also in many aspects of religion. 
IV.3. Ethnic dynamics
The ethnic situation of Eastern Anatolia is far from static during the Classical and 
Hellenistic Ages, when changes occur mainly in two ways: by colonisation and by cultural 
influence (which may range from acculturation to assimilation). 
IV.3.1. Colonisation
Colonisation is well attested in the case of Greek population, and it started as early as 
the 8th century BC.52 The main foundations were Sinope and Herakleia on the Paphlagonian 
coast, Amisos and Trapezous on the Pontic coast, followed by Phasis in Colchis. Besides 
these large settlements, there were also others of smaller sizes, such as Kromna, Kytoros, 
Abonouteichos, Armene, Themiskyra, Kotyora, Kerasous and many others. These smaller 
communities have different trajectories. Some become little more than fishing villages, 
even inspiring jocose remarks, as the one recorded by Strabon about the walls of Armene.53 
Others follow the path of synoecism, though often not of their own volition. An example is 
represented by Sesamos, Kromna, Kytoros and Tieion, brought together by the will of Queen 
50 Cf. Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. ‘Cimmerians’.
51 For the relations established between a polis and its surrounding territories and communities, cf. 
infra, pp. 187-189. 
52 hAnSen & nielSen, 2004 provide excellent orientation. On the specific issue of Black Sea colonisation, 
cf. drewS, 1976.
53 “ὅστις ἔργον οὐδὲν εἶχεν Ἀρμένην ἐτείχισεν”, Str., 12.3.10.
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Amastris into a city bearing her name (of these, Tieion would later regain independence); 
another by Kytoros and Kerasous, refounded by king Pharnakes I as Pharnakeia. Colonization 
sometimes has more than one phase. For example, Amisos, though founded in the first 
instance by Milesians, received in later centuries an Athenian colony and changed its name 
to Peiraieus, after the harbour-city of Athens.54 Colonisation may also appear as a result 
of deportation. Of that, we have a single, but dramatic example: the inhabitants of Chios, 
accused (rightly or wrongly) by Mithradates VI of conspiring against his interests, were 
deprived of their possessions and forcibly moved to Colchis.55 
Colonisation of Eastern Asia Minor is not exclusively a Greek phenomenon. 
Iranians too penetrated this area during the extended period of Achaemenid rule, 
although from what we can discern this colonisation involved fewer individuals.56 
Another significant trait of this process is that it appears to involve primarily aristocratic 
elements who, after settling in the area, helped develop a highly efficient administration. 
One example illustrating how smoothly the Persian administration functioned is the 
Royal Road, which traversed Cappadocia from one end to the other. Of these Iranian 
aristocratic families, some with venerable pedigree, would emerge in the Hellenistic era 
the dynastai and even royal families.57
IV.3.2. Cultural Influence
Two ethnic groups in close proximity will generally experience mutual 
influences, i.e. a process of acculturation. Of the two parties, one may be more 
receptive than the other or, on the contrary, more preoccupied than the other with 
maintaining a sense of identity by preserving those traits it perceives as defining 
this identity. Thus, the process of influence often appears as asymmetrical, with one 
partner more visibly transformed than the other. The extreme scenario is represented 
by assimilation, as a result of which one group ostensibly loses its ethnic identity. 
The ethnically diverse landscape of Eastern Asia Minor has ensured prolonged and 
intense contact between the various ethnic groups and as such both acculturation 
and assimilation may be observed.
Classical scholarship has been until recently almost exclusively interested in the 
54  Str., 12.3.14.
55 MeMn., 23; APP., Mithr., 25 and 46-47; Athen., 6.91. It is interesting to observe that while in Memnon’s 
account, highly apologetic of his native city, it is the Heracleotes who boldly save the Chians from slavery, 
in Appian’s version the return of the Chians to their island is made one of the conditions of the peace with 
Sulla, which concluded the First Mithradatic War.
56 MitChell, 2007.
57 For the claims of the Mithradatids and Ariarathids of descent from none other than Dareios I, cf. 
infra, pp. 94-99.
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process whereby Greek culture (or various traits thereof) was gradually adopted by non-
Greek populations, i.e. in Hellenisation. This is a very visible and complex process, 
manifested both in the private and the public sphere. 
Onomastics is one field of private life where Greek influence is felt quite strongly. 
It is true that proving that a certain person bearing a Greek name is in fact non-Greek 
may seem at times impossible, but in several instances the probability of this happening 
is quite high: for example a certain Dionysios, eunuch in service of Mithradates VI (APP., 
Mithr., 76) is very likely to be one such man, given that it was not at all common for a 
Greek to be submitted to such treatment.58
Adopting the Greek form of organisation is a manifestation of  Hellenisation in the 
sphere of public life. One may observe, for example, non-Greek cities copying Greek 
institutions, such as small Anisa, which sets up an inscription (adopting the epigraphic 
habit is in itself another instance of Hellenisation) naming the boule, demos or the prytany.59 
Adopting the Greek language – which encompasses both the private and the public 
spheres – is at the same time patent and difficult to assess. On the one hand the administration 
appears to use exclusively Greek in its transactions. All coin legends, for example, are written 
in Greek, as are the other inscriptions with official character to be found in the area, from 
Amaseia, where Metrodoros, an official of Pharnakes I dedicates an altar (St.P. III, 94), to 
the great Commagenian hierothesion at Nemrut. But to what extent could Greek have spread 
beyond the poleis and the relatively narrow confines of the court? One short inscription from 
Gazioura is interesting from this point of view and is worth quoting in full: 
ξένον μηδένα ἐντὸς | τοῦ διαγράμματος | παρ[απ]ορεύ[εσ]θαι ἄ[νε]υ | τοῦ 
[ἀ]κρ[ο]φύ[λακο]ς· ἂ[ν δ’ οὖ]ν | ἁλίσ[κη]τ[α]ι, ὁ [μὲν] οἰκέτης | [μα]στιγω[θεὶς] 
πε[π]ρά[σεται], | [ὁ] δ’ [ἐ]λεύθ[ε]ρος [ἑα]υ[τὸν] | [αἰτιάσεται] (St.P. III, 278). 
This inscription has been used to argue that the xenoi must have been able to read 
the decree in order to heed it. A number of issues remain unclear, though. Who were the 
xenoi? It seems unlikely that Gazioura ever had a polis structure (in Strabon’s words, it 
was ‘παλαιὸν βασίλειον, νῦν δ’ ἔρημον’, 12.3.15), so it seems hard to believe they were 
inhabitants of the urban community without full citizenship. In this case, one is left to 
58 The care Strabon takes in 13.4.1 to explain the castration of Philetairos, the founder of the Attalid dynasty, 
by an unfortunate accident during childhood, doubtlessly propagating the “official” version of the story, 
underlines the fact that eunuchs were regarded by Greeks as completely alien.
59 MbBerlin 1880:646: “ἀγαθῆι τύχηι. | ἔτους ζʹ, μηνὸς Δίου, ἐν Ανίσοις, ἐπὶ | δημιουργοῦ 
Παπου τοῦ Βαλασωπου | ἔδοξεν Ανισηνῶν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι | δήμωι· πρυτανίων εἰπάντων· 
κτλ.” For other examples of Greek political life penetrating Asia Minor, cf. le dinAhet, 2003, particularly 
pp. 123-129.
Geographical and Historical Overview 57
wonder not only if they were able to really read Greek, but also if they were able to read at 
all. Perhaps the inscription was not intended to be read by the xenoi, but rather to the xenoi. 
The reason to display such a decree in the form of an inscription might be quite simply that 
the written word carries more weight than the spoken word. This inscription, therefore, 
while not being irrefutable proof that Greek enjoyed large circulation, even among the 
masses, constitutes yet another proof it was the official language of the administration.
Following the type of colonisation, one would expect Persian cultural influence to 
be exerted mainly at the level of local aristocracy. Indeed, there is data demonstrating 
the adoption of Achaemenid conventions by the wealthy strata, not only in the form of 
Iranian names,60 but also the adoption of items of clothing and furniture of Persian type, 
as demonstrated by reliefs carved in stone.61 The influence has, nevertheless, penetrated 
other strata as well, most notably in the domain of religious life, where Magi, for 
example, are called upon to perform numerous rites.62
The Semitic element of the population is equally dynamic. Thus, the power of 
assimilation of the Leukosyroi is visible right up to the end of the Hellenistic age: Strabon 
informs us (12.1.2) that although in the past the Cataonians had formed a distinct ethnic 
group, they had become, in the relatively short time between their annexation by Ariarathes 
III63 and Strabon’s own time, indistinguishable from the rest of the Cappadocian population.
The image that all these developments form is one of intense cultural dialogue, 
which forms an excellent premise for research.
v. historicaL deveLopments
For the sake of clarity, a brief outline of the major historical developments from the 
Achaemenid conquest to the Roman one in order to frame the analysis in the following 
chapters is perhaps useful at this point. More attention will be given to those periods or 
aspects that have drawn less attention from scholars, while offering only the sketchiest 
of treatments to those ages for which there is abundant bibliography, such as the rule of 
Mithradates Eupator and his wars against Rome.
V.1. The period of Persian rule
The Persians obtained the territory East of the Halys from their predecessors, the 
60 roBert, 1963; MitChell, 2007.
61  PASPAlAS, 2000, p. 540.
62  For the worship of Iranian divinities and the importance of the Magi, cf. infra, pp. 123-124. 
63 Strabon’s phrasing, “προσεκτήσατο δ’ αὐτοὺς Ἀριαράθης ὁ πρῶτος προσαγορευθεὶς Καππαδόκων 
βασιλεύς”, seems to imply he is talking about Ariarathes III (c.255-220), rather than about Ariarathes I, the 
Persian satrap who was killed by Eumenes and who, by adopting his nephew, founded the Ariarathid dynasty. 
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Medians, at the moment when the revolt of Cyrus the Great, the ruler of Anšan, ended 
successfully with his defeat of Astyages, the Median king, at some point between 554 
and 549 BC,64 and transfer of treasury from Ekbatana to Pasargadae. Cyrus proceeded 
to expand his dominion in Asia Minor by defeating the Lydian Kingdom around 547 
BC, tradition has it, after Croesus attacked and captured a Cappadocian town, Pteria, 
enslaving its inhabitants.65 
After the successful plot of the Seven Wise, Dareios is said by Diodorus to have 
granted Anaphas, the satrap of Cappadocia, special rights, such as tribute exemption.66 
Dareios certainly did not do that: none of the collaborators he mentions in the great 
Behistun inscription (Vindafarnā, Utāna, Gaŭbaruva, Vidrna, Bagabuxša, Ardumaniš)67 
has a name that could possibly be corrupted in such a way as to become Anaphas in a 
Greek source. Behind the tradition recorded by Diodorus (and Ktesias before him) there 
seems to be an aulic mythology created at the Cappadocian satrapal and subsequently royal 
court.68 It remains, however, an important piece of information that Cappadocia figured in 
Achaemenid tradition as a very important satrapy, perhaps even with special status.
According to Strabon, it was in Persian times that the region was divided in two 
administrative districts,69 but this seems to be an instance of projecting into the past a 
contemporary reality. What we can discern from literary and numismatic sources shows a 
single satrap in charge of this entire region: Datames, for example struck coins from Tarsus to 
Sinope, while Ariarathes I, the founder of the Cappadocian dynasty, struck coins at Gazioura, 
which is situated at the very heart of what would become the Pontic Kingdom.70
V.2. From Alexander’s Anabasis to the birth of the Cappadocian kingdoms
In Arrian’s account,71 Alexander passes briefly through Cappadocia, on his way 
from Ancyra – where he receives the submission of the Paphlagonians – to the Cilician 
Gates. It is unclear what the phrase “αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Καππαδοκίας ἐλάσας ξύμπασαν 
τὴν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ προσηγάγετο καὶ ἔτι ὑπὲρ τὸν Ἅλυν πολλήν” implies in 
terms of conquered territory, but Alexander nevertheless appointed a certain Sabiktas72 
as satrap of Cappadocia. The superficial character of this conquest is demonstrated by 
64 Cf. dAndAMAeV, 1989, p. 17, n. 1 for the main chronological hypotheses.
65  hdt., 1.76; diod., 9.31.3.
66 diod., 31.19.2.
67  DB IV, 80-86.
68 Cf. infra, pp. 92-97.
69  Str., 12.1.4.
70  For a discussion of the borders of Cappadocia in Achaemenid times, cf. deBord, 1999, pp. 83-91.
71 Arr., Anab., 2.4.2.
72 Thus Arr., Anab., 2.4.2. Curtius, however, calls him Abistamenes (Curt., 3.4.1).
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the fact that, after the battle of Issos, the fleeing Persians found shelter and support 
in Cappadocia, which they then used as a base of operations against Antigonos 
Monophthalmos, then satrap of Phrygia73. They failed, but due more to the generalship 
of Antigonos that from lack of manpower, if we are to believe Curtius’ words: “Darei 
praetores […] adsumpta etiam Cappadocum et Paphlagonum iuventute Lydiam 
reciperare temptabant.” (Curt., 4.1.34).74
The age of bitter struggle between Alexander’s generals left an indelible mark on the 
political landscape of the region. Ariarathes, the aged satrap of Cappadocia (he was around 
80 years old, according to Hieronymos of Kardia, quoted by Lucian75), had ousted the 
Macedonian satrap at some unknown moment, but his defiance of Macedonian authority 
was overlooked by Alexander, whose attention was fixed on his Eastern exploits. Being 
able to collect unmolested the revenues of his lands, he succeeded in raising an army of 
thirty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry.76 Even so, he was defeated twice by 
Perdiccas77 and eventually executed. Cappadocia was subsequently given by the victor 
to his protégé, Eumenes, according to the division of satrapies agreed upon at Babylon. 
Eumenes the courtier turned into a successful field commander and was able to forge 
an excellent army by combining Macedonian and local elements. He was accompanied, 
for example, by a certain Mithradates, son of Ariobarzanes, who claimed to descend from 
one of the Seven Wise.78 It is conceivable that this man was the one known to modern 
scholars as Mithradates II of Cius, whose father is also called Ariobarzanes.79 If so, he 
held sway – according to the Diodoran manuscript tradition – over Kios and Arrhine.80 
Bosworth and Wheatley have argued quite convincingly, however, that at this point the 
tradition is most likely corrupt and that Mithradates must have exercised authority over 
Mysia and Mariandynia. It remains obscure how Mithradates behaved when Parmenion 
established a bridgehead into Asia for Philip II and afterwards, during Alexander’s 
73  Curt., 4.1.34-35.
74 See also the comments made by BillowS, 1990, pp. 42-45. For a detailed presentation of Antigonos’ 
activity in Asia Minor, cf. BriAnt, 1973, pp. 45-95. 
75 luC., Macr., 13.
76  diod., 18.16.2.
77  Arr., MetAlex., 1.11.
78  diod., 19.40.2.
79 The tradition preserved by Diodoros (diod., 15.90.3) names as his father the famous Ariobarzanes, satrap 
of Phrygia who took part in the satrapal revolt against Artaxerxes Mnemon, only to be betrayed by no other 
than his own son and executed. This tradition has been supported by reinACh, 1890, pp. 5-7 and MCging, 
1986b, p. 248-9. Bosworth and Wheatley take the opposite stance and argue that there must have existed 
two prominent Persian dynasts by the same name, one ruling Mariandynia, the other Phrygia (BoSworth & 
wheAtley, 1998, pp. 160-161).
80 diod., 20.111.4.
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expedition, but as the Persian seems to have maintained his authority and the Macedonian 
king is known to have preferred to maintain the Persian collaborators in their positions, 
it is not unlikely that Mithradates chose the path of collaboration. After the death of the 
Conqueror, Mithradates, as mentioned above, lent his forces to Eumenes and with his 
substantial help the latter even succeeded in overpowering the much more experienced 
Crateros. Almost simultaneously, Perdiccas was assassinated in Egypt and the subsequent 
Triparadeisos agreement, having for main beneficiaries Antigonos Monophthalmos, 
Ptolemaios and Seleukos, gave Antigonos a free hand in dealing with Eumenes. 
After many daring operations on both sides, sometimes interrupted by brief episodes 
of reconciliation, Eumenes was betrayed by his own troops after the battle of Gabiene, 
in Persia, and executed. Asia Minor was now firmly in the hands of Antigonos, who 
industriously eliminated all remaining pockets of resistance. It happened, however, that 
the other diadochs soon allied against him and issued an ultimatum,81 among the conditions 
of which was that he should cede Cappadocia and Lycia to Kassandros and Hellespontine 
Phrygia to Lysimachos. These requirements aimed to undermine the main powerbase of 
Antigonos, which was represented by Asia Minor. Monophthalmos predictably refused to 
comply and thus the stage was set for the next stage in the conflict of the diadochi. Victory 
eluded all combatants and by 311 they concluded a peace which sanctioned the statu 
quo. It was to be a short-lived peace. A number of epic encounters marked the following 
years. The one which could be said to have had the most far-reaching consequences was 
Demetrios’ defeat of Ptolemaios off Cyprus, which offered the opportunity for Antigonos 
and Demetrios to have themselves acclaimed βασλεῖς by the army, in 306.
Events took a turn for the worse for Antigonos early in 302, when, as he was about to finish 
off Kassandros, he found himself facing a coalition of four kings: Kassandros, Lysimachos, 
Ptolemaios and Seleukos. The invasion of Asia Minor by Lysimachos and Seleukos that year 
(Kassandros personally led part of his troops in Greece, trying to pin down Demetrios, while 
Ptolemaios was busy occupying Coile Syria and consolidating his position there) created the 
optimum environment for two Persian dynasts who tried to carve up a kingdom for themselves. 
One of them was Mithradates, who would later be called “Ktistes”, “the Founder”, 
the son of Mithradates who had sided with Eumenes and was now deemed a subject 
of Antigonos. The old man was accused – perhaps rightly – of having negotiated with 
81  “Προάγοντος δ’ εἰς τὴν ἄνω Συρίαν Ἀντιγόνου παρεγένοντο πρέσβεις παρά τε Πτολεμαίου καὶ 
Λυσιμάχου καὶ Κασάνδρου. οὗτοι δ’ εἰσαχθέντες εἰς τὸ συνέδριον ἠξίουν Καππαδοκίαν μὲν καὶ Λυκίαν 
Κασάνδρῳ δοθῆναι, Φρυγίαν δὲ τὴν ἐφ’ Ἑλλησπόντῳ Λυσιμάχῳ” (diod., 19.57.1). The emendations 
proposed to the passage, namely “Ασάνδρῳ” for “Κασάνδρῳ” and “Λυδίαν” or “Κιλικίαν” for “Λυκίαν” 
have been rejected convincingly by Ed. Will in favour of the original text: cf. will, 1966, pp. 49-50.
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Kassandros (or perhaps with Kassandros’ general, Prepelaos, who was in Asia Minor, 
alongside Lysimachos) and duly executed. 
Ktistes was in danger of suffering the same fate, but it seems he was warned by 
Demetrios, whom he had befriended. Such, at least, is the story offered by Plutarch,82 
but the biographer uses this event from Demetrios’ youth, in which he displays at 
the same time magnanimity and loyalty, in order to build up a more striking contrast 
with Demetrios’ personality in later years. It is, therefore, not unlikely that the story 
as outlined by Plutarch is guided by literary motifs rather than by actual facts. What 
remains certain is that Mithradates fled speedily in the direction of Paphlagonia, partly 
because this region was close to his original holdings, partly because it was now under 
the authority of Lysimachos, who, as the enemy of his enemy, was likely to be his friend. 
His first centre of power was the fortress of Kimista (textual tradition had preserved the 
reading Kimiata – a palaeographical error easy to explain – but epigraphic documents83 
have recently shown the real name of the place), at the foot of the Olgassys Mountains, 
and from this area he expanded his authority into the fertile valley of the river Iris, 
which had Amaseia for centre.
The other Persian nobleman who took advantage of the strategic situation created 
by the conflict of the diadochi in Asia Minor was Ariarathes. He was the nephew and 
adopted son of Ariarathes, the old satrap of Cappadocia defeated and executed by 
Perdiccas (cf. supra). The younger Ariarathes succeeded in finding refuge in Armenia. 
He tried to regain his ancestral holdings when situation allowed it: Diodoros (diod. 
31.19.5) mentions his attempt was occasioned by the strife between Antigonos and 
Seleukos. While conflicts between these two have been numerous, the only context that 
would have allowed a successful expedition (for we obviously know it was successful) 
by the Cappadocian prince was that of the initial phases of the Ipsos campaign, in 
302/301, when the main actors – Seleukos and Lysimachos – were preoccupied with 
damaging Antigonos’ position in terms of financial resources, manpower and not least 
prestige. Ariarathes was granted by Orontes II (Ardoates, according to Diodoros84) 
a small army, and by Seleukos his complicity. In the decisive battle, he defeated 
Antigonos’ general Amyntas and took control of the country.
Thus, if in the Pontic Cappadocia Mithradates found an ally or at least an accomplice 
in Lysimachos, to the South, in Greater Cappadocia, Ariarathes was aided by Seleukos. As 
82  Plut., Dem., 4.1-5.
83 Marek, Kat.Kaisareia, 6; 14. See also the results of the Paphlagonian survey led by Roger Matthews, which 
identified Asar Kale as the most likely site for the ancient fortress of Kimista: MAtthewS, 2004, pp. 206-207.
84 Both Orontes and Ardoates are Greek variants of the Iranian name Aruuanta, or Ervand in Armenian.
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in the final battle against Antigonos the coalition of the four diadochi emerged victorious 
and old Monophthalmos lost his life, the two Persian princes could expect to reap the 
benefits of having supported the winning side. 
V.3. From the foundation of the dynasties to the Treaty of Apameia
The coalition of Kassandros, Lysimachos, Ptolemaios and Seleukos, cemented only 
by the common enmity towards Antigonos, was not destined to live long beyond the 
victory at Ipsos. 
In so far as Asia Minor was concerned, the greatest winner was Lysimachos, who 
greatly expanded his area of control. However, this large territory was far from having 
any sense of unity. Rather, it was a patchwork of principalities and poleis held together in 
a fairly loose manner by different forms of allegiance to the person of the king. As such, 
the cracks in the system became apparent in a relatively short time.
By the 280s the relations between the former allies were strained. Kassandros 
had died in 297, which gave Demetrios the opportunity to gain Macedon. In these 
circumstances, it was in Ptolemaios’ and Lysimachos’ common interest to eliminate 
Demetrios and limit the influence of Seleukos, which lead not only to an alliance between 
the first two, but also brought about a temporary rapprochement of the other two. 
Events took a favourable turn for Seleukos when his rivals faced dynastic difficulties: 
Ptolemaios I Soter died in 283, leaving on the throne Ptolemaios II Philadelphos, 
who was preoccupied by the claims of his half-brother Ptolemaios Keraunos; in 284 
Lysimachos was persuaded to eliminate his promising heir, Agathocles, in favour of 
Arsinoe’s offspring, Ptolemaios. This act of bitter dynastic intrigue, coupled with the 
perceived despotism of his rule85 prompted many allies to rebel. After having ensured 
the neutrality of the Lagid king, possibly under the threat of supporting the claims of 
Keraunos,86 Seleukos proceeded to eliminate his old friend. Asia Minor would, once 
again, be the decisive battleground.
In this campaign, which would culminate with the battle of Korupedion, the 
diplomatic manoeuvres were at least as important as the military ones. Twenty years 
previously Ariarathes and Mithradates had been aided more or less actively by the then 
allied Seleukos and Lysimachos. Now, when their original benefactors were at odds, the 
two Persian dynasts were probably forced to choose sides. One would be well advised, 
85 Lund (lund, 1992, pp. 107-152) calls to question the veracity of ancient sources which dwell on the 
avarice and high-handedness of Lysimachos’ rule, drawing sensible parallels with similar patterns of 
behavior of other, less maligned diadochs. It remains clear, however, that hostile propaganda had managed 
to erode his image significantly, even during his lifetime.
86 grAinger, 1990, pp. 180-182.
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when trying to determine which camp the two chose, to treat with caution the natural 
impulse of considering that Mithradates would continue to support Lysimachos and 
Ariarathes Seleukos. Treachery promised, in this context, to be highly profitable and there 
were many who changed sides, most notably Philetairos, governor of Pergamon. Yet a 
notice in Trogus pertaining to this period is very likely to demonstrate that old loyalties 
might still be functioning: 
Septimo decimo volumine continentur haec. Ut Lysimachus occiso filio Agathocle 
per novercam Arsinoen bellum cum rege Seleuco habuit, quo victus interiit: ultimumque 
certamen conmilitonum Alexandri fuit. Ut Seleucus amissis in Cappadocia cum Diodoro 
copiis interfectus est ab Ptolomaeo fratre Arsinoes uxoris Lysimachi […]. (trog., Prol., 17). 
Two issues require attention in this highly elliptic phrase. One would be the precise 
location of the battle lost by the troops of Seleukos. Magie87 has suggested that “Cappadocia” 
is an abbreviation for “Pontic Cappadocia”. Indeed, strategic considerations make the reading 
“Greater Cappadocia” unlikely: Seleukos would not have ventured so deeply in Lysimachos’ 
territory had Greater Cappadocia been hostile to him in the initial phases of the campaign and it 
is improbable that Ariarathes chose the path of disobedience after the final victory was secured 
by the Seleukid king. On the other hand, it is more reasonable to see Seleukos sending a punitive 
expedition against Mithradates (who would have been allied to Lysimachos) after Korupedion, 
during the period of seven months before he embarked on the fateful European campaign. 
The other issue is far more difficult to settle. The nature of the ablative absolute 
construction allows for a number of nuances: temporal, causal, even concessive. What was 
so important about this Cappadocian event that made it worth including in the Prologue 
alongside events of prime importance, such as the war between the diadochs and the 
deaths of Lysimachos and Seleukos? The causal and concessive values of the phrase, 
though theoretically possible, must probably be discarded in favour of the temporal value. 
Is the defeat in Cappadocia then merely a point of chronological reference (‘soon after 
the troops lead by Diodoros were lost in Cappadocia, Seleukos was murdered’)? In that 
case, one would expect the event of greater significance to act as the reference point for 
the other, and not vice versa. 
Perhaps one should consider, as scholarly opinion usually holds,88 that this event 
gave Mithradates the opportunity to assume the royal title and thus explain the apparent 
importance of the Cappadocian incident. Corroborating information to support such a 
87  MAgie, 1975, p. 1087, n. 36.
88 Thus, MCging, 1986a, p. 19.
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view is provided by Strabon:
τὴν δὲ Καππαδοκίαν […] παραλαβόντες Μακεδόνες περιεῖδον τὰ μὲν 
ἑκόντες τὰ δ’ ἄκοντες εἰς βασιλείας ἀντὶ σατραπειῶν περιστᾶσαν· ὧν τὴν 
μὲν ἰδίως Καππαδοκίαν ὠνόμασαν […], τὴν δὲ Πόντον, οἱ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τῷ  
Πόντῳ Καππαδοκίαν. (Str., 12.1.4)
The designation ‘Macedonians’ in this context appears to cover two distinct 
political entities: those who took over Cappadocia from the Persians are obviously the 
Macedonians under Alexander, while those who witnessed the transition of the two 
Cappadocian regions from satrapies to kingdoms must be the Seleukids. 
It would appear, however, that the enmity between the Mithradatid and the 
Seleukid court was quick to disappear, for we see Ktistes and Ariobarzanes (his son and 
apparently co-ruler) fight alongside the newly arrived Galatians against Ptolemaios II.89 
Another episode which supports the view that the Mithradatids had become reconciled 
with the Seleukids by the end of the reign of Ktistes is that Eumenes, the governor of 
Amastris and brother of Philetairos (the founder of the Attalid dynasty, who had sided 
with Seleukos I and maintained this allegiance at least nominally to the end of his life) 
chose in 279 to hand over the city not to the inhabitants of Heracleia, in spite of the 
tempting offers they had made, but rather to the Pontic house. As Mitchell has argued,90 
it is unlikely that Philetairos was not consulted in the matter and equally improbable 
that he would have allowed this important settlement to fall into inimical hands.
There followed a period of good collaboration between the two Cappadocian 
dynasties and the great Macedonian house, which took in around 245 the form of a dynastic 
alliance: Seleukos II gave two sisters in marriage to Mithradates II (son of Ariobarzanes) 
and Ariarathes III (son of Ariaramnes), respectively. By this time both of them had taken 
the royal title, as is demonstrated by numismatic evidence. 
Two staters bearing the legend ΜΙΘΡΑΔΑΤΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ (now held by the 
Bibliothèque Nationale and the von Aulock Collection, respectively) have been attributed 
by various scholars to three Pontic kings: Mithradates I Ktistes, Mithradates II and, 
recently, Mithradates III (cf. infra, Figure IV.3). Their imagery closely resembles that 
of the staters struck by Alexander, which are popular enough to be copied by Seleukids 
as well (houghton & lorBer, no. 1014, attributed either to Antiochos Hierax or to 
89 StePh.Byz., s.v. Ἄγκυρα.
90 MitChell, 2005, p. 526.
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Antiochos III). Callataÿ91 observed that the control marks are identical with those of 
civic issues by Amisos and therefore proposes to attribute them to Mithradates III, even 
offering a possible context for the issues, namely the attack on Sinope mentioned by 
Polybios in 220. There are, however, a few problems with this attribution. The presence 
of Amisene control marks does not point exclusively to Mithradates III, for we know the 
city had already been taken over by the Ariobarzanes: soon after his death, his successor 
– young Mithradates II – is besieged there by the Galatians.92 Moreover, one can hardly 
see a reason for using on staters the archaic formula ΜΙΘΡΑΔΑΤΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ,93 
while on tetradrachms he used the modern one, with inversed terms: ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ 
ΜΙΘΡΑΔΑΤΟΥ. Furthermore, it was Mithradates II who was in the best position to 
derive inspiration from Seleukid issues, whether by Hierax or by Antiochos III: he was 
the former’ brother-in-law and the latter’s father-in-law. It is probably safe to consider 
therefore that the royal title had been assumed by the Mithradatids probably as early as 
Ktistes’ victory, but certainly no later than Mithradates II’s reign (usually taken to last 
from around 250 to around 210).
In neighbouring Cappadocia, Ariarathes II apparently did not issue coins,94 while his 
successor, Ariaramnes, struck exclusively bronze coins, whose legend written in Greek 
letters mentions his name, but no trace of the royal title. It was only under Ariarathes III 
that the dynasty acquired this status, at an unknown date. The year 245, when Ariarathes 
takes as his bride Stratonike, daughter of Antiochos II Theos and sister of Seleukos II 
and Antiochos Hierax, serves as a terminus ante quem, for it is unlikely that the Seleukid 
court would have considered such a dynastic alliance had the Cappadocian been merely 
a dynastes. It is possible that he assumed the title βασιλεύς upon his annexation of 
Cataonia,95 an event of great importance. This region hosted the great temple of Ma from 
Comana, and it is now, during the reign of Ariarathes III, that the goddess makes her 
appearance on Cappadocian coins – in the guise of Athena Nikephoros – and would remain 
thereafter almost omnipresent on the reverse of Cappadocian coins. Numismatically, 
the elevation to royal status is attested by both bronze and silver issues with the legend 
ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΡΙΑΡΑΘΟΥ,96 which follow chronologically the bronze issues that 
91 CAllAtAÿ, 2009.
92 MeMn., 16.1.
93 The arguments in favour of considering this formula as archaic are presented in reinACh, 1888, p. 241, 
accepted in broad terms by Fr. de Callataÿ (cf. supra, n. 91).
94 Reinach attributes one bronze coin with Aramaic legend to Ariarathes II (reinACh, 1888, p. 30), but 
Simonetta denies such an attribution (SiMonettA, 1977, p. 16).
95 Str., 12.1.2.
96 SiMonettA, I.9; I.10.
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mention only the ruler’s name, either in Greek or Aramaic alphabet. 
Throughout this early period the two Anatolian dynasties were busy consolidating their 
positions. The Pontic kings tried to extend their influence along the shores of the Black Sea: 
they had acquired Amastris and Amisos by the time of Ariobarzanes; Mithradates (either II 
or III) initiated an attack on Sinope, which failed due to the energetic support lent by Rhodos 
to its fellow polis. The Cappadocian kings expanded their authority in the opposite direction, 
towards the South, taking Cataonia under Ariarathes III, as mentioned above. 
The two kingdoms quickly became important players in microasiatic politics. 
Their geographical position, which enabled them to control to a good degree the traffic 
between Western Asia Minor on the one hand, and the Syrian coast, Mesopotamia and the 
“upper satrapies” on the other hand often made them part of the conflicts that involved 
the Seleukids and their rivals, some of which – and by no means the least important – 
were themselves Seleukids. Therefore, the friendship of the Cappadocian kings was often 
courted. The two marriages mentioned above, those arranged by Seleukos II in around 245, 
can be placed within the context of the Third Syrian War, when he more or less abandoned 
Syria, but needed to keep Asia Minor safe. Shortly thereafter, during the conflict which 
opposed Seleukos II to his brother, Antiochus Hierax, the latter had with him Laodike, the 
daughter of Mithradates II “ἐν παρακαταθήκῃ” (Pol., 5.74.5), which probably means 
both hostage and prospective wife. This marriage was never consummated, but the same 
Laodike would afterwards become the wife of another charismatic rebel, Achaios. Her 
sister, also named Laodike, was given in marriage to Antiochos III in 222, and their 
daughter, Antiochis, would marry the Cappadocian king Ariarathes IV. 
This network of dynastic alliances (which are treated in more detail below, in the 
chapter detailing Dynastic Policies and Politics) is indissolubly linked to the political context 
in which they were established and defines the major lines of the political agenda of the 
parties involved. Thus, before the critical battle of Apameia the Seleukids, Mithradatids and 
Ariarathids intermarried frequently, and relations between them were generally good. As 
explained by McGing, “The Mithradatids got Hellenistic recognition, the Seleucids Iranian 
respectability”.97 The good relations went beyond mutually advantageous matrimonial 
ties, and one may observe them also in the military sphere, for Ariarathes IV contributed a 
contingent to Antiochos III’s army at Magnesia (liV., 37.31.4; 37.40.10). 
The Roman victory there, and the treaty which followed, concluded at Apameia, 
whereby Seleukid influence across the Taurus was severely reduced, signalled drastic and 
far-reaching changes in the political options of the regions under scrutiny. 
97 MCging, 2009, p. 205.
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V.4. From Apameia to the reign of Eupator
After the conclusion of the Apamean treaty, the Cappadocian house was quick 
to align its foreign policy to that of Rome and her ally in Asia Minor, Pergamon. This 
materialized in a hasty marriage between the Pergamenian king, Eumenes II and the 
young daughter of Ariarathes IV, Stratonike.
Pergamon was now perhaps the most influential power in Asia Minor, having gained 
not only large territories, but also, by virtue of having staunchly supported Rome, gained 
the ear of the super-power. However, these territorial gains also brought about a degree of 
political instability. Eumenes was forced, for example, to wage war against the Bithynian 
king Prusias over Phrygia Epiktetos and Galatia promised renewed trouble, in spite of 
Vulso’s successful expedition in the area. His rule may have been contested in other 
places as well, and this left the newly expanded Pergamenian kingdom open to challenge.
In this context the Pontic throne was occupied by a young and very ambitious king, 
Pharnakes. He succeeded in 182 in taking the city of Sinope and may have shown some interest in 
Galatia as well. The former earned him an enemy in Rhodos, the latter in Eumenes II of Pergamon. 
They complained before the Senate of Rome and the Elders sent a senatorial commission, which 
would become their standard response and the main instrument of Roman foreign policy in the 
area in the years to come. Encouraged by the apparent lack of involvement of the Republic,98 
Pharnakes took an even more aggressive stance. He ordered his troops to push at various 
moments of the campaign towards Tion (diod., 29.23.1), Galatia, which was ravaged by some 
ten thousand soldiers (Pol., 24.14.1), Paphlagonia, where they sacked the treasury of Morzios, the 
local ruler (Pol., 25.2.9) and the king prepared to lead in person an expedition into Cappadocia 
(Pol., 24.14.2). Besides these actions, Pharnakes tried to persuade Seleukos II to cross the Taurus 
(diod., 29.24.1) and, from the terms of the peace treaty, he seems to have also been allied with 
Artaxias, the dynast of Lesser Armenia, Akousilochos and Gatalos the Sarmatian.99  
The alliance between Eumenes II and Ariarathes IV could only be strengthened 
by Pharnakes’ behaviour and the two did in fact join efforts for a major expedition into 
98 Many scholars have seen this as an instance of cooling relations between Rome and her ally, Pergamon, 
less than a decade after Magnesia. A. Primo (PriMo, 2006, pp. 622-627) prefers to see in the four senatorial 
commissions sent to Asia Minor to investigate the conflict between Pharnakes and Eumenes a gesture of 
unequivocal support for Pergamon. It remains beyond doubt, however, that Rome sent her ally nothing 
except ambassadors and even took steps to prevent Eumenes from delivering what was promising to be a 
fatal blow to the Pontic king. 
99  The Polybian text: “περιελήφθησαν δὲ ταῖς συνθήκαις τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν δυναστῶν Ἀρταξίας ὁ 
τῆς πλείστης Ἀρμενίας ἄρχων καὶ Ἀκουσίλοχος, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην Γάταλος ὁ Σαρμάτης, τῶν δ’ 
αὐτονομουμένων Ἡρακλεῶται, Μεσημβριανοί, Χερρονησῖται, σὺν δὲ τούτοις Κυζικηνοί.” (Pol., 25.2.12-
13) is not clear enough with regard to the side taken by each ruler. Suppositions can only be made judging 
from the overall strategic situation or from parallels with later events. Cf. also MCging, 1986a, pp. 28-30.  
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Pontus.100 Pharnakes was finally persuaded to ask for peace and the text of the treaty 
drafted on this occasion has been preserved by Polybios (25.2.1-13). Conditions are quite 
harsh for the Pontic king: besides relinquishing all territorial gains (apart from Sinope, 
whose conquest does not appear to have grieved the victors), he must also return the 
booty captured and pay a fairly large war indemnity. Defeated, Pharnakes would spend 
the following years trying to re-establish his position financially and diplomatically.    
While these events took place in Northern Anatolia, to the South of the Taurus 
a Seleukid official with blood connections to the Orontids by the name of Ptolemaios 
entertained thoughts of rebellion. The context was quite advantageous. After the conclusion 
Treaty of Apameia the Seleukids suffered a marked – though far from fatal – decline. The 
great king Antiochos III died in 187 in Elymais and was followed by Seleukos IV, who 
was assassinated in 175 by his minister, Heliodoros. Antiochos IV then ousted the usurper, 
ignoring the claims of his nephew, Demetrios, held in Rome. Antiochos IV would die in 
164, while leading his armies East, and the throne was occupied by his son, the child 
Antiochos V, whose position was seriously endangered by Demetrios, now an energetic 
young man who demanded ever more vocally to be allowed to return to Syria. 
During these two decades of political instability within the Seleukid realm, a number 
of regions attempted to detach themselves from the Seleukid network of alliances or to 
gain independence. In 163 Ptolemaios was a high official in the Seleukid administration in 
Commagene. His title appears in our only source, Diodoros, as ἐπιστάτης, but scholars101 
have hypothesized that this is highly unlikely, as this title describes a royal representative 
in a polis. Ptolemaios, who appears from his actions to have been the governor of the 
region, is much more likely to have possessed the rank of strategos. Whatever his title, 
Ptolemaios chose to turn into an ἀποστάτης:
Ὅτι ὁ τῆς Κομμαγηνῆς ἐπιστάτης Πτολεμαῖος ἔτι μὲν καὶ πρότερον 
καταφρονήσας τῶν Συριακῶν βασιλέων ἀποστάτης ἐγένετο, καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους 
ἐκείνων περισπασμοὺς ἀδεῶς τῆς χώρας ἐδυνάστευσε (diod., 31.19a.1)
He was taking advantage of a number of circumstances. To the North-West, his 
neighbour, Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia, had already abandoned Seleukid alliance. 
To the North-East, Artaxias and Zariadris, former generals of Antiochos III (Str., 
11.14.5) had each declared himself king in a region of Armenia (the former in Greater 
Armenia, the latter in Sophene), being or at least claiming to be continuators of the Orontid 
100  Pol., 24.14.8-9. For a detailed analysis of the geographical implications of the Polybian passage, cf. BeAgon, 1995. 
101 Cf. FACellA, 2006, pp. 200-201.
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dynasty, and therefore related to Ptolemaios.102 Further East, Timarchos had rebelled in 
Media. Most importantly, on the Seleukid throne now sat a weak king, Antiochos V. 
His next action was an attempt to take over Melitene, which not only possessed 
an extremely fertile soil (cf. supra), but also controlled an important crossing over the 
Euphrates. He may have counted on a slow reaction of the Cappadocian king (it is 
unknown whether this rival was the old Ariarathes IV or the young Ariarathes V) and 
on the help of his kinsmen, the kings of Armenia,103 but Ariarathes arrived swiftly with a 
large army and defeated him.
The arrival in Antioch of Demetrios in late 162 or early 161 and his swift 
elimination of Antiochos V hailed the last era of significant Seleukid involvement in 
the affairs of Asia Minor. This energetic king embarked on more campaigns designed to 
reassert Seleukid authority, even at the cost of upsetting Rome. In Media, he defeated 
Timarchos. In Judea, his troops defeated Judas Maccabeus. 
With regard to Cappadocia and Pontus, regions technically outside his area of 
influence according to the terms of the Apamean treaty, he tried to play the card of 
diplomacy: he offerd his sister, Laodike, in marriage to Ariarathes V and his cousin, 
Nysa, to the old Pharnakes. The latter accepted gladly the proposal, showing more 
preoccupation with his own interests than with the sensibilities of the Roman Senate104 
but the former was dissuaded by a timely intervention of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. 
Politically rejected and personally insulted, Demetrios attempted to eliminate 
Ariarathes in 158, by supporting his brother, Orophernes.105 Initially, the attempt 
was successful, and the Senate even recognised the two as joint kings. However, 
Orophernes’ rapacity towards his subjects, coupled with the military intervention of 
Attalos II in favour of Ariarathes (whom he had befriended back in the days when 
they both studied in Athens) would decide the issue in 156. Orophernes was exiled 
and would soon find his death.106 
Demetrios would die in 150, after being defeated by Alexandros Balas, who had the 
support of – among others – Attalos II and Ariarathes V. During his last years his political 
102 gArSoïAn, 1997, pp. 47-48.
103  SulliVAn, 1977, pp. 745-6.
104 A more detailed discussion of the subject has been made in the paper “Nysa – A Seleukid Princess in 
Anatolian Context”, presented at the ‚Seleukid Dissolution’ conference, Exeter, July 2008.
105  Ed. Will argues convincingly (will, 1966, pp. 313-314) that the story related by Diodorus (31.19.7), 
according to which Antiochis, the Cappadocian queen, was sterile at first and adopted in secret two 
boys before giving birth to Ariarathes IV’s true children, two daughters and a son, is mere propaganda, 
originating from Ariarathes V who was eager to consolidate his position against his brother, Orophernes. 
106 According to Trogus, he tried to rouse the mob of Antioch against his benefactor, Demetrios, but the 
Seleukid king apprehended him and had him imprisoned in Seleukeia (iuSt., 35.3-4). 
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influence in Asia Minor had all but disappeared. The rulers of the three houses that form the 
object of the current investigation, the Mithradatids, the Ariarathids and the Commagenian 
Orontids are known or are very likely to have obtained the friendship of Rome. In so 
far as Ptolemaios I is concerned, we do not posses enough data to go beyond reasonable 
suppositions, but fortunately information is available for Ariarathes V and Pharnakes I. The 
former continued the philo-Roman policy initiated by his father and soon after his accession 
to the throne sent an embassy to Rome bearing as gift a golden wreath worth ten thousand 
gold pieces and renewing on this occasion the ties of friendship with the Republic.107 The 
latter concluded in around 155108 a treaty with the city of Chersonesos, among whose 
clauses was that both sides would abide by the Roman philia: “τάν τε ποτὶ Ῥω]μ̣αίους 
φιλίαν διαφυλά[σσοντος καὶ μηδὲ]ν ἐναντίον αὐτοῖς πράσσοντος” (IosPE I2, 402, 
3-5); “τήν τε πρὸς Ῥωμαίους φιλίαν διαφυλασσόντων καὶ μηδὲν ἐναντίον αὐτοῖς 
πρασσόντων”(IosPE I2, 402, 26-28). 
Shortly thereafter (late 155 – early 154) Pharnakes died and was followed on the 
throne by his brother, Mithradates IV. By this time, the relations between the Mithradatids 
and Ariarathids seem to have improved greatly since the 183-179 war. For example, they 
both send troops to Attalos against Prousias, “according to the terms of the alliance”109 and 
the overall command is exerted by Demetrios, the son of Ariarathes.110
The reign of Mithradates IV, who ruled alongside his sister-wife Laodike, was 
short, ending in about 150. A tetradrachm with the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΙΣΣΗΣ [Λ]ΑΟΔΙΚΗΣ 
and depicting Hera standing on the reverse111 may attest a period when Laodike ruled as 
sole regent of the still young Mithradates V, son of Pharnakes and Nysa. 
In the mean time, Ariarathes V was pursuing in Cappadocia the philhellenic policy 
which brought him the praise of Diodoros: “οὗτος […] φιλοσοφίᾳ προσανέχων, ἐξ οὗ 
καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀγνοουμένη πάλαι Καππαδοκία τότε τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις 
ἐμβιωτήριον ὑπῆρχεν.” (diod., 31.19.8)
107 Pol., 31.3; diod., 31.19.8; diod., 31.28.1;T.liV., per. 46. 
108 højte, 2004.
109  “Ὅτι κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἄτταλος ἔτι κατὰ χειμῶνα συνήθροιζε μεγάλας δυνάμεις, ἅτε καὶ τῶν περὶ 
τὸν Ἀριαράθην καὶ τὸν Μιθριδάτην ἐξαπεσταλκότων αὐτῷ στρατιὰν ἱππέων καὶ πεζῶν κατὰ τὴν 
συμμαχίαν, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Δημήτριος Ἀριαράθου.” Pol., 33.12.1.
110 McGing (MCging, 1986a, p. 35, n. 103) rightly suggest Demetrios was the son of Ariarathes IV and the 
brother of Ariarathes V, and not the son of the latter. Given that in 163, when he becomes king, Ariarathes V 
is described as a young man, it is unlikely that by 154 he would have a son old enough to command an army. 
Moreover, in around 160, when Demetrios proposes to Ariarathes the marital alliance, the Cappadocian 
king must have appeared as available. It is true that polygamy was practiced by the Eastern Anatolian 
houses (cf. infra, pp. 120-121) and thus in theory Ariarathes might have already had a wife, but in practice 
a Seleukid princess could hardly expect to be one of many wives. 
111 BABelon & reinACh, 1925, p. 13, no. 8.
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The year 133, which saw the disappearance of the Attalid dynasty, changed 
dramatically the Anatolian political landscape. Rome transformed from a distant – if 
nosy – arbiter, who operated mostly through senatorial commissioners, of varying skill, 
intelligence and moral standards into a palpable, physical presence in Asia Minor, operating 
through tax farmers and an entire administrative apparatus. This metamorphosis did not 
occur without opposition, and the revolt of Aristonikos required a sustained military effort 
to eliminate.112 Rome’s by now traditional allies in the area, Cappadocia and Pontus, 
helped with troops. The Cappadocian king, Ariarathes V, even died on the battlefield.
His son and successor, Ariarathes VI, inherited a kingdom enlarged by the gratitude 
of Rome – for Lykaonia was added to the Cappadocian dominion in recognition for his 
father’s diligence – but weakened by the sudden death of the former monarch, coupled 
with the young age and lack of experience of the current one, who for a while shared the 
power with his mother, Nysa.113 This queen, possibly a daughter of Pharnakes, but not 
necessarily so, seems to have been so enamoured with power that she murdered her five 
eldest sons, in order to ensure as long a regency as possible. The people of Cappadocia 
were, predictably, enraged, and executed her after a short period of time (iuSt., 37.1).
Mithradates Euergetes took advantage of the situation to invade the neighbouring 
kingdom, as if it were a foreign country: “ὡς ἀλλοτρίαν” (APP., Mithr., 10). This phrase 
need not evoke any acts of barbarity on his part: Appian considers it worthy of mention 
because in his opinion the Mithradatids and the Ariarathids were members of the same 
dynasty and Euergetes would have been the first to break the fraternity between the two 
kingdoms and ruling houses. Appian is blatantly wrong: not only were the two dynasties 
distinct, but, as mentioned previously, Pharnakes I at least prepared an expedition against 
his Southern neighbour if he did not execute it. 
The military operations did not lead to an annexation of Cappadocia. According 
to Glew,114 this is indicative that Euergetes at no time had an inimical attitude towards 
Ariarathes, but actually intervened on his behalf, in order to strengthen his position 
in the face of internal opposition. This friendly attitude is thereafter confirmed and 
strengthened by the marriage between Ariarathes and Mithradates’ daughter, Laodike. 
This hypothesis not only goes against Appian’s express statement, but is moreover 
not the only scenario that can account for the main facts in the equation, namely 
the Pontic invasion and the subsequent marital alliance. As McGing rightly points 
112 For a summary of the military operations, cf. MAgie, 1950, vol. I., pp. 148-154. 
113 As attested by a numismatic issue depicting jugate busts of Nysa and Ariarathes, with the legend “ΒΑΣΙΛΙΣΣΗΣ 
ΝΥΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ | ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΡΙΑΡΑΘΟΥ | ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ ΤΟΥ ΥΙΟΥ”: cf. SiMonettA, 1977, p. 29.
114 glew, 1977. 
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out,115 just because Cappadocia maintained its territorial integrity and independence 
does not demonstrate Mithradates was defeated, nor that he merely lent a hand to 
a neighbour in difficulty. The Pontic king, who was careful at all times to maintain 
the goodwill of Rome, even lending them troops during the Third Punic War (APP., 
Mithr., 10) and was confirmed as a friend of the Roman people (ibid.) could not afford 
to displease the Senate and annexing a large kingdom itself a Roman ally would 
certainly have had such an effect. The most Mithradates could hope to achieve was to 
extend his political influence Southwards and that, it seems, he succeeded in doing. 
He probably did not count exclusively on Laodike to make sure her husband treated 
Pontic interests with due consideration, but also on those who must have followed 
her to Cappadocia as part of her retinue. This episode is of great importance, as it sets 
a trend in Pontic-Cappadocian relations that would have critical consequences in the 
following generation.
While these events took place in Cappadocia, across the Taurus, in Commagene, 
Samos I was consolidating his position. His reign, which is placed in the latter half of 
the 2nd century, from around 130 to around 96, coincides with the age of bitter conflict 
between the Parthians and the Seleukid Empire, during which the latter try mostly in 
vain to regain the provinces lost by 139 to Mithradates I of Parthia. As such, Samos is 
very careful to cultivate a dual persona, which could accommodate with the same ease 
Eastern as well as Western characteristics. His coinage is telling from this point of view, 
for his portrait is depicted both with Persian royal attributes (the high tiara) and with late 
Hellenistic radiate diadem.
V.5. The age of Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysos
In 120, the Pontic king Mithradates V fell victim to a plot organized by his closest 
collaborators – his friends and even his wife. As a result, the diadem was passed to his 
young sons, both named Mithradates, who ruled for a while under the watchful eye of 
their mother. The elder of the two sons, who took the epithet Eupator,116 soon proved 
as ruthless as he was gifted. Having survived various assassination attempts, he in turn 
eliminated his mother and then his brother. 
His policy built on the legacy of his ancestors, from Pharnakes to Mithradates V. 
It promoted the assertion of Pontic influence wherever possible, but not necessarily 
115 MCging, 1986a, p. 38.
116 One wonders if this gesture, of extolling his dead father’s memory in the context of courtly intrigue 
that – sources tell us – surrounded his early years, is not meant as a teenager’s act of defiance in the face of 
the murderers rather than as a mere marker of youth and implicit vulnerability, as Muccioli would have it 
(MuCCioli, 1996). 
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in the form of territorial expansion. Appointing a trustworthy king (a son, more 
often than not) seemed to offer Eupator enough guarantees. Such was the case of 
Colchis, a region critical in the strategic architecture of Mithradates’ war effort,117 
acquired at an unknown date, possibly at the beginning of the 1st century: Mithradates 
attempted to control it through two sons, one also named Mithradates, the other 
called Machares. Both ended ill: the former came under suspicion of treason at 
the close of the First Mithradatic War and the king had him bound in chains and 
executed (APP., Mithr., 64); the other betrayed his father during the Third War 
(MeMn., 37.6) and committed suicide when Eupator approached him with an army 
(APP., Mithr., 102). The same Machares seems to have been appointed king over 
the Cimmerian Bosphorus (APP., Mithr., 67). The appointment of Moaphernes as 
ὕπαρχος καὶ διοικητὴς τῆς χώρας (Str., 11.2.18) may be either simultaneous, in 
which case he could only have overseen part of Colchis, or subsequent to these 
events, which would attest a shift of opinion from the king, who now preferred to 
have the area under tighter control. 
Eupator attempted to apply the same model in Cappadocia as well. When Ariarathes 
VI died (quite possibly assassinated by Gordios, who may or may not have acted under 
Pontic impulse), his wife Laodike became regent. Eupator may have hoped his sister would 
be his faithful ally, but the queen seems to have put her own interests first. Thus, when 
Nicomedes III of Bithynia invaded Cappadocia, she placated the invader by marrying him. 
Mithradates intervened militarily, but following his victory he did not annex Cappadocia, 
but preferred to install Ariarathes VII, his nephew. When the young Cappadocian king 
proved too strong-willed, opposing him militarily with the aid of neighbouring kings118 
(one of whom, according to Sullivan,119 may have been Samos, the king of Commagene), 
Mithradates personally assassinated him and replaced him with his own son, Ariarathes 
IX. When the Cappadocians drove Ariarathes IX away and recalled from exile Ariarathes 
VIII, Eupator intervened again and won another victory. The Ariarathid king died soon 
afterwards and with him the line became extinct. Laodike counterattacked by presenting 
publicly a third – in all likelihood spurious – son of Ariarathes VI.
If the case had not attracted the attention of Rome, it did now, for both Laodike and 
Mithradates sent envoys to Rome to plead the cause of their own candidate to the Cappadocian 
throne. From the Senate’s perspective, allowing Cappadocia to fall in the sphere of influence 
117  BrAund, 1994, in particular pp. 152-161.
118 “Igitur cum in aciem eduxisset Mithridates peditum LXXX milia, equitum X milia, currus falcatos 
sexcentos, nec Ariarathi auxiliantibus finitimis regibus minores copiae essent […]”, iuSt., 38.1.8.
119  SulliVAn, 1990, p. 53.
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of either Bithynia or Pontus would have upset the balance of forces, by creating a powerful 
block too close to the province of Asia for comfort. Their first reaction was to announce 
that Cappadocia would become ‘free’’.120 Since the days of Monophthalmos the concept of 
freedom had been proffered many times in Anatolia, with different meanings. 
The gesture of the senators could be explained according to two plausible scenarios. 
One has them act without a true understanding of affairs in Asia Minor. Having in mind 
the magnanimous proclamation of Flamininus at the Isthmian Games a century before and 
the enthusiastic response it elicited, they decide to apply the same procedure, with as little 
forethought as they demonstrated in the case of the similar and nearly simultaneous declaration 
of independence for Cyrene.121 The Cappadocians, however, aware of the inevitable dissolution 
of the state under these circumstances and eager not to fall under Pontic or Bithynian influence, 
beg the Senate to reconsider and to appoint a king. The senators, somewhat taken aback by the 
Cappadocian rejection of the gift of freedom,122 appoint, nevertheless, Ariobarzanes. 
The other plausible scenario has the senators and the Cappadocian delegation (or 
those Cappadocian delegates who were opposed to Mithradates) play a diplomatic game: 
Rome could not afford Cappadocia to fall into the hands of another king, either whole or 
in part, so they needed to reject both the Pontic and the Bithynian candidate and produce 
a third candidate. Thus, Rome was forced to take an unprecedented measure, appointing a 
new dynasty.123 In order to provide more legitimacy to such an act, Rome offers complete 
freedom to Cappadocia, on the understanding that the ethnos (who had a privileged 
relation with the Republic, as it was mentioned as a distinct party in the treaty of alliance, 
besides the monarch)124 would reject it and demand another king instead.
This situation could not please Mithradates, so he determined to oust Ariobarzanes as well. 
He was, nevertheless, trying not to open hostilities with Rome, so he avoided a direct attack. He 
appealed, therefore, in 96 or 95125 to his son-in-law, Tigranes, the king of Armenia. Tigranes had 
recently occupied the throne after having been held hostage by Mithradates II of Parthia and 
was quick to cement an alliance with the Pontic king by marrying his daughter, Cleopatra. With 
Ariobarzanes ousted, the Cappadocian throne was again occupied by Ariarathes IX. 
120 iuSt., 38.2.7; Str., 12.2.11. 
121  kAllet-MArX, 1995, p. 248.
122 “οἱ δὲ θαυμάσαντες εἴ τινες οὕτως εἶεν ἀπειρηκότες πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν”, Str., 12.2.11.
123 Rome had, on occasion, sanctioned new kings, who had seceded from larger entities: such was the case 
of Timarchos in Media, for example. However, anointing a new king in a state with well-established ties of 
alliance after the previous dynasty had disappeared was quite unusual.
124 “Συνέβη δέ, ἡνίκα πρῶτον Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν διῴκουν νικήσαντες Ἀντίοχον, καὶ φιλίας 
καὶ συμμαχίας ἐποιοῦντο πρός τε τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τοὺς βασιλέας, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις βασιλεῦσιν αὐτοῖς καθ’ 
ἑαυτοὺς δοθῆναι τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην, τῷ δὲ Καππάδοκι καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἔθνει κοινῇ”, Str., 12.2.11.
125 The delicate matter of the chronology of the period is addressed in dMitrieV, 2006. 
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Ariobarzanes, who dutifully took the title Φιλορώμαιος, sought help from the Senate, 
and his hopes were not deceived. The Elders ordered their young proconsul in Cilicia, Sulla,126 
to reinstate their protégé. The young aristocrat did just that, apparently without much 
effort, if one is to believe Plutarch (Plut., Sulla, 5.3), using mostly local troops and slaying 
many Cappadocians and Armenians. Sulla used the opportunity to meet a Parthian envoy, 
somewhere on the banks of the Euphrates (Plut., Sulla, 5.4), probably at Tomisa. 
The Parthians had become by the time of their great king Mithradates II the most 
important power in the East, having dealt a series of blows to the Seleukid might that 
had reduced the Macedonian dynasty to insignificance. Now they were establishing a 
formal relation of friendship and alliance with the great power of the West,127 and Sulla 
made sure his peers were well aware it was him who had achieved this. When he returned 
to Rome, he was accused of having extracted money illegally from “a friendly and allied 
kingdom”. The accusations were dropped and Sulla could thus claim to have been the first 
in yet another enterprise: demanding money from the Cappadocian king in order to have 
him restored to power. In subsequent decades his example was followed by others and 
this would set Cappadocia on the brink of bankruptcy.
By 90, however, Ariobarzanes was again being chased from his kingdom. The 
Armenians who did so, Mithraas and Bagoas (APP., Mithr., 10), may have been the 
generals of Tigranes or may have been subordinates of Mithradates himself. At the same 
time the Pontic king supported Socrates Chrestos in his successful attack against his 
brother, Nicomedes IV. The Senate, irritated by the Pontic king’s  activities, decided to 
reinstate both kings at the same time. 
The Roman representative, Manius Aquilius, succeeded in doing so relying 
mostly on local forces (the detachments of Cassius from the province of Asia, 
supplemented by large numbers of Galatians and Phrygians). As soon as the two 
kings were back in command, their Roman patron incited them to ravage the lands 
of Mithradates. It is unclear what the intentions of Aquilius were and to what 
extent he was following instructions from Rome. In all likelihood he was feeling 
prepared for any reaction from Eupator: if the king did nothing, he could go back to 
126 Sulla’s career in the 90s has produced much scholarly debate, starting with BAdiAn, 1959. Cf. the status 
quaestionis in hAtSCher, 2001.
127 One should not, however, read too much into this event. What the three people present (Sulla, Ariobarzanes 
and the Parthian ambassador, Orobazos) discussed remains unknown, but we can safely assume they did 
little more than exchange polite remarks, while remaining convinced they had obtained from the other side 
guarantees they would not interfere in what they perceived as being their sphere of influence. The subject 
has been treated in Gareth Sampson – The Dual Threat: Rome, Parthia and the Fall of the Seleukid Empire, 
paper delivered at the Seleukid Dissoultion conference, Exeter, 2008. 
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Rome and boast he had taught him a lesson; if the king responded militarily, he felt 
confident he would win an easy victory and earn even more reputation. It was the 
reaction of Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes that surprised him, however, as the two 
were extremely reluctant to attack Pontus. Eventually, Nicomedes complied, but 
only after being reminded in no unclear terms of his great debt of money to Aquilius 
and other prominent Romans. 
Eupator refrained from reacting, at least in the beginning and his first reaction was 
diplomatic, appealing to Roman help against the aggressor by invoking the old ties of 
amicitia that linked his dynasty and Rome. Aquilius forbade any attack on Nicomedes 
and by doing so he placed himself in an extremely delicate political position, because in 
the eyes of the world he was effectively denying Mithradates justice and offered him an 
excellent propaganda opportunity.  
Mithradates could chose to let matters as they were and accept loss of face or 
punish the invader and draw Rome into the conflict. The matter of the responsibility for 
the initiation of the First Mithradatic War has been a matter of heated political debate 
in Antiquity and no less heated scholarly debate in the modern age. Some, such as 
McGing,128 tend to agree with ancient sources which see in Mithradates the aggressor 
who only needed a pretext. Others, such as Fr. de Callataÿ,129 argue that the minting 
pattern, which demonstrates a sharp surge in May/June 89, is indicative that Mithradates 
was taken by surprise by the Bithynian invasion and rapidly minted the coins he needed 
in order to pay hastily assembled troops. 
It remains clear that Mithradates had tried to avoid war for a fairly long time. 
Could he avoid it again in 89, after Rome had transparently instigated his neighbours to 
ravage his territories? He would have lost face, and his royal vanity alone would have 
probably prompted him to respond militarily. Yet it seems Mithradates was facing an 
even more serious threat, as is demonstrated by the initial stages of the campaign. After 
the pillaging expedition, Nicomedes is said to have returned home laden with booty. Yet 
the first military encounter with the king’s troops, led by Archelaos and Neoptolemos 
takes place somewhere in the valley of the river Amnias (APP., Mithr., 18), in the region 
named Domanitis (Str., 12.3.40). Since the region thus named covers the area where the 
river Amnias flows into the Halys,130 and that is East of Sinope, one could say this first 
encounter took place within Mithradates’ own territory, which can only mean Nicomedes 
128 MCging, 2009, p. 210.
129 CAllAtAÿ, 1997.
130  tAlBert, 2000, 86.
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had returned with an even greater army. In Mithradates’ mind, there could have been 
no doubt that the Romans were ordering Nicomedes to change tactics from raiding to 
invasion and that the Romans were now fully bent on war. 
The Romans may have wanted the war, but, if one looks at the large armies 
that seem to appear almost instantaneously, Mithradates certainly was ready for it. 
His son, Ariarathes IX, was dispatched with a considerable force into Cappadocia, 
ousting the unfortunate Ariobarzanes yet again, while the king led another, even larger 
force, Westwards into Bithynia. Thus, it seems, responsibility for the beginning of the 
First Mithradatic War does not lay with one party alone. Rather, provocation followed 
provocation, each bringing the military showdown closer.131 
The Roman generals had not prepared an in-depth defensive of Asia: they 
probably had not expected to fight a defensive war. Therefore, as soon as Mithradates 
overcame the army of Manius Aquilius (and possibly of Cassius also, although that 
is not expressly mentioned in our sources), he was able to take possession of the 
province of Asia. From here, he launched an ambitious expedition to Greece. His 
general Archelaos was welcomed by Athens, which became his base of operations. 
Mithradates seemed at the height of his glory, but things took a turn for the worse 
when Sulla, in spite of the complicated situation in Rome, arrived in Greece with his 
legions and defeated his troops in a number of major battles: at the siege of Athens, 
at Chaeronea and at Orchomenos. 
Faced with catastrophic defeats in Greece and with a serious situation developing 
in Asia Minor itself, following the intervention of another Roman army, led first by 
Flaccus, then by Fimbria, Mithradates had to capitulate. He profited from the fact that 
Sulla and Fimbria did not act in concert, being bitter enemies in the context of the Civil 
War and chose the lesser of two evils, negotiating with Sulla. The terms of the peace 
were agreed at a conference at Dardanos, held in 85 between the Roman general and the 
king in person. They stipulated a return to the statu quo in territorial and political terms: 
Mithradates would abandon all his conquests in Asia Minor, but would be reinstated 
as a friend of Rome. Moreover, Eupator was supporting Sulla in his fratricide war, by 
giving over to him the remainder of his Navy and a detachment of archers. 
In the mean time, Mithradates’ Armenian ally, Tigranes, was busy in the East. Following 
the death of the great king Mithradates II in 88, Tigranes took advantage of the Parthian 
131 The abundant bibliography dedicated to the subject of the Mithradatic Wars makes it unnecessary to 
follow here all the details of the events. Cf. hind, 1994 for a synthesis; reinACh, 1890, MCging, 1986a, 
BAlleSteroS-PAStor, 1996 for monographs dedicated to Eupator’s reign; CAllAtAÿ, 1997, MAStroCinque, 
1999 for monographs dedicated to the Mithradatic Wars; and many others.
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turmoil to extend his rule. He was so successful he took the title “King of Kings”, highly 
reminiscent of Achaemenid tradition. By 85, his eyes were set upon Syria. In his path lay 
the small kingdom of Commagene, whose ruler Mithradates claimed Orontid descent, but 
who had strong ties with the Seleukids, being married to Laodike, daughter of Antiochos 
VIII Grypos and borrowing his father-in-law’s epithet, Kallinikos. In 83 Tigranes was the 
master of Syria,132 which implies Commagene had submitted or had been forced to submit. 
The former seems more probable for, although it remains unknown how the Commagenian 
king negotiated the complicated international situation, he seems to have made the right 
choices, as he remained in power. As he did so, he embarked on a programme of dynastic 
consolidation that had an important religious component, which would fully bloom under 
his son, Antiochos I. 
Further north, the existing tensions had not been diffused by the conclusion of the 
peace. Ariobarzanes accused Eupator he did not completely evacuate Cappadocia, while 
the Pontic king grew worried by the fact that although the peace had been concluded 
de facto, its ratification by the Senate was delayed (APP., Mithr., 64). This gave Murena 
an opportunity to commence hostilities again in 83, incited by a number of factors: 
Eupator’s military preparations, allegedly against rebel tribes; Archelaos’ accusations 
(for the Pontic general, faced with the charge of treason had fled the kingdom and 
sought refuge with the Romans); and not least Murena’s own political ambitions, which 
would have been greatly aided by a victory – an easy one to obtain, as he thought – 
against a wealthy Oriental monarch. 
The Roman general met with initial success, as the king purposefully offered no 
opposition. Only when, after receiving a deputation from the Senate, Murena persisted 
in his aggression, did Mithradates decide to retaliate. A major victory for the Pontic king 
ensued, which he followed by reoccupying Cappadocia (APP., Mithr., 65). It took another 
deputation from the Senate, which transmitted in no unclear terms to Murena that the 
war was against the wishes of Sulla, to put an end to military operations. During the 
negotiations Mithradates claimed “to keep those parts of Cappadocia he already held and 
others besides”.133 The conflict between Pontus and Cappadocia appeared to be solved 
when Mithradates’ demands were accepted and his daughter married Ariobarzanes’ son 
and took the name of her new husband’s mother, Athenais Philostorgos, as a sign of 
132 According to Trogus (iuSt.., 40.1), Tigranes had been invited to rule by the people of Syria after the 
candidacy of Mithradates Eupator had been deemed inopportune due to his war with Rome. Tigranes had 
been eventually chosen not only due to his personal qualities and his alliance to Parthia, but also because of 
his marriage with Eupator’s daughter, Cleopatra. 
133 “λαβὼν ἔχειν Καππαδοκίας ὅσα τε εἶχε, καὶ ἕτερα ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις”, APP., Mithr., 66.
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respect for the Cappadocian house. Thus ended the Second Mithradatic War, in 81. 
The following decade witnessed two important events which convinced the Pontic 
king that another war with Rome was inevitable: with Sulla dead in 78, the Senate 
postponed sine die the ratification of the peace agreement with Mithradates (APP., Mithr., 
67) and in 74 Nicomedes IV died and bequeathed his kingdom to the Republic, bringing 
the Roman presence dangerously close to Pontus. A series of factors strengthened 
Eupator’s resolution to fight, as they gave him the hope of success: Sertorius rose in revolt 
in Hispania; the Gauls were again restless; the Getic king Boirebistes grew in power and 
promised to antagonize Rome in his area134; the activities of the pirates grew in scale and 
boldness. In spring 73 Mithradates launched his attack on Bithynia and gave the signal 
for the beginning of his third and most bitter war with Rome.
His advance was held up in front of the walls of Kyzikos. It was here that Lucullus 
intercepted him and inflicted upon him the first in a long series of serious defeats (APP., Mithr., 
73-76; Plut., Luc., 9-11). Mithradates found himself ousted from his ancestral holdings and 
sought refuge with his son-in-law, Tigranes. The Armenian king, in all likelihood alarmed 
by the perspective of seeing Rome so close to his own lands, joined forces with Mithradates, 
only to be defeated in turn by Lucullus (Plut., Luc., 24-32; APP., Mithr., 84-87). 
This gave the signal for many kings who had been subjected to the rule of the 
Armenian King of Kings to change sides and seek the friendship and the protection of the 
Republic. Among them was the new king of Commagene, Antiochos I, who styled himself 
“Theos”, although it is still uncertain to what extent this act of submission was preceded 
by a defeat at Roman hands: Cassius Dio presents Antiochos as making overtures to 
Lucullus,135 whereas Plinius Maior has him endure a siege by the Roman general.136 It is 
conceivable that Plinius confused Lucullus with Pompeius, who would besiege Antiochos 
into friendship in 64.
 Unfortunately for the Roman general, his troops, unhappy with their share of the 
loot, mutinied. Eupator took advantage of the situation and regained, with Armenian 
support, his ancestral holdings by defeating Triarius, who had been left behind to guard 
the Pontic region (APP., Mithr., 89; CASS. dio, 36.9.2). Lucullus, sapped by political 
134 “Βοιρεβίστας ἀνὴρ Γέτης […] ἀνέλαβε κεκακωμένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπὸ συχνῶν πολέμων καὶ 
τοσοῦτον ἐπῆρεν ἀσκήσει καὶ νήψει καὶ τῷ προσέχειν τοῖς προστάγμασιν, ὥστ’ ὀλίγων ἐτῶν μεγάλην 
ἀρχὴν κατεστήσατο καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων τοὺς πλείστους ὑπέταξε τοῖς Γέταις· ἤδη δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαίοις φοβερὸς 
ἦν”, Str., 7.3.11.
135 “τόν τε τῆς Κομμαγηνῆς βασιλέα Ἀντίοχον […] καί τινα Ἀράβιον δυνάστην Ἀλχαυδόνιον ἄλλους τε 
ἐπικηρυκευσαμένους οἱ ἐδέξατο”, CASS. dio, 36.2.5
136 “In urbe Commagenes Samosata stagnum est emittens limum - maltham vocant - flagrantem. Cum 
quid attigit solidi, adhaeret; praeterea tactu et sequitur fugientes. Sic defendere muros oppugnante Lucullo: 
flagrabat miles armis suis. Aquis et accenditur; terra tantum restingui docuere experimenta”, Plin., 2.235.
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machinations back in Rome and by the disobedience of his own soldiers in the field, was 
finally replaced with Pompeius.    
Pompeius reinstated discipline among the soldiery and decisively defeated 
Mithradates, who found himself compelled to flee, once again, from his lands (APP., 
Mithr., 100; Plut., Pomp., 32). Since he could no longer find refuge with Tigranes, he 
decided to withdraw to Colchis and thereafter to his Bosporan possessions. Old, but never 
lacking energy, he eliminated Machares, his own son, who had proven too independently 
minded and had sided with the Romans. It was, however, the rebellion of another son, 
Pharnakes, which would prove too much for Eupator. In 63 the great king committed 
suicide and gave the Romans (who were by now haunted by absurd fears they would be 
invaded overland by renewed Mithradatic forces),137 a reason to celebrate. 
V.6. At the whim of Rome 
Pompey’s intervention and subsequent administrative decisions in the East, which 
can be said at the same time to have been inspired by a broad vision and by petty personal 
interests, drastically changed the political environment of the area, but also brought about 
social and cultural transformations. Politically, the direct consequence of Mithradates’ 
disappearance was the transformation of much of his Anatolian holdings into a Roman 
province, which joined the recent province of Bithynia. The rest of the lands were 
apportioned to various dynasts who had been helpful not so much to Rome in general, but 
to Pompey in particular. 
In order to ensure a better administration and control of the land, Pompey promoted 
a type of government that was far more familiar to Rome than the previous mosaic of 
municipalities, temple estates and villages dominated by dynasts: the polis138 whose demos 
utilises and is held responsible for the surrounding territory, the chora. Pompey refounded 
poleis (Amaseia), transformed older urban or semi-urban communities into poleis (Zela), 
or quite simply founded new poleis where none had existed before (Nicopolis). This new 
pattern of social organisation soon influenced the cultural context of the region, with 
Greco-Roman features of civilisation becoming quite prominent. Of these, one of the 
most visible is the epigraphic habit, which only now acquires momentum. 
Ariobarzanes I and II of Cappadocia and Antiochos of Commagene may have found, 
in 63, reason to celebrate.139 Relieved from their oppressors, Mithradates Eupator and 
137 APP., Mithr., 109; CASS. dio, 37.11.1.
138 Pompey’s activities are well covered by modern bibliography, from FletCher, 1939 to MAgie, 1950 and 
to højte, 2006. The new province of Bithynia-Pontus is described in vivid detail in MArek, 2003.
139 Ariobarzanes I abdicated in favour of his son in 63 or 62, but his departure from office is described as 
calm and serene: “laetus erat qui regnum deponebat, tristis cui dabatur” (VAl.MAX., 5.7.2).
Geographical and Historical Overview 81
Tigranes respectively, the three kings could thank Rome for their freedom and territorial 
expansion: Cappadocia received parts of Cilicia, while Commagene received Seleuceia 
on the Euphrates. These favours, however, came at a fairly high price. With Rome’s 
sphere of interest and influence extended by Pompey to the Euphrates and beyond, these 
two kings found it highly advisable to respect the wishes of the Republic in most matters 
pertaining to external policy. The epithet “Philoromaios” two of kings (Ariobarzanes I 
and Antiochos I) used in official documents is a clear attestation of the fact. Another 
reason for concern, at least for the Ariobarzanids, was represented by the large sums of 
money they owed their Roman patrons, among whom Pompey and Brutus ranked high, 
which would seriously undermine the Cappadocian finances in the following decades.
Pompey returned to Rome and eventually celebrated a magnificent triumph. The 
image this ceremony projected was that Rome, through the agency of Pompeius, now 
had the entire Orient at her feet. A tablet bore the following inscription, enumerating a 
dazzling array of regions and kings with exotic names: 
Πομπήιος Γναΐου υἱὸς Μέγας […] ὑπερασπίσας δὲ Παφλαγονίαν τε καὶ 
τὸν Πόντον, Ἀρμενίαν τε καὶ Ἀχαΐαν, ἔτι δὲ Ἰβηρίαν, Κολχίδα, Μεσοποταμίαν, 
Σωφηνήν, Γορδυηνήν, ὑποτάξας δὲ βασιλέα Μήδων Δαρεῖον, βασιλέα 
Ἀρτώλην Ἰβήρων, βασιλέα Ἀριστόβουλον Ἰουδαίων, βασιλέα Ἀρέταν 
Ναβαταίων Ἀραβίαν, καὶ τὴν κατὰ Κιλικίαν Συρίαν, Ἰουδαίαν, Ἀραβίαν, 
Κυρηναϊκὴν ἐπαρχίαν, Ἀχαιούς, Ἰοζυγούς, Σοανούς, Ἡνιόχους καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ 
φῦλα τὰ μεταξὺ Κολχίδος καὶ Μαιώτιδος λίμνης κτλ. (diod., 40.4.1)
In a Rome where wealth and military triumph was the certain path towards 
political honours, the ambitious longed for commands in the East, as that seemed to 
offer both in abundance.
It was therefore only a matter of time before someone would start hostilities against 
the most powerful kingdom in the area that was not already obedient to Rome: Parthia. 
It was a member of the First Triumvirate, the one with least military experience (though 
by no means completely devoid thereof) that would choose this path, with catastrophic 
consequences: Crassus. Rome and Parthia had been at peace for a generation, since the 
meeting between Sulla, Ariobarzanes and the Parthian envoy Orobazos on the banks of 
the Euphrates. A formal relation of amicitia must have been in place at least since the 
Roman arbitration in the conflict between Armenia and Parthia over Gordyene, during 
Pompeius’ command in the East, although the perspective of a conflict between the 
Republic and Parthia was evoked in this context, only to be discarded for logistic as well 
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as political reasons. It may be true that the mutual interest the two super-powers shared in 
Armenia or in Syria put them on a collision course,140 but the campaign itself which led 
to the catastrophic defeat at Carrhae in 53 was not inevitable, as was demonstrated by the 
vigorous domestic opposition.
With Crassus defeated and the Roman legionary standards captured, the Parthian 
king Orodes II was expected to take the conflict into the Roman lands. In this context, 
Pompeius’ policy ten years previously of strengthening the friendly kingdoms of 
Cappadocia and Commagene by offering them control over strategic points proved well-
timed and wise.   
A vivid picture of the tense situation is drawn by Cicero’s letters, who complains 
vehemently about his appointment to Cilicia (51/50), from which province he was 
expected to keep a keen eye on Parthian activities and on the positions of the Roman allies 
in the area. A series of letters to friends in Rome – Atticus in particular – bear testimony 
of the situation on the ground. 
Thus, in his letter to Cato from the 28th of August 51 (CiC., Ad Fam., 15.3), he 
announces the leader of the optimates party that he received grave news from Antiochos 
of Commagene about an imminent crossing of the Euphrates by massive Parthian forces 
under the leadership of the king’s son, Pacorus, simultaneously with an Armenian raid on 
Cappadocia. This Parthian invasion and the fragility of the Roman position would represent 
a most delicate subject reflected in his correspondence throughout his office. In Ad Att., 5, 18 
(September 51) he expresses the belief that his best ally against the Parthian invasion would 
be winter (“certissimum subsidium est hiems”) and describes frantic Roman preparations to 
meet an imminent attack: stockpiling of resources, calling on allied kings such as Deiotarus 
for assistance and levying Roman citizens for the legions. In an official dispatch (Ad Fam., 
15.2, September 51) he informs the Senate of a plot against Ariobarzanes III Philoromaios 
(his father, Ariobarzanes II had recently been assassinated), apparently with Parthian 
participation since the presence of Roman troops at Cybistra prompt many to divulge the 
secret they had kept out of fear. In a subsequent letter (Ad Fam., 15.1, late September 51) he 
paints a most discouraging picture of the situation: the soldiers at hand are few, the levies 
are hard to enact as the citizens are scattered and demoralised, Bibulus – the appointed 
commander in Syria – is cowardly and the allies, due to the ill-treatment received at Roman 
hands, are alienated or impoverished: “Cappadocia est inanis, reliqui reges tyrannique 
neque opibus satis firmi nec voluntate sunt”. 
140 Thus, Sampson: ‘the war that broke out in the 50s BC was not due to the actions of any one man, but 
was the result of the wider forces of history’ (SAMPSon, 2008, pp. 83-4). The author has since nuanced his 
position substantially: cf. supra, n. 127.
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It is with great relief that he announces his friend Caelius Rufus at the end of 
November (Ad Fam., 2.10, late November 51) that the Parthian forces in Syria had been 
defeated by Cassius and that the Parthian threat had been if not eliminated altogether, at 
least postponed until the following summer, by which time he hoped to be replaced. 
After military action is over, having on his part nothing more serious than eliminating 
some forts in the Ammanus range, Cicero takes the time to boast of his achievements to 
Cato (Ad Fam., 15.4, January 50), highlighting again his rescue of Ariobarzanes III, this 
time adding a few interesting details: that the queen-mother was still active politically, for 
she effected the exile of two prominent philoi, Metras and Athenaios; and that the priest 
at Comana had pressed his personal agenda, relying on “iis qui novari aliquid volebant”, 
on his financial resources and on the soldiers at his disposal, even threatening a civil 
war. Cicero’s timely intervention saved the day and kept the peace in a kingdom whose 
security remained an important pillar of the Roman policy in the region. 
The dire economic state of Cappadocia, a direct consequence of the loans taken by the 
kings from prominent Romans is evoked in a letter to Atticus from the 22nd of February 50: 
primum ab Ariobarzane sic contendi, ut talenta quae mihi pollicebatur illi daret. quoad 
mecum rex fuit, perbono loco res erat; post a Pompei procuratoribus sescentis premi coeptus 
est. Pompeius autem cum ob ceteras causas plus potest unus quam ceteri omnes, tum quod 
putatur ad bellum Parthicum esse venturus. ei tamen sic nunc solvitur: tricesimo quoque die 
talenta Attica XXXIII, et hoc ex tributis; nec id satis efficitur in usuram menstruam. […] alii 
neque solvit cuiquam nec potest solvere; nullum enim aerarium, nullum vectigal habet. Appi 
instituto tributa imperat; ea vix in faenus Pompei quod satis sit efficiunt. amici regis duo 
tresve perdivites sunt, sed ii suum tam diligenter tenent quam ego aut tu. equidem non desino 
tamen per litteras rogare, suadere, accusare regem. Deiotarus etiam mihi narravit se ad eum 
legatos misisse de re Bruti; eos sibi responsum rettulisse illum non habere. et mehercule ego 
ita iudico, nihil illo regno spoliatius, nihil rege egentius. (Ad Att., 6.1)
Thus, thirty three talents per month is as much as the king can afford to pay and 
that does not even cover the interest rate to one creditor alone, Pompeius, who is given 
preference over all the others due to the information that he would take up command in 
the area against the Parthians. 
Luckily for Cicero, the attention of the Parthians was directed elsewhere and he 
could leave his province at the end of July 50 with a feeling of deep satisfaction. This, 
however, was not to last long. Rome was soon to be caught in a civil war, and all the 
Eastern dynasties within its sphere of influence would be dragged into it. In spring 49 
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Caesar crossed the Rubicon and Pompeius fled to Greece. From here, he called on his 
Eastern clientele for military support. Ariobarzanes III of Cappadocia and Antiochos I 
of Commagene each sent him a small detachment: the Cappadocian sent five hundred 
horsemen who seem, according to their place in the list, to have been heavy cavalrymen 
(CAeS., BC, 3.4.3); the Commagenian sent two hundred soldiers, most of whom were 
horse archers (CAeS., BC, 3.4.5). These took part in the decisive battle of Pharsalus and 
were either killed or taken prisoner. 
In the Bosporan kingdom, Eupator’s son Pharnakes II had consolidated his position 
since the death of his father. His coinage shows him taking the pompous title ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ 
ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ ΦΑΡΝΑΚΟΥ.141 Observing the conflict between the most 
prominent Roman generals, he thought the time was ripe for action and quickly overrun 
Colchis, Armenia Minor and finally Pontus. He may have been welcome in certain areas, 
but in many others he had to assert his rule in a violent manner and a layer of destruction 
attests to this.142 Pharnakes could only hope to become so entrenched by the time the 
Roman civil war was over so as to present the Republic with a fait accompli and begin 
negotiations from a position of strength. Things seemed to go according to plan, as 
he succeeded in inflicting a severe defeat at Nicopolis on the combined forces of Cn. 
Domitius and Deiotarus which amounted to three legions and to which an auxiliary force 
of cavalry from Ariobarzanes III was added (BAlex., 34-40).
Not long afterwards, however, after having settled the matters of Egypt, Caesar 
himself came to Asia Minor. At Zela, in the same place where Eupator had defeated 
Triarius, Caesar thoroughly overpowered Pharnakes II (BAlex., 72-76) and put an end 
to his Anatolian ambitions. The king withdrew to Sinope and from there crossed back to 
Bosporus. His fate was sealed when he was attacked and defeated by the rebel Asandros. 
Pharnakes is said to have fallen in battle after having fought valiantly and having received 
numerous wounds (APP., Mithr., 120).
The elimination of Mithradatid ambitions in Asia Minor might have brought 
about a period of stability in the area, particularly in Cappadocia which had been their 
victim even as late as Pharnakes’ expedition. But the Ariobarzanids were confronted 
with serious domestic problems. The apparent concord between Ariobarzanes III and 
his brother Ariarathes which seemed to exist at the time of Cicero’s governorship of 
Cilicia had given way to enmity. Caesar attempted to reconcile the two by confirming 
the elder brother as king and appointing the younger as High Priest at Cappadocian 
141 FroloVA & irelAnd, 2002, p. 33.
142 BrAund, 1994, p. 147 sqq.
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Comana. That, however, did not please Ariarathes and he is soon to be found in Rome 
attempting to find himself a kingdom.  
In neighbouring Commagene, Antiochos was busy consolidating the political, 
cultural and religious project initiated by his father, whose most striking expression was 
the syncretistic cult of Greco-Iranian divinities, to whom the person of the king was 
added. The king was careful to advertise both his Western and his Eastern connections 
and this ideological position found a faithful reflection in the political activities of the 
king: his daughter was given in marriage to the Parthian king Orodes II, but during the 
Parthian expedition of 51/50, the Commagenian king was careful to keep the Roman 
officials well informed of the movements of their enemies.
The assassination of Caesar in 44 brought new troubles in the East. Cassius’ 
proconsulship brought him back to Syria, which he had previously defended with much 
vigour against the Parthian attack. From this position, he also controlled the allied 
kingdoms of Cappadocia and Commagene. When Ariobarzanes showed some inclination 
to collaborate with the Caesarians in the months preceding Philippi, Cassius moved swiftly 
to eliminate him and seize his treasury. Ariobarzanes, whose epithet Philoromaios had not 
helped him in the face of Roman avarice, was succeeded by his brother, Ariarathes X.
The same year, 42, Cassius and Brutus were defeated in mainland Greece by 
the leaders of the Caesarian party, Marcus Antonius and Octavianus, who decided to 
settle their differences in the face of the common enemy. After Caesar’s murderers were 
eliminated, the victors attempted to maintain a degree of security in the Roman world by 
effectively separating it into spheres of influence. The opulent East fell to Antonius, while 
Rome itself remained in the hands of Octavianus. 
In the East, Antonius was busy exacting tributes and living in luxury. In summer 41 
he met again with Cleopatra VII, queen of Egypt and by winter he was following her in 
Alexandria. While a few modern scholars attempt to excuse his behaviour and assert he 
was still master of his heart and his actions,143 his contemporaries had a different opinion. 
Thus, in spring 40 the renegade Q. Labienus (son of Titus Labienus, Caesar’s lieutenant in 
Gaul and Pompeius’ lieutenant in Greece) led together with Pacorus a powerful Parthian 
attack on Roman-held territories, no doubt spurred on by the triumvir’s perceived softness. 
After defeating Decidius Saxa, the two leaders split forces: Pacorus turned south, towards 
Palestine, while Labienus advanced in Asia Minor all the way to Lydia and Ionia,144 
benefiting at least from the neutrality of the Cappadocian and Commagenian rulers, if not 
143  Thus, goltz huzAr, 1978, pp. 153-155.
144 Plut., Ant., 30.
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from their active cooperation. The Roman counter-attack led by Ventidius was decisive, 
and the Parthian forces were scattered, while Labienus and Pacorus remained dead in the 
field. The Eastern kings could only wait with anxiety the reaction of Marcus Antonius. 
Antiochos I was subjected to a siege in his own capital, Samosata, and he could 
count himself fortunate for being able to extricate himself from this delicate situation 
through a substantial bribe, three hundred talents.145 Ariarathes X seems not to have been 
so lucky, for by 36 the throne of Cappadocia is occupied by a man, Archelaos, 146 with 
no dynastic credentials other than descending from the High Priest at Comana Pontica. 
The will of the triumvir Marcus Antonius replaces the entire logic of dynastic legitimacy 
which had existed in Cappadocia since its beginning, three centuries previously.
Antiochos I himself, sensing his end near, associated his son, Mithradates II, to the 
throne. By 36 he had reached the end of a tumultuous life,147 during which he had succeeded 
in maintaining and even extending the territories of his kingdom mostly through his diplomatic 
ability. It is not known what part Mithradates II took in Antonius’ Parthian campaign, but he was 
certainly ranged in his camp and attended in person at the decisive battle of Actium. In spite of 
this, he was forgiven by Octavianus and continued to rule. He was even aided by Octavianus, not 
yet bearing the title Augustus, when his brother Antiochos II entertained thoughts of rebellion. No 
doubt, the position of Commagene at the border between the Romans and the Parthians would 
have been strengthened by the diplomatic marathon of Augustus, which produced a relaxation of 
tensions between the two super-powers, marked symbolically in the year 20 by the returning of 
the standards captured from Crassus at Carrhae. Mithradates’ own balanced policy is indicated 
by the fact that he used in official documents, like his father, the epithet ‘Philoromaios’ and at the 
same time had himself represented wearing the Eastern tiara. 
Yet there seem to have existed tensions within Commagene of which we know 
little, for Mithradates II was succeeded by Mithradates III, his nephew, in the year 20, 
by the order of Augustus. The new king quickly married a princess from Emessa, Iotape. 
Apart from this important event, little is known about Mithradates’ reign.
His successor was Antiochos III, who married his sister, Iotape, and courted the 
favour of Rome. It has been suggested that he was the first representative of this dynasty 
to have been awarded Roman citizenship. The names ‘Gaius Iulius’ that his descendants 
145 Plut., Ant., 34.
146 Sullivan raises the possibility that Archalaos Philopatris Ktistes is one and the same as the rebel Sisines, 
who had opposed Ariarathes X a few years previously (SulliVAn, 1990, p. 182). It is unlikely, not least 
because when adopting a dynastic name upon accession to the throne, one tends to use a well-established 
name (in our case, Ariarathes or Ariobarzanes) and ‘Archelaos’ rang in Cappadocia with the same dynastic 
exoticism as ‘Sisines’.
147 Dio Cassius (dio CASS., 49.23.3) has him assassinated by Phraates IV. 
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use indicate that the grant of citizenship was made either by Caesar or by his adopted son, 
Augustus.148 Upon his death, in AD 17, there was a debate about the future of Commagene. 
While the lower classes preferred to be ruled by Antiochos’ successors, the upper classes 
preferred to see Commagene transformed in a Roman province.149 Not surprisingly, the 
will of the latter prevailed and Germanicus was sent to oversee the process.
In Rome, Antiochos’ son and daughter lived well, enjoying the respect of their hosts. 
Antiochos befriended the Julio-Claudian family and it was due to his close friendship 
with Caligula that he succeeded in becoming king again, not only in name, but also in 
fact. To his ancestral Commagenian possessions Rome added parts of Cilicia as well. 
Although deposed again by the same Caligula, Antiochos IV was reinstated by Claudius, 
as part of his wider strategy concerning the security of the Eastern border of Rome. His 
reign was contemporary with renewed tensions between Rome and Parthia and he had a 
good share of military campaigns, though they seem to have been of rather limited scale 
and not always successful.150 
When Vespasian came to the throne, his strategic vision differed markedly from that 
of Claudius, and required not buffer-states between Rome and Parthia, but rather strong and 
energetic Roman presence. Thus, in AD 72 Antiochos IV was again deposed, after accusations 
of collaboration with Parthia had been put forward. His sons, Epiphanes and Kallinikos, fled 
indeed in that direction as soon as the Roman forces invaded,151 but this need not represent proof 
that the accusation had been grounded in truth. Indeed, soon thereafter one finds the entire family 
reunited in Rome,152 under the strict, but respectful surveillance of the emperor Vespasian.
Members of the dynasty would continue to occupy positions of authority within 
the Roman administration. Thus, Epiphanes and Kallinikos, integrated in the senatorial 
aristocracy of the Empire, would be sent as governors in the East. Epiphanes’ son, 
Philopappos, could still style himself king in the Greek inscription from his funerary 
monument in Athens, although the Latin version only mentions his consulship. 
With Philopappos ended a long line of kings who stood at the crossroads between 
East and West. The geographic, cultural and strategic position of Pontic Cappadocia, 
148 Cf. BrAund, 1984, pp. 42-43.
149 “ Ἐτελεύτησεν δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς Κομμαγηνῆς βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχος, διέστη δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τοὺς 
γνωρίμους καὶ πρεσβεύουσιν ἀφ’ ἑκατέρου μέρους, οἱ μὲν δυνατοὶ μεταβάλλειν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας 
εἰς ἐπαρχίαν ἀξιοῦντες, τὸ πλῆθος δὲ βασιλεύεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια”, ioSePh., A.Iud., 18.53. The position 
of the masses is probably a testimony of the success enjoyed by the royal propaganda, an example of which 
is the great complex at Nemrut Dağ.
150 SulliVAn, 1977, pp. 789-791.
151 ioSePh., B.Iud., 7.237.
152 IGL Syr 6, 2796.
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Greater Cappadocia and Commagene interwove their destinies. The dynasties in these 
regions were confronted with a similar set of challenges and not infrequently proposed 
the same solutions. How they dealt with different aspects of politics, administration, 
military and religious matters will be addressed in the following chapters.
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iii. dynAstic policies And politics
I n spite of the oft-quoted words under the heading ‘βασιλεία’ from the Byzantine encyclopaedic compilation Suda, which claims that it is neither birth nor law that 
confer kingship upon men, but solely their ability to lead armies and manage affairs,1 one 
notices that in the Hellenistic world (increasingly so after the generation of the ‘Epigonoi’ 
replaces that of the ‘Diadochoi’) and particularly in Eastern Anatolia dynastic links are 
very important. The following pages will examine how dynastic identity was built, 
propagated and used by the ruling houses of Pontus, Cappadocia and Commagene, while 
paying attention to Achaemenid and Argead antecedents, as well as to contemporary 
Hellenistic parallels. 
i. estabLishinG dynastic LeGitimacy
I.1. The Achaemenid court 
“I am Cyrus, king of the world, great king, mighty king, king of Babylon, king 
of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four quarters, the son of Cambyses, great king, king 
of Anšan, grandson of Cyrus, great king, king of Anšan, descendant of Teispes, great 
king, king of Anšan, of an eternal line of kingship”2. When Cyrus the Great conquered 
Babylon in 539 BC, he had every reason to be proud, having conquered the Medes and 
the Lydians. Yet, on the cylinder he interred in Babylon, he mentions only two elements 
that define his elevated status – favour of the god Marduk and his belonging to an “eternal 
line of kingship”, to a dynasty. 
While this was the image he wished to project3, it is interesting to note that some 
of his Semitic subjects of whose opinion we are better informed, the Jews, seem to have 
found worthy of note only the first half of his statement (and even that in a distorted 
fashion, so as to become concordant with their own beliefs): the idea of divine favour: 
“Thus saith Cyrus king of Persia, The Lord God of heaven hath given me all the kingdoms 
of the earth; and he hath charged me to build him a house at Jerusalem, which is in Judah.” 
(Ezra, I, 2), reiterated, even more forcefully, in Isaiah, XLV, 1-2: “Thus saith the Lord 
to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him; 
1  “οὔτε φύσις οὔτε τὸ δίκαιον ἀποδιδοῦσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰς βασιλείας, ἀλλὰ τοῖς δυναμένοις 
ἡγεῖσθαι στρατοπέδου καὶ χειρίζειν πράγματα νουνεχῶς”, SudAS, s.v. βασιλεία.
2  hAllo & younger jr., 2003.
3 The term propaganda might be somewhat inappropriate in this historical context, when the whole issue 
here is one of self-representation, all the more so as the cylinder was buried and arguably ceased to directly 
influence people the moment it was removed from sight.
[…] I will go before thee, and make the crooked places straight: I will break in pieces the 
gates of brass, and cut in sunder the bars of iron”4. However, the idea of Cyrus’ legitimacy 
as a result of his descent does not appear to carry any relevance in the eyes of the Jewish 
people. This seems to indicate that, while attempting to accommodate the desires of his 
subjects, the Achaemenid had his own conceptions about the fundamentals of kingship, 
which would be carried on by his Achaemenid successors and beyond. 
The importance of ancestry in Achaemenid eyes is quite evident in the propaganda 
efforts of Dareios I to legitimise his position. He had been a high court official (this 
might explain his prominence among his fellow conspirators) and he proved in a short 
time to be an excellent strategic manager and a fairly competent military leader. And 
yet, in order to justify in the eyes of the world that he held the royal title by right, he 
chooses to stress two elements above all others: divine favour and royal descent. The 
latter is all the more surprising as he was not the legitimate successor to the throne, 
as convincingly argued by both Dandamaev and Briant5. In pragmatic terms, it is clear 
that his success as founder of a dynasty is due primarily to his abilities in court politics, 
general management and generalship,6 but this should not obscure the fact he tried to instil 
in the mind of the “general public” a completely different perception: while in reality 
victory gives him legitimacy, he wishes people to believe it is legitimacy that gives him 
victory. Thus, tellingly, even in such a triumphalist account of his deeds as that carved in 
rock at Behistun, he allows certain military setbacks to be recorded, like the defection of 
his guards.7 On the contrary, he is extremely careful to strengthen his claim of dynastic 
legitimacy, even commissioning a fake inscription on Cyrus the Great’s tomb by which 
that monarch appeared to include himself in the Achaemenid dynasty. The spuriousness of 
the inscription is proven by the fact that dynastic records of Persian kings before Dareios, 
like Cyros’s cylinder quoted above, do not list Achaemenes as their ancestor, but Teispes. 
The fake inscription may be assigned with a fair degree of certitude to Dareios, because 
subsequent kings naturally took fewer pains to find arguments in favour of their dynastic 
legitimacy. Having fabricated a noble genealogy, Dareios mentions it repeatedly (DBa 
9-13, DB I 6-8), anticipating by two and a half millennia the dictum often attributed to 
Goebbels that “If you repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth”.
4 The phraseology is remarkably similar to that used on the Cyrus Cylinder itself: “He [Marduk] ordered 
him to go to his city Babylon. He set him on the road to Babylon and like a companion and a friend, he went 
at his side. […] He made him enter his city Babylon without fighting or battle”.
5  dAndAMAeV, 1989, pp. 107-108; BriAnt, 2002a, p. 109 sqq. The main argument used by scholars to 
discredit his claims is: had it been true that the Achaemenids were of royal lineage related to the branch 
of Cambyses and Bardiya, then after the demise of the two, kingship would have more naturally fallen to 
Dareios’ grandfather, Arsames, or his father, Vistaspa, both of whom were still alive at the time.
6  Briant discusses at length (BriAnt, 2002b, passim) the importance of military factors in deciding succession 
in the Achaemenid realm, elevating in a fairly perilous manner pragmatic elements to the rank of ideology, 
similar to the Greek Hellenistic and Roman Imperial ideologies.
7 True enough, this does not appear in the Old Persian version, but rather in the Elamite one.
Dynastic Policies and Politics 91
I.2. Philip, Alexander and the diadochi
A somewhat different approach is taken by founders of dynasties in the 
Macedonian world. Before the extinction of the Argead line, there existed the 
custom that the eldest son would succeed his father, but some prominent exceptions 
preclude absolute statements. One such exception was Philip II, brother of the late 
king Perdiccas and uncle of the natural successor, Amyntas, and who did not rule 
as regent, but directly as king, interrupting thus the usual sequence of transmission 
of the royal title from father to son. It is only Justin that mentions a period during 
which Philip was regent (“Itaque Philippus diu non regem, sed tutorem pupilli egit. 
At ubi graviora bella imminebant serumque auxilium in exspectatione infantis erat, 
conpulsus a populo regnum suscepit.”, iuSt., 7.5), while the other authors either 
indicate that Philip was king from the very beginning (diod., 16.1.3) or simply make 
no mention of anything out of the ordinary about Philip’s status (not even his bitter 
enemy, Demosthenes). To these arguments, J.R. Ellis (Ellis, 1971) adds epigraphical, 
but also circumstantial evidence to support the idea that Philip was soundly seated on 
the throne of Macedon as king from the very beginning.
As opposed to the Achaemenid kingship, the Macedonian monarchy, probably 
emerged from the heroic monarchy of archaic Greece,8 preserves a number of specific 
features. One of the most striking is the role of the assembly of the Macedonians in the 
process of the coronation. It has been argued that the acclamation was a mere formal 
gesture: the “people in arms” did not represent an elective assembly, but merely sanctioned 
the choice reached through other political means.9 It is nevertheless significant that this 
event remained throughout the Hellenistic Age an integral part of the ceremony through 
which a new king acceded to the throne.
Alexander’s epic conquest spread Macedonian power over an immense territory, 
which made inevitable a number of changes, one of the more important being that the 
centre of power was moved from mainland Macedonia to Babylon. Thus, it became 
inevitable that the only body of Macedonians at hand to ratify important decisions was 
the army. After the unexpected death of the Conqueror, the Macedonian leadership 
fragmented, with several centres of power emerging quickly: mainland Macedonia, Asia 
Minor, Babylonia, Egypt and so forth. Each leader had about him a body of soldiers and 
each troop was in potentia an assembly holding as much “constitutional” power as the 
next. After Kassandros fulfilled the secret wish of all the other diadochs by eliminating 
Alexander’s offspring, the royal title came within reach for the Conqueror’s former 
officers. Each the founder of a new dynasty, they were compelled to find ways to justify 
their new positions.10 
8 elliS, 1994, pp. 727-728.
9 AnSon, 1985.
10 weBer, 1995.
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Ptolemaios alone – in so far as we can determine – tried to establish a link between 
himself and the Argead line,11 by claiming to be the bastard son of Philip II and therefore 
half-brother of Alexander.12 
Others tried to perpetuate the myth of Alexander and emphasize their own privileged 
relation with the Conqueror – without, however, inventing any familial relations with him 
– and derive their legitimacy from this vague concept of proximity. Thus Demetrios and 
Lysimachos minted coins which bore Alexander’s image, but whose legend mentioned 
their own names accompanied by the royal title, as if to signify they were Alexander’s 
legitimate successors.13 Eumenes (though apparently more concerned to preserve his 
position as general than to acquire royal status) went even further, placing an empty throne 
in the royal tent where the war council was to be held and convincing the Macedonians 
that Alexander was having conversations with him (Plut., Eumen., 13.5-8). 
The other diadochs – and many subsequent usurpers, such as the successful ones 
from Pergamon or Bactria or the many unsuccessful ones – seemed to believe that victory 
in battle and the subsequent acclamation by their troops was sufficient to give them the 
royal aura they needed.14 In a way, by doing so, they were returning to the heroic type of 
regality from archaic Greece, to the very roots of the Macedonian kingship. 
*
If considered therefore through the lens of the Weberian power-theory, the 
Achaemenid model of kingship tends towards the traditional type, whereby the position 
of the ruler is justified mainly by recourse to ancestral customs, whereas the Macedonian 
model tends towards the charismatic type, whereby the ruler’s personal deeds and abilities 
justify his position. Naturally, the didactic division between apparently antagonistic 
monarchic models cannot accurately cover the entire spectrum of royal strategies and 
power relations in either of the two traditions, but examination from this perspective 
remains a useful exercise, as it helps to draw attention to the relevant details.  
I.3. Strategies of dynastic legitimacy in Eastern Anatolia
When Polybios needed to introduce Mithradates II (Pol., 5.43.2, in a context of crucial 
political importance: offering a wife to the Seleukid king Antiochos III) to an audience 
likely to know little or nothing about him, he pointed to a few crucial bits of information: 
after mentioning briefly the fact that he was king and ruled over Pontic Cappadocia, 
Polybios seems to insist on the fact that Mithradates traced his lineage to one of the Seven 
11 Some traditions make Apame, Seleukos’ wife, the daughter of Alexander (cf. infra). It is surprising, 
however, that Seleukid official mythology rejected this association.
12 A reflection of this courtly legend may be found in Theocritos, Idyll 17, 20-25. Cf. also CollinS, 1997, who 
argues – only in part successfully – that the story of Soter’s being the illegitimate son of Philip II would not have 
benefitted so much Ptolemaios I as his son, Ptolemaios Keraunos, who briefly occupied the throne of Macedon.
13 It is true that continuation of monetary types may have pragmatic reasons, rather than ideological, since 
certain types acquire great prestige and credibility, due to their stability, but in this case it seems hard to dismiss 
the idea that the diadochs wished to project themselves as continuators of Alexander: cf. Plut., Alex., 4, 2.
14 gehrke, 1982.
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Wise Persians and that his title to rule was based on the fact that Dareios I had appointed 
his ancestor as dynast over the region bordering the Black Sea. In all likelihood, Polybios 
presents here the official version, which he may have obtained from a Seleukid source, 
which in turn relayed that which the Pontic house itself wished to publicize. 
The first two ideas describe his status, whereas the last two provide what the 
Mithradatids perceive as the foundation for their position. Their claim for nobility rests 
almost entirely – in this account – upon their Persian roots, both in terms of genealogy 
(being descendants of Persian aristocracy) and in terms of institutionalised authority 
(having been entrusted with a satrapy in the area by the Achaemenid kings). Very similar 
claims may be identified in the literary and epigraphic record in the case of the Ariarathids 
and the Commagenian Orintids.
This is of particular interest, since this strategy, although widely used in Eastern 
Anatolia, is not used all over Asia Minor. The Attalids, for example, did all they could 
to erase from memory any connection with their Persian past. The story of Philetairos’ 
becoming a eunuch is related by Strabon (Str., 13.4.1) as having happened not through 
a deliberate act of castration (as was widely practiced in the Eastern tradition on young 
boys of subject communities), but rather as a result of an unfortunate accident. This is, 
in all probability, the official version of the Attalid court, designed to avoid embarrassing 
questions. Not surprisingly, since this dynasty was throughout its history eager to pose as 
champion of the Greek cause and associations with Persian practices would have damaged 
this image. It is symptomatic that in the sculptural complex at Pergamon their victory 
over the Gauls is equated to the Greek victory over the Persians in the 5th century BC and 
even to the victory of the Olympians over the giants: all of the defeated symbolising the 
forces of the barbarity, irrational, monstrous. 
Therefore the perspective of Eastern Anatolian dynasties, emphasizing Persian 
tradition and advertising proudly their blood connections with the Achaemenid kings, 
stands out as an important pillar of their identity and self-presentation.
ii. dynastic history and mythoLoGy in eastern anatoLia
II.1. The Mithradatids
The claims to noble ancestry made by the Pontic house differ widely, depending on 
the source of information. Thus, some authors credit them with being descended from one 
of the Seven Wise Persians. As mentioned above, Polybios – our most important source 
for Pontic affairs before the reign of Mithradates Euergetes – falls into this category:
ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης εὔχετο μὲν ἀπόγονος εἶναι τῶν ἑπτὰ Περσῶν ἑνὸς τῶν 
ἐπανελομένων τὸν μάγον, διατετηρήκει δὲ τὴν δυναστείαν ἀπὸ προγόνων τὴν 
ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτοῖς διαδοθεῖσαν ὑπὸ Δαρείου παρὰ τὸν Εὔξεινον πόντον. (Pol., 
5.43.2)
An isolated piece of information from Diodoros seems to imply that this view may 
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have been shared by Hieronymos of Cardia (Diodoros’ most likely source) although, 
since no connection is made between the character described in the passage and the future 
Pontic House, the question remains whether or not this Mithradates, son of Ariobarzanes 
and supporter of Eumenes is the same as Mithradates, son of Ariobarzanes and father of 
Mithradates Ktistes, killed by Antigonos Monophthalmos at Kios:
συνῆν δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ Μιθριδάτης ὁ Ἀριοβαρζάνου μὲν υἱός, ἀπόγονος δ’ ἑνὸς τῶν 
ἑπτὰ Περσῶν τῶν συγκαθελόντων τὸν μάγον Σμέρδιν, ἀνὴρ ἀνδρείᾳ διαφέρων καὶ 
τεθραμμένος ἐκ παιδὸς στρατιωτικῶς. (diod., 19.40.2).
A few Roman authors agree with this pedigree. Thus, Florus, by means of 
introduction to his summary of the Mithradatic Wars, writes a brief archaeologia, making 
a swift transition from the mythical history of Pontus to the mythologised past and lastly 
to Eupator himself. The genealogical note agrees with the previous two writers in making 
one of the Seven Persians the distant ancestor of the founder of the Mithradatid dynasty: 
harum <Ponticarum> gentium atque regionum rex antiquissimus Aeetas, post Artabazes, 
a septem Persis oriundus, inde Mithridates, omnium longe maximus. (FloruS, 1.40) 
The same is true of Aurelius Victor: “Mithridates rex Ponti oriundus a septem Persis 
[…]”, Aur. ViCt., Vir. Illustr., 71.1. 
On the other hand, particularly Latin authors of later times – who lived at the same 
time as or later than Mithradates Eupator – credit the dynasty with the more noble origins. 
Instead of being descendants merely of Persian aristocracy, they are said to have for 
ancestor Dareios the Great. Thus writes Sallustius: “Ita Darius regnum obtinuit, a quo 
Artabazes originem ducit, quem conditorem regni Mithridatis fuisse […]” (SAll., Hist., 
II, 73). Tacitus says the same thing when referring to one ruler of Bosporus, Mithridates 
VIII. His testimony, however, holds good for the Mithradatid dynasty of Pontus as well, 
as the Bosporans claimed to be their direct descendants:
Mithridates terra marique Romanis per tot annos quaesitus sponte adsum: utere, ut 
voles, prole magni Achaemenis, quod mihi solum hostes non abstulerunt. (tAC., Ann., 
12.18.4)
 Iustinus, epitomising Pompeius Trogus, adds another illustrious king to the list of 
Mithradatid ancestors: Cyrus the Great: 
<Mithridates> […] paternos maiores suos a Cyro Darioque, conditoribus Persici 
regni, maternos a magno Alexandro ac Nicatore Seleuco, conditoribus imperii 
Macedonici, referat. (iuSt., 38.7.1). 
Appianus, a Greek writer but heavily influenced by Latin historical tradition, agrees 
with the more noble ancestry: 
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ὁ Μιθριδάτης ἀπέθνησκεν, ἑκκαιδέκατος ὢν ἐκ Δαρείου τοῦ Ὑστάσπου, 
Περσῶν βασιλέως, ὄγδοος δ’ ἀπὸ Μιθριδάτου, τοῦ Μακεδόνων ἀποστάντος τε 
καὶ κτησαμένου τὴν Ποντικὴν ἀρχήν. (APP., Mithr., 112).
How might this discrepancy be explained? The difference is not, obviously, between 
friendly and hostile sources, nor is it relevant that most Greeks favour one interpretation 
and most Latins another. In all likelihood, the distinction is to be made between phases 
of dynastic ideology. In the tumultuous period of the Diadochoi and the Epigonoi, during 
which the identities of most ruling houses were defined against the background of often 
mythical ancestries, the version in circulation was more “humble” and this is what 
Hieronymos of Cardia heard and recorded. We are assured by Lucianus of Samosata that 
the venerable Hieronymos did dedicate at least some passing remarks to the founder of 
the Pontic house:
Μιθριδάτης δὲ ὁ 
Πόντου βασιλεὺς 
ὁ προσαγορευθεὶς 
Κτίστης Ἀντίγονον 
τὸν μονόφθαλμον 
φεύγων ἐπὶ Πόντου 
ἐτελεύτησεν βιώσας 
ἔτη τέσσαρα καὶ 
ὀγδοήκοντα, ὥσπερ 
Ἱερώνυμος ἱστορεῖ. 
(luC., Macr., 13).
Polybios, in mid-
second century BC had access 
to the same story, passing 
it on to subsequent writers 
who used his Histories as a 
source, most notably Titus 
Livius (if we trust Florus to 
have faithfully recorded his 
ideas) and Diodoros (although for this particular piece of information, Diodoros may 
have drawn on Hieronymos of Cardia rather than on Polybios). 
By the 1st century BC, however, the more “noble” claim is found in the sources, 
starting with Sallustius, a claim designed to accommodate the increased importance 
enjoyed in international politics by the Pontic house and the new scope of its ambitions. 
Although this later version may have appeared at the time of Mithradates Euergetes, it is 
more likely to have been disseminated by his more illustrious son, Eupator.   
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Figure III.1. Mithradatid descent, according to 
Bosworth and Wheatley 
While many modern scholars tend to deny the factual truth of these claims,15 there 
have been researchers, like Bosworth and Wheatley16, who have tried to go against the 
current and prove them by putting together the scraps of information we can gather 
from the Greek sources. While certain of their observations, like Mithradates’ sway over 
Mysia rather than over Cios, are likely to be true and their arguments concerning textual 
transmission make perfect sense, not the same may be said about their attempts to trace 
Mithradatic lineage through the onomastic jungle of Achaemenid Persia. The foundations 
of this enterprise are completely hypothetic (as the authors themselves agree, on page 160). 
For example, based on rather late testimonies (Sallustius and Florus), who name a certain 
“Artabazes” as the founder of the house, they authoritatively conclude that “it is hard to 
see who this individual might be other than Artabazos, son of Pharnakes”, ignoring the 
obvious answer: “another Artabazos”. Given the fragmentary state of our information 
regarding the Achaemenid prosopography, one may never rule out the possibility of there 
existing a number of people bearing the same name at the same time and sometimes 
active in the same geographical context, as the authors themselves are careful to note in 
the case of two Ariobarzanes active in Western Anatolia in early 4th century BC. Also, 
the argument relies very much on the assumption that Achaemenid offices were rigid, 
allowing long dynastic series to enjoy the same position in the same place. This, however, 
contradicts the available evidence, which suggests the Achaemenid administration was 
very fluid at its highest levels.17 More importantly, they take the phrase “descended from 
one of the Seven Persians” literally, ignoring the fact that it had became a mannerism well 
before the arrival of Alexander in Asia.18 This is very well illustrated by the fact that most 
of our sources never think it worthy to name which one of the Seven Persians was claimed 
as ancestor by the Mithradatids and that this phrase was used like a title, simply denoting 
illustrious ancestry rather than be taken literally.   
Such a project remains, unfortunately, too deeply anchored in the hypothetical. 
The truth may forever elude us. In this particular context, however, factual truth is of 
secondary importance: what the Pontic court claimed and what the other courts accepted 
as being valid matters far more.
It is interesting to note that one source, Pompeius Trogus, mentions Alexander 
among the ancestors of the Mithradatids, in particular of Mithradates VI. It is somewhat 
unclear how the connection between Alexander and the Seleukids was made, given that 
the children of the Conqueror (Herakles by Barsine – if indeed he was his son and not a 
simple pretender manipulated by politicians far more powerful and cunning than himself 
15  Thus, for example, MCging, 1986, pp. 13-14, in his status quaestionis. McGing seems to have accepted 
later the historicity of such claims: MCging, 2007.
16 BoSworth & wheAtley, 1998, accepted, among others, by MitChell, 2002, pp. 52-53 and McGing (cf. 
supra, n. 15).
17 klinkott, 2005.
18 ibid., pp. 49-52.
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– and Alexander IV by Rhoxane) had been murdered before having offspring of their own. 
Even more peculiar is the fact that the connection is advertised by “secondary dynasties”, 
the Mithradatids and the Orontids of Commagene (cf. infra), but not by the Seleukids 
themselves, who preferred to extol Apollo as ancestor. It is unlikely the connection is to 
be seen through the Ptolemaic blood brought to the Seleukids by Cleopatra Thea (there 
had been a previous marital connection between Antiochos II and Berenice Phernephoros, 
but this blood tie has been severed by the murder of Berenike and her young son). Firstly, 
the ancestor claimed by Mithradates Eupator is Seleukos, not Ptolemaios. Secondly, 
Ptolemaios claimed to be the bastard son of Philip II of Macedon, being a blood relation 
of Alexander, but not his descendent. Thirdly, the last certain tie between the Pontic house 
and the Seleukids is made through Nysa, daughter of Antiochos IV Epiphanes, wife of 
Pharnakes I, therefore before the arrival of Cleopatra Thea on Seleukid soil. 
A possible solution has been put forward by Tarn,19 who, while trying to find the 
propagandistic foundation for the Alexander connection claimed by the Bactrian king 
Agathocles in his “pedigree” coinage, suggests there may have existed a legend which 
made the Iranian noblewoman Apama, Seleukos I’s wife, into the daughter of Alexander 
and Rhoxane. Tarn explains that within the space of a few generations factual truth 
becomes obscured in oral tradition, which tends to ignore the facts proper historians are 
bound to take into account. It remains curious, however, that such a gratifying legend has 
the character of a folk tale and is not picked up by the official Seleukid propaganda, but 
only by collateral dynasties, which used this fabricated ancestry to add another dimension 
to their dynastic claims and implicitly, to their political ambitions.  
II.2. The Ariarathids
The claims of dynastic ancestry made by the Ariarathid house of Cappadocia have 
been recorded in detail by Diodorus Siculus, and deserve to reproduced here:  
Ὅτι λέγουσιν ἑαυτοὺς οἱ τῆς Καππαδοκίας βασιλεῖς εἰς Κῦρον ἀναφέρειν τὸ 
γένος τὸν ἐν Πέρσαις, διαβεβαιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ Περσῶν τῶν τὸν μάγον 
ἐπανελομένων ἑνὸς ὑπάρχειν ἀπόγονοι. καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ Κύρου συγγένειαν 
οὕτω  καταριθμοῦνται. Καμβύσου τοῦ Κύρου πατρὸς ἀδελφὴν ὑπάρξαι γνησίαν 
Ἄτοσσαν· ταύτης δὲ καὶ Φαρνάκου τοῦ Καππαδοκίας βασιλέως γενέσθαι παῖδα 
Γάλλον, καὶ τούτου γενέσθαι Σμέρδιν, οὗ Ἀρτάμνην, τοῦ δὲ Ἀναφᾶν, ὃν καὶ 
διενεγκεῖν μὲν ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ τόλμῃ, γενέσθαι δ’ ἕνα τῶν ἑπτὰ Περσῶν. (diod. 
31.19.1)
This genealogy looks suspicious: Pharnakes, the husband of Atossa is deemed 
anachronistically “king of Cappadocia”; the name Gallos fits ill in a list of Persian names 
(unless one recalls that sacred eunuchs, important characters at the Achaemenid court, 
were sometimes called in the Greek sources Γάλλοι; even so, the insertion of such a man 
in a dynastic line is hard to accept); finally, the name of Dareios’ accomplice, Anaphas, 
19 tArn, 1938, pp. 446-451.
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is a late creation. In Dareios’ own words, set in stone at Bisitun, his companions were 
Vindafarnā, Utāna, Gaubaruva, Vidarna, 
Bagabuxša and Ardumaniš (DB, IV, 80-
86). Herodotos, on the other hand, gives a 
slightly different list: Otanes, Aspathines, 
Gobryas, Intaphernes, Megabyxos and 
Hydarnes (hdt., 3.70). The substitution 
of Ardumanish by Aspathines is a sign 
that already by the time of the Father of 
History being “one of the Seven” had 
become a title rather than a fact. The list 
of conspirators is even more distorted in 
Ktesias: Onophas, Idernes, Norondabates, 
Mardonios, Barisses and Ataphernes 
(Fragmenta 3c, 688), recording the 
official version accepted at the court of 
Artaxerxes II.20 
It is only now, in early 4th century, 
that one finds the Anaphas mentioned by 
Diodorus (provided, of course, that we 
are not dealing here with a homonymous, 
but not related character). Whether or not 
the connection between Ariarathes I and 
Anaphas is real (the space of two centuries between this – putative? – ancestor said to be 
a contemporary of Dareios, and the proper founder of the dynasty, Ariarathes, who dies 
in 322 at the ripe age of 82,21 is enough to accommodate the five generations enumerated 
by the Diodoran – read: official – genealogy, although the pattern of generations is deeply 
unbalanced), the literality of the claim of royal Achaemenid descent put forward by the 
Cappadocian house must be doubted. It is perhaps interesting to note that the Ariarathids 
make no mention in their family tree of Alexander, although their history of intermarriage 
with the Seleukids is just as respectable as that of the Mithradatids. This could be due to 
the relative scarcity of the sources (only Diodorus mentions this subject) or perhaps to the 
enmity towards the Seleukids installed after the battle of Magnesia, when the Cappadocian 
house embrace the Roman alliance.
II.3. The Ariobarzanids
When the line of the Ariarathids became extinct, the Romans are said to have offered 
freedom to the Cappadocians and that the latter, terrified by the prospect, have begged to 
20 dAndAMAeV, 1989, p. 103.
21 Again, according to Lucian, quoting Hieronymos, in Macrobioi, 13.
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Figure III.2. Ariarathid genealogy
remain a monarchy and chose (since “elected” does not seem to cover the political reality 
of the process) Ariobarzanes. He was a nobleman – his prestigious Iranian name appears 
to confirm this – and belonged to the anti-Mithradatid faction, but sources are unusually 
discrete with regard to his origins. That may reveal the fact that the king himself claimed 
no illustrious ancestor and was content with being a “bourgeois king”. Since his main 
source of support lay not within Cappadocia, but was rather represented by Rome, this 
strategy may not have been unwise and may account for the “veristic” style in which his 
portrait is represented on the coins he managed to issue.   
II.4. Commagenian Orontids
In order to establish the dynastic claims of the Commagenian house, one must look 
not towards the Greek authors, but rather to the epigraphical record, in particular two 
grand monuments: that of Antiochos I Theos at Nemrud Dağ and that of Philopappos in 
Athens. Both are monumental tombs and both use sculpture and inscriptions to identify 
and describe the ancestors of the interred king, informing the audience (Commagenian 
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Figure III.3. Orontid genealogy
subjects through the centuries in the case of the former, Athenian contemporary co-
citizens in the case of the latter) about the way in which they perceived their ancestry and, 
consequently, themselves. The Commagenian list of ancestors starts with Dareios and lists 
four more Persian kings, Xerxes, Artaxerxes, Dareios II22 and Artaxerxes II23. Next in line 
is the satrap Aroandes (generally known from Greek sources as Orontes24), followed by his 
son or grandson, whose name was also Aroandes and who is, in turn, succeeded by his son. 
Unfortunately, of his name only the final part remains, -danes, which may be 
reconstructed in many ways: Bardanes, Ordanes, Abandanes and others25. The name 
of his successor has not been preserved epigraphically, but historical record (mainly 
diod., 21.19.5) mentions an Orontes, satrap of Sophene who enjoyed a fair degree of 
independence from the Seleukids. Next in line are two more satraps of Sophene, Samos 
and Arsames. The twelfth stele is completely lost, so we are not informed on the link 
existing between the satraps of Sophene and the first man to be properly designated as 
ruler of Commagene, Ptolemaios, honoured in the thirteenth stele. He is followed by 
his son, Samos, and by his grandson, Mithradates Kallinikos. Kallinikos is honoured 
throughout the Nemrud Dagi complex, as the father of Antiochos I Theos and with him 
ends the list of paternal ancestors.
On his mother’s side, Antiochos wished to pay homage first and foremost to 
Alexander the Great, then to Seleukos Nikator, Antiochos I Soter, Antiochos II Theos, 
Demetrios I Soter, Demetrios II Nikator and his own wife, Isias Philostorgos. These are 
just the monarchs whose name has been spared by the passage of time, for in fact the list of 
maternal ancestors contains seventeen names, two more than the paternal forefathers. The 
discrepancy is explained by Facella26 as representing a later stage of construction, initiated 
by Antiochos after the death of his wife, Isias and his daughter Antiochis. 
The visual setting of the two lists is symptomatic for the dynastic conception of the 
Commagenian king, for the two are presented in parallel lines, facing each other over the 
causeway, and being given, therefore, equal weight. The king is careful to underline this 
also in writing, for while referring to the Greek and Persian tradition, he calls them “ἐμοῦ 
γένους εὐτυχεστάτη ῥίζα” (IGLSyr1, 1, vv. 30-31). 
This balanced vision, or, at the very least, this balanced public statement, is 
discarded in the later phases of the dynasty, for C. Iulius Antiochus Philopappus chose 
to be represented on his Athenian funerary monument in the company of just two male 
22 The stele is badly damaged; this reconstruction has been suggested by Dörner. Jalabert and Mouterde 
have suggested, instead, Rhodogune, daughter of Artaxerxes II Memnon: cf. FACellA, 2006, p. 91, n.70.
23 The few letters remaining of the inscription have been read by Dörner to indicate Artaxerxes; Puchstein 
had read Artasyras, father of Aroandes: cf. FACellA, 2006, pp. 92-94.
24 Xen., Anab., 2.4.8; Plut., Artax., 12.1-3; diod., 35.90.3 and others.
25 FACellA, 2006, p. 142. In fact, due to the poor state of conservation, the ending of the name might also 
be read as -lanes, which, however, does not seem to be shared by many names. On the other hand, as noted 
above, the Commagenian orthography differed sometimes substantially from regular Greek orthography. 
26 FACellA, 2006, pp. 274-275.
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ancestors, identified in the inscriptions27 as king Antiochos, son of king Antiochos (which 
refers, in all probability, to Antiochos IV, his grandfather, the last true ruler of Commagene) 
and king Seleukos Nikator, son of Antiochos. Two ancestors stand out by their conspicuous 
absence: one is Dareios, the other is Alexander. 
It would be hard to believe their absence is due to ignorance on the part of 
Philopappos, so perhaps it would be better to seek an explanation through the political 
context of the day.28 Due to the fact that the emperor Traianus is named Optimus, but 
has only two martial titles, Dacicus and Germanicus,29 the monument must have been 
built between 114 and 116 AD. At the time, the emperor was waging a successful, but 
nevertheless taxing war against the Parthians. The Eastern rivals of Rome made much 
of the Achaemenid tradition and, therefore, had Philopappos placed on his tomb an 
inscription honouring Dareios, he would have certainly been accused of open Parthian 
sympathies, which, as a public figure, he could hardly have afforded. Another hypothesis, 
less attractive though, is that the dynast was mindful of Athenian sensitivities, since 
Dareios had been, after all, one of the great enemies of the city. Perhaps, in their public 
speeches, the exponents of the Second Sophistic may have brought back to the ear 
of 2nd century AD hearers some of the anti-Persian ethos present in the speeches of 
Isocrates, which, being by that time half a millennium old, were sure to excite these 
lovers of antiquated stories. It is doubtful, however, weather such literary enterprises 
were politically significant enough to make a dynast reassess his dynastic origins.30
The omission of Alexander has probably been prompted by the status of the 
Macedonian in the high imperial age: from a symbol of the despotic monarch in Seneca 
(‘ille <Gaius> pontes nauibus iungit […], rerum omnium ruina furiosi et externi et 
infeliciter superbi regis imitatio’, Sen., Dial., 10.18.6, this “unfortunately vain king” being 
an allusion to Alexander31), he became the epitome of the virtuous king, who treasures 
education and who can successfully serve as a model for the Roman emperor: these are the 
main coordinates alongside which his image is constructed in Dion Chrysostomos’ series 
of speeches Peri Basileias. Moreover, it is known that Traianus himself sought to imitate 
Alexander (CASS. dio, 68.29). It is, therefore, not improbable that claiming descent from 
the great Macedonian king in that political context would have been assimilated to putting 
forward ambitious political claims. 
A great difference is therefore to be noted between the dynastic representations of 
these two representatives of the Commagenian house: if Antiochos I portrayed himself 
27 IG II2 3451 c and e.
28 Sullivan and Facella are not explicit about the reason they believed to stand behind this choice, implying 
perhaps that it was a matter of fashion: SulliVAn 1977, p. 797; FACellA, 2006, p. 358.
29  IG II2 3451 a.
30 For a more general discussion of the political significance of the concept of Persia as a menace after the 
Median Wars, cf. Bellen, 1974, passim. 
31  MAlloCh, 2001, p. 208.
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as great as he could, through the magnifying glass of his ancestry, C. Iulius Antiochus 
Philopappus portrayed himself as great as he could without attracting the wrath of the 
truly great people of his age – in particular Traianus. 
II.5. Dynastic myths in evolution
As seen from all of the above, the dynastic conception of the royal houses under 
scrutiny is not static, as an immutable truth, but rather fluid, adapting itself to suit the needs 
of the day, that is, attracting positive responses from an increasingly diverse audience. 
All houses claim to descend from Persian nobility and this is, as far as we can 
reconstruct, perfectly true, though the connections to the Achaemenid kingship, either 
indirect (by claiming descent from one of the Seven Persians with whose daughters 
the king was expected to marry) or direct (claiming descent from Cyros and Dareios), 
are highly speculative. It is conceivable that these claims were put forward before the 
arrival of Alexander in Asia, but must have been reinforced by the elevated status of 
these dynasties as they took the leap forward from the condition of satrapal house to 
that of royal house. Given the ethnic composition and the history of their realms (cf. 
supra, pp. 48-54), it is conceivable that such a step was prompted by the expectations 
of their subjects, for whom, in good Achaemenid tradition, royalty was not won through 
the spear, but inherited through blood. As the Hellenistic Age developed, bringing with 
it new connections and new demands in terms of legitimacy, the Seleukid ancestry 
began to be advertised and finally Alexander was brought into play. 
iii. dynastic and mythicaL memory 
Given the sometimes very detailed character of genealogies put forward, one must 
naturally wonder what the source was for such reconstructions, whether it was oral 
history we may no longer possess traces of, internal dynastic narrative or even Greek 
written sources. The fluidity of memory in dynastic context has been analysed with great 
success in the case of the Sassanians.32 Similarities may be found with Eastern Anatolian 
royal families, in so far as it can be argued that in both cultural areas the memory of the 
Achaemenids is to a good extent preserved in oral histories, passed on by the masses 
as myths, particularly foundational myths, and by aristocrats as genealogies underlining 
their own prestige. 
An example of foundational myth designed to strengthen internal cohesion might 
be the information found in Strabon (Str., 12.1.4), that the division between the two 
Cappadocian regions, Pontic Capadocia and Greater Cappadocia, is to be attributed to the 
Persians, whereas our historical record (mainly Greek literary sources, satrapal coinage and 
Achaemenid epigraphical records) points to the existence of only one administrative unit. 
It is unfortunate that we do not possess examples of aristocratic genealogies apart 
32 dAryAee, 2006.
Dynastic Policies and Politics 103
from those of the royal houses, but these alone – coupled with the numerous attestations 
of Iranian names among the aristocracy – are enough to stand as proof that Persian descent 
was prestigious. It is hard to tell to what extent the written sources have influenced the 
image the royal houses had of themselves, but it is relatively easy to point that there must 
have been an independent dynastic tradition, given the differences in names that sometimes 
appear: the Ariarathids claim to descend from Anaphas, whereas some Greek sources 
have Onophas,33 while the Orontids of Commagene claim descent from Aroandes, a much 
closer approximation of the Iranian *Aruuanta than the form Ὀρόντας or Ὀρόντης 
preserved in the Greek histories.34 
iv. constructinG and projectinG the dynastic imaGe
As often happens in politics, merely generating a set of ideas or representations 
is never enough. These ideas need to be conveyed to the community in such ways as to 
be at the same time comprehensible and acceptable. In the complex social and cultural 
environment of Eastern Asia Minor, delivering a comprehensible and acceptable 
message with regard to nobility of descent and implied legitimacy proved a particularly 
complicated task. We possess only meagre traces of evidence for the way in which 
the dynasties advertised their descent to their own subjects. Though few, these pieces 
of evidence are sometimes of striking artistic quality and must have impressed their 
intended audience as much as they do in the case of the modern public and deserve 
therefore a more detailed analysis.
IV.1. Public gestures 
The imitatio maiorum performed in public gestures is a very potent message that a 
monarch may send forth. Echoing an ancestor’s iconic gestures – those that had become 
defining to his character in the public mind – can be said to have almost ritual significance, 
as it places the monarch in a direct line of continuity with the heroicised ancestor. Some 
gestures seem to be unambiguous, in the sense that they appear to vibrate with the 
memory of a clearly identifiable ancestor (who is sometimes mentioned by name). For 
example, Mithradates VI sacrificed to Zeus Stratios on a mountaintop as was the habit of 
Achaemenid kings: “οἷόν τι καὶ ἐν Πασαργάδαις ἐστὶ τοῖς Περσῶν βασιλεῦσι θυσίας 
γένος” (APP., Mithr., 66).
A similar illustration of the constant re-affirmation of ancestry performed by the three 
dynasties under scrutiny is the education of the crown prince. Two models were available: 
the Greek and the Persian paideia, each characterised by certain defining acts, each embraced 
by various monarchs and each having particular cultural and political connotations. 
Some of the Ariarathids, for example, embraced with much enthusiasm the Greek 
33  Provided, of course, that manuscript tradition has not become corrupt along the way, which is not to be 
entirely excluded.
34 cf. FACellA, 2006, p. 304, n. 36.
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ideals of paideia: Ariarathes V is praised for his Greek education – which he had received 
in Athens, alongside Attalos II35 – and for his open support of Greek letters. Later, during 
his reign, his court becomes a hub of cultural activity: 
τοῦτον δὲ ἀνδρωθέντα καὶ Ἀριαράθην φασὶ μετονομασθῆναι, παιδείας τε 
Ἑλληνικῆς μετασχεῖν […] καταλαβόντος διεδέξατο τὴν βασιλείαν, τήν τε ἄλλην 
ἀγωγὴν τοῦ βίου ἀξιολογωτάτην ἐνδεικνύμενος καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσανέχων, 
ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἡ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀγνοουμένη πάλαι Καππαδοκία τότε τοῖς 
πεπαιδευμένοις ἐμβιωτήριον ὑπῆρχεν. (diod., 31.19.7-8). 
Not the same may be said about the Mithradatids, who seem to have preferred the 
Persian education. It has been convincingly argued36 that the story of Eupator’s early 
years (found, with most details, in iuSt., 37.2) is full of elements characteristic of this 
type of paideia (hunting on horseback, various trials, including poisoning, survival in 
isolation, designed to remind the future king of the humble, but vigorous beginnings of 
the Achaemenids). 
The imitation of Alexander represents an important act by the monarch. The afore-
mentioned Greek paideia of the Ariarathids may be an attempt to emulate the great king, 
who is known to have been educated by Aristotle, with whom he maintained a lively 
correspondence even while on campaign (or so the legend ran, in the Hellenistic era, taken 
up later, in the Imperial Age, by Plutarch).37 Another example of outspoken imitation 
of the Macedonian king is offered by the Commagenian Antiochos IV Epiphanes, who 
comes to the aid of Titus at the head of a body of cavalrymen trained from a young 
age to rival Alexander’s Companions.38 It seems, however, that the most and clearest 
examples of imitatio Alexandri are – not surprisingly – offered by Mithradates VI 
Eupator, who seemed to programmatically immitate the great conqueror. For example, 
he stays overnight in a Phrygian inn rumoured to have been visited once by the great 
Conqueror;39 he is said to possess Alexander’s purple cloak;40 he makes a generous 
donation to the Temple of Artemis in Ephesos paralleling that of Alexander;41 etc.
On the other hand, Mithradates’ personality is complex enough to accommodate the 
imitation of another distinguished ancestor: Dareios, for he is said to possess a number of 
35 The base of the statue found near the Stoa of Attalos bearing the inscription “Καρνεάδην Ἀζηνιέα Ἄτταλος 
καὶ Ἀριαράθης Συπαλήττιοι ἀνέθηκαν” demonstrates, according to most scholars, that Ariarathes V was 
an Athenian citizen. Cf. hABiCht, 1990, pp. 571-572, for a discussion of the subject, including Mattingly’s 
arguments against identifying the person named in the inscription with the Cappadocian prince. Whatever the 
solution to this dilemma, it remains epigraphically attested that there was Cappadocian influence in Athens at 
the time and this may have resulted from a prolonged presence of the young Cappadocian in Attica.  
36 BAlleSteroS-PAStor, 2006.
37 Plut., Alex., 7.
38 ioSePh., B.Jud., 5.460. 
39  APP., Mithr., 20.
40 APP., Mithr., 117.
41  Str., 14.1.23.
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objects which had belonged to the Achaemenid king and passed on from one negation to 
another as heirlooms.42
If the gestures listed above – certainly, just a brief overview with illustrative 
purpose, which does not nurture ambitions of exhaustiveness – other gestures seem 
to us (and may have seemed to the ancients, as well), more ambiguous. For example, 
Eupator appointed satraps over the newly conquered territories in Asia Minor.43 This 
gesture may be interpreted as an attempt at emulating the Achaemenids or, equally 
well, as emulating his Macedonian ancestors, Alexander and the Seleukids, by returning 
the land to the state of affairs before Magnesia. After all, Mithradates had, by force of 
arms, annulled the right of the Romans to determine the status of Western Asia Minor, 
which they had wrested, again by force of arms, from Antiochos III. It is not surprising 
that Eupator is mentioned abundantly in this section: not only do we possess about him 
vastly more information than about any other king of the region, he was also masterful 
in his efforts of image creation and manipulation.    
IV.2. Oral traditions and written texts
As elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, monarchs in Eastern Anatolia welcomed at 
their court intellectuals of all sorts: historians, poets, astronomers and so forth: the case 
of the Pontic court (as exemplified under Mithradates VI Eupator) has been discussed in 
the Introduction, while the Ariarathids have been mentioned in the section above. These 
men of letters would strive to enhance the glory of their patrons, much in the same vein as 
Theocritos, for example, had praised Ptolemaios II Philadelphos in his works. A common 
strategy in order to do so was to refer to the honourable origins of the monarch. Such 
references would naturally integrate and elaborate on oral traditions already in existence. 
When we are not fortunate enough to possess internal and direct evidence for a dynasty’s 
mythology – as we do in Commagene, thanks to Antiochos I’s love for epigraphical 
documents – references to this subject found in literary works created by writers who 
lived in the proximity of the monarch are our only means of recovering, at least in part, 
the royal ideology. 
One interesting example of what must have been part of the oral tradition 
which was subsequently absorbed into the written record is the story of Mithradates I. 
Three main sources document the story or its immediate context: APP., Mithr., 9; 
Plut., Dem., 4; and diod., 20.111.4. Appian mentions that Antigonos had with 
him Mithradates, a descendant of Persian kings; that he had a dream according to 
which Mithradates reaped the golden field and carried the treasure to Pontus; that 
the diadoch attempted to have Mithradates killed; and that the latter succeeded in 
evading him and fleeing accompanied by six horsemen. Plutarch’s version includes 
the same dream, but this time Mithradates owes his escape to his friend Demetrios 
42 APP., Mithr., 115; APP., Mithr., 116.
43  welleS, 1974, inscription 73, 1.
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and he flees in the middle of the night, apparently without escort. Diodoros’ story is 
the briefest and the most pragmatic: Mithradates the father, a subject of Antigonos, 
treacherously negotiated with Kassandros and was subsequently put to death; his 
son took over as the head of the dynasty and ruled Cappadocia and Paphlagonia for 
thirty six years. 
Diodoros’ unembellished treatment of Mithradates’ execution and his son’s escape to 
Cappadocia (no omen is invoked, and the execution is motivated by clear political reasons, 
while the blame is shouldered fully by the treacherous dynast) may point to an external source 
– quite possibly Hieronymos of Cardia –, while the care to indicate with precision the number 
of years during which Ktistes ruled might point equally well to an internal source. 
The versions presented by Appian and Plutarch bear, on the contrary, the imprint 
of an internal source: firstly, they focus on the image of Ktistes, the founder of the 
dynasty and make him the main character; secondly, the treacherous intentions are 
transferred onto Antigonos; thirdly, the omen announces the future glory of Ktistes 
and of his descendants. Plutarch’s version then brings Demetrios into play and shifts 
attention to the exploits of the young man in shrewdly finding a way to reconcile filial 
duty with friendship, thus indicating that an external influence – it remains uncertain if 
this influence was exerted by Plutarch himself or not – altered substantially an internal 
narrative. The end of the story as presented by Appian, however, is most in tune with 
what we may suppose to have been the royal tradition: by escaping the excesses of 
an abusive monarch, accompanied by six companions, and subsequently defeating the 
monarch (for having survived him in this context may be assimilated to a victory) 
Ktistes was in effect re-enacting the conspiracy of Dareios I.
It is also interesting to note that this story contains a number of literary motifs 
commonly found in legends about royal figures across the Eastern Mediterranean basin, 
whose origin may well be Near-Eastern. Thus, the tyrant’s dream warning of the future 
greatness of a humble (or currently disgraced) young man is also present in the legend 
of Cyrus (hdt., 1.108); the young man’s flight from the tyrant is also associated with 
Perdiccas, founder of the Argead house (hdt., 8.138), with Ardashir, founder of the 
Sassanian dynasty (Karnamak, 3) and even with Alexander (PS.-CAlliSt., 2.14-15); the 
last two also share with Mithradates’ legend the image of the young man taking with 
himself some of the king’s gold, doubtlessly in a symbolic assumption of the royal 
attributes (and even Perdiccas’ gesture of gathering the sunlight reflected on the floor of 
the king’s house may be seen as an equivalent).
This story and its branches is a good indicator of how oral traditions and widely 
known legends, preserved primarily by the royal family and by the Court, found their way 
into the writings of favourable writers and from there passed into the works of neutral or 
openly hostile writers, who choose to either keep the details of the story as close to the 
original as possible or, on the contrary, distort the narrative according to their own agenda. 
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IV.3. Artistic depictions
As public gestures were accessible only to a limited number of people (those who 
were present at the specific time and place in which the gesture was being performed) and 
written accounts could only reach the literate (who in all likelihood represented a minority 
in Eastern Anatolia at the time), monarchs needed more potent means of communicating 
their ideas regarding ancestry and its legitimising power. Thus, they resorted to artistic 
depictions, whose appeal cut across social and cultural strata.  
IV.3.1. Architectural Monuments 
Edifices erected by the ruling elite and most importantly by the monarchs 
themselves were powerful statements, given that the choice of style or decoration 
was not fortuitous. Sometimes this choice was consciously integrated in a broader 
communicational strategy. Even if at times it simply reflected the artistic trends, it is 
just as important, since trends or fashions could only find favour if they responded to 
the world view and expectations 
of those who ordered the 
erection of the edifices. While 
all monuments are important for 
determining the preferences of 
a certain monarch or a certain 
dynasty, funeral monuments 
are particularly relevant to the 
subject discussed in the present 
chapter, as they reveal the 
monarch in relation with both 
the past and the future: how he 
places himself (as, very often the monarch would commission his tomb while still 
alive) within a tradition and how he desires to be perceived by future generations. 
The most important architectural complexes within the geographical area under 
scrutiny are the Pontic “royal tombs” from Amaseia and the Commagenian hierothesion 
from Nemrut Dağı.44 
The “royal tombs” of Amaseia are thus called due to a phrase of Strabon, who while 
describing with pride his native city, mentions that within the walled perimeter one could see 
the royal palace and the “monuments of the kings”, “μνήματα βασιλέων” (Str., 12.3.39). 
Since the most visible monuments – certainly now, but in all likelihood also in Strabon’s 
times (cf. Figure III.4) – are the tombs carved in stone, scholars have deduced that these 
44 The tomb from Amisos described in detail by BurCu erCiyAS, 2006, pp. 67-115, though extremely 
important in terms of grave goods cannot qualify as an architectural monument, given its apparent lack of 
exterior pomp (p. 68). 
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Figure III.4. ‘Royal’ tombs at Amaseia
must be the monuments Strabon had in mind. Some, such as Fleischer,45 attribute the 
five tombs (designated each by a letter, A to E, counting from the right to the left) to 
each of the five kings from Mithradates I Ktistes to Pharnakes I, who moved the capital 
to the newly conquered Sinope and consequently abandoned the construction of Tomb 
E. This is certainly an appealing theory, but there are some observations which do not fit 
well with it. Firstly, though Fleischer 
has been able to determine a relative 
chronology based on construction 
details (Tomb A has been built first, 
followed by Tomb C, then B, D and 
E), little evidence has been found 
upon which to establish a convincing 
absolute chronology, other than the 
terminus ante quem provided by the 
inscription carved above Tomb E, 
mentioning King Pharnakes, who is in 
all likelihood Pharnakes I.46 Secondly, 
some tombs include more than one bench and – if one may use the analogy with the tomb 
from Amisos, which had five graves, of which three or four were used47 – it is likely that 
they were intended to accommodate more than one corpse. Thirdly, in the proximity 
of the citadel there are other tombs of similar design, some of which are known to 
have belonged to people of high status, but not kings, such as Tes, the archiereus.48 
Therefore, it may probably be wiser to consider these monuments as the belonging to 
the high aristocracy, including persons of royal blood, though not necessarily bearing 
the royal title.
Though virtually nothing remains of the original decoration of the tombs, R. 
Fleischer and his team have done much to investigate all the telling details and have 
discovered that the complex of monuments presented a distinctly eclectic sight. Thus, 
tombs A, B and D had facades with six or four Ionic columns (cf. Figure III.5) and 
in all likelihood an entablature and tympanum of the same style (although no traces 
of sculptural decoration could be identified). By contrast, Tombs C and E, with their 
columnless facades and vaulted roofs, would have appeared alien to the eyes of any 
Greek. So far, scholars have been unable to determine precisely the sources of inspiration 
45 FleiSCher, 2009.
46 The case is supported by the triangular shape of the letter phi, which has parallels in 2nd century BC 
Macedonian inscriptions. Cf. BernArd, 1993, p. 12. 
47  According to the description, in Grave 1 archaeologists could not identify skeletal remains, although there 
were grave goods deposited there (erCiyAS, 2006, p. 69).
48  St.P. III, 95.
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Figure III.5. Tomb A in Amaseia. Reconstruction
for such a design. Given its popularity in the Pontic area,49 Fleischer suggests plausibly 
that it is an indigenous design. 
The eclectic appearance of the complex was generated not only by the contrast 
between the different tombs, but also by the contrast between the architectural elements 
of the same tomb. Thus, even in the case of the tombs with Greek facades, the entrance 
into the funeral chambers was not carved at the level of the column base, in accordance 
with Greek customs, but rather at a higher level, reminding of the Naqš-i Rustam tombs 
of Dareios the Great and his descendants. This placement was in all likelihood determined 
not only by artistic choice, but also by religious reasons.50 
The architectural complex of Nemrut Dağı is an equally interesting illustration 
of architectural eclecticism. The general design gravitates physically and symbolically 
around the central mound, which forms in effect the mountaintop, and it is well-known 
that Persian kings were said to offer sacrifice in such dramatic spots. Yet the arrangement 
of the different items that form the complex had been determined after painstaking 
calculations inspired by astrology, itself a field of knowledge that resulted from the 
osmosis of Oriental and Hellenic influences.   
IV.3.2. Large-scale statuary
It is not only the architectural details that give the Nemrut Dağı complex its great 
importance for the study of the way in which Persian and Greek traditions were combined 
in artistic representations in order to convey a sense of equal respect for both nurtured by 
the ruling elite, but also the great sculptures that adorn it, and which represent the epitome 
of Commagenian style. Similar images have been discovered elsewhere in Commagene, 
indicating a sustained effort of image creation and propagation.
In terms of general style, the combination of traditions creates a striking effect. 
The majestic heaviness of the volumes of Middle-Eastern inspiration complements well 
the elegant poses and realistic treatment of certain bodily features, such as the eyes and 
beards, inspired from Classical Greek art.51 
Royal iconography is revealing for the manner in which Commagenian kings (and 
Antiochos I in particular) wished to be perceived by the participants in the rituals at Nemrut 
Dağı. The king is portrayed as an equal of the gods, both on the great East and West terraces 
– where he is enthroned besides deified Commagene – and on the bas-reliefs lined next to the 
colossal sculptures – in which he is represented as standing as tall as they are and engaging in the 
ritual gesture of dexiosis.52 While there are Oriental precedents to this imagery, most notably in 
Egypt, the idea of the deified ruler seems rather rooted in the royal Hellenistic ideology. 
49 See, for example, the aforementioned tomb of Tes, but also the dramatic tomb of Hikesios from Laçin 
(FleiSCher, 2005; MArek, 2003, figs. 54, 55 & 56).
50 FleiSCher, 2009, p. 115.
51 SiSMondo ridgwAy, 2002, 37.
52 rollinger, 2007.
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The costume of the king is equally charged from the imagological perspective: he 
invariably wears the tiara, a symbol of Oriental – in particular Persian and Armenian53 – 
regal power entwined with the diadem, a symbol of Macedonian kingship. The decoration 
of the tiara varies from one relief to another. It is sometimes decorated with the image of a 
lion, sometimes with an eagle flanked by stars or even with a thunderbolt. The presence of 
the lion may be explained as a reference to the king’s 
zodiacal sign, while both the eagle and the thunderbolt 
may be interpreted as symbols of royalty in Greek key, 
given that the eagle was the iconic bird of Zeus and 
the thunderbolt his weapon of choice; moreover, these 
two symbols are highly reminiscent of Alexander, 
on whose coins the thunderbolt and eagle hold a 
prominent place and who appeared in a painting by 
Apelles as holding himself the thunderbolt.54  
The rest of the royal attire bears the mark of the 
same distinctive combination of traditions: Antiochos 
wears a tunic with long sleeves and trousers, which 
are reminiscent of the Persian tradition, but also a 
mantle, which is part of the Macedonian king’s 
regular outfit (cf. infra, p. 138). The decoration of the 
tunic features prominently the “Macedonian” eight-
rayed star, laurel leaves (reminding one of the Greek 
symbol of Olympic victory) and oak leaves, which in 
all likelihood point again to a privileged relation with 
Zeus-Oromasdes, the king of all gods. 
In his left hand the king carries a long sceptre, an 
ancient Indo-European symbol of royalty, present both in 
Achaemenid imagery, as demonstrated by the audience scenes at Persepolis and that depicted 
on the inside of a shield in the “Alexander” sarcophagus, and in Greek representations of gods 
– Zeus in particular – and kings. On his right thigh the king has a short sword, of the akinake 
type, the iconic sidearm of the Persian soldiers, which gained in time ritual significance, 
becoming, for example, the weapon used by Mithras to slay the bull. 
The visual representation of the king is therefore complementary to his vision as 
expressed in epigraphic form and synthesized best in the formula “[...] Περσῶν τε καὶ 
Ἑλλήνων - ἐμοῦ γένους εὐτυχεστάτη ῥίζα” (IGLSyr., 1.1, 29-31). The union of the two 
53 young, 1967, argues convincingly that Antiochos wears at all times the Armenian tiara.
54  The association of the noble bird with royalty was further cemented when the image was used by 
Seleukids and Ptolemies alike to underscore their status and privileged relation with the supreme god of 
the Greek pantheon, in foundation legends and in artistic depictions.
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Figure III.6. Antiochos I
traditions in the person of the king is communicated programmatically through the means 
of monumental art. 
Antiochos I’s monuments are extremely important, because they are – at least for the 
time being, until archaeologists uncover new monuments in Eastern Anatolia – unique in 
their quality of being an “internal” document: they 
are addressed to the king’s own subjects, to whom 
they communicate the king’s own vision about the 
manner in which his heritage justified his rule, and 
have been in all likelihood carved by indigenous 
artisans, whose work has at least received the final 
approval from the king personally, if it was not 
guided to a good degree by him. Such “internal” 
documents existed elsewhere in Anatolia, but the 
vicissitudes of nature or of history have destroyed 
them. Such, for example, was the silver statue of 
Pharnakes I (Plin., 33.11.54) or the golden one 
of Mithradates VI, with a height of 6 feet (Plut., 
Luc., 37) or even 8 cubits55 (APP., Mithr., 116), both 
taken by Pompeius from somewhere in Pontus and 
shown on the occasion of his triumph in Rome. 
Kings, however, advertised a certain vision 
of themselves not only to their own subjects, but 
also to friendly communities. In this case, the royal message was transformed: on 
the one hand because it was adapted to fit the expectations of the audience, on 
the other hand, because the message was reproduced using the artistic vocabulary 
of the local craftsmen, who were more often than not charged with creating the 
sculpture, as is implied for example, by the Delian decree honouring Pharnakes 
I: “οἱ ἐπιμελησόμενοι τῆς κατα[σκ]ευῆς καὶ τῆς ἀναθέσεως τῶν εἰκόνων κατὰ 
τὸ ψήφισμα οἵδε κεχειροτόνηνται· Λέων Αἰξωνεύς, Φιλόξενος Πειραιεύς, 
Διονύσιος ἐγ Μυρρινούττης” (ID 1497bis). Two examples illustrate very well 
this shift in tone: the funerary monument of Philopappos in Athens (cf. supra, pp. 
99-100) and the statue of Mithradates VI Eupator identified on Delos, believed to 
have been housed within the heroon dedicated to the king by the priest Helianax.56 
As demonstrated by the inscription, this statue is dedicated by the same person, 
Helianax, an Athenian citizen (ID, 1563). It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the 
appearance of the statue – at least in so much as it is preserved – has nothing distinctively 
non-Greek about it, but presents Mithradates in the typical outfit of the Hellenistic kings. 
55 Approximately 3.5 metres.
56 ChAPouthier, 1935, p. 39; kreutz, 2009, pp. 135-136.
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Figure III.7. Mithradates VI
Some have considered that the military costume is of Roman type and deduced that 
the Pontic king was careful at the time (102-101 B.C.) to show a conciliatory attitude 
towards the super-power of the day.57 A comparative study with similar Hellenistic 
torsos will show, nevertheless, that the linothorax with the elaborately knotted belt is 
not specifically Roman (other examples can be identified, for example, on the Telephos 
Frieze from the Pergamon Altar). The mantle – though clearly similar to a number of 
representations of the Macedonian cloak such as the Pella mosaics – has been considered 
to be the Roman paludamentum. However, as demonstrated convincingly by Hallett,58 the 
Roman general’s mantle in the Republican period was simply a form of chlamys and only 
acquired its particular shape and iconic value in the Early Imperial Age. It is therefore 
more appropriate perhaps to consider that the appearance of Mithradates on Delos was not 
influenced by his desire to please Rome, but was fully Hellenic, created by a Greek and 
aimed at a Greek audience, complementing well his other declarations of Greek descent 
and phil-Hellenism which brought him the support of the Greek communities particularly 
during the First War with Rome.      
IV.3.3. Small-scale statuary
If large-scale statuary is indicative rather 
of the tastes of the ruling elites (in particular of 
the king who commissions the most important 
projects), small-scale  terracotta statuary, by 
its very nature accessible to a wider public, 
is important as a reflection of the horizon 
and expectations of the middle or even lower 
social strata. Since artists would use moulds 
to produce numerous identical terracotta 
statuettes, customers could not influence their 
appearance directly, but could do so – at least 
in theory – through the offer-and-demand 
mechanisms of the market. 
The subjects covered by this genre are 
extremely varied, from everyday characters to 
gods. The overview of the terracotta production 
of Amisos published by Summerer59 shows, 
for example, a preference for decorative 
elements (protomai) and representations of gods, in particular Dionysos. Examples of 
representations of royal figures are extremely sparse and quite often it is very hard to 
57 For example, MCging, 1986a, pp. 90-91.
58 hAllett, 2005, pp. 334-335.
59 SuMMerer, 1999.
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Figure III.8. Terracotta portrait from Amisos
discriminate between royal portraits and standardised representations of heroic figures, on 
the one hand because the reduced dimensions and the material allow relatively little detail 
to be included, on the other hand because the resemblance between king and hero may be 
in fact intentional. An example of such blurring of boundaries is perhaps provided by a 
terracotta portrait now exhibited in the Sinop Archaeological Museum (cf. Figure III.8): 
Summerer compares the features of this portrait with those of Mithradates V Euergetes on 
his silver coins and identifies similarities in the facial features. In case the portrait belongs 
indeed to the Pontic king, the lion headdress and the specific head tilt may represent 
a genealogical statement, namely the link with Alexander the Great and, through the 
Argead line, with Herakles. It must be avowed, nevertheless, that the identification is 
by no means certain and that the figure may, after all, be simply a representation of a 
youthful, beardless Herakles or even of Alexander himself.
Thus, by contrast with large-scale statuary, which is produced under close guidance 
of the king or the Court, and which is consequently very attentive to the messages 
conveyed, terracotta statuettes are rather more ambiguous.         
IV.3.4. Coins and cameos
Numismatic imagery was certainly a potent means of communication, but extreme 
care must be exercised when analysing this type of evidence, given the irregular character 
of issues and apparent distinctions between intended targets for different types of coins. 
It has been argued that the main purpose for striking coins was to pay the professional 
troops that had become essential in the Hellenistic Age.60 While there is no evidence that 
troops were paid different wages while on campaign and while performing garrison duties, 
it could be argued that troops hired for shorter periods, which were subsequently disbanded 
and would be generally leaving the area under the control of their former paymaster, would 
be consequently eager to be paid in precious metal (commonly silver, but sometimes also 
gold), which would be worth just as much in other geographic areas. On the other hand, 
troops performing garrison duties, by the nature of their more stable employment and limited 
area of activity, would be equally content with bronze issues which would necessarily be 
accepted by local traders. This implies that coins of precious metal were expected (or 
intended) to reach an external “public”, whereas lower-value bronze coins were designed 
with an internal “public” in mind. This observation may be supported by numismatic issues 
such as those of Ariarathes III, who depicts himself on bronze coinage wearing a Persian 
tiara, whereas on the silver issues he depicts himself in usual Greek fashion (SiMonettA 
1977 p. 19, nos. 4 and 1, respectively) or by the issues of Mithradates VI Eupator, who 
strikes on his bronze coins (among many other designs) the image of Perseus (or perhaps 
himself in the guise of Perseus), the mythical founder of the Persian people, while on his 
silver or gold issues he adopts a Greek fashion, similar to Alexander. 
60 CAllAtAÿ, 1997, pp. 389-415.
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The reality, however, is much more nuanced than that. Firstly, soldiers on campaign 
are not entirely models of parsimoniousness,61 so the cash they received upon enrolling 
(true enough, only a part of the total amount they were due for the duration of the contract) 
tended to flow quite liberally out of their pockets, ending up in the hands of the locals, 
who would thus be exposed to a Greek portrayal of their ruler. Secondly, the allocation 
of Persian designs exclusively to bronze issues and of Greek designs exclusively on 
silver issues is disproved by a number of issues, for example the series of silver drachms 
depicting Ariarathes VI with an upright and diademed tiara (SiMonettA, p. 32, no. 1), 
which means the image of king in good Achaemenid tradition was advertised to the Greek 
world as well. Thirdly, the relative scarceness of coins of some rulers in our possession 
today prohibits too general statements.  
If coins were intended primarily for military and economic use, cameos and intaglios 
would be used almost exclusively by the very wealthy. Sometimes they were collected 
for their beauty, and Mithradates VI was famous in Antiquity for his daktylotheke (Plin., 
37.11). More often, though, they were mounted on rings and used to sign letters and other 
documents. Besides deities and other mythological creatures, it is likely that the image of 
the king was present on many cameos. Courtiers would naturally try to impress their king 
and their peers by either using the royal portrait or by having their own image carved in such 
a way that it would resemble the style adopted by the king himself. That might explain why 
the numerous gem portraits assigned by scholars to Anatolian kings and to Mithradates VI 
in particular62 are sometimes so dissimilar from each other and from the portraits on coins. 
*
Remaining content to identify trends and tendencies rather than general truths, 
one must conclude that Eastern Anatolian kings did their best to advertise their ancestry 
through all genres of art as a means of underlining the nobility of their descent and hence 
the legitimacy of their rule and exploited the complexity of their dynastic ties to underline 
different aspects of their personality to different audiences: the Greek world was generally 
presented with the image of a monarch of Greco-Macedonian inspiration, whereas their 
own subjects generally perceived a king in good Achaemenid tradition, although images 
incorporating both traditions are not uncommon.
v. success of dynastic propaGanda
The two main authorities in whose eyes Eastern Anatolian monarchs might wish 
to gain credibility were their own subjects and their peers. In both instances, the issue of 
descent would be of crucial importance. The fact that in the eyes of the subjects ancestry 
does provide legitimacy seems to be illustrated by Eupator’s return to Pontus during the 
third war with Rome, as described by Cassius Dio: 
61  I am grateful to François de Callataÿ for this observation.
62  See, for example, the plates illustrating Vollenweider, 1983, but also højte, 2009a, p. 158.
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οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ἐκείνου τε εὔνοιαν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὁμοφύλου καὶ ἐκ τῆς 
πατρίου βασιλείας καὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων μῖσος διά τε τὸ ὀθνεῖον καὶ διὰ τὸ 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφεστηκότων σφίσι κακουχεῖσθαι ἔχοντες, προσεχώρησάν τε 
αὐτῷ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐκεῖ Ῥωμαίων Μᾶρκον Φάβιον 
ἐνίκησαν. (CASS. dio, 36.9.2).
One might be suspicious when confronted with such a statement – what could Cassius 
Dio know of the motivations of the Pontic people? Does this vague ἄνθρωποι refer to the 
population at large or just to a segment of it? In this particular instance, however, factual 
truth remains of secondary importance: either a real piece of information, documented 
in the field by Romans or a false one, propagated by royal agents, it remains beyond 
doubt that the Pontic kings desired to project an image of themselves that underlined 
their ancestral claim on kingship, transmitted uninterruptedly from one generation to the 
other. It was not the recently obtained military success, reversing a series of ignominious 
defeats that endeared Eupator to the masses, but rather his high birth. 
Another instance of popular adherence to the dynastic idea may be found in Josephus: 
Ἐτελεύτησεν δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς Κομμαγηνῆς βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχος, διέστη δὲ τὸ 
πλῆθος πρὸς τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ πρεσβεύουσιν ἀφ’ ἑκατέρου μέρους, οἱ 
μὲν δυνατοὶ μεταβάλλειν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς ἐπαρχίαν ἀξιοῦντες, 
τὸ πλῆθος δὲ βασιλεύεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. (ioSePh., A.Iud., 18.53). 
If the wealthy desired the country to become a Roman province, possibly stimulated 
by the prospect of greater economic freedom or eager to obtain greater guarantees of 
security with regard to their Eastern neighbour, Parthia, the people wanted to preserve 
the dynasty and the ways of their forefathers, which is a testament to the success of the 
propaganda programme of the Commagenian Orontids.
In Cappadocia something similar may have happened when the Ariarathid dynasty 
was wiped out and, following arbitration attempts, Rome offered Cappadocians their 
freedom (as discussed above, in the historical overview). The delegation, nevertheless, 
begged the Senate to allow them to remain a kingdom. While this may demonstrate that 
the idea of royal legitimacy in Cappadocia, nurtured by more than two hundred years 
of Ariarathid rule, was deeply rooted in the local mentality, it may also be the reflex of 
political expediency, in particular of the realisation that Mithradates VI could only be 
repelled by a strong, united Cappadocia, led by a single ruler approved by Rome. 
vi. inter-dynastic marriaGes
After having dwelled on the issue of how royal blood was claimed, the enquiry 
must now turn to examining how this was enriched over the centuries by inter-dynastic 
marriages, of which the sources have preserved abundant evidence. 
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VI.1. Inter-dynastic marriages: an overview
The earliest we know of seem to have been more or less simultaneous: we are 
told by Eusebios in his Chronicle (euSeB., Chron., 95) and by Diodorus Siculus (diod., 
31.9.6) that Seleukos II Kallinikos marries two of his sisters, Laodike and Stratonike, to 
Mithradates II and Ariarathes III, respectively. A number of years later, Mithradates II 
offers two of his daughters, both called Laodike, to Antiochos III63 and to Achaios (his 
Laodike had been a hostage – probably as prospective bride – of Antiochos Hierax).64 
In turn, Antiochos III seems to have continued his father’s policy and gave one of his 
daughters, Antiochis, in marriage to Ariarathes IV.65 
A major brake in the Anatolian dynastic policy is brought about by the political 
situation following the treaty of Apameia. The Mithradatids continue to cultivate 
their relation with the Seleukids, for Pharnakes accepts as bride Nysa,66 possibly a 
daughter of Antiochos IV,67 and later Mithradates V’s wife, Laodike, might have been 
a Seleukid princess (depending how much weight one attaches to the literality of 
Justin’s account that Mithradates VI Eupator claimed descent from the Seleukids on 
his mother’s side).68 Yet the Ariarathids choose to interrupt dynastic relations with the 
Seleukids: an intended marriage between Ariarathes V to Demetrios I’s daughter is 
cancelled following pressure from Rome.69 
Following this episode, the infamous Nysa is preferred, who, given her name, 
may have been a daughter of Pharnakes. The following queen on the Cappadocian 
throne was certainly a Pontic princess: Laodike, the daughter of Mithradates V 
and sister of Mithradates VI, married to Ariarathes VI,70 while the last is Athenais 
Philostorgos, the very young daughter of Mithradates VI, married to the equally 
young Ariobarzanes II.
 Eupator was very energetic in his efforts to establish marital ties with surrounding 
dynasties: among his sons in law were Tigranes the Great of Armenia, Ariobarzanes II 
of Cappadocia, numerous (we are told by Plutarch) Scythian princes; he even desired to 
include the Ptolemies in this list, but he failed. 
The matrimonial activities of the Commagenian Orontids begin in earnest with the 
marriage between Mithradates I Kallinikos to Laodike Thea Philadelphos, daughter of 
Antiochos VIII Grypos and Cleopatra Tryphaina, a tie extolled in numerous epigraphic 
63 Pol., 5.43.1-4.
64 Pol., 5.74.5; wAlBAnk, 1967, p. 96.
65 diod., 31.19.7; Iscr. di Cos, ED 5.
66 ID 1497bis.
67 Cf. C.E. Ghita – Nysa. A Seleukid Princess in Anatolian Context, paper delivered at the Seleukid 
Dissolution conference, Exeter, 2008.
68 iuSt., 38.7.
69 iuSt., 35.1. 
70 iuSt., 38.1.
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documents from Commagene. Their marital conections would, in later years, extend to the 
royal courts of Parthia (CASS. dio, 49.23.4), Judaea (ioSePh., A.Iud., 19.355), Atropatene (CASS. 
dio, 54.9.3), Armenia (ioSePh., A.Iud., 19.139) and Cilicia (ioSePh., A.Iud., 18.139-141).71
VI.2. The politics of inter-dynastic marriages
From this quick survey, one might draw the conclusion that whatever dynasty 
enjoyed higher authority would manage to impose princesses on the thrones of those with 
lesser power. While this view is mostly accurate in describing the Pontic-Cappadocian 
relations, where marriages occur mostly in order to seal a peace, it is not equally so in 
the other cases. One must certainly pause and wonder what exactly is it that the two sides 
expect to gain from such a contract.
Firstly, it is the political and military aspects that require consideration. Ideally, a 
princess who passes from one court to another will act as a mediator between the two, 
ensure good communication, mutual goodwill and generally act as the visible reminder 
of an alliance. Since, however, she did not travel between the two courts, her influence 
is exerted more on her husband than on her father and she is, in turn, subjected more to 
the authority of the former than to that of the latter, all the more so as she is interested 
in obtaining a prominent position at Court, not least because that would better serve the 
interests of her progeny. Quite often, the grim reality is that the father wants her to be his 
agent, while the husband wants her as a hostage. It is, therefore, no wonder that major 
military campaigns are preceded or followed by sustained matrimonial activities. 
Seleukos II Kallinikos marries his sisters to the Pontic and Cappadocian kings in a 
bid to ensure stability at least in Anatolia, while he is engaged in reclaiming his Asiatic 
possessions, destabilised and devastated by the offensive of Ptolemaios III in the Third 
Syrian War. Antiochos III receives the hand of Laodike quite early in his reign, in 222 
BC and since at this very early stage the influence of Achaios, himself married to another 
Laodike,72 is not yet eclipsed by that of Hermias, one might be lead to suppose the king’s 
cousin was no stranger to this marriage, meant to enforce Antiochos’ position in a West 
he had not had the time to familiarize himself with; some twenty years later, he is in a 
position to offer himself a daughter to the king of Cappadocia, in the turbulent period 
between 200-190 BC, during which Antiochos concentrates on gaining or regaining 
territories in Asia Minor and Thrace, engaging thus on the perilous trajectory that ended 
up with his disastrous defeat at Magnesia. 
Demetrios I Soter, after having more or less satisfactorily finished his campaigns 
in Mesopotamia and Judaea, opened matrimonial negotiations with Ariarathes V 
(diod., 31.28). One can only wonder if this was not done in an attempt to ensure an 
71 Cf. SulliVAn, 1977.
72  Although we might not establish with certainty the date of Achaios’ marriage to Laodike, his sustained 
activity in Western Asia Minor, where the princess was held, makes it plausible that the two had at least met, 
if they were not already married, by the time of Antiochos III’s accession to the throne.
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alliance in view of a planned expedition into Cilicia, where Attalos was soon able to 
install the pretender Alexandros Balas, but it seems probable that by giving Nysa, the 
daughter of Antiochos IV to Pharnakes I of Pontus he was trying to regain by political 
means the Seleukid position of authority in Asia Minor, lost as a result of Roman 
armed intervention.73 
Marriage ties are concluded not only in the wake of military enterprises, but 
also at their end, with a famous precedent in the marriage proposed by Dareios III to 
Alexander. Thus, Ariarathes IV offered the hand of his daughter, Stratonike, to Eumenes 
II, thus putting an end to his opposition to Rome and, implicitly, to the Pergamenian 
king, which had culminated with the participation on the side of Antiochos III at the 
battle of Magnesia, itself prompted by a matrimonial tie with the Seleukid king, as 
shown above. It is tempting to see in Ariarathes V’s wife, Nyssa, the daughter of 
Pharnakes I by the Seleukid Nyssa, in all likelihood the daughter of Antiochos IV. 
If this is correct, then this marriage must have come as part of the wider network of 
alliances put in place by Pharnakes in the aftermath of his defeat in the Pergamenian 
war. The crimes of this queen, who murdered all but one of her sons in an attempt 
to secure the regency for herself have fundamentally destabilised the Cappadocian 
dynasty, which saw itself compelled to accept junior status in relation to Pontus. The 
betrothal of Laodike, daughter of Mithradates V to the very young Ariarathes VI came 
after a semi-successful military campaign of the former against the latter74. Finally, the 
last act in this matrimonial cavalcade is the marriage between Athenais Philostorgos to 
Ariobarzanes II, both still children, concluded in an attempt to leave behind the bitter 
conflict between their parents, Mithradates VI and Ariobarzanes I.
Though a marriage may be significant in terms of political and military goals, one 
must also take into account the broader dynastic policies. Ever since the Macedonians 
had found themselves in the midst of a fascinating Orient that continued to revere their 
ancient royal traditions, which relied more on legitimacy of blood and rank than on 
military prowess, they had been trying to accommodate these expectations of their 
subjects: while the Ptolemies appealed to the pharaonic coronation ceremonies, the 
Seleukids needed to invoke close ties with the Achaemenid line. The first step had 
been done by the founder of the dynasty, Seleukos Nikator, who, as mentioned above, 
understandably kept the Iranian Apame as his wife. The fact that his descendent, 
Antiochos III, well acquainted with the Eastern satrapies, asked or was advised to 
ask the hand of Laodike, daughter of Mithradates II might have not only the strategic 
dimension discussed above, but also broader implications: since the Mithradatids 
claimed descent from one of the Seven Wise Persians and the King of Kings was 
expected o marry exclusively women from among these noble families, one might be 
73  Cf. supra, p. 117, note 67.
74 APP., Mithr., 30. 
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tempted to believe Antiochos was in fact perpetuating an Achaemenid tradition in a bid 
to ensure the loyalty of his Iranian subjects. It is not only the Seleukids, however, who 
profited from these marital ties. The prospect of obtaining “dynastic accreditation” 
from the greatest power in Asia, built on the frame of Alexander’s empire and even 
claiming Alexander’s blood – through the artifice of claiming Apame, the wife of 
Seleukos I, was in fact Alexander’s daughter – must have appealed enormously to the 
comparatively weak states of Asia Minor.75 
vii. maritaL practices
VII.1. Sibling marriages
One subject not yet touched on is the sibling marriages. A number of them 
are recorded within the Mithradatid and the Orontid dynasties: in Pontus between 
Mithradates IV and Laodike Philadelphos and between Mithradates VI and Laodike; 
in Commagene between Antiochos III and Iotape II and between C. Iulius Antiochos 
Epiphanes and Iotape IV Philadelphos. It is hard to discern if, in this respect, the 
dynasties were perpetuating an Achaemenid model, as presented by Cambyses, who 
married his sisters,76 or a Hellenistic model, as initiated by Ptolemaios II Philadelphos 
and also adopted by the Seleukids. 
If in Roman Egypt sibling marriage was practiced by a significant minority of 
the population, according to the papyrological record,77 in Hellenistic Anatolia the 
phenomenon seems to be an exclusively royal prerogative. By the very fact of making 
a public statement that normal rules to not apply to the royal pair, the king and queen 
would see their position elevated above that of ordinary people and Ager’s comments 
with regard to Ptolemaic incest seem to apply very aptly to Eastern Anatolian incest 
as well.78 The question emerging from this statement is whether by breaking the taboo 
which appears to have good genetic motivations the royal couples were inviting disaster 
in the form of degenerate offspring. The incestuous marriages between the members of 
the Commagenian Orontids did produce children, but historical record does not preserve 
information about their physical and mental health. Such information is only available for 
one of Mithradates VI’s daughters, Drypetine, born from the union with his sister, Laodike. 
Drypetine is said to have possessed two rows of teeth, which made her a particularly 
75 ‘The Mithradatids got Hellenistic recognition, the Seleukids Iranian respectability’, MCging, 2009, p. 205.
76 hdt., 3.31; for a discussion of the herodotean passage and the place of sibling marriage in Persian 
tradition, cf. BroSiuS, 1996, pp. 45-47.
77  PArker, 1996.
78 “It would be better to say that they fulfilled a taboo and gave it meaning by crossing a boundary that is barred 
to ordinary people. In so doing they demonstrated that they were extra-ordinary. This extraordinariness is 
about more than a simple assimilation of royalty to specific gods. It is about power, and about sub- conscious 
and perhaps universal human instincts that there is something ‘numinous’ about those who transgress such 
boundaries”, Ager, 2005, p. 20.
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unpleasant sight,79 but she is given by Valerius Maximus as an example of filial love, as she 
faithfully accompanies her father, even in the hour of defeat.    
VII.2. Monogamy and polygamy
Another important aspect of marital policies is the presence of polygamy. While 
this habit had been accepted by scholars as being used both by the Argead house and by 
the Achaemenids, there had been a long debate over whether or not the Hellenistic houses 
practiced it. The arguments put forward by D. Ogden80 seem convincing enough and the 
view must be adopted that by and large, royal polygamy was accepted as a natural and 
useful political device. 
Unfortunately, the state of the historical record regarding the Eastern Anatolian 
dynasties is not entirely satisfactory: while we retain important pieces of information 
about the marital activities of Mithradates VI Eupator and we have sources talking about 
his harem (Plut, Luc., 18; APP. Mithr., 368), not the same may be said about his ancestors 
or his neighbours, although they probably behaved in a similar manner. 
It is interesting to note that sources operate a clear distinction between ‘wives’ and 
‘concubines’: the former are named ‘γυναῖκες’ (APP., Mithr., 27), ‘συνοικοῦσαι’ (Plut., 
Luc., 22.7) or ‘uxores’ (oroS., 6.5.5), while the latter ‘παλλακίδες’ (Plut., Pomp., 
32.8) or ‘paelices’ (oroS., 6.5.5). While this distinction of status seems clear and has 
well-known parallels in the practices of other Hellenistic dynasties (adding strength to 
the belief that we are not dealing here with mere approximations in language made by 
authors incapable of representing Hellenistic realities with the aid of languages - Greek 
and Latin - rather more apt to describe ‘bourgeois’ realities), sources do not always agree 
if a particular “royal woman” was a wife or a concubine. 
The best known example is Hypsicrateia, the one who followed Mithradates VI 
faithfully, even in the hour of defeat and even donned a manly suit, earning from the king 
the nickname ‘Hypsicrates’. Plutarch calls her a concubine: ‘παλλακίς’ (Plut., Pomp., 
32.8), while Valerius Maximus insists that she was ‘regina’, that Mithradates was her 
‘coniunx’ and that he considered her to be his ‘uxor’ (VAl.MAX., 4.6ext.2). On the one 
hand, Valerius Maximus may be suspected of raising Hypricrateia above his status because 
he needed her to fit in the chapter ‘De amore coniugali’, on the other hand Plutarch may 
be accused of robbing her of her title because he wanted to emphasize her extraordinary, 
almost hybristic personality (‘παράτολμος’ is the word used by the biographer): the status 
of concubine or even courtesan fits better a woman who abandons all decorum and crosses 
the gender border by dressing like a man out of love for the king than it fits a married 
woman and a queen. A statue base has been recently discovered at Phanagoria bearing 
the text “ΥΨΙΚΡΑΤΕΣ ΓΥΝΑΙ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΙΘΡΑΔΑΤΟΥ ΕΥΠΑΤΟΡΟΣ ΔΙΟΝΥΣΟΥ 
ΧΑΙΡΕ” and thus confirming spectacularly the anecdote narrated by Plutarch that Eupator 
79 VAl.MAX., 1.8ext.13.
80 ogden, 1999, ix-xix.
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liked to call her by a boy’s name, Hypsikrates, because she used to don a man’s suit and 
follow him everywhere. Her title in the inscription is interesting: it is neither ‘βασίλισσα’, 
nor ‘παλλακίς’. So, while her position was not as low as indicated by Plutarch, she seems 
to have been just one of Mithradates’ many wives, not his queen.     
It would seem that the more elevated status of wife and queen was reserved for 
women who were themselves of royal blood. Ironically enough, this rule seems best 
illustrated by an exception, Monime, who rejected the king’s love until he offered her 
the status of wife and queen (Plut., Luc., 18, 3), which the king appears not to have been 
willing to offer her from the beginning. On the other hand, royal women for whom a 
suitable husband was not found tended to remain unmarried (as is the case with the two 
sisters of Mithradates named in the same passage from Plutarch’s biography of Lucullus, 
both rather elderly virgins). While this does not constitute definite proof, is may be an 
indication that “suitable husband” meant “royal husband”. 
This would mean, in turn, that the Achaemenid policy of endogamy (the king was 
forced by tradition to marry into the select group of families generically labelled as having 
been founded by “one of the Seven” and royal women would find husbands in the same 
milieu, excluding foreigners, however noble or famous) was replaced by the Hellenistic 
practice of preponderant exogamy, whereby royalty would marry royalty, each house 
finding its status recognised and elevated in the process. 
 
viii. concLusions
For the ruling houses of Pontus, Cappadocia and Commagene, establishing their 
dynastic legitimacy by tracing their lineage to the great kings of the Persians and the 
Macedonians, maintaining their legitimacy by intermarrying with their royal peers or 
even resorting to sibling marriages and propagating this image by any means available 
(myths, artistic representations, coin portraiture etc.) to as wide an audience as possible 
represented an important and constant preoccupation. This consistent policy represented 
not only a means of defining and enhancing their identity, but also provided net political 
advantages, both within their own kingdoms and in their international relations.
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iv. reliGion And its politicAl
reverberAtions
The purpose of the present chapter is to argue that the religious phenomenon in Eastern Anatolia during the Hellenistic times presents the same main characteristics as 
it does elsewhere in the Hellenistic world. The major trend which may be identified is 
the syncretism, the process whereby subtle similarities between divinities and religious 
concepts of different origins led to their assimilation and cross-fertilisation. In Eastern Asia 
Minor, the main religious traditions which interact are the Persian and the Greek, although 
older strata may still be visible. The monarchs of Pontus, Cappadocia and Commagene 
have participated or even encouraged the phenomenon, sometimes with the expectation 
that this would further their political aims.
In the following pages, the religious phenomenon will be analysed only in its 
institutional aspect, and, more narrowly, only in so far as it involved the king or those 
in his immediate proximity. Thus, the ‘private’ worship of different gods, hinted at by 
the many terracotta artefacts depicting divine figures produced in the area1 or even local 
cults (such as, for example, the civic cults honouring founding heroes in the Greek 
poleis) will not form the object of this study: not because they might not yield important 
insights into the process of cultural dialogue and negotiation, but because doing so would 
narrow excessively the range of evidence (which, for this type of religious manifestation, 
is almost exclusively archaeological), whereas in the study of religion as practiced and 
encouraged by King and Court, one is aided by a much more varied range of evidence: 
literary, numismatic and, crucially, epigraphical.
i. reLiGion at court 
The king, as ruler of the realm, could send powerful messages and had it in his 
power to set trends. He could even decide to introduce new gods or declare his own super-
human status. But even the king acted within a network: while he could influence to some 
extent the worship of the divine, he often had to seek confirmation of his status from the 
divine, invoking a privileged relation with it in order to set himself above his subjects. 
Both the Achaemenids and the Argeads took this step, using different strategies. A brief 
overview of these strategies will be provided below, in order to provide the necessary 
1 SuMMerer, 1999, pp. 40-65.
background for the developments in Eastern Anatolia which will be analysed afterwards. 
I.1. The Achaemenids: rule by divine consent
In a document crucial for understanding how an Achaemenid king saw his relation 
with the divinity, the great Bisitun inscription, Dareios I repeats almost obsessively the 
phrase “vašnā Auramazdāha adam xšāyaθiya”, ‘by grace of Auramazda I am king’. As 
discussed above (cf. infra, pp. 138-139), Dareios does not see his kingship as a result of his 
many victories, but rather the other way round: his victories were a natural consequence 
of the fact that he was rightful king, appointed by the grace of the supreme god. A very 
similar attitude may be perceived in another important text, the Cyrus Cylinder (cf. supra, 
pp. 88-89), in which the king explained his victories as a consequence of the favour 
shown by Marduk. 
I.2. The Argeads: rule by divine descent
The relation the Argeads claimed to have was of a far more direct nature, namely 
that they were direct descendants from Zeus, through Herakles, and this was assiduously 
advertised through a variety of means, such as coin iconography. As the Greek conception 
of the divine was more flexible than that of other cultures (allowing, for example, semi-
divine status for people who had done extraordinary things, such as founding a new city), 
it is not surprising that the Argeads eventually claimed super-human status, the most 
striking gesture being doubtlessly that of Philip II, who set up his own statue as the 
thirteenth Olympian.2 Later, when Alexander tried to impose the proskynesis in the court 
ceremonial, his Greek companions objected that this gesture was reserved for divine 
beings – whether or not Alexander had intended this or not remains a debatable matter.
*
The subsequent monarchs, who ruled over different portions of Alexander’s great 
empire, had before them these models of royal relation with the divine, as well as other 
local traditions, such as the Egyptian or Babylonian one. In their choices, they strived 
to find a balance between what was necessary, expedient, desirable and possible, taking 
into account their political needs, which demanded that they should establish as close a 
relation with the divinity as possible (going as far as identification), with the sensitivities 
of their subjects, who might have interpreted the claims of the monarchs as blasphemous. 
ii. KinG and priesthood
A particular dimension of the relation between the monarch and the divine is 
represented by the relation between the ruler and the representatives of the priestly class, 
a category which appears to have been more substantial, much better structured and hence 
more influential in the East than it did in Greece.3 
2 “σὺν δὲ τούτοις < εἴδωλοις τῶν δώδεκα θεῶν > αὐτοῦ τοῦ Φιλίππου τρισκαιδέκατον ἐπόμπευε 
θεοπρεπὲς εἴδωλον, σύνθρονον ἑαυτὸν ἀποδεικνύντος τοῦ βασιλέως τοῖς δώδεκα θεοῖς”, diod., 16.92.5.
3 Cf. VolkMAnn, 1937.
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II.1. Political importance of priests
The political importance of priesthood is best illustrated in Pontus and Cappadocia 
by the fact that the High Priests of the two Comanas are often blood relations of the 
monarch and are considered to rank ‘second after the king’ – a honorific position with 
strong Iranian connections – and share with the monarchs the right to don the diadem 
during certain religious festivals.4 Another indication of the high status of priests is the 
wealth they enjoyed, in the form of temple lands, worked by numerous hierodouloi: 
Comana boasts a population of six thousand ‘sacred slaves’, while other centres such as 
Venasa number three thousand inhabitants.5  
Also, according to Strabon, the Magi represent in this region a highly respected 
class: “πολὺ γὰρ ἐκεῖ < ἐν τῇ Καππαδοκίᾳ > τὸ τῶν Μάγων φῦλον, οἳ καὶ πύραιθοι 
καλοῦνται· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν Περσικῶν θεῶν ἱερά” (Str., 15.3.15). This is visible not 
only in everyday cult, in which they seem to be always present, but also in the fact that 
the Iranian divinities they worshipped gained places of honour in the most important 
sanctuaries of the region, sanctuaries honoured by kings themselves. 
II.2. Privileged sanctuaries as political messages
A policy of patronage towards religious centres was recognised quite early by 
monarchs as a wise attitude, consolidating their royal attributes of piety and generosity. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that both Achaemenid and Macedonian kings treated religious 
centres with generosity. 
For example, Cyros the Great takes pride in the text inscribed on the so-called Cyrus 
Cylinder in having revived the cult of Marduk, abandoned by his predecessor, Nabonidus, 
and in having returned to Sumer and Akkad the divinities whose cultic images had been 
removed by the same Nabonidus (§ 32). Dareios, in turn, claims to have done much the 
same, restoring temples and cults throughout his realm, all of which had been upset by 
Gautama (DB, 14). 
Similar practices may be observed in the case of the representatives of the major 
Successor kingdoms, amongst whom there is a great competition for the title of εὐεργέτης, 
bestowed for aiding cities finance the erection and repairing of temples as well as for 
subsidising the cult therein. In this context, centres such as Athens, Delphi, Delos and 
others become important venues for the display of royal magnificence.6
Similarly, the kings of Eastern Anatolia demonstrated their generosity to numerous 
sanctuaries, both within and outside the borders of their kingdoms. Not only did they 
4  Str., 12.3.32. For the rank of ‘second after the king’ in the context of administration, cf. infra, pp. 
174-176
5  Comana: Str., 12.3.34; Venasa: Str., 12.2.6.
6 For the phenomenon as a whole, cf. BringMAnn, 1993, passim; for Athens, cf. hABiCht, 1997, in particular 
pp. 223-227 or thoMPSon, 1953, passim; for Delos, cf. MikAlSon, 1998, pp. 218-220, SChAlleS, 1985, pp. 
38-9; for Delphi, cf. SChAlleS, 1985, pp. 41-44, 104-124.
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respect the existing property of temples,7 but they also added to it, by erecting sacred 
edifices in different cities (Str., 12.3.14) or by dedicating portions of the ge basilike to 
sanctuaries (IGLSyr. 1, 1; St.P. III, 94). 
The political motivations for supporting domestic sanctuaries (not taking into 
account here personal devotion to one god or another) are transparent: earning the support 
of the priesthood (a class important in all times and in all cultures, but particularly so 
in the Orient) as direct beneficiaries of this gesture and of the subjects in general, as 
people generally expect their leaders to show piety. In the particular case when at the 
receiving end of an act of evergetism was a sanctuary in a Greek city subject to the king, 
the gesture may be interpreted in the wider framework of the εὔνοια and φιλανθρωπία 
which ideally characterised the relation between polis and king, as civic inscriptions so 
emphatically state, a relation in which the ruler is expected to show magnanimity and the 
ruled gratitude.
Continuing a tradition quickly established by the great Hellenistic houses, the kings 
of Eastern Asia Minor bestowed many gifts on prominent sanctuaries in Hellas. Ariarathes 
V Eusebes Philopator is the monarch best known for his acts of evergetism, directed 
mainly towards Athens, whose citizen he was. Thus, he is known for having acted as a 
sponsor for the Dionysiac college of τεχνίται8 and to have been ἀγωνοθέτης for the 
Panathenaia. No wonder that Diodorus praises his philhellenism and his efforts to bring 
Greek culture into Cappadocia.9 In Pontus, Mithradates V Euergetes is the first Pontic 
king known for having bestowed generous gifts upon the Delians,10 whence his epithet. 
His successor, Mithradates VI Eupator, continued this tradition and has been honoured 
with a number of statues and inscriptions on the island, the most conspicuous being those 
set up by the priest Helianax in the heroon dedicated to the king.11 
The political motivation for offering gifts to sanctuaries outside one’s realm is 
probably emulation. Once the attributes of the ideal king were established and these 
included, besides martial virtues, the generosity towards Greek cities and in particular 
towards Greek sanctuaries, all kings strived to outdo their peers. Characteristically, 
the royal munificence was focused on a relatively limited number of venues (the most 
important being, as mentioned above, Athens, Delos and Delphi), which become true 
showcases, where kings show their wealth before their peers and before passers-by. 
7  Strabon, when describing Zela, states that “τὸ παλαιὸν μὲν γὰρ οἱ βασιλεῖς οὐχ ὡς πόλιν ἀλλ’ ὡς 
ἱερὸν διῴκουν τῶν Περσικῶν θεῶν τὰ Ζῆλα, καὶ ἦν ὁ ἱερεὺς κύριος τῶν πάντων” (Str., 12.3.37). this he 
contrasts with the treatment suffered by the precinct during Roman times, when “ἐκάκωσαν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ 
ἐμείωσαν τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἱεροδούλων καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐπορίαν. ἐμειώθη δὲ καὶ ἡ παρακειμένη χώρα 
μερισθεῖσα εἰς πλείους δυναστείας.” (ibid.). In the same vein, a king who does not respect the inviolable 
character of temple properties is portrayed as a villain (diod., 31.34.1).
8 IG II2, 1330.
9 diod., 31.19.7-8.
10  Cf. ID 1557 and 1558; roBert, 1978. 
11 kreuz, 2009.
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iii. the KinG’s Gods
When setting out to study the particular divinities which receive most honour 
from the kings of the area, the obvious starting point is the great hierothesion at Nemrut 
Dağ. The importance of this monument cannot be overstated and it will serve as a 
starting point in the subsequent overview. Its importance resides not only in the fact 
it represents a striking and well-characterised artistic achievement, but also in the fact 
that the long inscription left by Antiochos I Theos spells out his religious conception, 
which is programmatically syncretistic. Thus, he states: “{ε}ἰκόνας παντοίαι τέχνηι, 
καθ’ ἃ παλαιὸς λόγος Περσῶν τε καὶ Ἑλλήνων — ἐμοῦ γένους εὐτυχεστάτη ῥίζα 
— παραδέδωκε” (IGLSyr. 1, 1, vv. 28-31). He reveres equally divinities from Persia, 
Macedon or Commagene itself: “ἐγὼ πατρῴους ἅπαντας θεοὺς ἐκ Περσίδος τε καὶ 
Μακετίδος γῆς Κομμαγηνῆς τε […] εὔχομαι” (ibid., vv. 224-227). The gods who 
receive particular attention are Zeus-Oromasdes, Apollo-Mithra-Helios-Hermes, 
Artagnes-Herakles-Ares and Kommagene.
III.1. Zeus-Oromasdes
The first to be honoured is the ruler of the universe, who in Greek thought was Zeus 
and in the Iranian conception, Aura Mazda, transparently hidden behind the Hellenised 
form Ὠρομάσδης. They are connected by their royal function, by their celestial dominion, 
their patronage of justice and their common association with the planet Jupiter. The 
association had been well established in the Greek psyche: Herodotos, Xenophon, Strabon 
and others call the Persian supreme god “Zeus”.12
The cult of Zeus is extremely popular throughout Eastern Anatolia and can be 
observed in a variety of contexts, betraying influences from a number of quarters: local 
Anatolian, Semitic, Iranian, as well as Greek. 
At the dawn of the Hellenistic Age, Zeus figures prominently on the coinage of 
Ariarathes I13 (who continued the tradition initiated by Datames, satrap of Cilicia and 
Cappadocia)14 and already at that time it appears to have undergone a process of syncretism. 
Thus, the god is enthroned, his torso is naked and holds in his arms the sceptre and the 
eagle – elements of Greek origin; at the same time, he holds an ear of grain and a bunch 
of grapes, elements which point to a connection with fertility, which appears to be of local 
Anatolian origin; finally, the Aramaic legend reads ‘Ba’al Gazur’, identifying him as one 
of the numerous Semitic Ba’alim, celestial ‘Lords’ of a place or of a tribe, similar to those 
12 hdt., 1.131; Xen., Cyr., 8.7.3; Str., 15.3.13.
13 In the subsequent analysis, coin imagery will occupy a prominent place. However, the exegesis is by 
no means easy. A correct interpretation of coin imagery rests to a good degree on the examination of large 
numbers of intertextually related coins, which is impossible at the present for Eastern Anatolian kingdoms, 
given both the limited number of coins so far discovered and – more importantly – the discontinuous 
character of issues (CAllAtAÿ, 2009). Due care must be taken not to demand from coinage more evidence 
than it can provide: for example, the presence of a divinity or hero on the obverse of a coin or series of coins 
does not automatically prove the existence of a cult.
14 Cf. hArriSon, 1982, p. 167 and p. 173.
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worshiped for example at Venasa or at Doliche15 (Figure IV.1a). Zeus would continue 
to appear on the coins struck in this area throughout the Hellenistic age. On the reverse 
of the silver tetradrachms struck by Mithradates III, Zeus is depicted as enthroned and 
holding the eagle, in a manner resembling closely the types struck by Alexander, indicating 
perhaps the greater 
integration of Pontus in 
the Hellenistic market of 
ideas and imagery or, more 
likely, an understandable 
timidity associated with 
the beginning of minting 
by a certain authority, 
whose credentials may 
not be so solid and which prefers to adopt images that are already well-known and which 
may, consequently, inspire confidence (Figure IV.1b). During the short reign of Mithradates 
IV, Zeus appears on coins together with his sister-wife Hera, justifying and adding prestige 
to the union between Mithradates and his sister-wife Laodike Philadelphos, in a manner 
reminding one of Theocritos’ Idyll 17, honouring Ptolemaios Philadelphos. Zeus would again 
figure prominently on Pontic coinage during Eupator’s reign, in the so-called ‘civic issues’ 
(Figure IV.1c). The representation is canonical, showing Zeus’s laureate bust on the obverse 
and the eagle clutching the thunderbolt on the reverse, a type familiar in Ptolemaic, Epiriote 
or Seleukid coinage, but also in the coinage of Greek poleis such as Knossos or Oinoanda. 
It is difficult, however, to decide if the deity represented is the Olympian Zeus or rather a 
syncretistic divinity, such as Zeus Stratios or Dikaiosynos, whom Eupator worshiped. 
In Olshausen’s view,16 Zeus Stratios is associated closely with Persian and Anatolian 
traditions. Appian informs us that Mithradates performs in his honour a ritual that is 
Persian in nature, being careful to emphasise this is an ancestral practice: 
< Μιθριδάτης > ἔθυε τῷ Στρατίῳ Διὶ πάτριον θυσίαν ἐπὶ ὄρους ὑψηλοῦ, 
κορυφὴν μείζονα ἄλλην ἀπὸ ξύλων ἐπιτιθείς. πρῶτοι δ’ ἐς αὐτὴν οἱ βασιλεῖς 
ξυλοφοροῦσι καὶ περιθέντες ἑτέραν ἐν κύκλῳ βραχυτέραν τῇ μὲν ἄνω γάλα καὶ 
μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ ἔλαιον καὶ θυμιάματα πάντα ἐπιφοροῦσι, τῇ δ’ ἐπιπέδῳ σῖτόν 
τε καὶ ὄψον ἐς ἄριστον τοῖς παροῦσιν ἐπιτιθέντες, οἷόν τι καὶ ἐν Πασαργάδαις 
ἐστὶ τοῖς Περσῶν βασιλεῦσι θυσίας γένος, ἅπτουσι τὴν ὕλην. ἣ δ’ αἰθομένη διὰ 
τὸ μέγεθος τηλοῦ τε χιλίων σταδίων γίγνεται τοῖς πλέουσι καταφανής, καὶ 
πελάσαι φασὶν ἐς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, αἰθομένου τοῦ ἀέρος, οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι.  ὃ 
μὲν δὴ τὴν θυσίαν ἦγε πατρίῳ νόμῳ. (APP., Mithr., 66)
While the sacrifice on top of mountains and the pivotal role of fire in the ritual are 
of certain Persian origin, other details do not match what we know about the Zoroastrian 
15 toorn, 1999, s.v. ‘Baal’; cf. also MerlAt, 1960.
16  olShAuSen, 1990, p. 1902.
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Figure IV.1. Zeus in numismatic representations
traditions. For example, the pouring of milk, honey, wine and oil on the fire would have 
appeared to an orthodox Zoroastrian not a mark of respect, but an abominable act of 
defilement: as fire is pure, it must not be tainted with impure things, not even a human’s 
breath and for this reason the Magi covered their mouths; the sacrilege would be even 
greater if honey were to be poured onto the fire, as the bee is a malefic being in the 
Zoroastrian tradition. One might suspect Appian is here simply inserting familiar elements 
(the libations of milk, honey, wine and oil are common in Greek chthonian sacrifices) 
into the account of an exotic rite. This is the explanation that seems to be favoured by de 
Jong.17 However, Strabon, a native from Pontus, gives a partly similar account of the rites 
performed by Persian magi: “ἐφάπτονται οἱ Μάγοι καὶ ἐπᾴδουσιν, ἀποσπένδοντες 
ἔλαιον ὁμοῦ γάλακτι καὶ μέλιτι κεκραμένον οὐκ εἰς πῦρ οὐδ’ ὕδωρ, ἀλλ’ εἰς 
τοὔδαφος”.18 Strabon claims to describe what happens in Persis and de Jong rightly 
points out that this is incongruent with the data we possess from Zoroastrian sources. 
However, rather than accusing Strabon (and Appian as well) of oversimplification, one 
might suppose he is in fact assigning to Persia rites that were performed and that he had 
witnessed in Cappadocia. After all, he had never travelled into the heart of Iran, but had 
firsthand experience with the Magi in Anatolia, which might have led him to suppose there 
was no significant difference between the religious practices in the two areas. If such is 
the case, then the figure of Zeus Stratios is indeed the result of syncretism, a conclusion 
further supported by the Gökcebağ relief, showing a bearded male figure holding a shield 
and a double axe, believed by Cumont and Olshausen to be a representation of Stratios, 
which would thus connect him to the plethora of Anatolian axe-wielding gods.19
The question naturally emerging is why Mithradates worships this particular 
divinity. Zeus Stratios was certainly a very popular god, as attested by many inscriptions, 
both Hellenistic and Imperial,20 and that may offer a plausible, but not entirely satisfactory 
answer. The military context of the sacrifice (in the midst of the second war against Rome, 
after a great victory against Murena, and before embarking on the third war) certainly 
represents part of the explanation, but by no means the whole explanation. After all, 
Zeus Stratios was not the only patron of armies – Ares, Nike and the native Ma all shared 
this function. Hind has proposed the theory that Stratios was the chief protector of the 
Mithradatid dynasty,21 which would provide a good reason, but this does not corroborate 
17 jong, 1997, pp. 140-142. 
18  Str., 15.3.14
19 Cf. wAiteS, 1923. For Iuppiter Dolichenus, probably the most famous axe-wielding god of Anatolia, cf. 
MerlAt 1960.
20 “Διὶ Στρατίῳ Βασιλεὺς εὐχῇ”, St.P. III, 140 (the dedicand being a king or, more likely, a private individual 
whose name is Basileus – such a name, and its feminine counterpart, Basilissa, are attested in Pontus and 
Paphlagonia in Imperial times: cf. SEG, 13.532; MArek, Kat. Amastris, 32 and 103; St.P. III, 42, 71, 71a; etc.); 
“Διὶ Στρατίῳ [ὁ δῆμος ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ] κυρίᾳ”, St.P. III, 141 (dedicated in 98/99 AD by the whole people of 
Amaseia). These and many other inscriptions and representations attest the popularity of the god.
21 hind, 1994, p. 137.
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well with the information in Strabon22 that Men Pharnakou fulfilled the function of dynastic 
patron. Perhaps Mithradates chose this divinity because of its Persian origin, using it 
as a pendant or counterweight to the other sacrifices, which he performs in parallel in 
Greek manner. Was then Mithradates performing the ceremony in honour of a divinity he 
believed to be of pure Persian origin, or was he promoting a divinity of whose composite, 
syncretistic nature of he was fully aware? Unfortunately, the answer to this question will 
probably remain in the perilous domain of speculation, as the only measuring tools we 
have are the perceptions of his contemporaries reflected more or less faithfully in later 
written sources. If Appian offers a truthful testimony in only emphasising the ‘Persian’ 
character of the ceremony, then Mithradates was following a local, degenerate tradition. 
If, however, Eupator knew more about this divinity than later authors did, he may have 
chosen Stratios precisely because of his manifold character, as a unifying figure of East 
and West, much the same as he did when he used Perseus (cf. infra).    
Another interesting divinity worshipped by those around the king is Zeus 
Dikaiosynos, which seems to be attested by an inscription found East of Sinope23: 
“Διὶ Δικαιοσύνωι μεγάλωι Πύθης Διονυσίου στρατηγῶν χαριστήριον”. The date 
of the inscription is not beyond doubt, but in case it is Hellenistic, it offers another 
instance of syncretism promoted by the Mithradatid court, since the formula seems to 
merge Greek patterns with Achaemenid frames of mind. On the one hand, the sovereign 
god as patron of justice is common in both cultures: in Greek, the epithet ‘Dikaiosynos’ 
associated with Zeus is rare, but not exceptionally so, while in the Achaemenid 
inscriptions Auramazda is often associated with the virtue of truthfulness or justice.24 On 
the other hand, the epithet ‘μέγας’ seems to go back to a Persian formula: the common 
phrase ‘baga vazṛka’ (associated with Auramazda),25 rendered in Greek ‘θεὸς μέγας’ 
corresponds perfectly to the equally common phrase ‘xšayathiya vazṛka’, translated by 
the Greeks as ‘βασιλεὺς μέγας’.
The cult of Zeus Asbameios at Tyana seems to have received particular attention 
from the Cappadocian kings: in case the epithet is to be explained as a Hellenisation of a 
Persian word derived from ‘aspa-’, ‘horse’,26 one may correlate this with the numerous 
Cappadocian bronzes depicting a horse and rider.  
III.2. Apollo-Mithras-Helios-Hermes
More intriguing than the association between Zeus and Auramazda is the association 
between Apollo, Mithras, Helios and Hermes. While Apollo and Helios are closely 
22 Str., 12.3.31.
23 IK Sinope, 75, first published in roBinSon, 1905, no. 24.
24 DNb, 5-11; DPd, 17-18; etc.
25  “A mighty god <is> Auramazda” or “Auramazda the mighty”: DNa, DNb, DPd, XPa and many other 
inscriptions.
26  MitChell, 2007, pp. 167-8.
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related in Greek mythology, they are never linked syncretically with Hermes.27 The 
binding element between these three Greek gods seems to be the Iranian Mithras, who 
has a solar element, is a guarantor of contracts and is a mediator himself.28 Interestingly 
enough, Mithras is not stricto sensu a solar god in orthodox Zoroastrian tradition, a fact 
demonstrated by Gershevitch in a compelling paper,29 but is so in marginal areas such 
as the parts of Parthia and Sogdia which converted to Manichaeanism, where ‘mehr’ 
has become a common noun, meaning ‘sun’. A similar phenomenon seems to take place 
in Commagene, with Mithras taking on a much more ‘solar’ aspect than allowed by the 
Zoroastrian sacred texts. 
It is doctrinal differences such as this, which bring the Iranian divinity closer to 
the Greek pantheon, that represent for scholars such as Bivar or Beck30 the evidence to 
support the hypothesis that Commagene was the interface between East and West in terms 
of Mithras cult, providing the missing link between two radically different religions – 
Zoroastrianism on the one hand and Western or “Roman” Mithraism on the other hand.
While Apollo is honoured in Pontus by Mithradates V Euergetes in his coinage, 
either marking a privileged relation with Delos31 or adopting a local cult from Sinope,32 
the god Mithras is almost entirely absent from our documents pertaining to Pontus and 
Cappadocia, with the exception of the theophoric dynastic name of the Pontic house, 
which does not, in itself, constitute evidence of cult. Thus, many have tried to fill in this 
gap, with mixed results. 
Bivar,33 for example, proposes to identify a cult of Mithras at Sinope, in the form 
of Sarapis, which was then exported to Alexandria. This hypothesis rests on the title 
xshatra-pati given in a Carian inscription to Apollo, whom the author equates with 
Mithras, only to discover that the title xshatra-pati evolves phonetically into shahrbed, 
which may represent the true etymology of the name ‘Sarapis’. Bivar then attempts to 
find confirmation of his hypothesis in a Tacitean passage, which narrates how Ptolemaios 
Soter was visited by a vision of the god, asking to be taken from Pontus and brought 
to Alexandria and how the Egyptian deputations set sail for Sinope, where the king 
Skydrothemis was convinced, at the end of three long years of negotiations, to relinquish 
the effigy of the god (tAC., Hist., 4.83-4). This daring hypothesis rests, however, on three 
doubtful assumptions: that the god Mithras hides behind every mention of Apollo in Asia 
Minor, that Sarapis is etymologically connected with the Middle Persian shahrbed and 
27 There even exists a story that makes Apollo and the newly born Hermes antagonists, following a shrewd 
act of theft: cf. HymnHerm., vv. 17 sqq.
28 MerkelBACh, 1984, pp. 23-27.
29 gerSheVitCh, 1975.
30 BiVAr, 1975; BeCk, 1998.
31 roBert, 1978.
32  CAllAtAÿ, 1991 (non vidi).
33 BiVAr, 2001.
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that the tradition preserved by Tacitus is historically accurate, in spite of its anecdotic 
character. There is some evidence which clearly contradicts Bivar’s proposition. Firstly, 
the story of Sarapis’ exodus is clearly a myth: there is no record of a king in Sinope at the 
time of Ptolemaios Soter. Secondly, when Sarapis does arrive in the space of the Euxine, 
people receive him as a novelty: a 3rd century inscription from Histria34 records how a 
committee is sent to the oracle in Calchedon in order to inquire about this god, as the 
people of Histria were not certain what to do with him. Certainly, if the supposed cult 
of Mithras-Sarapis had been so old and so well-established in Sinope (a city with ample 
commercial connections in the Black Sea basin), the Histrians would have already been 
familiar with him. 
Another hypothesis which has been proposed is that the hooded character represented 
on Pontic coinage was in fact the god Mithras, syncretised with Perseus.35 The argument 
runs in the following manner: the famous tauroctony scene in Roman Mithraism is but an 
artistic representation of a cosmic scene – the constellation Perseus appears on the night 
sky to be above the constellation Taurus, as if subduing it or slaying it. The primordial bull 
slayer must therefore have been Perseus, not Mithras. Ulansey then ingeniously discovers 
some links between Perseus and Mithras: they both look away from their victim; they are 
associated with a leonine monster; they are both venerated in Cilicia. The swapping of 
identities must have happened when the Perseus-worshipping Cilicians became closely 
associated with the Mithras-venerating Mithradates VI of Pontus. The logic of the argument 
is faulty for a number of reasons. Firstly, the author appears to eliminate completely the 
Iranian contribution to the doctrines of Western Mithraism (a stance as far from the truth 
as its opposite view, which held that Roman Mithraism had a fundamentally Zoroastrian 
character)36 and this is disproved by the fact that there are demonstrable linguistic ties 
between the Iranian world and the Roman manifestations of the Mithraic cult,37 which 
may point to other, more profound, points of contact. Secondly, the author postulates the 
existence of a powerful cult of Mithras at the Pontic court simply based on theophoric 
names within the dynasty, an argument that fails to corroborate with the other pieces of 
evidence. Thirdly, the author himself identifies a powerful cult of Perseus in Cilicia, even 
well after the Cilicians are said to have operated the transformation of Perseus to Mithras. 
Fourthly, while the looking away from the victim characterises most Roman relieves, not 
all of them obey this rule, nor does the analogy explain Mithra’s hypostasis as a hunter. 
Moreover, the leonine character in Western Mithraism is never the victim, as the Gorgon 
is – on the contrary, he even receives epigraphic dedications. Finally, the author postulates 
34  IScM I, 5.
35 Cf. ulAnSey, 1989, in particular chapters 3: Mithras and Perseus and 6: The Meaning of the Bull-Slaying, 
pp. 40-46 and 88-90.
36  The main supporter of this stance was Fr. Cumont, followed by his disciple, M. Vermaseren. See, for 
example, CuMont, 1956 or VerMASeren, 1963.
37 Cf. SChwArtz, 1975. 
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the Cilician “Perseists” were very eager to hide their doctrine, while upholding the view 
their main doctrine was that the constellation Perseus stood on top of the Taurus – a secret 
that was immediately revealed to anybody who looked at the stars. In view of all these 
arguments, it is highly unlikely the youth wearing the Persian cap present on the Pontic 
coinage might be Mithras. 
Tantalising though it may be, the absence of Mithras from the Pontic space must 
be accepted as a fact, at least until such time as more compelling evidence is uncovered.
An bilingual inscription from Farasha might provide for Cappadocia the evidence 
which is absent from Pontus, and it has been published by Grégoire in 1908. The Greek 
version reads “Σαγάριος Μαι̣[φά]ρ̣νου στρατηγ[ὸ]ς Ἀριαραμνε̣ί̣(ας) ἐμάγευσε Μίθρῃ”, 
while the Aramaic one reads “sgr br mhyprn rb hy[l]’ | mgyš [lm]trh” (CIMRM, 19; KAI, 
265). In case this inscription were Hellenistic, it would be of tremendous importance, not 
only for the study of Anatolian religion in general, as it would offer another instance of 
Mithras cult in Anatolia apart from Commagene before the Roman era, but also for the 
present investigation, as it emanates from a high official, a strategos, making a dedication 
to an Iranian divinity and continuing the epigraphic use of Aramaic, established since the 
Achaemenid times. 
However, this inscription appears to have been set up in Roman times, as indeed 
Donner and Röllig, the editors of the KAI, are inclined to believe. The key term allowing 
some approximation of the date is ‘στρατηγὸς’ / ‘ rb hyl’  ’. The Greek is highly 
ambiguous, designating a number of functions, from ‘district governor’ to ‘municipal 
official’ to ‘leader of a military formation’. Fortunately, the Aramaic phrase is much more 
precise, and it translates as ‘chief of the army’ or ‘chief of the garrison’. In Hellenistic 
terminology, this function would be best represented with the term ‘φρούραρχος’, but 
this is not the word used in the inscription. As a similar use of the term ‘στρατηγὸς’ 
appears in other bilingual dedications to the ‘Roman’ Mithras, for example that made by 
a certain Ethpeni at Dura,38 the view that Sagarios lived and acted as garrison commander 
at some point in the Roman era becomes more likely. 
The matter is likely to remain under debate, and therefore it is safer not to draw 
definitive conclusions about the importance of Mithras for the Cappadocian elite before 
Roman times and remain content with the sole attestation of the god in Commagene.
III.3. Artagnes-Herakles-Ares
Artagnes is the Greek form for Verethragna, the Iranian divinity of force and violence, 
which naturally associates him with the Greek divinities most closely associated with war 
and feats of physical prowess, Ares and Herakles. Another point of contact between Ares 
and Verethragna is their common association with the planet Mars.
In the Hellenistic world, in which victory on the battlefield was one of the main 
38  Cf. FrAnCiS, 1975, p. 425.
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attributes of kingship, it is only natural that Ares and his companion, Nike, should receive 
veneration, and Eastern Anatolia is no exception: the ‘civic’ issues struck under Eupator’s 
direct coordination include many visual references to these two divinities, such as their 
portraits or depictions of weapons – the sword, the bow or 
the quiver (Figure IV.2).
The last two weapons, the bow and quiver, 
alongside the club, are tightly associated with Herakles, 
who is also represented on Pontic coins. The presence of 
the hero in the numismatic imagery may be a testament 
to his wide appeal, which is manifested throughout the 
oikoumene (from Iberia, where he is present on the coins 
struck by the Barcids, to Parthia, where statues of him are being erected), but may also be 
interpreted as a political gesture. As mentioned above, the Argeads claimed descent from 
Zeus through Herakles, and Eupator, in turn, claimed descent from Alexander the Great. 
Thus, it is conceivable that by placing Herakles on his coins, Eupator was reminding his 
audience of his noble origins.
III.4. The All-nurturing Commagene
The πατρὶς πάντροφος Κομμαγήνη, who is not explicitly associated with any 
other divinity – Greek or Iranian – is an interesting presence. The concept of divinised 
fatherland could perhaps be a transposition in Commagenian space of the ‘genius loci’ or 
of the ‘Tyche’ worshiped by many cities, such as Antiocheia on the Orontes. At the same 
time, the fertility attribute which characterises the divine being Commagene puts her on a 
par with other venerable divinities of Anatolia, the most important of them being Ma, the 
great goddess venerated at Comana. 
Like many Mother-Goddesses originating in Anatolia (whose perpetual 
transformation is beautifully illustrated in the Museum of Anatolian Civilisations 
from Ankara), Ma is a union of contrasts. On the one hand, she is a goddess of 
destruction, as demonstrated by the fact that Strabon equates her with Enyo (12.2.3), 
and mentions a local tradition which held that the ritual had been brought there from 
Scythia by Orestes and Iphigeneia, being well known that the ritual described in the 
Greek tragedy was violent in the extreme. On the other hand, Ma possesses a kinder 
nature, one which presides over fertility and the cycle of life and rebirth. Thus, the 
land around her sanctuary at Comana is planted with vines – a symbol of plenty, 
and many women practice prostitution there, transforming Comana into a ‘second 
Corinth’ (Str., 12.3.36).   
The importance of the sanctuary in political terms – namely that the High Priest 
was considered ‘second after the king’ – has already been mentioned above, but it was not 
limited to this aspect. The goddess figured prominently on Cappadocian coins, representing 
a type that changed little over the centuries. She is represented as carrying spear, helmet 
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Figure IV.2. Coin of the 
‘Ares/sword’ type
and shield,39 either standing or sitting, and often holding Nike on an outstretched arm. The 
imagery is practically identical with that of Athena, as known from Greek mythology and 
parallel representations on coins issued by other Hellenistic dynasties and for this reason 
numismatists usually identify the goddess on the Cappadocian coins as Athena. 
The association is not gratuitous and indicates in fact a syncretistic process, supported by 
functional parallelisms and by historical developments. Thus, both goddesses have a martial 
side and both preside over fertility (Athena, although a perpetual virgin, had won the contest 
for the patronage of the Attic metropolis by creating the olive-tree). This association could 
only be reinforced by the close relations between the Ariarathids and the city of Athens.40
Given the great importance enjoyed by Ma both in Cappadocia and in Pontus, one 
would expect Athena-Ma to figure prominently on Pontic numismatic issues as well. 
Tellingly, the Pontic coinage starts with an issue of staters closely modelled on pre-existing 
Alexander types, depicting helmeted Athena on the obverse and Nike holding crown on 
the reverse (Figure IV.3). It is certain 
that Mithradates II, who seems to have 
been behind this issue,41 was attempting 
to mimic the popular Alexander types, 
but it is perhaps significant that from 
the multitude of images used by the 
Conqueror, the Pontic king chose the one 
most closely related to the goddess Ma. 
Athena appears again on Pontic coins 
during the reign of Eupator, and one must not exclude the possibility that the motivation 
for this return could be political, namely the close connections between Athens and the 
Pontic kingdom, well attested at least for Euergetes and for Eupator.42 There is, however, 
a supplementary element which characterises the iconography of the goddess at this 
moment – on her helmet one may notice the representation of the winged horse Pegasus: 
thus, she receives praise for protecting the Perseus, the ancestor of all Persians, and, 
through Dareios I, of Mithradates himself (cf. infra).
III.5. Ruler cult
The phenomenon of ruler cult is not entirely foreign to Eastern Anatolia in Hellenistic 
times. Ruler cult has two forms – ancestor worship and worship of the living monarch. An 
39 SiMonettA, 1977.
40 Cf., for example, PAniChi, 2005.
41 Cf. supra, pp. 65-66. Callataÿ supports the view that this issue should be assigned to Mithradates III: 
CAllAtAy, 2009.
42 For Mithradates Euergetes: cf. supra, n. 31 and 32; for Mithradates Eupator: cf. CAllAtAy, 1997, pp. 
303-304, where he demonstrates that the coinage of Athens offers important testimonies of this close 
cooperation: during the years 98/7 and 97/6 the reverse bears the symbols of the Gorgon and the Pegasus, 
while the coinage of the year 87/6 not only bears the Pontic star, but it is even issued in the name of King 
Mithradates and Aristion.
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Figure IV.3. Coin of the ‘Athena/Nike’ type
example of ancestor worship is possibly offered by the royal tombs at Amaseia, whose 
architecture seems to have been designed to accommodate a (modest) form of cult,43 
but more strikingly by the Nemrut complex, with its long series of ancestors depicted in 
heroic poses. 
The living monarch may also take on super-human status, and Hellenistic kings of 
Eastern Anatolia had many models from which to draw inspiration. Dareios, for example, 
does seem to imply in the Bisitun inscriptions he is restoring world order (acting, as it 
were, as a representative of Auramazda, on a quest to punish the Lie) and many seals of 
the Achaemenid age depict scenes in which the Persian king engages monsters or wild 
beasts: these seem to depict the mythical scenarios in which the hero battles the forces 
of evil, in the manner of Mesopotamian kings.44 The Hellenic monarchs took things one 
step further: as discussed above, Philip II set himself up as the thirteenth Olympian, and 
subsequent Hellenistic monarchs practiced on a wide scale this elevation of the monarch 
above the human level.
Monarchs in Eastern Anatolia were obviously sensitive to such models, adopting 
and adapting them to best suit their needs. For example, Mithradates IV and Laodike 
issue coins with their jugate busts on the obverse and with a representation of Zeus and 
Hera on the reverse: this was probably meant to send the signal that the royal couple were 
an earthly parallel or manifestation of the divine couple. Their nephew and successor 
may have represented himself with the lion’s mane, a symbol of Herakles, but the 
attribution of the small terracotta statuette is not entirely assured.45 Later, Helianax, a 
local priest of the Kabeiroi, would erect on the island of Delos a heroon46 dedicated to 
Mithradates VI. Eupator’s palette of self-representations was extremely rich and it even 
included an instance of near-deification, by the assumption of the title ‘Dionysos’. The 
possible explanation is that Eupator has managed to defeat the Scythians and has this, 
metaphorically, gone to the ends of the world, much like the god.47 The aetiology of this 
title is presented by Plutarch thus:
Μιθριδάτην δὲ τὸν πολεμήσαντα Ῥωμαίοις ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν, οὓς ἐπετέλει, καὶ 
πολυφαγίας ἆθλα θεῖναι καὶ πολυποσίας φασίν, νικῆσαι δ’ αὐτὸν ἀμφότερα, καὶ 
ὅλως πιεῖν πλεῖστον <τῶν> καθ’ αὑτὸν ἀνθρώπων, διὸ καὶ Διόνυσον ἐπικληθῆναι. 
τοῦθ’ <ἡμεῖσ> εἴπομεν ἕν τι τῶν εἰκῆ πεπιστευμένων εἶναι, τὸ περὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς 
ἐπικλήσεως· νηπίου γὰρ ὄντος αὐτοῦ κεραυνὸς ἐπέφλεξε τὰ σπάργανα, τοῦ δὲ 
σώματος οὐχ ἥψατο, πλὴν ὅσον ἴχνος τι τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν τῷ μετώπῳ κρυπτόμενον 
ὑπὸ τῆς κόμης <διαμέν>ειν αὐτῷ (Plut., Quaest.Conviv., 624.1)
43 FleiSCher, 2009.
44  Garrison and Root, in their discussion of the ‘heroic encounter’ scene, argue that the male hero may not 
in fact be the king, but an abstraction representing ‘the Persian Man’. However, when this male figure is 
clearly represented in royal garments, the hypothesis does not seem very well grounded: cf. gArriSon & 
root, 2001, pp. 56-60
45 SuMMerer, 1999, p. 166.
46 Cf. kreuz, 2009.
47 Cf. SeAFord, 2008, pp. 37-8.
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There are two layers of explanation present in the text – one fabulous, depicting 
Mithradates as singled out by the divinity for privileged status, the other mundane, 
presenting him in the framework of the tryphe attitude, well-known at the Seleukid and 
Ptolemaic courts. Unfortunately, it is not easy to discern which of the two versions (if 
any) originated at the Pontic court.
Yet again, the most striking example of a religious phenomenon associated with the 
ruler comes from Commagene and has Antiochos I Theos for author. His epithet leaves 
no doubt he saw himself as divine and his bombastic tone in setting out sacred laws, valid 
“for all eternity”, and festivals in his own honour is fully appropriate in this context. 
The phenomenon of ruler cult as present in the three kingdoms shows therefore 
more signs of Macedonian than of Achaemenid inspiration and is in keeping with the 
practices current within contemporary Hellenistic dynasties more than with the venerable 
Persian traditions.
III.6. Syncretism as deliberate policy and its political implications
In an environment as diverse as Eastern Asia Minor in terms of historical and ethnic 
background, cultural traditions and political structures, religious syncretism, performed 
as a means of mitigating differences and promoting unity, could serve as a potent political 
tool. Below will be analysed three instances of religious syncretism that have for main 
actor a king – Antiochos I Theos in Commagene, and in Pontus Pharnakes I, Mithradates 
IV and Mithradates VI, with the aim of discovering if the final product of the syncretistic 
process responded to their long-term needs.
When first making contact with the great sanctuary of Nemrut, the first item with 
which one comes into contact is its outwardly form, its artistic shell. Indeed, given that 
many of the people who attended the ceremonies held there were illiterate, the iconography 
was the most efficient way for the king to send his message and, accordingly, iconography 
offers significant evidence of syncretism. The style of the reliefs is highly evocative of 
Achaemenid art, with a certain hieratic heaviness of volumes. Some characters – the king 
himself, Apollo-Mithras and others – wear Persian dress (an item upon which Antiochus 
lays particular emphasis in the inscription), while some others are depicted according to 
Greek canons – such as Artagnes-Herakles, shown in the heroic nudity familiar from Greek 
representations. One detail is of particular importance, namely the pose of the characters 
that join hands in a dexiosis, a gesture with strong religious implications in the Eastern 
frame of mind,48 showing a particular degree of connectedness between the two parties. 
The more educated would have perceived the pervasiveness of astrological 
references,49 not only in the sanctuary, but also in the coins struck by Commagenian 
48 Cf. MerkelBACh, 1984, pp. 26-26; jACoBS & rollinger, 2005, pp. 144-151; rollinger, 2007, pp. 138-141.
49  Campbell even states that the main criterion for syncretising Iranian and Greek divinities was their 
particular association with celestial bodies. While this factor was certainly important, it could not have been 
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kings,50 and in and this is in itself a syncretistic process, as astrology in the meaning and 
with the implications visible at Nemrut was the child of the Hellenistic Age, after Oriental 
mythology combined with Greek logos and philosophical ideas. Even more subtly, in 
the conception that lay behind the sanctuary, while there are interesting deviations from 
Zoroastrian orthodoxy, there are, nevertheless, discernable traces of Iranian influence. One 
passage in particular is extremely informative in this respect: “σῶμα μορφῆς ἐμῆς πρὸς 
οὐρανίους Διὸς Ὠρομάσδου θρόνους θεοφιλῆ ψυχὴν προπέμψαν εἰς τὸν ἄπειρον 
αἰῶνα κοιμήσεται” (IGLSyr 1, 1, vv. 40-44). The Greek is very cumbersome and almost 
meaningless without recourse to the Iranian concepts.51 The eternal sleep, the soul eager 
to return to the divinity after death (ruvān-fravahr), the throne of Aura-Mazda which acts 
as a Treasury of souls (Garōdmān), and the body of the form (the tan of the advēnak) are 
all Iranian ideas, which may only awkwardly be set into Greek.
The other example to be analysed is that provided by Pharnakes I and his god, Men 
Pharnakou, a composite divinity that is extremely puzzling in its syncretistic appearance. In 
his representation on the silver coins, he is dressed, on the one hand, in Greek fashion, with 
a broad petasos and chlamys, and holding in his left hand sometimes a caduceus, sometimes 
a cornucopia; on the other hand, he holds in the right hand a vine with grapes at which a 
young deer nibbles – a symbol of fertility specific to Anatolian deities. The thunderbolt 
it sometimes has over the head associates him with celestial divinities such as the Greek 
Zeus, but also with the Semitic Baalit, lords of the mountains. He became very closely 
associated with the Mithradatid dynasty, to the extent that the royal oath was sworn in his 
name: “ἐτίμησαν δ’ οἱ βασιλεῖς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦτο οὕτως εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὥστε τὸν βασιλικὸν 
καλούμενον ὅρκον τοῦτον ἀπέφηναν τύχην βασιλέως καὶ Μῆνα Φαρνάκου”.52 
The last of the unifying characters to be analysed is Perseus. The hero and the 
symbols associated with him (the harpe, the gorgoneion and Pegasus) are of great 
importance in Pontic coinage. He first appears on a silver issue of Mihradates IV, but his 
presence becomes preponderant only under Mithradates VI, or so it would seem, given the 
scarcity of information relating to the monetary activities of Euergetes. His presence may 
be explained as a reference to the mythical ancestry of the Mithradatids, since they (or 
at least their most active representative, Eupator) claimed descent from both Alexander 
and Dareios I (cf. supra, Chapter ‘Dynastic Policies and Politics’). The Argeads traced 
their lineage back to Herakles and Zeus. Herakles, however, was himself a descendant 
from Perseus (incidentally, another son of Zeus). At the same time, Perseus is consistently 
represented wearing a Persian leather cap on his head and this underlines another facet of 
the decisive factor, if only because the pairs of gods are not binary, which would mean that more Greek 
divinities would be associated with one and the same planet. Cf. CAMPBell, 1968, p.73.
50  Thus, FACellA, 2008, p. 215.
51 The discussion here is based on CAMPBell, 1968, pp. 59-62.
52 Str., 12.3.31. This oath will also be discussed below, p. 169. 
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his mythological personality, that of Greek hero and ancestor of the Persian people.53 He 
was therefore a symbol of the integration of East and West, a potent message in the hands 
of an able propagandist, which Mithradates VI Eupator doubtlessly was.
The syncretistic figures that emerge during the Hellenistic times in Eastern 
Anatolia are complex, integrating influences not only from both Greek and Iranian 
sources, but also from other traditions as well, such as the Anatolian or the Semitic 
one. As such, they respond to the needs of a refined public, capable of appreciating 
these intricacies and in all likelihood eager to see these cultural inheritances valued and 
integrated in the new construct.  
iv. concLusions
The general conclusion which emerges from the analysis of all the data presented 
above is that, indeed, the major trend which may be observed in the Anatolian religious 
environment during the Hellenistic times is that of syncretism, the process whereby 
Anatolian, Semitic and Iranian divinities (or local varieties of Iranian divinities) 
are equated with Greek divine beings, and whereby Iranian theology is translated 
linguistically and conceptually into Greek. This phenomenon can be observed in 
equal measure in all three kingdoms, although its most articulate expression is the 
Commagenian epigraphical dossier. It has been actively encouraged by the high 
officials of the kingdoms, starting with the monarchs themselves, and used as a potent 
political tool, designed to act as a unifying factor in an otherwise diverse and dynamic 
environment.
   
53 Cf. ogden, 2008, pp. 109-112.
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v. the KinG And his Army1
The present chapter will attempt to pursue the data preserved in the ancient sources relating to Eastern Anatolian armies in Hellenistic times – frustratingly little for the early days 
and almost overwhelmingly much for the last days – and identify the residues of Achaemenid 
tradition intermingled with the novelties brought about by the Greco-Macedonian influence. 
It will try to prove that the two were not mutually exclusive and that while the latter prevailed 
in certain material aspects, like the equipment of the soldiers (although not all), royal control 
over training and manufacture of weapons or the divisions of the army, the former was still 
behind the mentality of the rulers in this area, most notably in the patterns of recruitment. 
i. in the shadow of mithradates
Scholars who spend time in the study of Asia Minor in Hellenistic times in general and 
military matters in particular must be grateful to Mithradates VI Eupator and his indisputable 
skill which allowed him to remain at war with the Romans for a considerable number of 
years, thus attracting the attention of the ancient historians. Works dedicated to the military 
exploits of his Roman opponents – to whom he offered ample opportunities for glorious 
victories and spectacular comebacks – are treasure troves for modern historians, who find 
therein information relating to numerous aspects of his kingdom and its surroundings, but 
relating above all to military matters. It is, however, a mixed blessing. An extraordinary king 
in extraordinary circumstances, this monarch is the focus of attention, to the detriment of his 
ancestors, who receive but summary treatment. Moreover, while continuing to a certain degree 
the policy of his predecessors, he managed in the course of his career to change the status and 
the external perception of his kingdom. It is not surprising, therefore, that he introduced (or 
is very likely to have introduced) a number of changes and reforms. This makes generalizing 
statements and conclusions very risky, for what one may see as a trait defining the dynasty as 
a whole may, in fact, be a trait introduced by this man, who dominated his age. 
ii. the antecedents
II.1. Macedon
It is perhaps not unfair to describe the Macedonian society as “militarised”. After 
all, one of the fundamental institutions, the one that sanctioned the accession to the 
1 The ideas presented in the present chapter form the nucleus of the article “The Pontic Army: Integrating 
Persian and Macedonian Traditions”, British Archaeological Reports, 2009, forthcoming.
throne of the new king, was the assembly of the people in arms. Also, even before the death 
of Alexander, the Macedonians were disposed to accept the rule of people who showed 
promising warlike qualities, even though not directly related to their predecessor (one 
such example being Philip II himself). After the Argead line was brutally extinguished, 
the role of the army as legal authority became even more prominent. It is characteristic 
that the new generation of Macedonian kings, beginning with Antigonos Monophthalmos, 
establish their legitimacy primarily on the grounds of their military achievements,2 which 
overshadow their complete lack of dynastic legitimacy. The Macedonian king continues 
to be a soldier, even in times of peace and he expresses that publicly in his outfit, which 
is military in nature: boots, chlamys and wide-brimmed hat: it is interesting to see in 
Plutarch a clear opposition between the outfit of the kings that followed Alexander’s 
tradition and those who followed the fashion of the “barbarians”: 
ἅμα δὲ καὶ προήγαγε τῶν παίδων Ἀλέξανδρον μὲν ἐσθῆτι [τε] Μηδικῇ 
τιάραν καὶ κίταριν ὀρθὴν ἐχούσῃ, Πτολεμαῖον δὲ κρηπῖσι καὶ  χλαμύδι 
καὶ καυσίᾳ διαδηματοφόρῳ κεκοσμημένον· αὕτη γὰρ ἦν σκευὴ τῶν ἀπ’ 
Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλέων, ἐκείνη δὲ Μήδων καὶ Ἀρμενίων. (Plut. Ant., 54.8).3 
II.2. The Achaemenid Empire
As opposed to that, the Achaemenid kingship was anchored in the idea of legitimacy 
through descent and divine favour. Within the text of the most important written document 
left behind by Dareios I, the Behistun inscription (in which he strives to glorify his 
achievements and publicise his vision of legitimacy), the accent is always laid on bloodline 
and favour of Ahura Mazda. Certainly, the many victories are important, but they do not 
appear to be the foundation of his claim to rule: he is not a legitimate king due to his 
irreproachable string of victories, but rather, he enjoys a flawless military record due to him 
being the exponent of truth and order. It is significant that numerous representations of the 
king depict him in the “audience scene”, as guarantor – or even embodiment – of peace: 
one such scene could once be seen on the inside of the shield wielded by a Persian soldier 
on the so-called Alexander Sarcophagus, now in the Archaeological Museum in Istanbul.4 
Briant discusses the pragmatic importance of victory on the battlefield for the 
succession to the throne in the Achaemenid Empire5 and his observations are perfectly 
2 BillowS, 1990, p. 156; for a more general treatment of warfare and its connection to political power in 
Hellenistic times, cf. BAker, 2003, p. 375 sqq; gehrke, 1982, passim; PréAuX, 1978, p. 5; and many other 
studies.
3  For a more detailed discussion of the outfit of the Seleukids in particular, cf. BiCkerMAn, 1938, pp. 32-33.
4 Cf. BroSiuS, 2005, p. 148, although her interpretation of the symbolism (the shield protecting the interior 
image, would be symbolic of the soldier protecting the peace existing within the borders of the Persian 
state) is perhaps too poetic. It remains, nevertheless, significant that the image chosen as representative for 
the King of Kings, even in a military context, reminds one of his civil duties. 
5  BriAnt, 2002b, passim.
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valid from the point of view of Realpolitik, and further confirm Max Weber’s 
statement6 that power within any state is “the rule of man over man based on the 
means of legitimate, that is, allegedly legitimate violence”. This, however, does not 
account for the fact that, once the Persian king acquired power, he wished to project 
an image of himself that had little to do with violence on the battlefield: the imagery 
depicting him while battling wild animals  or monsters translates, in fact, violence in 
a metaphysical setting. 
Moreover, whereas kings who followed in Alexander’s footsteps considered it their 
duty to take active part in the battle (to give but one example, Antiochos III’s charges 
at the head of his personal guard during the battles of Raphia or Magnesia were epic, 
if fruitless, enterprises), physical courage is not required of the Persian king: the best 
example is represented by Xerxes, who is perfectly content to watch the battle of Salamis 
from a distance, without thinking this would damage his authority or the morale of his 
troops – quite the opposite is true. 
Two counter-examples might be brought forward: Cyrus the Great and Cyrus 
the Younger. However, these two heroes must be regarded with some prudence, as the 
information pertaining to their bravery stems not from Persian sources, but rather from 
Xenophon’s apologetic and not infrequently mythologizing account. It is therefore not 
inconceivable that the Greek historian, while trying to convince a Greek audience of the 
virtues of barbarian leaders, chose to underscore or even invent those virtues that would 
have been familiar to his readership, and not those that either Cyrus would have presented 
to their own subjects.7 
iii. KinGship and the miLitary in anatoLia
III.1. Assuming Kingship
The relation between kingship and the military in Asia Minor is not easy to discern. 
For instance, we lack an important criterion, for we cannot determine with certainty 
the moment when Mithradates I, Ariarathes III and Samos declared themselves kings. 
Scholarly tradition (based mainly on Syncellus)8 suggests 281 as a possible year for 
Mithradates,9 associating the event with a military victory over Diodoros, a general of 
Seleukos (based on Trogus’ Prologue to Book 17), but it is by no means certain that 
Mithradates, however much influenced by his friendship with Demetrios, would assume 
the royal title in Macedonian fashion. On the other hand, it is noticeable that a great 
victory, that over the Macedonian Amyntas (diod., 31.19.5), does not prompt Ariarathes 
II to assume the title of king, something only his grandson, Ariarathes III, feels entitled 
6 weBer, 2008, p. 78.
7  What Cyrus the Great saw fit to advertise may be found in the Cyrus Cylinder: cf. supra, pp. 88-89.
8  SynCell., 523.5; 593.7.
9  Advocated (with caution), for example, by MCging, 1986, p. 17.
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to do (according to numismatic evidence),10 while it is hard to associate the event with 
any notable military success on his part, except perhaps the conquest of Cataonia (Str. 
12.1.2). For Samos, the scope of military action was even more restricted, and yet he 
managed to assume the royal title, at an unknown date. 
III.2. Military Epithets
In other Hellenistic kingdoms, it is a common occurrence for kings to assume titles 
with military resonance (like Soter, Kallinikos or Nikator) in order to emphasize their 
prowess in battle and thereby gain greater authority over subjects and fellow kings alike. 
Such titles are extremely rare in all three dynasties examined here. Eastern Anatolian kings 
prefer titles that reflect either nobility of descent and familial solidarity (like Philopator, 
Philometor, Philadelphos or Eupator), benevolent attitude (like Euergetes or Dikaios), 
respect towards the gods (like Eusebes or Dionysos) or even outright divinity (like Theos 
or Epiphanes). There are only two exceptions. One is the atypical Orophernes, who briefly 
ruled Cappadocia jointly with Ariarathes V, a man closer by upbringing to the Seleukids 
than to the Cappadocians, and who boasted the title Nikephoros. The other is Mithradates 
Kallinikos of Commagene. However, his title might reflect more piety in familial relations 
than boast of military accomplishments, since Kallinikos is – not coincidentally, I believe 
– the title of his father-in-law, Antiochos VIII, whom the Commagenian king honoured in 
numerous inscriptions.
III.3. Official Imagery with Military Theme
It is true that coinage seems to document an arduous martial ethos of the monarch by 
the copious military imagery that can be found on it (particularly, but not exclusively so, 
on the so-called “civic” bronze issues, intended for mass circulation): the rider wielding 
a short spear, the quiver, the sword in sheath, the aegis, Ares, Nike, etc. However, the 
interpretation of coin types is notoriously difficult. 
For instance, an otherwise pacific portrait of Zeus could be considered to convey 
a military message, given Eupator’s particular reverence towards Zeus Stratios (APP., 
Mithr., 66), but the club (or even the quiver) might not: it is not unreasonable to believe 
this representation is set in the wider context of Pontic interference in the Aegean, 
indicating the attempt to connect the Mithradatids with the Argead dynasty and with 
Alexander in particular, whose mythical ancestor was Heracles (as discussed above, in 
chapter ‘Dynastic policies and politics’). Likewise, a representation of Athena/Ma in full 
military gear might represent rather a message of legitimacy and continuity (or attempts 
to gloss over dynastic brakes), than testify to the military prowess of the monarch.
III.4. The King on the Battlefield
In general, it would seem that the monarch was not expected to lead his army in 
the field of battle: the most warlike of the kings of Asia Minor, Mithridates VI Eupator, 
10  Cf. SiMonettA, 1977, pp. 17-20.
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can easily delegate the waging of the war in Greece to his generals, while he spends his 
time organising the territory newly acquired in Asia. Likewise, his grandfather Pharnakes 
I had delegated the command to his generals and only once seems to have been prepared 
to take the field in person, in a campaign against Cappadocia. It is, however, unclear if 
the campaign ever materialised – our source, Polybios, only mentions the preparations.11 
It is true that a number of Cappadocian kings die on campaign, but this fact needs to 
be put in context: Ariarathes IX (Arcathias in the account of Appian) dies on campaign in 
Greece, but he does so not as king of Cappadocia, but rather serving his father as Pontic 
prince; Ariarathes VII dies at the hand of his uncle, Mithradates VI, but that was a murder 
in a (feigned) diplomatic context, not in war; only Ariarathes V dies truly on the field of 
battle, fighting in the war against Aristonikos. 
At the same time, if we are to believe the words Appian puts in the mouth of 
Eupator in APP., Mithr., 70, he promises to lead his troops in person and he can derive 
great pride from his military successes (or, rather, the absence of defeats). Moreover, 
when his corpse is brought back to Pontus in an unfortunate state of preservation, it 
is recognised from the numerous scars,12 which must have been a matter of public 
knowledge, advertised as a sure sign of prowess on the part of the monarch. 
III.5. Eastern Anatolian Kingship in the Light of the Two Traditions
The point here is obviously not that Anatolian kings did not lead their armies in battle 
at all and that physical courage was not considered a quality; rather, that they tended not 
to follow the model of Alexander (leading from the front and engaging personally in the 
slaughter) and in general preferred the Achaemenid model of the king who stood behind 
and masterminded the operations, delegating the actual fighting to subordinate generals.  
iv. the fLeet
The interaction between the two traditions can be traced not only in the attitude of 
the monarch towards the army as a major pillar of power, but also in details such as army 
composition and recruitment or even equipment of land forces and the fleet. The fleet 
requires special treatment, because, on the one hand, of all the kingdoms I am to analyse, 
Pontus alone possessed one (particularly strong at the time of Mithridates Eupator), on 
the other hand because it offers an excellent case study for the complementarity of Greek 
means and Persian conceptions. 
IV.1. The Fleet of Pontic Cappadocia
IV.1.1. Historical Development: The Fleet before Pharnakes I
The development of the Pontic Navy is intimately connected with the territorial 
expansion of the kingdom along the shores of the Black Sea. It is well known that the 
11  “αὐτὸς δὲ τῆς ἐαρινῆς ὥρας ὑποφαινούσης ἥθροιζε τὰς δυνάμεις, ὡς ἐμβαλῶν εἰς τὴν Καππαδοκίαν”, 
Pol., 24.14.2.
12 Plut., Pomp., 42, 2.
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kingdom was formed manu militari by Mithridates I Ktistes around the nucleus offered 
first by the fortress of Kimista,13 then by the city of Amaseia, having no direct contact 
with the Pontus Euxinus. 
Control of the shore meant control of the extremely rich trade routes that took the 
produce of the interior and distributed it all across the basin of the Black Sea, but also into 
the Mediterranean. The alliance between Mithridates I and Heracleia against Seleukos 
Nikator (MeMn., 7.2) might not have been entirely innocent: it is not hard to suppose that 
the king was trying to establish a sort of protectorate, if not a more strict form of control 
over this flourishing city. He did not succeed, though. 
The first maritime settlement to have been won for the kingdom, at least as far as 
we can tell, was Amastris, turned over by its ruler, Eumenes, to Ariobarzanes, the son 
of Ktistes. The circumstances are not very clear and the historian gives no reason for 
Eumenes’ refusal of the Heracleote offer of money and his preference for Ariobarzanes, 
beside the fact that he was “caught by an inexplicable fit of anger”.14 
However, there is another city that is annexed quite early on: Amisos. The 
terminus ante quem is again offered by Memnon, in chapter 16, where he says that 
the people of Heracleia help the young Mithridates II to survive besiegement from the 
Galatians by sending him supplies there. Amisos lay at one end of a very important 
North-South trade route, which passed through Amaseia, the capital of the kingdom 
and which traversed Pontic Cappadocia, Greater Cappadocia and Cilicia.15 It is not 
unreasonable to believe that Ktistes and Ariobarzanes, his son, must have coveted this 
city and the wealth it brought. Strategically speaking, Amisos was more important 
than Amastris, which appears to be more of a “target of opportunity”. Yet, it is not 
possible to go beyond speculation and assert that the conquest of the former preceded 
that of the latter, because of the dire lack of hard evidence.
Between these two cities, now caught in a more or less intended pincer movement, 
lay Sinope. Strabo’s praise of it in 12.3.11 is well known. Such a splendid city was 
more than interesting to the dynasty and we have early proof of that: Mithridates II (or 
perhaps Mithradates III?) tries to mount an amphibious attack on it, or so the Sinopean 
ambassadors speedily sent to Rhodes believed (Pol., 4.56). This is the first implicit 
proof of the existence of a Pontic Navy. It is intriguing that the city which ruled the 
sea inside the Cyaneai16 and which not long before that proudly issued coinage that 
shows on the obverse the prow of a trireme (for example BMC 26, SNGBMC 1506) 
13 Plut. Dem., 4; for the discussion regarding the geographical position of Kimista and the necessary correction 
of the erroneous reading Kimiata preserved by the manuscript tradition, cf. MitChell, 2002, p. 53.
14 “διὰ τὸ τῆς ὀργῆς ὑπαχθέντος ἀλόγιστον”, MeMn., 9, 4. MitChell, 2005, p. 526 sees in this gesture of 
Eumenes an order from Philetairos, his brother, who upon consolidating his Pergamenian domain, “broke 
his final link with his Paphlagonian homeland”. 
15 Cf. MCging, 1986, p. 4.
16 “κατασκευασαμένη δὲ ναυτικὸν ἐπῆρχε τῆς ἐντὸς Κυανέων θαλάττης”, Str. 12.3.11.
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does not take into consideration engaging in battle with the Mithradatid Navy and 
prefers to shut itself up from the sea with palisades. It would be naïve to believe 
Strabo’s statement indicates strictly a commercial dominion over the sea and that 
the city lacked war-ships: Herakleia did not enjoy the same importance and yet it 
managed to equip impressive vessels at a much earlier date, i.e. during the conflict 
between Ptolemaios Keraunos and Antigonos, son of Demetrios Poliorcetes.17 It is 
more probable that the king had managed to acquire a large fleet of his own, which could 
only have been built in the two recently captured cities, Amisos and Amastris, perhaps 
more in the latter, since Strabon (12. 3.12) states that the ship-building material is more 
abundant in Sinopitis and on the rest of the coast towards Bithynia. The Mithridatic fleet 
was, however, limited not so much by the lack of building materials (the greatest problem 
the Ptolemies faced, for example), but rather by the lack of well-trained steersmen and 
naval officers. On the one hand, the local Greeks were not so many: the passing note in 
Diodorus, which would suggest a venerable tradition of ship-building and ship-manning 
in the region, since Xerxes, in preparation for the invasion of Greece, has some of his fleet 
built in Pontus,18 is quite likely to be an exaggeration meant to strike awe in the reader at 
the sight of the greatness of the preparations for war made by the Oriental despot. On the 
other hand, the sailors and steersmen bred in the Mediterranean basin had their attention 
focused closer to their own homes. How, then, could be explained the complete idleness 
or inexistence of the Sinopean fleet? One might venture to suppose it had been wiped out 
in a previous engagement and try to use Polybios’ words: “καί τις οἷον ἀρχὴ τότε καὶ 
πρόφασις ἐγένετο τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἀχθείσης ἀτυχίας Σινωπεῦσιν”19 to prove it. The 
matter remains, however, shrouded in mystery. 
IV.1.2. Historical Development: The Fleet, from Pharnakes I to Mithradates V
The Mithridatic Navy then disappears from history. There is little evidence of it at 
the time of Pharnakes, although this warlike king waged many wars and finally managed 
to reduce Sinope by siege: “ἐκ πολιορκίας ἑάλω καὶ ἐδούλευσε Φαρνάκῃ πρῶτον” 
(Str., 12.3.11). Here, Strabo’s wording would indicate a regular siege, which was a fairly 
lengthy process. However, further on in the same chapter, he states that the attack was 
sudden: “ἑάλω, πρότερον μὲν τοῦ Φαρνάκου παρὰ δόξαν αἰφνιδίως ἐπιπεσόντος”.20 
17 MeMn., 8, 5.
18 “ἤρξατο δὲ < ὁ Ξέρξης > ναυπηγεῖσθαι κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν παραθαλάττιον τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτὸν ταττομένην, 
Αἴγυπτόν τε καὶ Φοινίκην καὶ Κύπρον, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Κιλικίαν καὶ Παμφυλίαν καὶ Πισιδικήν, ἔτι δὲ 
Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίαν καὶ Μυσίαν καὶ Τρῳάδα καὶ τὰς ἐφ’ Ἑλλησπόντῳ πόλεις καὶ τὴν Βιθυνίαν καὶ τὸν 
Πόντον.”, diod., 11 2.1.
19 Pol., 4.56.1.
20 The suddenness of the attack might be taken as an indication that it was sea-borne. It is not out of the 
question, but the geographical features of the area make it relatively easy for an attack coming from the 
land to remain undetected until the last moment: the configuration of the mountains in the Hinterland 
makes travel on the shore difficult and instead forces land traffic to follow other routes, through the valleys 
(therefore covered from the eyes of reconnaissance vessels). 
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The two statements might be reconciled by supposing an initial assault, executed 
hastily in the hope of finding the Sinopeans unprepared which failed for some reason, 
after which the king went on with a siege, which was to prove successful. This might 
have involved a blockade of the sea, but there is simply not enough evidence either to 
confirm or to deny such a hypothesis.
There is an interesting suggestion by Reinach,21 who uses firstly the treaty which 
put an end to the war between Pharnakes, Eumenes and Ariarathes, in which the cities of 
Chersonesos and Mesembria, among others, are being named as signatories22 and secondly 
the bilateral treaty between the king and the city of Chersonesos (IosPE I2, 402), as proof 
of an early policy of championship of Hellenism promoted by the Pontic king, resembling 
all too much that of Mithridates Eupator. Such a policy could only be substantiated with 
the help of a powerful navy and, if things are indeed so, this might be indirect proof that 
the Pontic Navy was being maintained at a high level of professionalism. 
Doubts have been raised, however,23 that such a reading of the two sources is valid. 
Why would the Greek cities see in Pharnakes a champion? He was not known to favour 
the freedom of Greek cities (since he was the one who reduced Sinope to slavery, to quote 
Strabon)24 and neither were his ancestors, with the possible exception of Ktistes, who had a 
defensive alliance with Heracleia. Certainly Eumenes II could claim this title of protector 
for himself, capitalising both on his father’s exploits against the Celts and on his own role 
in the overthrowing of the tyrannical (or so the Roman propaganda claimed) Antiochos 
III and in helping Manlius Vulso against the Galatians. It would be more reasonable to 
see the Greek cities acting collectively against Pharnakes, who had probably disturbed the 
economical network in the basin of the Black Sea by his capture of Sinope: the Rhodian 
embassy to Rome immediately afterwards (Pol., 22.9.2) stands as proof of the degree of 
indignation the Greek merchants could feel in such a situation. It results therefore that 
the Sarmatian Gatalos is more likely to have acted against the cities at the instigation and 
with the support of the Pontic king. McGing’s hypothesis25 that the Sarmatians had an 
entire history of good relations with the Chersonesitans by extrapolating from the isolated 
episode of the victory the Sarmatians won under Queen Amage over the Scythians on 
behalf of the Greek city is not entirely convincing, for it does not offer sufficient grounds 
for Gatalos’ presence in the 179 BC treaty: if indeed he supported the city of Chersonesos 
and fought Pharnakes, it must be admitted that either Pharnakes dispatched a sizeable 
corps to operate on the Northern shores of the Black Sea (which is unlikely, given that his 
land forces were having a hard time holding on to the superficially occupied regions in 
21 reinACh, 1890, pp. 65-66.
22 Pol., 25. 2.11.
23 MCging, 1986, pp. 28-30; højte, 2004, passim.
24  Str., 12.3.11.
25 MCging, 1986, p. 30.
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Anatolia) or that Sarmatian troops have been transported to the main field of operations, 
in Asia Minor, something we never hear of. This is, admittedly, an argumentum ex 
silentio, but it cannot be entirely dismissed. Furthermore, the fact that Polybios deems 
Pharnakes “the most lawless of all the kings before him” (“Φαρνάκης πάντων τῶν πρὸ 
τοῦ βασιλέων ἐγένετο παρανομώτατος”, Pol., 27.17.1) and the stipulation in the treaty 
with Chersonesos that the king will not plot against the city, wage or instigate war against 
it nor do anything that might harm it26 might well be the result of his alliance with a 
barbarian against Greeks. All that seems to discredit Reinach’s theory.
One could, perhaps, argue that, after having conquered Sinope, Pharnakes would 
have had increased resources for and indeed increased need of a Navy, in order to protect 
his increased commercial network. That may be so, but there is no evidence that he took 
steps in this direction. An episode of the war with Pergamon, when Eumenes shuts off the 
Hellespont in order to impose an economic blockade on his enemy,27 clearly illustrates this. 
On the one hand, the Pergamenian king imposes this blockade primarily against the ships 
heading towards the Euxine (τοῦ βασιλέως Εὐμένους ἐφορμοῦντος ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν 
Ἑλλήσποντον στόματος χάριν τοῦ κωλύειν τοὺς πλέοντας εἰς τὸν Πόντον), therefore 
primarily against those merchants (most of them of Rhodian origin) who maintained 
relations with Pharnakes rather than against Pontic ships bound for the Mediterranean. On 
the other hand, Pharnakes seems to have done nothing to lift the blockade, which was ended 
by the Rhodians (ἐπελάβοντο τῆς ὁρμῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ διεκώλυσαν Ῥόδιοι). All these pieces 
of information seem to point to a decline of the Pontic navy during this period.
The next occurrence of the Navy is during the reign of Mithradates Euergetes, 
who sends the Romans an auxiliary force consisting of some ships and a small 
detachment to aid them during the final siege of Carthage. Unfortunately, Appian’s 
phrasing is extremely vague,28 but the Pontic participation must have been little more 
than symbolic. The obvious question to ask is weather this token participation was 
due to the smallness of the Pontic Navy, to the Roman self-sufficiency or to the lack 
of interest on behalf of the king to please the Republic by a grand gesture. I believe 
the last hypothesis can be easily cast aside as the least probable and that the answer 
is a combination of the first two. On the one hand, the Romans simply did not need 
to muster too large a fleet to confront the Carthaginians, whose control of the sea 
had been all but eliminated in the First Punic War. On the other hand, it is perfectly 
natural for a king whose interest lay not so much in the expansion of his kingdom 
across the sea, but rather towards the South and West, into Phrygia, to reduce the 
costs of maintaining a fleet to the minimum. 
26  IOSPE I2, 402, lines 19-23.
27  Pol., 27.7.5.
28  “ναῦς τινας ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίους καὶ συμμαχίαν ὀλίγην παρασχὼν βασιλεὺς Πόντου, Μιθριδάτης, ὁ 
Εὐεργέτης ἐπίκλησιν” (APP., Mithr. 10).
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IV.1.3. Historical Development: The Fleet under Mithradates VI Eupator
The greatness and dissolution of the Pontic Navy are both due to the same king – 
Mithridates VI Eupator. Once again, development of the fleet and territorial expansion 
go hand in hand and form a sort of vicious circle: in order to secure possession of the 
new territories, Eupator needed a strong fleet, but in order to build a strong fleet, he 
needed to gain possession of more places suited for ship-building. The chronology of 
his conquests is many a time unclear. It would seem, though, that the first step he took 
was to conquer Crimea29 and instrumental in this action was the brilliant Diophantos, 
son of Asclepiodoros, a Greek from Sinope. The role the Navy played in his repeated 
expeditions to Crimea is secondary – almost entirely to transport troops from one shore 
to the other. The one mention of its presence is on the ‘Diophantos Inscription’, (IOSPE 
I2, line 37) and is very ambiguous: “παρῆν ἔχων ἄκρου τοῦ ἔαρος σ̣[τρα]τόπεδον 
πεζ̣ικ̣[ό]ν τε καὶ ναυτικόν”. While the wording might suggest the presence of war-
ships, the subsequent narrative simply states that the Pontic troops along with a local 
militia have been embarked on the ships and transported to the place of action. The 
enemy does not seem to have opposed them at sea with equal fierceness as on land. 
It is true that Strabon mentions a naval engagement between Neoptolemos and the 
barbarians off the coast of Phanagoreia (first in 2.1.16, without naming the general, then 
with more precision in 7. 3.18), but I do not think this episode should be seen as part of 
the initial campaign of conquest, for it does not really fit with the narrative offered by the 
epigraphical account and is more likely to be the expedition of punishment against tribes 
made rebellious by the king’s defeat at the hands of the Romans, described by Appian, in 
chapter 64. 
Acquiring the vast territory of the Crimean Bosporus offered Mithridates excellent 
means to improve and enlarge his fleet. Strabon offers us a glimpse of that when he 
mentions that the city of Theodosia alone possessed a harbour capable of offering shelter 
to no fewer than a hundred ships.30 Panticapaion has a smaller port, with a capacity of 
only thirty ships. However, it would seem that the city with the largest port of all (or, 
rather, the city with access to most natural ports) was Chersonesos, but unfortunately no 
precise indication of the number of its ships is being given. We must assume, though, that 
these figures cover both the military and the commercial fleets, as not all cities were as 
fortunate as Athens, Carthage or Alexandria, for example, which could afford separate 
spaces for the two. 
Some time after the conquest of the Tauric Bosphorus, Mithridates’ attention has been 
drawn by the Eastern coast of the Euxine, to Colchis. Little is known about the manner in which 
the annexation of this region was achieved and to what degree the Navy was involved. The 
29 Cf. reinACh, 1890, p. 67, note 1, on the authority of Pompeius Trogus, Iustinus and Strabon.
30 “Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ὀρεινὴν τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἡ Θεοδοσία κεῖται πόλις, πεδίον εὔγεων ἔχουσα καὶ λιμένα 
ναυσὶ καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐπιτήδειον” (Str., 7.4.4)
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long-lasting reputation of the Colchians as war-like and indomitable folk, well established since 
the times of Apollonios,31 might lead one to suppose this was no easy victory. The long-term 
rewards were more than worth the effort, for the victory not only provided excellent material 
for propaganda (and we see Pelopidas, Mithridates’ ambassador taking full advantage of the 
fact: APP., Mithr., 15),32 but also first class material for ship-building. It is again Strabon who 
underlines the importance of this region for the Pontic Kingdom, in 11.2.17-18. We are thus 
being told that the territory around Phasis is marvellously endowed with all things necessary 
for naval constructions.33 It is natural, therefore, that Mithridates took the fate of the region to 
heart and made it so that the governor was invariably chosen from his  closest friends, among 
whom Strabon proudly mentions his mother’s uncle, Moaphernes. Colchis soon became 
his main ship-yard.34 Since the geographer seems to bind these two statements by a link of 
causality, one is prompted to think that the strategic decision of expanding into the region was 
taken by Eupator precisely because of its abundance of ship-building material. This is hardly 
surprising: the king now controlled vast territories spread along the shores of the Euxine and 
such a dominion was hard, if not altogether impossible to maintain without the help of a mighty 
Navy. The Euxine was for Mithridates what the Aegean had been for the Athenians and what 
the Mediterranean was beginning to be for the Romans – either a vector of communication, 
if the fleet was successful in its main task, i.e. maintaining the illusion of the omniscience, 
omnipotence and omnipresence of the central authority or a great barrier, in case the fleet was 
disrupted by any circumstance and failed. That this was true for the Pontic Kingdom as well is 
proven by the afore-mentioned rebellion of the Bosphoran tribes, which only takes place after 
Mithridates is finally forced to surrender his warships to Sulla, at the end of the first war.
The sources are unanimously in awe at the sight of the might of the Pontic fleet. 
Appian has the Bithynian ambassadors mention that it numbers no less then three hundred 
“decked” ships (“νῆές τέ εἰσιν αὐτῷ κατάφρακτοι τριακόσιαι”, APP., Mithr., 13), and not 
much further he adds a hundred of the smaller biremes (“νῆες κατάφρακτοι τριακόσιαι, 
δίκροτα δὲ ἑκατόν, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη παρασκευὴ τούτων κατὰ λόγον”, APP., Mithr., 17). 
Appian is known for his tendency to inflate numbers so it is perfectly legitimate to pause 
and examine the information. The δίκροτα are usually considered to be one and the same 
as the διήρεις, being therefore manned by a crew of 48 rowers and some 10-12 officers 
and other sailors. When he says “νῆες κατάφρακτοι” he must imply at least triremes, 
which means that they were manned by at least 200 sailors, of whom 170 were rowers. 
31 He calls them, for example, “Κόλχοι ἀρήιοι” (Argonautika, 2.397).
32 As always, one must be cautious when dealing with discourses in ancient historians. However, if a 2nd 
century AD author had a useful image of warlike Colchians in his rhetorical repertoire, it is not unlikely a 
1st century BC orator (Pelopidas certainly, perhaps also Mithradates) would have it as well and would be 
eager to use it as soon as the opportunity arose.
33 “ἀγαθὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ χώρα καὶ καρποῖς […] καὶ τοῖς πρὸς ναυπηγίαν πᾶσιν· ὕλην τε γὰρ καὶ φύει καὶ 
ποταμοῖς κατακομίζει, λίνον τε ποιεῖ πολὺ καὶ κάνναβιν καὶ κηρὸν καὶ πίτταν” (Str., 11.2.17).
34 “ἦν δ’ ἔνθεν ἡ πλείστη τῷ βασιλεῖ πρὸς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ὑπουργία” (Str., 11.2.18).
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But greater ships were to be found under Mithridates’ command: his flag-ship was a 
quinquireme (APP., Mithr., 24) and it was not likely to be the only ship larger than a 
trireme. Simple arithmetic shows that such a fleet (at least 65,000 men, excluding not 
only the other soldiers, either hoplites or archers, which were at least 6 per ship, but also 
the transport ships, without which ancient fleets are known to have been tied to the shore, 
because the design left little room for provisions)35 was quite impossible to sustain first 
and foremost for financial reasons. 
However, one must not doubt that the Pontic fleet was indeed sizable. Sources agree 
that it outnumbered copiously the Rhodian fleet and that it had absolute mastery over the 
Aegean (APP., Mithr., 25, diod., 37.28, Plut., Luc., 2.2). The terms of the peace treaty also 
stand as proof of that – after so many maritime disasters, Mithridates is to hand over to 
Sulla either 70 ships (Plut., Sulla, 22.5 and 24.3) or even 80 (MeMn., 25.2).
The sources are also aware of another thing – it was a young and inexperienced 
fleet, unable to match the skill of their opponents. The story of Lucullus’ early career 
under Sulla’s command (Plut., Luc., 2-3) and that of the siege of Rhodes (APP., Mithr., 
24-27) is full of episodes which prove it beyond doubt. While the episode of the mounting 
of the σαμβύκη on two ships which manoeuvred it close to the walls might stand as proof 
of certain skill, the collapse of the construction may have been caused not only by its 
own excessive weight, as Appian states (APP., Mithr., 27), but also to miss-coordination 
between the two ships. 
Try as they might, the officers Mithridates brought from Syria and Egypt (APP., Mithr., 
13) proved incapable of instilling into the newly formed fleet the skill required to face 
successfully their Greek counterparts. Local seamen such as the son of Philokrates, who 
was from Amisos, honoured by the Olbians for his navigation skills even in bad weather36 
seem to have been relatively few. Therefore the king was trying (unsuccessfully, it would 
seem) to gain the advantage in numbers by an explosive programme of construction, 
while maintaining a decent level of excellence by using the experience of commanders 
formed in other communities, better acquainted with the sea. This strategy seems sensible 
enough in itself and not to require a Quellenforschung in order to be explained. It is 
interesting, however, how similar Mithridates’ approach is to that of the Achaemenid 
kings and how different from the Greco-Macedonian view. 
IV.1.4. The Persian Approach to Navy Composition
It is quite hard to gather reliable information about the Persian navy, but two main 
sources are unavoidable: Herodotos’ Historiai and Arrianos’s Anabasis. The former 
contains a very instructive catalogue of naval contingents that take part in Xerxes’ 
European adventure (7.89-95), from which we can find out that the largest body of ships 
35 It is also important to underline that in Appian’s view, these were only the “national” contingents, to 
which the allied forces were attached, like, for example, that of the ill-fated Chians.
36 IosPE I 2, 35.
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was furnished by the Phoenicians (300), followed by the Egyptians (200), Cyprians 
(150) and by the Cilicians and the Ionians (100 each)37. That the Herodotean catalogue 
has more chance of being credible than the more celebrated parallel from the Homeric 
epic is proven by recurrent references to these contingents within the narrative: in the 
engagement from Artemision, the Egyptian contingent fights most gallantly, while the 
Ionians and Cilicians are confronted with different fates (8.10.14-17); before the battle 
of Salamis, Themistocles’ efforts are directed at bringing about a defection of the Ionians 
and Carians (8.18); in the battle itself, it is the Phoenicians and Ionians that are made to 
bear against the Athenians and Spartans, respectively (8.85); in the aftermath, Mardonios 
used Egyptian sailors as infantrymen (9.32). 
Even before Xerxes, Cambyses had made use of the Phoenician sailors (3.19) and 
Darius of the Ionians (4.89). The situation seems to be unchanged in the final hour of 
the Achaemenid dynasty: the main force of the Persian fleet is made up of Cyprians 
and Phoenicians whose expertise surpasses that of their Greek foes by far,38 while in the 
final episode of the surrender of nearly the whole Persian navy following Alexander’s 
electrifying progress through Anatolia and Phoenicia, the following numbers are given: 
the king of Cyprus has 120 ships, the kings of Arados, Byblos and Sidon have 80 ships, 
Rhodos and Lycia 10 ships each (Arr., Anab., 2.20.1-3). In this situation, the absence of 
the Ionian contingents from the Persian fleet is not at all surprising, since they had been 
reduced to obedience towards Alexander in the early stages of the campaign, while the 
absence of the Egyptians can be fully explained by the fact they must have appeared to the 
Great King as untrustworthy, since the revolt lead by Nectanebo had been crushed only 11 
years prior to Alexander’s invasion.
The pattern seems clear – the Achaemenids had a marked preference for temporarily 
using highly skilled subjects instead of fostering a much more expensive “national” fleet. 
The reasoning is simple: the fair degree of local and satrapal autonomy, which went as 
far as tolerated or encouraged inter-fighting provided the background for the training of 
skilled soldiers and sailors, while not being cumbersome for the royal treasury. This had 
both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the principle allowed the quick 
recruitment (or rather enlistment) of good fighters without forcing the Great King to 
spend enormous sums by maintaining a permanent Fleet. On the other hand, the large 
fleet thus created lacked terribly in mass coordination and the loyalty of one individual 
contingent was only as strong as that of its leader, as the above-mentioned episode of 
37 However unreliable the numbers may be by themselves, the proportion of the participation does not 
appear to be wholly unfounded. 
38 “ὀλίγαις τε γὰρ ναυσὶ πρὸς πολλῷ πλείους ξὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ ναυμαχήσειν καὶ οὐ μεμελετηκότι 
τῷ σφῶν ναυτικῷ <πρὸσ> προησκημένον τὸ τῶν Κυπρίων τε καὶ Φοινίκων” (Arr., Anab., 1.18.7) While 
it’s true the stark contrast between the two fleets in terms of individual quality of the crews may be just 
a rhetorical device to extol the future success of the Macedonian fleet in 1.19 and particularly in 2.2, it is 
nevertheless from Alexander’s subsequent decision, of engaging the Persians exclusively on firm soil, that 
the fundamental truth of the gross imbalance in numbers between the two fleets clearly emerges. 
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the mass desertion undertaken by the Phoenician and Cyprian kings fully proves it. The 
king tried to counter this tendency and maintain a fair degree of control over the fleet 
by appointing Persian commanders (for example, in 8.89, concluding the account of the 
battle of Salamis, Herodotos mentions the death of Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes and 
one of the admirals, along with many other Persians, Medians and allies, while in Darius’ 
III Kodommanos days the navy had been entrusted to Autophradates), but this did not 
mean non-Persian commanders were rare (Artemisia, queen of Ephesus, to name but the 
most famous example from Herodotos, behaves much like an admiral, not like a simple 
captain and is often convoked in the council of war, whereas in Arrian’s story Memnon, 
Alexander’s gifted and energetic foe obtains the greatest honours from the Great King).    
IV.1.5. The Greco-Macedonian Approach to Navy Composition
On this level, of the philosophy of the ideal fleet composition, the Greco-Macedonian 
tradition is diametrally opposed, as may be observed from a very quick glance at the 
Athenian fleet, which, since it was the most successful and influential Greek fleet of 
the Classical Age, will be taken as the paradigm. It is known that Athens insisted on 
maintaining a permanent fleet and that the city laid its confidence in its own citizen sailors 
(only in emergency by metics and only in case of calamity by slaves), so much so that at 
the moment of the short-lived abolishment of democracy in Athens in the final stages of 
the Peloponnesian War, the navy stationed in Samos becomes the repository of national 
identity and rebels in the name of traditional civic, democratic values.39 The information 
given by Thucydides (1.121.3), that the Athenian fleet would be composed mostly of 
mercenaries (“ὠνητὴ γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία”) is to be taken 
cum grano salis – it comes from the discourse of the Corinthians inciting the Spartans to 
war and, as such, is bound to portray the enemy as a mercenary band, lacking conviction 
and easily turned aside with a few coins. 
This model appears to have inspired the great Hellenistic dynasties, though in 
their case, with the possible exception of Macedon, the concepts of ‘nationality’ and 
‘citizenship’ are obviously much more elusive than in the case of the Classical polis 
of Athens (thus, Philip V even appears to have converted phalangites into sailors: 
“ἐγύμναζε τοὺς φαλαγγίτας καὶ συνείθιζε ταῖς εἰρεσίαις”40). The turbulent 
times made it imperative for the great kingdoms to maintain permanent fleets, and this 
situation inspired a greater degree of central (royal) control, as well as a higher degree 
of professionalization of soldiers and, in time, a much greater degree of homogeneity 
within the fleets. From this perspective, Hellenistic fleets were much more similar to the 
Athenian model than to the Persian one.
39 thouk., 8.25.
40 Pol., 5.2.4. Hatzopoulos, however, (hAtzoPouloS, 2001, p. 28) warns against taking Polybios’ words for 
granted and quotes other instances (such as Pol., 16.7.5) where the ‘Makedones’ were named side by side 
with ‘ta pragmata’, which might suggest a heterogeneous structure of the crews in the Antigonid Navy.
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IV.1.6. Pontic Ships
Since the time of the battle of Salamis, the sturdy trireme had proven its indubitable 
superiority over the competing Phoenician models, longer, slimmer and lighter and 
therefore both less able to pack a mighty punch and more vulnerable to a ramming attack. 
Consequently, the trireme becomes the queen of the waves and is quickly adopted by the 
Phoenicians and Cyprians serving the Great King (Arrian, Anabasis, 2.20.1). 
It is therefore not surprising that the Pontic fleet, at least at the time of Mithridates 
VI, but conceivably also before him, is made up preponderantly of triremes. The sources 
mention other types of ships as well: δίκροτα (APP., Mithr., 17), πεντηκοντήρεις 
(MeMn., 27.1), κέρκουροι (ibid.). While these ships had certain Phoenician and 
Cypriote origins, they had seen service in the Greek fleets as well, confined to second-
rank service, particularly as fast troop transport vessels or as heavy supply ships. It is 
therefore quite hard to assess if they are an Achaemenid inheritance or a Greek import. 
The sources always name them as auxiliaries of the main task force, which might make 
the balance tip in favour of the Greek side, but the sources are invariably Greek and 
may thus distort reality. 
Not so in the case of the other major presence in the Pontic fleet, the πεντήρης, an 
entirely Greek construct. At the siege of Rhodos, the flagship is one such heavy vessel 
(APP., Mithr., 24), but this is by no means the only one to have seen action under the 
Mithridatic flag: for instance, Neoptolemos seems to be on such a vessel when confronting 
Lucullus (Plut., Luc., 3.9), since Demagoras, the Rhodian captain fears a prow-to-prow 
impact, while during the Third Mithridatic War (Plut., Luc., 12.3), the Roman general 
must confront a squadron of thirteen πεντήρεις.41 It is interesting, however, that the 
quinquireme is the largest vessel to have been commissioned by Mithridates. While heavy 
when compared to the τριήρης, it is nevertheless insignificant when compared to the 
dreadnoughts that saw service in the Lagid or Antigonid fleets, from the yet reasonable 
δεκήρης to the huge, possibly double-keeled τεσσαρακοντήρης, which boasted a crew 
of no less than 4000 men. It is significant that Pontic ship production was entirely geared 
towards mass-production.
IV.1.7. The Pontic Fleet: Between Traditions
To sum up, the history of the Pontic fleet, as shaped by the individual kings and 
by punctual circumstances, seems to have followed in general terms the Achaemenid 
philosophy, which meant mass recruitment in times of need (Mithridates II and VI, less 
so Mithridates V), followed by periods of dissolution, when it was perceived as a needless 
expense (Mithridates III and IV, Pharnakes I, perhaps even Mithridates V). Even when 
Greek technical superiority was acknowledged, a fact reflected by the focus on the trireme 
41 The number of heavy ships of the quinquireme type seem to have increased dramatically in the eve of 
the Third War, and this is very likely a direct result of royal involvement in the building programme, a 
development perfectly parallel to the one followed by the Pontic infantry, for example (cf. infra).
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as the main front-line vessel, it was guided by a Persian frame of mind, which appears to 
have valued above all else numerical superiority and financial parsimony. 
v. Land armies
Land armies seem to be somewhat better documented and information sometimes 
extends to cover not only the Kingdom of Pontus, but also Cappadocia and, although rarely, 
even Commagene. However, more information does not necessarily mean more accurate 
information and this is the major obstacle in drawing accurate conclusions. All too often our 
sources are merely reproducing topoi, most notably the one regarding the immense number 
of soldiers in the Oriental armies, and their equally immense incompetence. It is perfectly true 
that the outcome of the different wars would indeed suggest they were quite simply no match 
for the fewer, but more disciplined soldiers of the “civilised” nations, Greeks, Macedonians 
and, when these have “gone native”, the Romans, but what histories often fail to mention is 
the difficulty with which they won: a campaign lasting a few years is sometimes reduced in 
the accounts to the final, decisive encounter.
V.1. The Cavalry
The sources are unanimous in considering cavalry the most prestigious branch of 
the land army, and they appear to be telling the truth. We are assured of this by the 
parallels in nearly every other culture, from the Atlantic to India. No wonder: breeding, 
maintaining and training a warhorse demanded great expenses and therefore cavalry was 
almost entirely the domain of the aristocracy42. 
The prestige enjoyed by the Eastern Anatolian cavalry in particular during the 
Hellenistic times and beyond43 was based not only on their superior social status, but also 
on a record of effectiveness on the battlefield. In a number of occasions, we hear of their 
thunderous charges that manage to break even through the ranks of such disciplined troops 
as the legions of Rome: at the battle of Chaeronea under Archelaos,44 at the battle on the 
river Lycus under Mithridates VI himself45 or at the battle of Nicopolis under Pharnakes 
II.46 They proved thus to be worthy descendants of the Cappadocian horseman that were 
more than a match for the Macedonian horse under the leadership of Eumenes47 and who, 
42 At least in those regions of Europe, Africa and Asia where horses did not live in abundance, supported 
by vast expanses of grass-covered flat land. Other ethnies, however, most notably the Scythians, managed 
to develop nomadic cultures that revolved around the horse. Yet, their supply of horses seems to have 
depended on the wild herds, which meant they had to rely on short, but agile and resilient horses, more apt 
for skirmishing duties than hand-to-hand combat.
43 See, for example, the eulogy of Cappadocian horses in SolinuS, 45. Although this late Roman author 
preserves little data of real historical interest, he nevertheless testifies to the fame enjoyed by these animals 
as extremely intelligent and supremely apt for war.
44 APP., Mithr., 165; Plut., Sulla, 19.1.
45 Plut., Pomp., 32.7.
46 BAlex., 40.
47 Plut., Eumen., 5.5; 7.1-5.
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before that, had served the Achaemenid kings with loyalty and distinction: at the battle 
of Gaugamela, a strong Cappadocian contingent was present (in spite of Alexander’s 
expedition into their country and his appointing Sabictas as satrap) and it fought well on 
the prestigious right flank, alongside the Armenian detachment48, putting great pressure 
on the left flank of the phalanx49.
V.1.1. Heavy Cavalry: the Two Traditions
All these exploits belong to the heavy branch of the cavalry and are made possible by 
the special equipment they possess, 
namely good protection for the 
rider and ideally also for the horse, 
coupled with powerful offensive 
weapons. In this respect, the Persian 
tradition differed markedly from the 
Greek. While the Greeks preferred 
to leave their horses unprotected 
except by occasional forehead 
plates, the Persians tended to provide 
their horses with both head and 
chest guards50 (Figure V.1a). As for 
the protection of the rider, while both traditions advised the use of helmet and breastplate, 
the shapes and materials differed. The Greeks and Macedonians preferred the Boiotian 
helmet, coupled with either solid bronze muscular plate or the more flexible linen corselet 
(Figure V.1b). The Persians, on the other hand, preferred a different type of helmet, round 
or conical (as the example dedicated at Olympia sometime during the Median Wars, now 
preserved in the Archaeological Museum of Olympia) and breastplates made of scales – 
bronze, iron or bronze plated with gold. Interestingly enough, the Persian custom seems 
to have demanded that the armour be covered: Masistios, for example, the leader of 
the Persian cavalry at Plataia wears his gold-plated armour beneath a purple tunic.51 In 
addition to these, the Persians also used thigh-protection in the form of leather blankets 
covered with metal scales attached to the saddle, which were then wrapped around the 
48 Arr., Anab., 3.11.7.
49  Arr., Anab., 3.14.5.
50 Xen., Anab., 1.8.7. The many details offered by AShley, 1998, p. 60 should perhaps be taken cum grano 
salis. More reliable – to a certain extent, given for example his belief that Xen., Cyr. may be confidently used 
as a source for the tactical realities of the 6th century BC – is neFiodkin, 2006.The available representations 
do not support Xenophon, but this should not lead us to discard completely the evidence he provides: the 
representations on Greek pottery are altogether too often marred by artistic convention (many examples 
also omitting, for instance, the saddle), while the representations on Persian stamp seals are incomplete, 
sketchy or depict light cavalry. 
51 hdt., 9.22.2.
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Figure V.1. Persian and Macedonian cavalrymen
thighs – these are called by Xenophon παραμηρίδια.52 The Greeks, however, used no 
such devices, in spite of Xenophon’s advice in Hipp., 12.10, which was probably inspired 
by his Persian adventures. The difference is clear also in so far as the offensive weapons 
are concerned: while the Persians used the παλτόν, a versatile short spear, which may be 
used equally well as a missile and a hand-to-hand weapon, the Greeks and Macedonians 
preferred the long lance, ξυστόν. In the hands of Alexander’s cavalrymen the latter 
proved to be much superior and Diodorus records attempts by Dareios to accustom his 
own troops with its use53. 
V.1.2. Anatolian Heavy Cavalry in Hellenistic Times: Equipment
One may be led to suppose that the superiority of the Greek model, amply 
demonstrated on the battlefield, would convince all subsequent generals to adopt 
it. Indeed, we find that the son of the Commagenian king Antiochos IV Epiphanes is 
helping Titus during the Judean War at the head of a body of cavalrymen nicknamed “the 
Macedonians”: 
Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ Ἐπιφανὴς Ἀντίοχος παρῆν ἄλλους τε ὁπλίτας 
συχνοὺς ἔχων καὶ περὶ αὑτὸν στῖφος Μακεδόνων καλούμενον, ἥλικας 
πάντας, ὑψηλούς, ὀλίγον ὑπὲρ ἀντίπαιδας, τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον 
ὡπλισμένους τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένους, ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἐπίκλησιν εἶχον 
ὑστεροῦντες οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ γένους. (ioSePh., B.Jud., 5.460). 
While it is possible that this late occurrence may be simply the extravagance of a 
prince dreaming of rivalling Alexander and his Companions, it may also be explained as 
an instance of reminiscence from the time of Alexander himself, or as a tradition inherited 
by the Commagenian court from their former Seleukid masters. 
Nevertheless, Alexander’s model has not always been followed. We find, for 
example, that Mithradates VI’s mounted bodyguard is equipped in the Persian fashion.54 
The evidence refers directly to Hypsicrateia, the king’s concubine, but she is mentioned 
as part of the eight hundred riders who accompany Eupator, so it is not unreasonable 
to suppose this was the outfit of them all. One is bound to wonder what exactly did 
“ἀνδρὸς […] Πέρσου στολὴν καὶ ἵππον” mean for Plutarch and if his view of Persian 
equipment concords with ours. It probably does, at least to a good extent, given that 
our own conception rests almost entirely on artistic depictions, such as the painting that 
served as model for the so-called Alexander Mosaic from Pompeii55 (confirmed here and 
52 Ibid. For additional info, cf. SekundA, 1992, pp. 54-60, although this contribution to Achaemenid studies 
fails to rise to the level of his later works, mainly due to his uncritical use of artistic depictions as substitute 
for archaeological evidence.
53  diod., 17.53.1.
54 Plut., Pomp., 32.8. 
55 For a detailed discussion of the original painting, cf. StewArt, 1993, pp. 130-150. 
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there by the occasional piece of equipment discovered in archaeological digs) and these 
were available to Plutarch as well. 
It must be noted, nevertheless, that the Macedonian influence was not altogether 
absent. One of the most important changes brought about by Alexander’s successes was 
the adoption of the lance, which is demonstrated in the age of conflict that followed 
the Conqueror’s death: in the clash between Eumenes’ Cappadocians and Crateros’ 
Macedonians, the two forces both fight with long spears which break on impact.56 The 
other is the disappearance of the thigh-guards: when a Roman centurion manages to come 
near Eupator, it is at his exposed thighs that he chooses to strike, for wont of better target.57 
It may be imagined that the relative rigidity of the παραμηρίδια, while not a major 
impediment in launching the javelin, would have prevented the solid grip imperative for 
the use of the lance as shock weapon and led to the discarding of this cumbersome form 
of protection. 
V.1.3. Anatolian Heavy Cavalry in Hellenistic Times: Recruitment
Unfortunately, in the matter of the recruitment of heavy cavalry, we are reduced 
to reasonable guesses, as our sources are completely silent. It seems very likely that 
the majority (apart, that is, from the royal mounted guards and from mercenaries) were 
part of the corps offered by landed aristocrats, who had the necessary wealth for their 
equipment and maintenance. The following discussion will attempt to find arguments in 
favour of this hypothesis, by bringing together pieces of information relating to diverse 
eras, but all gravitating around a particular area, Armenia Minor, chosen as case-study. 
The information seems to indicate that: a) the landed aristocrats could and did employ 
bodies of soldiers; b) of these soldiers, a good proportion were cavalrymen; c) these 
cavalrymen were of the heavy type. The argument rests on many conjectures, but it may 
be fruitful to follow. 
Plutarch (Plut., Crass., 17.9), assures us that Crassus was able to call on the 
dynastai58 for military assistance and that they were legally bound to heed his call. Their 
military obligations were at this time connected in all likelihood to the arrangements 
made by Roman generals such as Lucullus and Pompey, in the wake of their victories 
in Anatolia, namely rewarding those who had fought on their side – states, polities or 
dynastai – with lands or even whole cities59. It is significant that they tended to offer such 
gifts on the periphery of the territory they had wrested from Mithradates, in Armenia 
Minor and Colchis, areas where the power of the dynastai was traditionally very well 
established, which may indicate that the Roman victors were perpetuating a system 
already in place. The pattern that seems to emerge is that the landed aristocrats would 
56 Plut., Eumen., 7.5.
57 APP., Mithr., 89.
58 For a more detailed discussion of these noblemen and their role in running the state, cf. infra, pp. 178-184.
59 Str., 12.3.1; 12.3.33; Plut., Pomp., 38.2.
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receive gifts of land in exchange for military service and that this military service was not 
limited to their own person, since they are on a par with large communities: “ἐπιγράφων 
δὲ < ὁ Κράσσος > καὶ δήμοις καὶ δυνάσταις στρατιωτῶν καταλόγους”. We may quite 
safely assume, therefore, that point a) is satisfied: the dynastai had both the obligation and 
the means to maintain bodies of retainers. 
In order to proceed to point b) and determine the type of troops preferred, we must 
go back in time a considerable number of years, to the period of the First Mithradatic 
War. Thus, on the list of Pontic forces, one finds a very strong contingent of cavalry from 
Armenia Minor, under the leadership of Arcathias.60 It is not unreasonable to suppose that 
these were mainly “nobiliary detachments”, given firstly that Armenia Minor had always 
been in the hands of dynasts61 and secondly that, if we put any trust in the precision 
of Appian’s language (which, however, is not always advisable), these horsemen were 
not part of the royal detachments: “συμμαχικὰ δὲ ἦγον αὐτῷ Ἀρκαθίας μέν, αὐτοῦ 
Μιθριδάτου παῖς, ἐκ τῆς Βραχυτέρας Ἀρμενίας μυρίους ἱππέας” (APP., Mithr., 17). 
Although we do not possess detailed information about the total numbers of soldiers 
(infantrymen and cavalrymen) from Lesser Armenia serving under Mithradates, the 
number of horsemen we are given – ten thousand – is large enough to lead us to believe 
they represented a substantial segment of the entire detachment. It results, therefore, that 
point b) is also satisfied: a consistent proportion of the nobiliary detachments was, indeed, 
represented by horsemen. 
Determining the answer to point c) is somewhat more difficult. Appian, for example, 
does not provide a description of the aforementioned troops, so the only way to determine 
their type is through analogies or deductions. The analogy with the situation in Greater 
Armenia is not decisive, for although one may notice a marked preference for heavy or 
even super-heavy, cataphract cavalry, the Armenian forces also employed highly proficient 
mounted skirmishers.62 The problem may be solved by yet another piece of information 
to be found in Appian: he notes that during the battle on the river Amnias, the cavalry of 
Arcathias is called upon to maintain a defensive line against oncoming Bithynian infantry.63 
This particular task they could never have hoped to achieve had they been light troops, 
which are only suitable for skirmishing duties. It would appear, therefore, that point c) is 
also satisfied: nobiliary mounted corps tended to be of the heavy type.  
V.1.4. Anatolian Heavy Cavalry: Persian and Greek Models
The picture that emerges from this perhaps contorted argument is that a good 
proportion of the heavy cavalry available to the kings in Eastern Anatolia was formed by 
the corps of retainers in the service of noblemen, bound to serve the monarch in exchange 
60 APP., Mithr., 17.
61 “δυνάσται δ’ αὐτὴν < τὴν μικρὰν Ἀρμενίαν > κατεῖχον ἀεί”, Str., 12.3.28.
62 CASS. dio, 36.5.
63 APP., Mithr., 18.
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for lands. Thus, the situation appears to bear more similarities with the Achaemenid system 
than with the Macedonian, for while the Western tradition emphasised the personal liability 
of the owner of a relatively small plot to serve as cavalryman, the Eastern tradition, often 
compared to the Medieval feudal system, put greater pressure on the nobility, demanding 
that they arm and maintain a body of soldiers, while at the same time providing them 
with the revenue to do so by an offer of land. Perhaps a reflection of this system is to 
be found in the tablet of Gadal-iama from Nippur, who is hired by an aristocrat to serve 
as heavy cavalryman.64 One may notice, therefore, that while Greco-Macedonian ideas 
were adopted, particularly in the practical field of equipment and tactics, the underlying 
tradition followed in Eastern Anatolia remains the Achaemenid. 
V.1.5. Light Cavalry
This is even more obvious when dealing with the other branches of the cavalry. It 
seems likely that the light cavalry had a good proportion of horse archers, a certain Eastern 
influence. This, however, is never clearly stated in the sources, unless one interprets the 
phrase in CASS. dio, 36.49.6: “ἱππῆς γὰρ καὶ τοξόται τὸ πλεῖστον ὄντες” as a hendiadys. 
Yet, the Armenian parallels mentioned above make it very plausible that a body of horse 
archers would complement the striking force of the heavy cavalry.
V.1.6. Scythed Chariots and their Achaemenid Roots
We are far better informed about the situation of scythed chariots. These appear 
frequently in the armies of Pontus, both at the time of Mithradates Eupator and at the 
time of his son, Pharnakes II. These were used mainly as a terror weapon, similar to a 
certain extent to the use of elephants: by their irresistible charge, they were to smash 
through compact enemy formations, breaking their cohesion in order to allow other troops 
– cavalry and infantry – to exploit the gaps and achieve victory. They were, however, 
severely limited by a number of factors: they needed a fairly long space in order to gain 
the necessary momentum, they were quite fragile in rocky terrain, once engaged on a 
trajectory, they could not manoeuvre with ease, making them predictable and finally, 
driver and horses were very vulnerable to missiles. On the battlefield, their frightening 
presence sometimes brought about resounding victories, such as the one obtained by 
Archelaos against Nicomedes by the river Amnias (APP., Mithr., 18), but rather more 
often they brought little but disappointment, such as at the battle of Chaeronea against 
Sulla or at Zela against Caesar (BAlex., 75.2). 
Their prolonged career might perhaps be explained by their venerable Achaemenid 
roots. It is still rather unclear when and where they first evolved, but ancient sources are 
unanimous that this was a Persian invention.65 Nefiodkin’s theory,66 namely that they 
appeared specifically to counter the solid hoplitic formation, based on the observation that 
64 neFiodkin, 2006, pp. 10-12.
65  Arr., Tact., 2.5; Xen., Cyr., 6.1.30.
66 neFiodkin, 2004.
The King and his Army 160
historically, it was vulnerable to skirmishers and therefore could not have been designed 
against them fails to take into account that it fared no better against disciplined heavy 
infantry such as Alexander’s phalangites at Gaugamela or the Roman legionaries in the 
two battles just mentioned. Also, the geography of Anatolia, with its rugged terrain, was 
hardly inviting for a device that needed vast plains in order to function at its best. It would 
perhaps be more fruitful to search for the origin of the scythed chariot in Mesopotamia. 
Whatever its origins, however, the presence of these chariots in Eastern Anatolian armies 
lent them an unmistakeable Persian appearance. 
V.1.7. Camels
Camels were another Eastern oddity present on the battlefields and reminding of 
long Achaemenid traditions, in spite of their obvious difficulties at coping with the rugged 
terrain. As such, they must have been relegated to a secondary role and we only hear of 
them incidentally, in two passages: Plut., Luc., 11.3-4 and CASS. dio, 36.49.3.
V.2. The Infantry
5.2.1. The Infantry: Classical background
If the cavalry of the East had the reputation of being formidable, the same could not 
be said about the infantry. The defeat of the invading Persian armies by the hoplite armies of 
Greece, greatly inferior in numbers, during the Median Wars created the legend of Eastern 
cowardice and effeminacy. Whatever the cause of the defeat (from bad generalship to lack 
of motivation on the part of the lower ranks), it is certain that the traditional light infantry of 
Persia was no match for the heavy Greek footmen in frontal encounter. The situation had not 
changed significantly by the time of Alexander: the only significant segment of the infantry 
was represented by the Greek mercenaries. It is true, however, that the image emerging 
from Xenophon’s Anabasis is far more nuanced. Although the Greek hoplitic force emerges 
victorious from most encounters (or so the narrator wants us to believe), admiration for the 
effectiveness, valour and even discipline of Anatolian light infantrymen is often expressed.67
V.2.2. Hellenistic Anatolian Infantry: Facts and Clichés 
An evaluation of the infantry in Eastern Anatolia during the Hellenistic times is made 
very difficult by the aridity of our sources, which are, moreover, heavily biased, highly rhetoric 
and not always careful to separate facts from clichés. For example, Plutarch seems to imply 
that in the First Mithradatic War the Pontic troops were all covered in silver and gold: 
αἵ τε μαρμαρυγαὶ τῶν ὅπλων ἠσκημένων χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ 
διαπρεπῶς, αἵ τε βαφαὶ τῶν Μηδικῶν καὶ Σκυθικῶν χιτώνων 
ἀναμεμιγμέναι χαλκῷ καὶ σιδήρῳ λάμποντι πυροειδῆ καὶ φοβερὰν ἐν 
τῷ σαλεύεσθαι καὶ διαφέρεσθαι προσέβαλον ὄψιν. (Plut., Sulla, 16.2-3) 
and 
67 Valiant Chalybes: Xen., Anab., 4.7.15; disciplined Mossynoikoi: Xen., Anab., 5.4.12.
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ἀφελὼν γὰρ τὰ παντοδαπὰ πλήθη καὶ τὰς πολυγλώσσους ἀπειλὰς 
τῶν βαρβάρων, ὅπλων τε διαχρύσων καὶ διαλίθων κατασκευάς, ὡς 
λάφυρα τῶν κρατούντων, οὐκ ἀλκήν τινα τῶν κεκτημένων ὄντα […] καὶ 
γεγυμνασμένους μᾶλλον ἢ κεκοσμημένους ἤθροιζεν ἵππους […] ἔτι δὲ ναῦς 
οὐ χρυσορόφοις σκηνίσιν οὐδὲ λουτροῖς παλλακίδων καὶ γυναικωνίτισι 
τρυφώσαις ἠσκημένας, ἀλλ’ ὅπλων καὶ βελῶν καὶ χρημάτων γεμούσας 
παραρτισάμενος, ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Βιθυνίαν (Plut., Luc., 7.5-6). 
This is certainly just an echo of the age-old beliefs that the East was a land of fabulous 
wealth and that Eastern men were prone to adorn themselves like women.
V.2.3. Light Infantry
From what one may discern in the sources, the light infantry continued to be an 
important segment of the infantry in Anatolian armies throughout the Hellenistic Age. It 
is, for example, a detachment of light infantry that is sent by Ariarathes IV to Antiochos 
III in the eve of the battle of Magnesia. 
We do not know how well or badly they fared in that battle and one must wait until 
the First Mithradatic War for more information on the subject. Thus, Appian describes 
the engagement between the vanguard of the Mithradatid army, consisting of a body of 
light infantry, led jointly by Archelaos and Neoptolemos, and the entire Bithynian army 
under Nicomedes. The Pontic force is described as being outclassed and outnumbered68 
(‘Νικομήδης μὲν ἅπαντας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ, Νεοπτόλεμος δὲ καὶ Ἀρχέλαος τοὺς εὐζώνους 
μόνους’, APP., Mithr., 18; ‘τῶν Βιθυνῶν, πολὺ πλειόνων ὄντων’, ibid.), and yet it manages 
to win the battle at the river Amnias due in equal measure to the leadership of the two 
brothers in command and to the general quality of the troops, capable of performing delicate 
manoeuvres, such as a controlled retreat while engaged in combat and spirited enough not 
to lose heart although the initial stages of the engagement were far from successful. 
V.2.4. Light Infantry: Equipment
Because of the dire lack of archaeological evidence, it is neigh impossible to 
determine with precision the equipment of these infantrymen. Therefore, one must be 
very cautious when using the literary sources.
For example, Duncan Head’s reconstruction of the Cappadocian contingent present 
at Magnesia69 as bearing the heavy thureos and the long Celtic sword is in all likelihood 
inaccurate, as it relies exclusively on a too literal understanding of Livy’s phrasing: “ab 
68  Since in the previous paragraph the total forces of Nicomedes were given as 50.000 foot and 6000 horse, 
one may venture to say that the Pontic advance party may have numbered about 40.000. The number may 
not, however, be used to determine the total of light infantry in the Pontic army: firstly because numbers 
relating to ancient armies are generally unreliable (and this is particularly true of Appian’s numbers), 
secondly because it is quite hard to believe that the vanguard was composed of the entire body of light 
infantry at Mithradates’ disposal.  
69 heAd, 1982, p. 122.
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laeuo cornu phalangitis adiuncti erant Gallograeci pedites mille et quingenti et similiter 
his armati duo milia Cappadocum (ab Ariarathe missi erant regi)” (T.Liv., 37.40.10). 
However, Livy makes no comment about their actual pieces of equipment: he merely 
indicates that these pedites belonged to the class of light infantry – not as heavy as the 
phalanx, nor yet skirmishers, such as the Neocretans, Carians or Pamphylians (described 
as caetrati) or as the Cyrtians (described as funditores), all of whom are placed by the 
Roman historian at the extreme of the left flank.70
 Equal care must be exercised when reading other, particularly late, sources such 
as Appian. The fact that in the description of the Pontic light infantrymen at the opening 
stages of the First Mithradatic War he uses the technical term εὐζῶνοι invites many 
hypotheses. These had become in the Hellenistic times, particularly among the Aitolians, 
a specialised body, with distinctive equipment: large thureos shield, but no other body 
armour, javelins which double as short spears for hand-to hand combat and short sword 
as side-arm. As such, they were not very different from the mountaineers inhabiting the 
Paryadres that Xenophon describes in Anab., 5.4.12-13.71 As Appian goes on to say that 
the troops of Mithradates did include some mountaineers from the area, the Chalybes,72 
one might perhaps draw the conclusion that ancient traditions had been preserved and 
adapted to suit the requirements of Hellenistic warfare. Unfortunately, things are not so 
clearly cut. Firstly, Xenophon himself gives a description of the Chalybes73 that bears no 
resemblance to the Hellenistic εὐζῶνοι. Secondly, Appian is rather careless in his use 
of technical military terms. To him, the word εὐζῶνοι meant quite simply light infantry 
or heavy infantry without baggage (the equivalent for the Latin expediti): “Σύλλας δέ 
[…] ἀναπαύσας δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπ’ ὀλίγον ἐς τὸν Εὔριπον σὺν εὐζώνοις ἐπὶ τὸν 
Ἀρχέλαον ἠπείγετο” (APP., Mithr., 45). One must therefore remain content to notice that 
the equipment of the Eastern Anatolian light infantrymen allowed them to engage with a 
relative degree of success in hand-to hand combat, weather this equipment followed the 
pattern of their ancestors from Achaemenid times or had evolved to match that current in 
the Greek states.
V.2.5. Heavy Infantry
From a general reading of the ancient sources, it would seem heavy infantry 
70  Cf. also goldSworthy, 2000, pp. 72-73; grAinger, 2002, p. 322. BAr-koChVA, 1976, p 169 seems to be 
the source of Head’s reconstruction of the Cappadocians.
71 “ἔχοντες γέρρα πάντες λευκῶν βοῶν δασέα, ᾐκασμένα κιττοῦ πετάλῳ, ἐν δὲ τῇ δεξιᾷ παλτὸν ὡς 
ἕξπηχυ, ἔμπροσθεν μὲν λόγχην ἔχον, ὄπισθεν δὲ τοῦ ξύλου σφαιροειδές. χιτωνίσκους δὲ ἐνεδεδύκεσαν 
ὑπὲρ γονάτων, πάχος ὡς λινοῦ στρωματοδέσμου, ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ δὲ κράνη σκύτινα οἷάπερ τὰ 
Παφλαγονικά, κρωβύλον ἔχοντα κατὰ μέσον, ἐγγύτατα τιαροειδῆ· εἶχον δὲ καὶ σαγάρεις σιδηρᾶς.”
72 APP., Mithr., 69.
73  “οὗτοι ἦσαν ὧν διῆλθον ἀλκιμώτατοι, καὶ εἰς χεῖρας ᾖσαν. εἶχον δὲ θώρακας λινοῦς μέχρι τοῦ ἤτρου, 
ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν πτερύγων σπάρτα πυκνὰ ἐστραμμένα. εἶχον δὲ καὶ κνημῖδας καὶ κράνη καὶ παρὰ τὴν 
ζώνην μαχαίριον ὅσον ξυήλην Λακωνικήν, ᾧ ἔσφαττον ὧν κρατεῖν δύναιντο, καὶ ἀποτεμόντες ἂν τὰς 
κεφαλὰς ἔχοντες ἐπορεύοντο, καὶ ᾖδον καὶ ἐχόρευον ὁπότε οἱ πολέμιοι αὐτοὺς ὄψεσθαι ἔμελλον. εἶχον 
δὲ καὶ δόρυ ὡς πεντεκαίδεκα πήχεων μίαν λόγχην ἔχον.” (Xen., Anab., 4.7.15-16).
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represented the most important segment of the infantry. Appian, for example, expressly 
states it is so (APP., Mithr., 18). Yet, his statement needs to be corroborated with other 
pieces of evidence, not only because he is a relatively late author and one without 
extensive personal experience in military matters, but mainly because, like most other 
historians, he would have been best acquainted with the Roman, Greek and Macedonian 
Late Hellenistic systems, traditions that emphasized the role of heavy infantry, which 
would have inevitably distorted his perspective. 
Fortunately, corroborating evidence does exist, both in the form of literary accounts 
and archaeological documents. On the one hand, all narratives of battles delivered by 
Eastern Anatolian armies describe these events as classical encounters, with heavy infantry 
placed in the centre and playing a major part in the fight. On the other hand, the surviving 
‘Shield of Pharnakes’, a phalangite shield offered in all likelihood as a dedication to a deity, 
chosen therefore as representative for the whole 
army, demonstrates the prominence of heavy 
infantry over its light counterpart. Moreover, the 
senior rank of the heavy infantry commander 
is attested epigraphically: Dorylaos, known to 
have been the leader of the phalanx,74 is named 
in ID 1572 ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, one of the most 
important ranks in the Pontic administration.75
V.2.6. Heavy Infantry: Equipment
What type of equipment did the heavy 
infantry carry, then? In their case, sources copiously 
attest the Macedonian influence, labelling them as 
phalangites. ‘Φάλαγξ’, however, is a deceiving 
term. While it may be applied to the hoplitic 
formation or to the Macedonian formation introduced by Philip II, it is also used in relation to 
any body of heavy infantry, like the Roman legionaries,76 so it is necessary to find additional 
evidence for the character of Eastern Anatolian heavy infantrymen.
Luckily, the evidence is available and it points to their equipment being of standard 
Macedonian type. Archaeology has an important contribution in this respect, by the 
discovery of a shield inscribed with the name of Pharnakes (Figure VI.2).77 Taking into 
consideration its shallowness (10.4 cm at the centre); its rimless design coupled with the 
triangular protrusions on edges, designed to be bent inwards in order to affix a wooden 
core; and its dimensions (79.8-81.4 cm in diameter), it appears to have been designed for 
74  “ἦγον […] Δορύλαος ἐν φάλαγγι ταττομένους”, APP., Mithr., 17.
75  Cf. infra, p. 179.
76 Heavy infantry in general: APP., Hann., 87; Roman legions: APP., Celt., 1.9; etc.
77 Cf. BernArd, 1993.
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Figure V.2. The ‘Pharnakes Shield’
a Macedonian-style phalangite rather than for a traditional Greek hoplite. 
Another piece of evidence is now housed in the Sinop Archaeological Museum and 
consists of a stone sculpture: a male head, 
partially deteriorated, but which nevertheless 
preserves enough details to determine that the 
type of helmet worn is of the Thraco-Attic type 
(Figure VI.3). This helmet design was very 
popular among the Macedonian phalangites, as 
attested for example by the relieves of the Belevi 
Mausoleum, offered for comparison in the 
same illustration. Given the telling protrusion 
at the base of the neck, this sculptural piece 
must have been integrated in a larger ensemble, either an acrolithic sculpture or a tondo 
portrait similar to those present in the Delian Heroon. As such, one is bound to wonder 
whether this artistic depiction is indeed relevant for the Pontic space or whether it is merely 
an import item. Two elements seem to point to it being a locally manufactured item: the 
inferior quality of the marble and the absence of highly detailed finishes. The portrait should 
therefore be considered relevant to the equipment of local troops. 
Further evidence for the equipment of the Pontic heavy infantry is provided by 
the literary sources. Thus, Plutarch mentions they used the long Macedonian pike, the 
σάρισα: “τῶν μὲν βαρβάρων προβαλλομένων τὰς σαρίσας μακρὰς καὶ πειρωμένων 
τῷ συνασπισμῷ τὴν φάλαγγα διατηρεῖν ἐν τάξει” (Plut., Sulla, 18.4). Not only do 
they have the equipment of phalangites, they also use specific formations and adopt 
specific tactics: thus, as in the above passage, they form the συνασπισμός78 and strive to 
maintain at all cost a solid formation. 
V.2.7. Heavy Infantry: Organisation
The Pontic army seems to have adopted not only the equipment specific to the 
Macedonians, but also the honorific names for at least part of their detachments. Thus, 
there existed a detachment of the “Brazen Shields”, the Χαλκάσπιδες, who seem to be an 
elite detachment, given that they receive particularly important and dangerous missions, 
such as occupying key positions in the face of the enemy: 
δείξας αὐτοῖς τὴν πρότερον μὲν γενομένην ἀκρόπολιν τῶν 
Παραποταμίων, τότε δὲ ἀνῃρημένης τῆς πόλεως λόφος ἐλείπετο πετρώδης 
καὶ περίκρημνος […] συνεκτραχυνόμενος ὀχυρὰν ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι τὴν 
ἄκραν ποιεῖ. διὸ καὶ τοὺς χαλκάσπιδας ὁρῶν τῶν πολεμίων ὠθουμένους ἐπ’ 
αὐτὴν ὁ Σύλλας ἐβούλετο φθῆναι καταλαβὼν τὸν τόπον (Plut., Sulla, 16.6-7). 
78  This is by no means a singular occurance: it is the same formation, described as “συντεταγμένη φάλαγξ 
καὶ ὡπλισμένη καλῶς” that carries the day in front of the barbarian Palakos, in Crimea (Str., 7.3.17).
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Figure V.3. Thraco-Attic helmet
Also, on the battlefield they are placed on the honorary right flank: at the battle of 
Chaeroneia, they are placed under the command of Taxilas and meet Murena, who was 
stationed on the left flank of the Roman army (Plut., Sulla, 19). 
The term Χαλκάσπιδες is also used in the Antigonid (PolyB., 2.66.5) and Seleukid 
(PolyB., 30.25.5) armies. In Macedon, they simply represent one half of the phalanx (the 
other being represented by the Λευκάσπιδες)79, but in the Seleukid kingdom, they appear 
to have an elevated status. If the emendation of the Polybian text at 30.25.5 proposed by 
Kaibel is correct, as Bar-Kochva argues,80 the passage would read “τούτοις ἐπέβαλλον 
Μακεδόνες δισμύριοι, <χρυσάσπιδες μὲν μύριοι > καὶ χαλκάσπιδες πεντακισχίλιοι, 
<οἱ> ἄλλοι δὲ ἀργυράσπιδες”, rendering thus the Χαλκάσπιδες equal in number to the 
elite Ἀργυράσπιδες, representing thus the middle tier in a threefold stratification. However, 
Walbank and Sekunda81 strongly disagree with this emendation, seen as excessive and 
unfounded. Even ignoring the proposed emendation, the status of the Brazen Shields at 
the Daphne Parade seems one of considerable prestige, being singled out from the mass 
of the “Macedonian phalanx”, alongside the Silver Shields. Given the apparent elevated 
status of the Pontic Brazen Shields and the general history of tight relations with the 
Seleukid court, it seems more likely that the Mithradatid kings had imported the Seleukid 
model and not the Antigonid. 
It is difficult to determine when the corps appears, but the shield of Pharnakes, 
which seems not to have been painted over but must have been subjected to intense 
polishing seems to fit exactly the equipment of Χαλκάσπιδες in other kingdoms, making 
it tempting to set the reign of Pharnakes as the terminus ante quem. 
It is interesting to note that the corps does not seem to exist as such during the 
lifetime of Alexander, being a Hellenistic innovation. This demonstrates that the armies 
of Eastern Anatolia remained open to innovations throughout the Hellenistic times. Also, 
it demonstrates that whereas in so far as the cavalry was concerned, the Achaemenid 
model was perpetuated with slight alterations, in the case of infantry, the Macedonian 
model was embraced wholeheartedly.
V.2.8. Heavy Infantry: Recruitment
The matter of the recruitment of the heavy infantry is shrouded to a good extent 
in mystery. In a number of occasions, we see local levies being integrated successfully 
in the Pontic battle array, be they citizen militias (as happened in Crimea, under the 
leadership of Diopahntos)82 or – shockingly for the Romans – even slaves liberated ad-
79 Cf. hAtzoPouloS, 2001, pp. 73-84. 
80 BAr-koChVA, 1976, p.232, n. 8.
81 wAlBAnk, 1979, p. 450; SekundA, 2001, pp. 90-92.
82  IosPE I2, 352, lines 12, 19 and 39.
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hoc (as in Greece, under the leadership of Archelaos).83 However, this does not clarify the 
background of the detachment of Brazen Shields. Seleukid parallels demand that they be 
recruited from the Macedonian settlers, but such settlements have not yet been traced in 
Eastern Anatolia: the few new settlements that bear dynastic names seem rather to have 
been synoikismoi and do not seem to present an essentially military character.
V.2.9. Heavy Infantry: Reforms and Royal Supervision
The military reform introduced by Mithradates Eupator, namely replacing either 
partially or wholly the Macedonian phalanx with the Roman manipular system (Plut., Luc., 
7.5) is another instance of innovation and attempt to keep up with the times. It is interesting 
to note the importance of the king in the whole process and the degree of control he is 
capable of exerting on the weapon manufacture and training of the rank and file: 
ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης ὅπλα τε εἰργάζετο κατὰ πόλιν ἑκάστην καὶ 
ἐστρατολόγει σχεδὸν ἅπαντας Ἀρμενίους. ἐπιλεξάμενος δ’ αὐτῶν τοὺς 
ἀρίστους, ἐς ἑπτακισμυρίους πεζοὺς καὶ ἱππέας ἡμίσεας, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους 
ἀπέλυσε, τοὺς δ’ ἐς ἴλας τε καὶ σπείρας ἀγχοτάτω τῆς Ἰταλικῆς συντάξεως 
καταλέγων Ποντικοῖς ἀνδράσι γυμνάζειν παρεδίδου. (APP., Mithr., 87). 
This is in line with the Macedonian tradition, initiated by Philip II and continued 
by Alexander and the Diadochs, who were heavily involved in the training of their 
armies and constantly promoted innovation, constantly fiddling with the length of the 
sarisa or even to the point of partially retraining the phalangites to fight as legionaries 
when the superiority of the Roman style of fighting had become evident.84 This is 
in stark contrast with the position adopted by the Achaemenid kings, who are rarely 
recorded to interfere with the military traditions of their subjects. For example, the 
invention of the scythed chariot is attributed to Cyros the Great, but the information 
(found in Xenophon’s highly mythologized Cyropaidia) is, as we have seen above, 
quite untrustworthy. At the other end of the dynasty, it is recorded that Dareios III 
ordered the manufacture of longer swords and spears for his cavalry: “τὰ μὲν γὰρ 
ξίφη καὶ τὰ ξυστὰ πολὺ μείζω τῶν προγεγενημένων ἐποίησε διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν διὰ 
τούτων πολλὰ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν τῇ περὶ Κιλικίαν μάχῃ πεπλεονεκτηκέναι” 
(diod., 17.53.1); this, however, was too little, too late. 
vi. concLusions 
The general conclusion that emerges concerning the military in Eastern Anatolia is, as 
outlined at the beginning of the chapter that Macedonian influence was felt particularly with 
regard to the technical side of things – equipment and tactical use of different bodies of soldiers 
83 Plut., Sulla, 18.5.
84  Pol., 30.25.3. Cf. also BAr-koChVA, 1976, p. 60.
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– while the Achaemenid tradition was maintained at the level of mentalities, particularly 
regarding the recruitment of troops and the philosophy of their strategic deployment, but most 
importantly in the relation between king and Army as a pillar of power.
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vi. power structures 
And lAnd tenure
The present chapter will investigate how power and wealth (in particular land tenure) are related in Eastern Anatolia during the Hellenistic Age: how one generates the 
other and how losing one may – or may not – lead to losing the other. The analysis 
will start from power structures (in other words, the administration and the people who 
form it) and then proceed to discuss wealth distribution. This order of treatment has not 
been suggested by any conviction that the former necessarily precedes and generates the 
other,1 but rather by the need to impose a certain degree of clarity to the methodology 
and by the fact that documents are more generous in describing power structures than 
they are in indicating wealth distribution. The pattern that will become visible as the 
analysis unfolds is that power structures which appear to have an important Macedonian 
component combine with a system of wealth distribution that is specific to older historical 
strata, such as the Achaemenid one.
i. the KinG
The king in Eastern Anatolia, as throughout the Hellenistic world, represented the 
highest authority in his realm. His relations to various spheres (military, dynastic, religious) 
have been discussed in the previous chapters and in the following pages his role in the 
administration will be analysed, focusing, from the myriad of tasks both great and small 
that a monarch had to fulfil (from deciding issues of foreign policy to deciding the dress 
code at a certain festival), on just three aspects: his role in the administrative structure 
of the kingdom; the ruler’s role as dispenser and guarantor of justice; and, finally, his 
position as decision-making factor in the economy. The discussion of these aspects will 
hopefully illustrate better how the different traditions have coalesced in Eastern Anatolia.
I.1. Administrative roles of the king
I.1.1. The King and the administration of his realm
The king was the lord of his realm, but in order to be able to exert his power 
effectively over the entire span of the domain, he was compelled to delegate some of 
1 While this may have been the case at some point in the history of mankind, as demonstrated by the fact that 
many animals form groups in which there is a hierarchy, but possess nothing which may be labelled with 
the human term ‘wealth’, the biunivocous correspondence of power and wealth had been well established 
amongst humans well before the Hellenistic Age.
his authority to others, who governed certain regions in his name. In the Achaemenid 
kingdom, these officials were named ‘xšaçapāvan-’, ‘satraps’, literally meaning ‘those 
who protect the kingdom’,2 while in Macedonia the title seems to have been ‘στρατηγός’.3 
The Macedonian monarchies of the East, and in particular the Seleukids, seem to have 
hesitated between the two terms, using both in different contexts. The same hesitation 
may be noticed in the institutional usage of the kingdoms studied here. 
In his description of Cappadocia, Strabon states that it was divided into ten 
‘στρατηγίαι’, which he then names individually as Melitene, Cataonia, Cilicia, Tyanitis, 
Garsauritis, Laviansene, Sargarausene, Sarauene, Chamanene and Morimene.4 His 
testimony is particularly useful, as he specifically mentions that this division applies to 
the old administrative system, used under Archelaos and the previous kings, and does 
not apply to the current state of affairs, as the Romans had not yet decided the form in 
which the country, now a Roman province, would be organised. It is sometimes difficult 
to confirm Strabon and identify the governors of these regions in the historical record, due 
to the ambiguity of the term ‘στρατηγός’, which could be applied in equal measure to the 
governors of the στρατηγίαι, to lesser officials within the Greek cities or, quite simply, 
to those who led military contingents of varying sizes. However, we are fortunate to be 
able to identify a certain Mithratochmes (or Arsames) son of Iazemis, who fulfilled with 
certainty the role of regional governor: ‘[...] στρατηγὸν Καταονίας’.5 
Given that the Commagenian Apollas bears the same title,6 alongside other 
prestigious aulic titles, ‘πρῶτος καὶ προτιμωμένος φίλος’ and ‘ἐκλογιστής’, it 
is not unlikely that he, too, was governor of a region and that the Commagenian 
Orontids had adopted (or continued) the Hellenistic practice of dividing the land 
into strategiai.
A similar organisation may be conjectured for Pontus:7 to support this hypothesis, 
one may invoke the many similarities between Pontus and Cappadocia; the presence of 
a ‘στρατηγός’ at Abonouteichos8 (although it is somewhat unclear if this Alkimos, son 
of Menophilos, is a regional governor or rather a city official); and the distribution of the 
so-called ‘municipal issues’ of coins, which do not map out the geographical distribution 
of poleis, but must represent centres of royal administration. 
Besides the strategoi, the Pontic administrative system included satraps (APP., Mithr., 
2  kent, 1953, s.v. ‘xšaçapāvan-’.
3 hAtzoPouloS, 1996, p. 207. The title seems to apply, nevertheless, to regions outside the Macedonian core 
of the state, such as Paionia or Thrace.
4  Str., 12.1.4. To these was added a part of Cilicia Tracheia, but only very late in the history of the kingdom, 
during Archelaos’ reign. 
5 Tit.Coman.Capp., 2.4.
6  SAVAlli-leStrAde, 1998, p. 201.
7  højte, 2009b.
8 Marek, Kat. Abonuteichos, 1.
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21; 22; 35 etc.), such as Leonnipos, apparently satrap of Caria,9 to whom Mithradates 
writes a letter, setting a price of forty talents on the head of Chairemon and his sons, stout 
supporters of the Roman cause. It is, nevertheless, conceivable that the satraps existed 
only during the reign of Mithradates VI and possibly just outside the core of the Pontic 
kingdom. One may wonder if Eupator was trying to bring back to life a Persian custom, 
honouring his ancestry and emphasizing his claim to be a direct descendant of Dareios I. 
While this would appear as a sound political gesture in Eastern Anatolia, not the same could 
be said about Western Anatolia, an area in which the Greek population was denser and 
where there seems to have persisted certain anti-Persian feelings, at least if one may judge 
from the Pergamene statuary, in which giants, Amazons, Persians and Galatians represent 
the forces of darkness, while the Olympians, the Greeks and the Attalids themselves form 
a league of sorts, battling side by side for order and light. It is perhaps more likely that 
Mithradates tried to imitate Alexander, who had himself appointed satraps in Asia Minor, 
such as Antigonos Monophthalmos. 
A special position in the Pontic system is enjoyed by the strategically important 
region of Colchis,10 which is governed by a ‘ὕπαρχος καὶ διοικητὴς τῆς χώρας’, who, 
according to Strabon, was always appointed from among the King’s closest collaborators, 
such as the geographer’s great-uncle, Moaphernes (Str., 11.2.18; 12.3.33). This makes it 
likely that this region was treated as γὴ βασιλική (cf. infra). 
I.1.2. The King in the judicial context
The King appears to be in Eastern Anatolia, as elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, the 
supreme judge of the realm. We see the king in action on a number of occasions, deciding 
the fate of individuals or even whole communities. Thus, Mithradates VI is known for 
convicting to death a rather large number of people, such as his son, Mithradates, accused 
of coveting the throne (APP., Mithr., 64), his Friend, the former Senator Attidius, accused 
of conspiring against his person (APP., Mithr., 90) or Manius Aquilius, accused of having 
started the war against him out of greed (APP., Mithr., 21). Mithradates also convicted 
the Chians to the payment of a large sum, 2000 talents, as well as to deportation, on 
accusation that they continuously favoured the Romans (APP., Mithr., 47). 
In fulfilling this task, the king was aided by his Council of Friends (cf. infra), 
but also by specialised officials, the highest of which was the ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνακρίσεων 
(ID, 1573), an official position with clear parallels at other Hellenistic courts. Strabon 
describes this official’s task as being “ταχθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς δικαιοδοσίας, ἀφ’ ἧς οὐκ ἦν τῷ 
κριθέντι ἀναβολὴ τῆς δίκης ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλέα”.11 The phrase does not clarify if he was 
in charge only of those trials in which the plaintiff could not appeal to the king (and 
if things were so, which were the cases in which the king himself could be involved?) 
9  I. Nysa, 7; I. Nysa, 8. Cf. welleS, 1974, pp. 294-299.
10 Cf. supra, pp. 148-149.
11 Str., 13.1.55.
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or if, on the contrary, his position was of such honour that his decisions could not be 
overturned, even by the king. 
The king had yet another role in the judicial sphere, one more abstract than that 
of supreme judge: his august person seems to have acted as a guarantee in contracts 
and oaths. Strabon makes a reference to the holy oath by Men instituted by Pharnakes: 
“ἐτίμησαν δ’οἱ βασιλεῖς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦτο οὕτως εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὥστε τὸν βασιλικὸν 
καλούμενον ὅρκον τοῦτον ἀπέφηναν τύχην βασιλέως καὶ Μῆνα Φαρνάκου”12 and it 
is not clear in his description what the exact purpose of this oath was. It could represent 
an oath of allegiance, such as that sworn by troops: 
ὀμνύω Δία, Γῆν, Ἥλιον, Ἄρη, Ἀθηνᾶν Ἀρείαν καὶ τὴν Ταυροπόλον καὶ τὴ[μ] 
| Μητέρα τὴν Σιπυληνὴν καὶ Ἀπόλλω τὸν ἐμ Πάνδοις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεοὺς 
πάντας καὶ πάσας καὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως Σελεύκου τύχην. (OGIS, 229). 
It could, on the other hand, represent a ‘commercial’ oath, for which an Achaemenid 
parallel may be identified: in Mesopotamia during the time of Achaemenid rule, the parties 
in a contract would take ‘the oath of the king’,13 which is clearly a continuation of earlier 
local practices of swearing by the name or the life of the king.14 
I.1.3. The King and the economy
The king’s most important role in the economy of his kingdom was his capacity 
to impose the fiscal policy and the monetary policy, in other words, he decided how 
much his subjects were supposed to pay in taxes and with which coins. Besides being an 
important political statement, striking coins of all denominations helped the local economy 
develop15 and helped integrate the different parts of the kingdom into a coherent unity. 
While this process is less visible in Cappadocia and Commagene, it can be clearly noticed 
in Mithradates VI Eupator’s approach. Numismatists such as Callataÿ16 have helped dispel 
the myth that ‘civic mints imply civic autonomy’ also known as ‘lex Seyrigiana’, arguing 
that the remarkable similarity between the types struck by different cities points in fact 
to a strict central control over the minting process. This unifying tendency can also be 
noticed when looking at the North-Pontic dominions of Mithradates. A substantial amount 
of Pontic coins (most of them struck at Amisos) are being shipped at two key moments 
across the Euxine, to be used by the cities in that region either as such or as ‘blanks’ to 
12 Str., 12.3.31.
13 dAndAMAeV & lukonin 1989, p. 123.
14 PoStgAte, 1992, p. 287.
15 The view that an increase in the quantity of coins minted demonstrates an economic boom, held by a 
number of modern scholars (such as SAPrykin, 2007, p. 203: “At the same time, they <the large number 
of silver coins struck by Mithradates in the period of the first war with Rome>, without a doubt, indicate a 
certain development of the Pontic economy)”, is to a good extent without foundation. In the ancient world, 
there was obviously not even a rough estimation of the GDP and the monetary mass could not correlate 
with the state of the economy. However, an increase in the monetary mass – often caused by an increase in 
military activity – could facilitate economic development, by creating better conditions for trade. 
16 CAllAtAÿ, 2003, pp. 225-226.
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be overstruck: at the turn of the century, when the Tauric Chersonese and the Bosporus 
came under Pontic rule and during the Third Mithradatic War.17 These were the moments 
when Mithradates tried first to crystallize the unity, both political and economic between 
his South- and North-Pontic possessions and then to recreate it after the defections which 
had intervened in the late 80s.     
The other very important role of the king in the running of the economy was that 
of economic actor, in his capacity of major owner of economic assets, most importantly 
land, and this aspect will be described below. 
I.2. Γὴ βασιλική
The pattern which seems to emerge both from Strabon’s description of Eastern 
Anatolia and from modern surveys is that of a land of few cities, but many villages, 
controlled by fortifications built in conspicuous places. Of these citadels, φρούρια, 
some were entrusted to dynasts (cf. infra), while others belonged to the king. Some were 
certainly used as treasuries and defensive points, having little or no economic value. For 
example, Kainon Chorion is said to be surrounded by dense forests and waterless spaces, 
which make it impossible for enemy armies to make camp anywhere within a radius of two 
kilometres.18 Others, nevertheless, controlled fertile land around them, such as Gazioura, 
which is situated in a fertile valley (modern Turhal), and noted by Strabon to be “an 
ancient royal residence, though now in ruins”.19 These fortresses controlled a considerable 
number of villages, if one is to take ad litteram Appian’s statement that Murena plundered 
“τετρακοσίας τοῦ Μιθριδάτου κώμας”,20 and understand that these villages belonged to 
Mithradates personally and not in a more general sense to Mithradates’ kingdom. Land 
could be used not only for agriculture, but also as pasture, and this seems to be the main 
use for the land around Mazaka owned by the Cappadocian kings.21
The King also derived revenues from the mines he owned (Str., 12.2.10; 12.3.30). 
It appears, however, that not all mines belonged to him (as happened, for example, in 
Egypt), for the inhabitants of Pharnakeia are said to obtain their livelihood from working 
the mines near their city, which must mean that these were part of the γὴ πολιτική and 
not of the γὴ βασιλική (although it is not inconceivable that they were originally part of 
the latter and were attributed by Pharnakes to his newly-founded city). 
Kings in this region also possessed hunting grounds, “τὰ ζωγρεῖα καὶ αἱ πλησίον 
θῆραι”,22 doubtlessly a continuation of the old Achaemenid practice of maintaining 
παράδεισοι, such as those seen by Xenophon during his expedition.23
17 SAPrykin, 2007, pp. 201-205.
18 Str., 12.3.31.
19 Str., 12.3.15.
20 APP., Mithr., 65.
21 Str., 12.2.9.
22 Str., 12.3.30.
23 Xen., Anab., 1.2.7.
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The king’s right of ownership over newly conquered lands, in the Macedonian 
spirit of the ‘spear-won land’, seems to have been used by kings in this area, although 
data is more visible, as in many other respects, in Eupator’s case. Thus, after conquering 
Colchis, he sent there a ‘διοικητής’,24 an administrator, which probably means that the 
land was viewed as his private property. There are indications that a similar phenomenon 
took place in the Bosporan region, where the previous pattern of settlement of villages 
dispersed widely across the chora is replaced at about the time when Mithradates took 
over the region by a different one, in which rural settlements gravitate around citadels, 
which at the same time dominate them and offer them protection.25 
The royal land offered the king not only material benefits, in the form of wealth, 
but it also provided him the means to exert munificence, offering to friends one of the 
most precious commodities of the ancient world: land,26 continuing at the same time an 
Achaemenid and a Macedonian tradition.
ii. court aristocracy and the dynastai
II.1. The Philoi
In all cultures, and particularly in the case of monarchic societies, the person or 
persons at the centre of power develop informal relations with certain people. These 
relations of personal friendship often gain political relevance, as the notions of influence, 
authority and power tend to overlap, even in modern societies. Both at the Achaemenid 
and at the Argead court, the Friends of the King are a conspicuous presence. In both cases, 
accession to or removal from the group of Friends depended on the wish of the king, at 
whose discretion were also the privileges that came with this position. These privileges 
could have been ceremonial (such as, for example, the right to wear clothes dyed with 
the precious pigment purple, as happened both in Persia and Macedonia), financial (in the 
form of gifts from the king, attested at both courts) or political (having the king’s ear27 
was an important asset and allowed one to obtain advantages not only for himself, but 
also for third parties). 
The importance of the friendship between ruler and certain members of his court 
was enhanced during the Hellenistic Age by the Macedonian dynasties of the Successor 
Kingdoms, when a fairly clear hierarchy of the philoi was established and when the position 
of philos became increasingly stable (though it has never lost the essentially dynamic 
character it had from the beginning), as a Friend could move from one court to another 
24  Str., 11.2.18.
25  højte, 2009b, pp. 102-103. One could argue, nevertheless, that this shift in pattern is due to the increasingly 
violent environment of the time, caused by Sarmatian incursions, and not by a change in administrative pattern.
26  One example is provided by Plutarch: Plut., Sull., 11.2.
27 The extent to which a courtier could have the king’s ear is illustrated well by an Achaemenid example: the 
Persian king was compelled by tradition to accept the visit of a descendant of the Seven Wise at any time, 
except when he was in bed with a woman. Cf. wieSehöFFer, 2001, p. 36.
Power Structures and Land Tenure 174
and still maintain this status,28 could expect to see his position confirmed by the new king 
when the old one died29 and could have reasonable hopes his descendants would occupy 
a similar position at Court.30 Yet the situation of the philoi was never fully crystallised. 
The ambiguity of their position, even towards the end of the Hellenistic Age, is illustrated 
by a gesture of Mithradates Eupator: when he installed his son, Machares, as ruler of the 
Bosporan Kingdom, he assigned a number of his own Friends to follow his son; years 
later, when he returned to his Bosporan possessions after being defeated by the Romans, 
he punished his treacherous son and he killed those same Friends, while sparing the lives 
of Machares’s personal Friends, stating that their betrayal was more than justified by the 
personal allegiance they owed to Machares.31 This demonstrates that – at least from the 
Mithradates’s perspective – the relation between Friends and King is not one governed by 
institutional rigours (otherwise, he would have pardoned all of Machares’ Friends, both 
old and new), but exclusively by personal allegiance and faithfulness.   
II.1.1. Recruitment of the philoi
In order to determine how the recruitment of the philoi was performed, it is necessary 
to determine first the identity of the Friends.32 Some of them, such as Dorylaos,33 owing to 
a long-term intimacy with the king – going back in this case as far as childhood –, develop 
a particularly close relation with him and receive proportional honours. 
Others, such as Athenion (the Epicurean philosopher from Athens who, sent on an 
embassy to Mithradates VI, became one of his Friends and gained the highest honour),34 
or as Metrodoros of Scepsis (whose rhetorical abilities earned him not only the title of 
“Father of the King”, but also the high position of ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνακρίσεων),35 are exceptional 
presences, people whose talent in certain areas (artistic, philosophical or otherwise) 
impressed the kings enough to grant them this important aulic title. 
There are others, such as Strabon’s great-uncle, Moaphernes,36 who belong to the 
group of the dynastai, the land-owning aristocracy or what one may call with a somewhat 
more modern term ‘landed gentry’. Their ownership of land and their role in the functioning 
of the army (discussed in more detail below, in Section II.2) brought them to the attention 
28 Mithradates VI transfers some of his friends to the Court of his son, Machares: “ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης αὐτοῦ 
τῶν φίλων, οὓς μὲν αὐτὸς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπιόντι ἐδεδώκει, πάντας ἔκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ τοῦ παιδὸς ἀπαθεῖς 
ὡς ὑπηρέτας ἰδίου φίλου γενομένους ἀφῆκε”, APP., Mithr., 102.
29 “monui regem ut omnem diligentiam ad se conservandum adhiberet, amicosque patris eius atque avi 
iudicio probatos hortatus sum regis sui vitam docti casu acerbissimo patris eius omni cura custodiaque 
defenderent”, CiC., Ad Fam., 15.2.4-8.
30 Such was the case of Dorylaos the Tactician, philos of Mithradates V Euergetes, and his nephew, Dorylaos, 
syntrophos of Mithradates VI Eupator (Str., 10.4.10), to quote but one example.
31 Cf. supra, n. 28.
32 In this respect, Savalli-Lestrade’s work (SAVAlli-leStrAde, 1998) is of particular value.
33 Str., 10.4.10.
34 “ὑποδραμὼν < Μιθριδάτην > τὸν βασιλέα τῶν φίλων εἷς ἐγένετο, μεγίστης τυχὼν προαγωγῆς”, Athen., 5.48.
35  Str., 13.1.55; for the position of High Judge, cf. SAVAlli-leStrAde, 1998, p. 181.
36 Str., 11.2.18; Str., 12.3.33.
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of the king, who selected a number of them to become his friends. 
It is probably the same mechanism that helped promote to the position of philos 
important citizens of the major cities in Pontus, Amisos and Sinope, such as Diophantos 
of Sinope37 or Papias of Amisos,38 namely the wealth of their families and their personal 
services to the king.    
II.1.2. Hierarchy of the philoi
As the Court became an increasingly complex structure, the need to distinguish 
between different classes of Friends, according to their degree of closeness to the monarch, 
became more stringent. This trend was felt firstly by the great monarchies of the East, the 
Ptolemies and the Seleukids, and the Houses of Pontus, Cappadocia and Commagene were 
quick to imitate them (drawing inspiration from the Seleukids, in particular, with whom 
they intermarried copiously).39 In the case of the Seleukids, for whom the documentation 
is more abundant, one may distinguish at least five classes of Friends: φίλοι, τιμωμένοι 
φίλοι, πρῶτοι φίλοι, πρῶτοι καὶ προτιμωμένοι φίλοι and συγγενεῖς (which include the 
king’s σύντροφοι and his honorific parent, πατήρ).40 
The literary and epigraphic evidence allows us to reconstruct for the Eastern 
Anatolian kingdoms an identical structure. The first rank, that of φίλος, though it must 
have been the most common, is the hardest to pin down on an individual, mainly because 
the ancient authors tend to use it collectively, designating the entire group of Friends. 
We are better informed about the next class, that of the τιμωμένοι φίλοι: we know 
of a certain Eteokles, a friend of Orophernes, who is honoured in an inscription from 
Priene (I. Priene, 135), and of Dionysios, a friend of Euergetes, honoured on a Delian 
inscription (ID, 1559). Diophantos, who led the victorious Crimean campaign on behalf 
of Eupator, may have been a τιμωμένος φίλος, if the inscription from Chersonesos 
which tells us his story may be trusted to convey accurately the aulic title: “Διόφαντος 
Ἀσκλα̣πιοδώρου Σινωπεὺς […] πιστευόμενος δὲ κ̣α̣ὶ τιμώμενος οὐθενὸς ἧσσον ὑπὸ 
βασιλέος Μιθραδάτ̣α Εὐπάτορος” (IosPE I2, 352, ). 
Among the πρῶτοι φίλοι were Papias, whose name and title was recorded on the 
same Delian Heroon (ID, 1573) and two persons, one of them being ‘son of Herakleides’, 
both of whose names were unfortunately lost, friends of Ariobarzanes III41 and who have 
37 IosPE I2, 352.
38 ID, 1573.
39 Cf. supra, pp. 114-117.
40 Bickerman (BiCkerMAn, 1938, pp. 41-42) identifies only four classes of Friends, placing the συγγενεῖς 
as a class different from the Friends, though this does not appear to be a sound distinction. If practices at 
the Pontic court in this respect closely resemble those of the Seleukid court, which appears to be the case, 
then the career of Metrodoros of Scepsis is evidence that the συγγενεῖς were not a class apart from the 
Friends, but rather the highest rank in their hierarchy: “ὧν ἦν καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Σκήψιος, ἀνὴρ εἰπεῖν 
οὐκ ἀηδὴς καὶ πολυμαθής, ἀκμῇ δὲ φιλίας τοσαύτῃ χρησάμενος, ὥστε πατὴρ προσαγορεύεσθαι 
τοῦ βασιλέως.” (Plut., Luc., 22.2). 
41 SAVAlli-leStrAde, 1998, pp. 195-196.
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been honoured by the city of Tyana. 
The rank of πρῶτοι καὶ προτιμωμένοι φίλοι is only attested in Commagene, and 
it was borne by a certain Apollas, son of Apollas. As his name is carved on the side of a 
relief representing Antiochos I,42 the natural assumption is that Apollas served this king, 
although a later date is not to be excluded entirely.
The highest tier of Friends, the συγγενεῖς is best represented in the Mithradatid 
Kingdom, and in relation to Mithradates VI Eupator. Metrodoros of Scepsis, who rose 
to the height of honours to be named ‘father’ by the king, has already been mentioned 
(see above, n. 40). Apart from him, the Delian Heroon preserves the memory of two 
σύντροφοι, Dorylaos (ID, 1572) and Gaios (ID, 1570, whose aulic title is confirmed by 
Plut., Pomp., 42).  
II.1.3. Philoi in the administration
II.1.3.1. The Council of Friends
Being good courtiers, the Friends seem to have accompanied the King everywhere, 
in times of peace and in times of war, forming a council of advisors. As a consequence 
of this permanent and immediate contact, some of the King’s aura of command was 
imparted upon them and they were recognised as people endowed with authority, although 
this authority was somewhat vague (with the exception of those Friends who received 
specific administrative titles, which will be discussed below). The council of the Friends 
resembled more a gentlemen’s club than an institution, and the purple cloaks with golden 
brooches they apparently wore43 should probably be seen as a status symbol rather than a 
badge of office. Bickerman apparently conceived the Council of Friends as an institution 
whose relation with the monarch was clearly determined, as if by a Constitution,44 but this 
opinion, followed closely even by Habicht,45 seems somewhat exaggerated, as it relies too 
much on exceptional cases when kings invoke the necessity to consult with Friends, in 
circumstances when postponing the decision would have been clearly to their advantage 
and they may have overstated the importance of this consultation simply to buy time.
The will of the monarch was always supreme, although this will could be swayed in 
42 ibid., p. 201.
43 The gift of a purple cloak received from the king as a sign of elevation is well attested for the Seleukids 
and we have no reason to doubt it was practiced in Eastern Anatolia as well: for example, when Mithradates 
Eupator, in love with Stratonike, wished to impress her poor father, offered him besides many other gifts 
a purple cloak and a horse (Plut., Pomp., 36). Moreover, a certain general by the name Dorylaos wears a 
distinctive purple robe and is killed during a chaotic retreat precisely because of it (Plut., Luc., 17.3: the 
historian does not clarify if the person who killed Dorylaos did so to rob him of the valuable garment or 
because the purple identified him as a man close to the King, who had betrayed his soldiers by attempting 
to escape first from the camp, without their knowledge, and had thus enraged them).
44 In commenting the encounter between Antiochos IV and Popilius Laenas, he writes: “C’était plus 
qu’une humiliation. C’était la violation flagrante d’une loi organique, quoique non écrite du royaume, 
selon laquelle le monarque en référait à ses amis dans toutes les circonstances graves et ne prenait aucune 
décision importante sans avoir demandé l’avis des amis”, BiCkerMAn, 1938, p. 48. 
45 hABiCht, 2006, pp. 26-27.
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one direction or another by persuasive friends. It was in this informal power (or ability) 
to persuade the monarch that the authority of a Friend ultimately resided and this was 
the reason why the φίλοι were so important in the eyes of third parties, as demonstrated 
among others by the numerous epigraphic documents in which the dedicators praise 
together the King, the Friends and the Army46 or extol the patronage of one Friend or 
another who had generously interceded in favour of a city or an individual.47 
A letter of Eupator to the hapless citizens of Chios illustrates well the situation of the 
council of Friends. After accusing the Chians of conspiring with the Romans, Mithradates 
concludes: “τοὺς οὖν ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὲν τῇ ἐμῇ ἀρχῇ, ἐπιβουλεύσαντας δὲ καὶ 
τῷ σώματι, οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φίλοι ἐδικαίουν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν τιμῶμαι δισχιλίων 
ταλάντων”.48 The king plays here a rather cynical game, exploiting the public knowledge 
that the opinion of the Friends was usually important, only to demonstrate in the end that 
he is the master of his own decisions, while at the same time using the opportunity to 
portray as generosity what was in effect a rather severe punishment. 
In the military context, where authority tends to be respected more strictly than in 
civilian life, Friends have an increased profile. They form the King’s council of war and 
his general staff: they advise him49 and he sometimes seeks their advice.50 This privileged 
relation with the commander-in-chief emphasizes the authority of the Friends in the eyes 
of the army, who accept orders from them when the King himself is not present.51
II.1.3.2. Friends as officials in the administration: The High Priest of Comana
Besides offering the King their advice whenever needed, the group of Friends 
also served as a useful pool of officers (as mentioned above) and representatives in 
the administration. Some of them were entrusted with a number of specific charges, 
which institutionalised their power. We do not possess the complete list of these official 
positions – this is hardly achievable even in the case of monarchies for which documents 
are much more abundant, such as the Seleukids or the Ptolemies – but the little we have 
will hopefully be sufficient to demonstrate that the administrative apparatus in Eastern 
Anatolia follows to a good extent the Macedonian model, although in some respects older 
46 “τὰ ἀγαθὰ γί-|νεσθαι τῶι τε δάμωι τῶι Κώιων καὶ βασιλεῖ Ἀριαράθει καὶ | βασιλίσσαι Ἀντιοχίδι καὶ 
τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς | φίλοις καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν”, SEG, 33, 675, vv. 18-21.
47 “[τῶν πρώτ]ων φίλων βασιλέως Ἀριοβαρ[ζάνου | Φ]ιλορωμαίου καὶ μάλιστα πιστευομ[έ]νων καὶ τιμωμένων 
παρ’ | αὐτῶι, [γε]γο[νό]τας δὲ καὶ [ἐπ]ὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ [τοὺς ἀδ]ελφοὺς | τοὺς κοινοὺς εὐεργέ[τας ἀ]ρετῆς 
ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας ἧς ἔχο[ντες] | διατελοῦσιν εἴς τε τοὺς βασιλεῖς καὶ τὸν δῆμον· οἱ δὲ ἀνδριάντες | [αὐτῶν 
ἀνέ]σθησαν τιμῇ δημοσίᾳ.”, Žurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosvieshchenija, 1900:27,33.
48 APP., Mithr., 47.
49 “ταύτην μὲν οὖν οἱ Κυζικηνοὶ μετὰ χρηστῆς ἐλπίδος ἔθυον, οἱ δὲ φίλοι τῷ Μιθριδάτῃ συνεβούλευον 
ὡς ἱερᾶς τῆς πόλεως ἀποπλεῦσαι.”, APP., Mithr., 75.
50 “Μιθριδάτης δ’, αὐτὸ πρὸ τοῦ Λουκούλλου πυθόμενός τε καὶ Λούκουλλον ἐλπίσας ἐπὶ τοσῇδε ἱππέων 
ἀπωλείᾳ αὐτίκα οἱ προσπεσεῖσθαι, φυγὴν ὑπ’ ἐκπλήξεως ἐπενόει καὶ τόδε τοῖς φίλοις εὐθὺς ἐξέφερεν 
ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ”, APP., Mithr., 80.
51 “ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης ἀπεφέρετο ὀπίσω, καὶ οἱ φίλοι τὴν στρατιὰν ἀπὸ νίκης λαμπρᾶς ἀνεκάλουν σὺν 
ἐπείξει βαρείᾳ”, APP., Mithr., 89. It matters little that Mithradates later reproached his Friends this order – 
the fact that the army obeyed shows that the authority of the philoi was recognized by the soldiers.
Power Structures and Land Tenure 178
strata are still visible. 
In Pontus and Cappadocia, the second person in the kingdom after the king himself 
is said to be the High Priest of each of the two Comanas.52 The position of ‘second after 
the king’ has been demonstrated to have clear Iranian – in particular Achaemenid – 
roots. Benveniste,53 developing the theory put forward by Volkmann,54 has identified this 
title over a wide geographical span, from Armenia to Sogdia, and demonstrated that it 
remounts to an Achaemenid formula, whose earliest attestation seems to be an inscription 
commissioned by Xerxes: “Dārayavahaŭś puçā aniyaści āhantā; Auramazdām avaθā 
kama āha: Dārayavauś haya manā pita pasā tanūm mām maθiśtam akunaŭś” (XPf, 27-
32). While Kent understood the formula as ‘Darius, my father, made me crown prince’,55 
Schmitt preferred to give this passage a neutral translation: “Darius had also other sons, 
but thus was the desire of Auramazda: Darius, my father, made me the greatest <after 
himself>”. The latter appears to be correct, taking into account all the occurrences of the 
title which are not associated with the actual heir to the throne. 
This position is well attested at the Achaemenid court under the name of 
‘hazarapatiś’ and translated into Greek as χιλιάρχος and in Hebrew as ‘ptšgr’ (literally, 
‘second <after the King>’). Alexander adopted this position and made first Hephaistion 
and then Perdiccas his χιλιάρχοι. Later in the administrative history of the Successor 
Kingdoms, the position of ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων seems to fulfil exactly the same role. 
Yet, the ‘second after the King’ in Cappadocia and Pontus, while clearly a descendant 
of the ‘hazarapatiś’ and thus cognate with the ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, is set apart by the 
fact that it represents a religious office. The explanation for this unusual fact must lie in 
the pre-Achaemenid history of Eastern Asia Minor, possibly as far back as the Hittites, 
who venerated assiduously their holy cities, among which a special place was occupied 
by Kummanni, in the region they called Kizzuwatna, and which is thought by scholars to 
have been the settlement which would later be called Comana.56 Here, documents attest 
the presence in the 14th century BC of a series of ‘princes-priests’, such as Kantuzzili and 
his successor Telepinu, sons of the Hittite king who were entrusted with the position of 
52 “καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος < ὁ ἱερεὺς > δεύτερος κατὰ τιμὴν [ἐν] τῇ Καππαδοκίᾳ μετὰ τὸν βασιλέα· ὡς δ’ ἐπὶ 
τὸ πολὺ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἦσαν οἱ ἱερεῖς τοῖς βασιλεῦσι.”, Str., 12.2.3. Although Strabon’s testimony 
is clear, that in most cases the High Priests were relatives of the kings, the only occupant of this position 
not to have been imposed by the Romans was Dorylaos, who was a syngenes, but not a blood relation of 
Mithradates Eupator. 
53 BenVeniSte, 1966, pp. 64-65.
54 VolkMAnn, 1937.
55 kent, 1953, s.v. maθiśta.
56  CASABonne, 2009, tries unconvincingly to argue that the equation Kummanni-Comana is not tenable 
and proposes instead an etymology based on an unattested Hittite toponym, *Kamarra, meaning ‘the 
shady one’, which would be reflected in a Neo-Assyrian text as Kammanu. Equally hard to accept is the 
hypothesis put forward by Haas (hAAS, 1994, p. 580) that ‘Kummanni’ was in Commagene and later 
gave its name to the entire region, due mainly to phonetic difficulties, although historical fact alone does 
not entirely preclude this idea, as the land of Kizzuwatna, whose capital Kummanni was, did include the 
territory later occupied by Commagene. 
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High Priest of Tešub and Hebat at Kummanni and who, in this capacity, were not only 
in charge of the administration of the entire region, but were also expected to take part 
in the military expeditions in the area.57 It is tempting to see the similarities between 
the functions of the Hittite ‘princes-priests’ and those of the Hellenistic High Priest of 
Comana as the result of continuity, rather than of coincidence.
II.1.3.3. Friends as officials in the administration: Other positions
Apart from the High Priest of Comana, there were other important positions in the 
administration occupied by Friends. Even Dorylaos, Eupator’s syntrophos, before being 
appointed High Priest, had occupied the positions of ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγχειριδίου and τεταγμένον 
ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων (ID, 1572). The first of these charges has been compared by Savalli-
Lestrade58 with Philip’s and Alexander’s σωματοφύλακες, who, besides being the king’s 
most trusted bodyguards, were also entrusted with the repression of plots against the King 
or other acts of treason. The second office could probably be likened with the modern 
office of Minister of Defence, being charged with the administrative side of the running 
of the Army, though Dorylaos is also known for taking the field while on campaign, at the 
head of the all-important phalanx.59
Doctors have always occupied positions of honour at the royal courts, in every 
culture. They are attested both at the Achaemenid and at the Argead court. During the 
Hellenistic age, the Successor Kingdoms proved hospitable to skilled doctors and the 
office of ‘Doctor-in-Chief’, ἀρχιατρός, was created. Given that Mithradates Eupator was 
renowned for his medical preoccupations (to such an extent that some of his Friends, eager 
to please him, offered their bodies for him to practice cauterisations and other medical 
procedures),60 it is not surprising that one of his most honoured Friends was Papias, the 
ἀρχιατρός (ID, 1573).
As it was part of the King’s duties to dispense justice, he was also surrounded by 
people who could help him in this capacity. Two people are known to have occupied 
the position of ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνακρίσεων, Papias (the same inscription as above, ID, 1573) 
and Metrodoros of Scepsis (Str., 13.1.55). The role of this official is also described by 
Strabon as “ταχθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς δικαιοδοσίας, ἀφ’ ἧς οὐκ ἦν τῷ κριθέντι ἀναβολὴ τῆς 
δίκης ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλέα”.61 
The growing bureaucratic apparatus ensured a better control of the kingdom and 
at the Court there soon appeared those officials whose responsibility was to deal with 
the paperwork. Thus, we have knowledge of the existence at the Pontic Court of the 
position of ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποῤῥήτου (a Friend by the name Kallistratos who had this role 
57 Freu, 2002.
58  SAVAlli-leStrAde, 1998, pp. 179-180.
59 APP., Mithr., 17; APP., Mithr., 49. 
60 Plut., De adul., 14.
61  Cf. supra, p. 167.
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is identified in Plut., Luc., 17; a certain ‘son of Antipatros’ receives a dedication in ID, 
1571 and Reinach suggested restoring the same name, Kallistratos, in the lacuna); at the 
Commagenian court there appears to be a special position for the ἐκλογιστής (SAVAlli-
leStrAde, 1998, p. 201) and so on. 
Another group of friends was entrusted by the king with important administrative 
positions away from the court itself, being in charge of governing various administrative 
divisions. These could be said to belong to the ‘outer circle of Friends’, because while 
a governorship conferred upon one prestige and not infrequently avenues for personal 
enrichment, it also meant loss of direct contact with the King, which, as mentioned above, 
represented the philos’ most important asset. 
We have knowledge of the existence of satraps (such as Leonippos or Eumachos), 
strategoi (such as Mithratochmes, son of Iazemis, and possibly the Commagenian 
Apollas) or ὕπαρχοι such as Strabon’s great-uncle, Moaphernes. 
Friends of the King could be sent to represent his interests even at the lowest level, 
as officials in cities. Thus, the city of Tyana honours two men whose title seems to be 
ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως62 and who, in this capacity, exercised benefactions towards the city. It is 
uncertain to what extent this title – quite vague in effect – was a more elegant rendering 
of the φρουράρχος, an official position much better represented in the historical record, 
particularly in the historical works dealing with the Mithradatic Wars. 
A particular group of the king’s Friends who play a role in administration is 
represented by those who represent the interests of the king outside the borders of the 
kingdom stricto sensu. They are the governors sent to friendly or subjected cities who are 
better known in literature as tyrants.63 The best known among these is probably Athenion, 
whose triumphal return to Athens is narrated in colourful terms by Athenaios (Athen., 
5.212) and who is later replaced by the infamous Aristion (APP., Mithr., 28). 
II.2. The dynastai64
This section aims to shed more light on a prominent sector of Eastern Anatolian 
societies in Hellenistic times, the landed aristocracy, which, however, remains to this day 
shrouded to a good extent in mystery. In order to find out more, one must piece together 
scraps of information from literary sources and the frustratingly little offered by epigraphy. 
In the present discussion, the term ‘landed aristocracy’, does not generally point to 
the aristocracy of the Greek poleis, but rather to the land-owners from the Hinterland, 
who appear to be quite different from the former from the point of view of their ethnicity, 
the régime of their property, and their military obligations.
62 Cf supra, p. 173, n. 41.
63 “αὐτὸς μὲν […] ἐν Περγάμῳ καθῆστο, πλούτους καὶ δυναστείας καὶ τυραννίδας διανέμων τοῖς 
φίλοις”, Plut., Sull., 11.2.
64  The section is based on Ghita, C.E. 2010. “Eastern Anatolian dynastai – the backbone of their kingdoms?”, 
in Rollinger, R. et al. (eds.) 2010. Interkulturalität in der Alten Welt: Vorderasien, Hellas, Ägypten und die 
vielfältigen Ebenen des Kontakts, Wiesbaden: 507-518.
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II.2.1. Terms used to designate the landed aristocracy
In the sources, these men of elevated status are called δυνάσται, ἄριστοι or 
μεγιστάνες. The first term65 is rather common in Greek, being used indiscriminately for 
barbarian chieftains (Pol., 10.35.6), for Greco-Macedonian sovereigns (Pol., 9.1.4), for 
Anatolian ‘barons’ (Str., 12.3.1) etc. and stems from δύναμαι, therefore designating the 
authority founded upon some form of military pre-eminence. 
The second term, ἄριστοι, is less frequent, but its use is not surprising, as it describes 
one’s superiority by birth, often in the form of belonging to a privileged family. Sometimes, 
however, the use of the word is ambiguous and one should abstain from drawing too many 
conclusions. For example, the reference in Plut., Luc., 31.8: “πρῶτος δ’αὐτὸς ἀντέστη 
τοῖς Ἀτροπατηνοῖς κατ’αὐτὸν οὖσι μετὰ τῶν ἀρίστων καὶ […] ἐτρέψατο” could be 
translated, as indeed Bernadotte Perrin (the editor of the 1914 LOEB edition) does, as “He 
set upon the Atropateni, who were stationed opposite him with the magnates of the King’s 
following and […] routed them” or simply “He set upon the Atropateni, who were stationed 
right in front of him, among the best troops in the army and […] put them to flight”.66 
The last term, μεγιστάνες, is far more exotic, for it appears to be applied exclusively 
to Oriental noblemen:67 in Greek, the word is abundant in the Septuagint and in Flavius 
Iosephus, while the Latin megistanes is being used in connection with the Armenian and 
Parthian courts.68 The formation of the Greek word appears quite transparent: the superlative 
μέγιστος + the suffix –αν–, specialized in designating groups of people. However, the 
relative rarity of the term, its appearance at the dawn of Hellenism, corroborated with the 
fact that Latin perceived it almost as a technical term, suited to describe a very narrow 
group of noblemen, invites to closer scrutiny. 
It is certainly interesting that Old Persian possesses a similar term to designate 
nobility: maθišta.69 The parallelism between the Old Persian maθišta, a superlative of 
the adjective maga (big, great) and the Greek μεγιστάν, derived from the superlative of 
the same adjective is, indeed, at the very least a striking coincidence. The similarities go 
even beyond the formal level and can also be traced in the functional level, for the Old 
Persian word seems to have evolved towards an “institutionalised” meaning. Thus, it 
was used not merely do designate an extraordinary military command,70 but also forms 
65 Studied in depth by Kobes: cf. koBeS 1996, especially pp. 9-70.
66 It is interesting to note that R. Flacelière and E. Chambry, in their 1972 Les Belles Letres edition turn the 
phrase, incorrectly, to my mind, to make the ἄριστοι the best of Lucullus’ own army: “Il marcha contre les 
gens d’Atropatène qui lui faisaient face avec ses meilleurs soldats”.
67  The early occurrence in Menandros (fr. 1035) is isolated and irrelevant. Being a comedy, we might 
suppose it was pointing indeed to an Eastern wealthy person, as part of a comparison not necessarily 
flattering to a character, but this is mere conjecture, impossible to prove unless new papyrological evidence 
comes to light.  
68 Front., Strat., 2.9; Sen., Ad Luc., 21.4; Suet., Calig., 5.1; tAC., Ann., 15.27. 
69  DB II, 19-20; DB III, 83-85 etc.
70 Cf. supra, n. 70.
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of leadership which were primarily civil.71 Roland G. Kent goes even further, translating 
maθiśta by “crown prince”.72 
It is useful to note that Old Persian could resort to a number of other words when 
describing the semantic area of nobility: Arya- (which tends, however, to be restricted to 
designating the Iranian ethnicity) and the perfect participle āmātā (stemming from the 
verb mā- ‘to measure’ and the preverb/preposition ā- ‘to’), but it is maθiśta which has 
the clearest parallels in Pehlevi and in Parthian: mĥsty and msyśt, respectively.73 This 
may suggest that maθiśta has enjoyed the widest use and that it was by this term that the 
Iranian noblemen in Achaemenid and post-Achaemenid times described themselves. 
What would the Eastern Anatolian land-owning aristocrats call themselves, then? 
Given the Iranian background of many and the reverence awarded to Iranian inheritance, 
one may be led to assume μεγιστάν would be favoured. We posses, however, no evidence 
of self-definition from these men, no document in which they would refer to themselves. 
The closest thing we have to an inside voice is the work of Strabon.74 When writing about 
this subject, Strabon systemically used the term δυνάσται. Whatever the geographer’s 
cultural agenda,75 we must accept this term as being used not only referentially (Greek 
and Roman authors about Anatolian nobility), but also self-referentially (land-owning 
aristocrats about themselves).
II.2.2. Γὴ ἰδιόκτητος
The issue of land owned by private individuals, γὴ ἰδιόκτητος, is very hard to 
analyse due to the lack of sources. It is only the property of the dynasts that has left some 
traces in the historical record. The following analysis will, therefore, be devoted to what 
might be called γὴ δυναστική. As mentioned above, dynasts held one or more of the 
strongholds Eastern Asia Minor possessed in such abundance. However, the true regime 
of this property is not entirely clear. May their hold on the phrouria be characterised 
as full property or just temporary possession? The Genitive in phrases such as “τὴν 
δ’ἄλλην ἀσφάλειαν τὴν αὐτῶν τε καὶ σωμάτων καὶ τῶν χρημάτων εἶχον ἐν τοῖς 
φρουρίοις, ἃ πολλὰ ὑπάρχει τὰ μὲν βασιλικὰ τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων”76 is not particularly 
illuminating. The notice that Pompeius, following the rout of Eupator distributed the land 
towards Armenia and Colchis to the allied dynasts77 may be interpreted in both ways, 
71 “Marguś nāmā dahyāŭś, haŭmaĭ hamiçiyā abava, aĭva martiya Frāda nāma Mārgava, avam maθiśtam 
akunavanta” (DB III 10-12: “There is a country, Margiana by name, that became rebellious to me. There was 
a man, Frada by name, a Margian – him they made their leader.”) or “avada aniyam maθiśtam akunavam, 
yaθa mām kāma āha, pasāva dahyāŭś manā abava” (DB V 28-30: “There, <after the defeat of Skunkha>, I 
made another their chief, as was my desire. After that, the country became mine”).
72 kent 1953, s.u. maþiśta. Cf. supra, p. 175.
73  gignouX 1972, s.v. mĥsty and msyśt.
74 For Strabon’s personal ties with the Eastern Anatolian aristocracy, cf. supra, pp. 21-22.
75  deSideri 2000, passim.
76 Str., 12.2.9.
77 “τὰ μὲν πρὸς Ἀρμνίαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Κολχίδα τοῖς συναγωνισαμένοις δυνάσταις κατένειμε” (Str., 12.3.1)
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since the verb κατανέμω, while conveying the meaning of “to divide, to allot” does 
not necessarily imply transfer of actual property. Otherwise, the references to fortresses 
passing from one hand to another are commonplace, especially as a victorious general, 
many times a Roman, rewards his allies.78 They seem to be, in a way, the “coin” used to 
purchase the allegiance of the nobility, and a very convenient one for both parts, since 
they were extremely valuable for the local nobility but virtually useless for the Romans, 
who sometimes preferred to pull them down rather than to bear the costs of manning and 
maintaining them.79
Two incidents, both pertaining to the period of the Mithradatic Wars, may shed more 
light on this particularly delicate subject. Among the many Pontic commanders yielding 
more or less willingly to Pompeius, Stratonike, the concubine of Mithradates, was the 
most conspicuous. She had been left in charge of a fortress, which she surrendered to 
the victorious Roman general on condition that he would spare her son (APP., Mithr., 
107; Plut., Pomp., 36.3-6, dio CASS., 37.7). In Plutarch’s words, she is the guardian 
of the richest of the king’s castles: “Στρατονίκη δέ, ἣ μέγιστον εἶχεν ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸ 
πολυχρυσότατον τῶν φρουρίων ἐφύλαττεν κτλ.” (Plut., Pomp., 36.3), but a few 
paragraphs later, in Plut., Pomp., 36.6, what she hands over is the whole region, spiced 
up, as one would expect from an Oriental, with a generous bribe in cash: “τῷ δὲ Πομπεΐῳ 
καὶ τὸ χωρίον παρεδίδου τοῦτο καὶ δῶρα πολλὰ προσήνεγκεν”. While this incident 
may not be used to argue that the δυνάστης owns his stronghold, since Stratonike does 
not own, but merely guards the φρούριον (so what she gives Pompey is the military 
control of the surrounding region, not real estate), it does prove that the fortress may 
not be considered independently of the surrounding area, that the arable land (‘χωρίον’, 
besides the meanings of ‘place’ or ‘district’, may also indicate an ‘estate’) around it was 
part and parcel of the tenure. 
 In order to determine how the land was worked, a useful analogy may be drawn with the 
situation of the noblemen of Armenian origin who master Lesser Armenia, as well as Sophene: 
δυνάσται δ’αὐτὴν <χώραν> κατεῖχον ἀεί, [...] ὑπηκόους δ’εἶχον καὶ τοὺς 
Χαλδαίους καὶ Τιβαρηνούς, ὥστε μέχρι Τραπεζοῦντος καὶ Φαρνακίας 
διατείνειν τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν. (Str., 12.3.28)
The use of the word ὑπηκόους is very likely to indicate that the Chaldeans and the 
Tibarenians were serfs, the half-way between slaves and free men, which has parallels in 
78  What Strabon describes in 12.3.1 is not an isolated event. Further examples can be found in Plut., Pomp., 
38.2 and other authors.
79 There was also a political message in tearing down the walls of phrouria, a very obvious marker of the 
new age brought about in Pontus by the Roman victories, the age of the polis as the administrative nucleus. 
For further discussion of the subject, cf. højte, 2009b. 
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the situation of the Mariandynoi around Herakleia, to name but one example,80 although 
the possibility that they were the subordinate partner in a purely military alliance may not 
be discarded.
More light is being shed on this juridical problem surrounding the φρούριον by a 
reference in Strabon to a financial transaction: 
ἔστι δὲ φρούριον ἀξιόλογον τῶν Καππαδόκων ἐν τῇ περαίᾳ Τόμισα· 
τοῦτο δ’ἐπράθη μὲν τῷ Σωφηνῷ ταλάντων ἑκατόν, ὕστερον δὲ ἐδωρήσατο 
Λεύκολλος τῷ Καππάδοκι συστρατεύσαντι ἀριστεῖον κατὰ τὸν πρὸς 
Μιθριδάτην πόλεμον. (Str., 12.2.1)
Thus, we find out that actual ownership was exercised over these strongholds, 
which could be bought, sold and made gift of. The hypothesis that it was merely the 
revenue of the land which was handed over, as many a time happened in the Seleucid 
kingdom81 is precluded by the fact that following this transaction, the fortress passed from 
one kingdom to another and in all likelihood the ruler of Sophene was purchasing, rather 
dearly, a strategic key point rather than a supplementary source of income. 
However, there are many questions which remain unclear, like who was the ultimate 
owner of the place, since Strabo’s Genitive plural Καππαδόκων is ambiguous, all the 
more so as he points in 12.2.11 that the Romans concluded an alliance at the same time 
with the Cappadocian king and the Cappadocian ἔθνος (in this context, ἔθνος has been 
variously translated, from the general tribe to the more specific and more probable 
nobility), seen as equal partners:
Ρωμαιοι [...] φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας ἐποιοῦντο πρός τε τὰ ἔθνη καὶ τοὺς 
βασιλέας, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις βασιλεῦσιν αὐτοῖς καθ’ἑαυτοὺς δοθῆναι τὴν 
τιμὴν ταύτην, τῷ δὲ Καππάδοκι καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἔθνει κοινῇ.
 The one who receives it back is obviously the Cappadocian king and the only 
chronologically suitable candidate for identification is Ariobarzanes I. Although not 
clearly stated, it seems very likely that the one who sold the fortress to the ruler of 
Sophene in the first place was the same Ariobarzanes: his political destiny, being driven 
out time and again by his enemies and continuously reinstated by the Romans brought 
Cappadocia on the brink of bankruptcy (a situation that continued unchanged under his 
successors) and it must have been in this context of dire need of cash that the king decided 
to part with a formidably important fortress, which guarded one of the few crossings over 
80 Str. 12.3.4. For a more detailed discussion of the situation of such tribes, cf. PAPAzoglu, 1997, particularly 
pp. 113-140.
81  For a detailed discussion of the epigraphical testimonies concerning the juridical status of purchased properties, 
particularly from the point of view of the people living on these properties, cf. PAPAzoglu 1997, passim.
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the Euphrates. What makes this incident particularly interesting is that Ariobarzanes had 
been a dynast before being elected to kingship, so this opens up the possibility of him 
owning Tomisa not as king, but as δυνάστης.     
 When considered in ensemble, all these pieces of information seem to leave open 
the possibility that the dynasts enjoyed full property over their fortresses and adjacent 
plots, although they cannot serve to prove this hypothesis irrefutably.
It may be more prudent to assume that ultimate property lay with the king and it 
was him who bestowed various strongholds or the income of the same upon various 
favourites of him and could withdraw his gifts at his leisure. The rather obscure notice 
that Mithradates Eupator gave his father-in-law the estate of a recently deceased rich man 
may be used, with some caution, as proof of that: “πλουσίου τεθνηκότος ἔναγχος οἶκον 
αὐτῷ μέγαν ὁ βασιλεὺς δεδώρηται” (Plut., Pomp., 36.5). However, the main question, 
why was the king in a position to dispose of the property of a dead man, might have a 
plethora of answers: the estate may have been left in a will, the rich man may have been 
executed for treason and his goods confiscated, the estate may have been royal land given 
ἐν δωρεᾷ, which naturally returned to the crown upon the death of the beneficiary and 
others are all equally plausible explanations.
II.2.3. Dynastai as soldiers
The situation in which the king provides land in exchange for military service is not 
without precedent, nor without parallels in the Hellenistic world. The Achaemenid kings would 
give plots of land in return for military service (the size of the plot was directly proportional 
to the rank and specialisation of the soldier)82 and a similar system, though with notable 
differences, may be seen in the Hellenistic East in the guise of the κατοικίαι. As the dynasts’ 
role in the army has been discussed in more detail elsewhere (cf. supra, pp. 155-156), it will 
be sufficient to remind here that in exchange for land, they provided the king a substantial 
proportion of his heavily armed troops, in particular cavalry of exceptional quality.
II.2.4. The social status of the dynastai
Since they were the core of the army and had much of the wealth of the land in their 
hands, their social status can only be considered enviable. Indeed, the sources give every 
indication that they were generally quite close to royalty. As discussed above, many of 
the king’s philoi were recruited from their ranks and some, such as Moaphernes, were 
selected for important administrative positions. 
If Plutarch’s account is to be believed, the daughters of the dynastai were not 
shunned by the king himself, who had them as concubines: “ Ὅσαι δὲ τῶν Μιθριδάτου 
παλλακίδων ἀνήχθησαν, οὐδεμίαν ἔγνω […]. ἦσαν γὰρ αἱ πολλαὶ θυγατέρες καὶ 
γυναῖκες στρατηγῶν καὶ δυναστῶν.” (Plut., Pomp., 36.2). While it is quite possible 
that the wives and daughters of important people within the kingdom would be housed 
in the palace, alongside the royal women (both as an honour, representing the feminine 
82 Cf. dAndAMAeV & lukonin 1989, p. 231 sqq.
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equivalent of the institution of the paides, the Royal Pages, and as hostages, ensuring the 
loyalty of their husbands and fathers), it seems quite unlikely that they – particularly the 
wives of other people – were indeed the concubines of the king and this appears to be just 
a literary exaggeration, meant to contrast the perverse Oriental despot (Mithradates) with 
the temperate and generous Roman general (Pompey). 
Whether the δυνάσται themselves were considered dignified enough to wed princesses 
remains shrouded in mystery. Sullivan83 has proposed an affirmative answer, in order to 
justify the claim made by Archelaos (son of Eupator’s most conspicuous general, also named 
Archelaos, who eventually betrayed his king) to have been a descendent of Mithradates VI in 
order to gain Berenike IV’s hand. The argument went that in the tightly knit network of marital 
alliances in the Hellenistic East, Berenike must have been perfectly aware of Archelaos’ family 
and the only possible connection with the Mithradatid house would be through an otherwise 
unattested princess, given in marriage to Archelaos the father. However, the Strabonian text 
says clearly that Archelaos the younger claimed to be the son of Eupator: 
ἧκε δ’ἀντ’ἐκείνου προσποιησάμενος καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι Μιθριδάτου υἱὸς 
τοῦ Εὐπάτορος Ἀρχέλαος, ὃς ἦν μὲν Ἀρχελάου υἱὸς τοῦ πρὸς Σύλλαν 
διαπολεμήσαντος καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τιμηθέντος ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων, πάππος δὲ τοῦ 
βασιλεύσαντος Καππαδόκων ὑστάτου καθ’ἡμᾶς, ἱερεὺς δὲ τῶν ἐν Πόντῳ 
Κομάνων. (Str., 17.1.11)
Obviously, he was convinced that close scrutiny of his claim would be impossible, given the 
great number of children sired by the king. Therefore, while the possibility of marriage between 
dynastai and princesses should not be rejected entirely, it must not be taken as a certainty.  
Perhaps the most important proof of the height of the esteem the δυνάσται enjoyed 
remains that when the Cappadocian dynasty had become extinct, it was Ariobarzanes, one 
from their ranks, who was judged fit to climb the throne.
Thus, by the fact that they owned a domain centred around a stronghold, they 
participated in the military expeditions of their king and formed an important segment 
of his court, one could justify the comparison made between the Eastern-Anatolian 
dynastai and the feudal lords of Europe during the Middle Ages.84 Their great importance 
in military, political and economic terms fully justifies considering the Eastern Anatolian 
δυνάσται a crucial segment in the social fabric of the Eastern Anatolian kingdoms.
iii. LocaL communities
The reason to include a discussion about local communities in the chapter dealing 
with power and wealth is that a community is necessarily a structure of power (developing 
83 SulliVAn, 1990, pp. 241-242.
84 Perhaps a comparison with the Eastern or so-called “Byzantine” feudalism would be more appropriate 
than the comparison with the Western version, since the noblemen of the Antiquity were not, in so far as we 
can judge, organized in a strict, many-layered pyramid, but were connected directly to the king.
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a certain hierarchy within itself; mastering and making use of the landscape around it; 
and finally, engaging with other communities in relations which range from emulation to 
outright hostility) which creates wealth and makes it possible for wealth to be distributed. 
In Eastern Anatolia, communities are numerous and come in different forms, according to 
their function and their degree of urbanisation. Thus, one may identify settlements which 
are geared towards agriculture or towards trade, serving military purposes or acting as 
religious centres, while occupying every level of urbanisation from the humble village to 
the imposing polis. 
A study of the terms Strabo uses to describe the different types of settlement85 is 
revealing: besides the concept of πόλις, which seems to represent the measuring stick 
for settlements, he mentions a πολίχνιον such as Herpa (12.2.5), a κωμόπολις such 
as Garsauira (12.2.5), πολίσματα such as Kastabla and Kybistra (12.2.7), a πολίχνιον 
such as Abonou Teichos (12.3.10) or a κώμη such as Armene (12.3.10). It is interesting 
to note that Strabon’s assessment of these settlements does not always correspond to the 
language used by the communities themselves. Thus, Anisa describes itself as a polis 
(it has specific institutions, such as a demos, a boule and prytaneis),86 whereas Strabon 
emphatically states that in the Cilician district (‘στρατηγία’) of Cappadocia there existed 
only one polis, namely Mazaka, also called ‘Eusebeia near the Argaeus’ (Str., 12.2.7). It 
is likely that Strabon himself was more interested in the outwardly aspects of urbanisation 
than in institutional details.87  
III.1. Villages
In Eastern Anatolia there appear to be entire regions where there are no urban settlements: 
“Πόλιν δ’ οὔτε τὸ τῶν Καταόνων ἔχει πεδίον οὔθ’ ἡ Μελιτηνή” (Str., 12.2.5). There are, instead, 
areas where villages are extremely numerous, as demonstrated not only by ancient literature, but 
also by modern surveys. Thus, Strabon mentions the Χιλιόκωμον, the ‘region of a thousand 
villages’, which stretched North-West of Amaseia, along one of the rivers that flows into the Iris 
(Str., 12.3.39). Appian describes a similar phenomenon: following an incursion into Mithradates’ 
territory, during which he had sacked some four hundred villages, Murena returned with much 
booty (APP., Mithr., 65) – this incidentally demonstrates that villages in this area must have been not 
only numerous, but also relatively prosperous. Modern surveys come to confirm the information 
provided by the ancient writers: surveys undertaken in Paphlagonia and in particular in the Sinop 
Peninsula illustrate an increase of rural settlements during the Hellenistic Age, although it was only 
during the Roman times that settlements of all types increased in number and size.88
85 BoFFo, 2000.
86 MbBerlin, 1880.646.
87 A parallel outlook may be observed in Pausanias’s Periegesis: “στάδια δὲ ἐκ Χαιρωνείας εἴκοσιν ἐς 
Πανοπέας ἐστὶ πόλιν Φωκέων, εἴγε ὀνομάσαι τις πόλιν καὶ τούτους οἷς γε οὐκ ἀρχεῖα οὐ γυμνάσιόν 
ἐστιν, οὐ θέατρον οὐκ ἀγορὰν ἔχουσιν, οὐχ ὕδωρ κατερχόμενον ἐς κρήνην, ἀλλὰ ἐν στέγαις κοίλαις 
κατὰ τὰς καλύβας μάλιστα τὰς ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσιν, ἐνταῦθα οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ χαράδρᾳ.” (PAuS., 10.4.1).
88 højte, 2006, pp. 17-20.
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Unfortunately, there is little to be said with any degree of certainty about the exact 
administrative regime of these small settlements or about the way in which they exercised 
property over the land (in case they did at all). What is reasonably certain, though, is that 
at least some of them were allotted to the numerous phrouria entrusted to the dynasts and 
even more of them must have been included in the γὴ βασιλική.   
III.2. Poleis and Γὴ πολιτική
As mentioned above, Eastern Anatolia is not a land rich in Greek-style poleis, 
whether in the institutional sense or from the point of view of the urban facilities present 
therein. One may notice, however, a steady increase in the number of cities during 
the Hellenistic Age. The old Greek colonies on the Northern coast of Anatolia such as 
Sinope, Amisos, Trapezous or the equally old cities of non-Greek origin such as Mazaka 
in Cappadocia continued to thrive and often benefited from acts of evergetism from the 
kings. The rulers appear to have been keen to promote urbanisation: they refounded old 
cities, often marking the event by giving them a new dynastic name, such as Pharnakeia in 
Pontus, Mazaka-Eusebeia in Cappadocia or Samosata in Commagene. Besides these, there 
appeared a number of new urban communities whose names indicate royal intervention: 
Eupatoria or Laodikeia in Pontus, Ariaratheia in Cappadocia or Arsameia in Commagene 
III.2.1. Case study: Sinope
In order to understand better the types of relation in which one such urban settlement 
engaged, the situation of Sinope will be analysed as case-study. The story of the foundation 
of the city (dated in the late 7th 
century) is complex and shrouded 
in myths:89 on the site of a probable 
early Cappadocian settlement, the 
Thessalian hero Autolykos is said 
to have founded the first city, which 
was then occupied by Milesians 
under Habron (or Habrondas). Soon 
thereafter, the Cimmerians occupied 
the site, and were repulsed later by 
other Milesians, the exiles Koos and 
Kretines. Once firmly established, the city could finally take advantage of the surrounding 
landscape and interact with neighbouring communities. 
The position of the city and the natural features of the landscape around it have been 
lauded by ancient authors, and with good reason. The place afforded very easy defence, as 
the city occupied a peninsula only two stades in width and the mountain behind it, while 
sloping gently towards the city, had cliffs almost impossible to scale on its seaward sides 
89 The essential evidence pertaining to this city is usefully collected by A. Avram, J. Hind and G. Tzetzkhladze 
in hAnSen & nielSen, 2004, pp. 960-963.
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Figure VI.1. View of Sinope from Boz Tepe
(Pol., 4.56.5-6; Str., 12.3.11). More importantly, the peninsula lay half-way between the 
Hellespont and Colchis and represented Asia Minor’s most Northerly point, closest to the 
Tauric Chersonese; it also formed two excellent harbours and this allowed Sinope to become a 
major maritime power, ‘ruling the sea inside the Kyaneai’, as Strabon puts it. It certainly helped 
that the configuration of the Black Sea (a great ellipse, constricted in the middle, resembling a 
Boeotian shield) created a circular water current in each of the two hemispheres, both rotating 
counter-clockwise and creating in the process two watery speedways, allowing ships to travel 
with celerity from Sinope to the Tauric Chersonese and back.90 
Besides serving as an avenue of communication and trade, in a manner befitting its 
name (scholars argue that the word Πόντος is etymologically related to the Latin pons, 
‘bridge’ and Sanskrit pánthāh,̣ ‘path’),91 the Black Sea offered Sinope excellent fishing 
grounds, the quality and quantity of tunny caught here being surpassed only at Byzantion 
(Str., 7.6.2; 12.3.11; 12.3.19). Although it lived mostly through and for the sea, Sinope 
made use also of the surrounding land, which was fairly fertile (Strabon mentions the 
beautiful gardens that existed on the terrace of Mount Skopelos and we know from the 
archaeological sites across the Euxine that Sinopean olive oil production was abundant 
– an exceptional phenomenon on the Anatolian shore of the Euxine) and rich in valuable 
wood, fit not only for making furniture, but also for ship-building.92
While the geographical disposition of the city and the patterns of exploitation of 
natural resources it developed over time represented a necessary condition for wealth to 
be accumulated, it was by no means sufficient. It was only through constant interaction 
with other communities, through connectedness, that wealth was created. The following 
lines will look at the way Sinope interacted with a few key communities and the power 
structures that emerged as a result.
The city was fully integrated in the wider Hellenic world, tied by trading interests, 
military enterprises and a general sense of cultural identity. Trade was a lively activity 
within the basin of the Euxine and Sinope was at the forefront of this activity, and the shards 
of its stamped amphorae found on all corners of the coast are a testament to this. In order 
to consolidate its trading interests, Sinope, a colony of Miletus, became itself a source 
of colonists, founding Kotyora, Kerasous and Trapezous. As opposed to its metropolis, 
however, Sinope maintained a very close grip on its colonies, and exacted tribute from 
them (Xen., Anab., 5.5.10). The lively trade within the Euxine was complemented by 
solid commercial ties with the main cities of the Mediterranean,93 most importantly, it 
would seem, with Athens, Delos and Rhodes. 
Experience has shown that a high level of connectedness brings strength to 
90 doonAn, 2004, p. 19, Fig. 1-15.
91 Cf. ChAntrAine, 1977, s.v. πόντος.
92 Olive oil: doonAn, 2004, p. 95; forests: doonAn, 2004, pp. 18-20. Cf. supra, pp. 41-43. 
93 Fish trade: diod., 31.24.1; Slave trade: AVrAM, 2007. 
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communities, but also generates important vulnerabilities. The first and most tangible 
benefit of the ties enumerated above was the prosperity enjoyed by the city, but no less 
important was the sense of participation in the Hellenic identity. Thus, Sinope participated 
and occasionally won prizes in some of the great Pan-Hellenic festivals, such as the Great 
Amphiaraia at Oropos (where Hestiaios won the juniors’ boxing competition: IG VII, 414) 
or the games in honour of Hera at Argos (a bronze hydria bearing the telling inscription 
“πὰρ hέρας Ἀργείας εμι τον hαFέθλο” has been found in Sinope: SEG 30, 1456). That 
Sinope was well attuned with the cultural trends of the day is also demonstrated by the 
fact that it produced men of value, recognised as such beyond its own borders. This 
is the order in which Strabon quotes them: Diogenes, the famous Cynic philosopher, 
Timotheus, another philosopher, the poet Diphilos and the historian Baton (Str., 12.3.11).
The vulnerability created by this high degree of connectedness is represented by the 
fact that Sinope was sometimes dragged into conflicts it would have probably preferred to 
avoid. For example, in about 436 an Athenian expeditionary force occupied it, ousting the 
tyrant Timesileos (Plut., Per., 20), and held it for approximately two decades. This event 
also had its advantages, as Sinope became a democracy with solid institutions, and whose 
Constitution has been noted down by those around Aristotle, who contributed materials 
to his monumental Politeia. 
If the relation between Sinope and the other poleis covered the full spectrum from 
friendly competition in the Olympic spirit to fierce animosity94 that one could expect from 
a relation between peers (with slight nuances when dealing with colonies), the relation 
with the ἔθνη of the Hinterland, the Paphlagonians and the Leucosyroi, was somewhat 
more complex. There existed, as one could expect, a fairly lively commerce, and one 
trace of that is preserved by Strabon, who, when discussing the quality of ruddle from 
Greater Cappadocia, calls the mineral ‘Sinopean ruddle’, because it was the merchants 
of Sinope who first brought it onto the Greek market.95 Epigraphy has preserved traces of 
another type of merchandise with which our postcolonial sensitivities find it hard to cope 
– slaves.96 Epigraphic documents in the Mediterranean basin record numerous slaves or 
likely slaves who have for ethnonym either ‘Παφλαγών’, ‘Κάππαδοξ’ or ‘Σινοπεύς’ and 
who are likely to have been brought as slaves to Sinope, on their way perhaps to an even 
larger slave market such as that on Delos. While warfare and piracy represent the most 
important sources of slaves, we should not automatically assume Sinope continuously 
attacked its neighbours in order to procure this valuable commodity. We do not even 
94 The rivalry between Sinope and Sesamos was so great that the former, when approached by Datames 
and asked for support against the latter, gladly lent to the Persian satrap everything that he could possibly 
need during a siege, from materiel to skilled personnel, only to see with horror that Datames was actually 
intending to use the war machines against Sinope itself. (PolyAen., 7.21.2) 
95 “ἐν δὲ τῇ Καππαδοκίᾳ γίνεται καὶ ἡ λεγομένη Σινωπικὴ μίλτος ἀρίστη τῶν πασῶν· ἐνάμιλλος δ’ 
ἐστὶν αὐτῇ καὶ ἡ Ἰβηρική· ὠνομάσθη δὲ Σινωπικὴ διότι κατάγειν ἐκεῖσε εἰώθεσαν οἱ ἔμποροι πρὶν ἢ τὸ 
τῶν Ἐφεσίων ἐμπόριον μέχρι τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων διῖχθαι”, Str., 12.2.10.
96 AVrAM, 2007.
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possess information that they kept the ἔθνη of the Hinterland in a state of subjection, 
as the people of Herakleia Pontica did with the Mariandyes. On the contrary, Xenophon 
informs us that they were in formal relations of proxenia with the Paphlagones (Xen., 
Anab., 5.6.11),97 and in the 5th-4th century a certain Μάνης ἐλαιοπώλης, a Paphlagonian 
oil seller, is recorded on a gravestone just outside the city walls.98 Under the circumstances, 
it is more likely that the slaves had already been brought in this condition well before they 
came into contact with the Sinopeans, as a result of raids and small-scale warfare99 of 
the sort Xenophon encountered throughout Anatolia, from Cyrus the Younger’s feigned 
(but perfectly credible) campaign against Tissaphernes and the Pisidians (1.1.11) to the 
internecine war of the Mossynoikoi (5.4.2-34).
The Sinopeans had most trouble not with their immediate neighbours, the 
Paphlagonians (contrary perhaps to expectations in view of the often tensed relations 
between the Greek poleis of the Western and Northern shores of the Euxine and their 
Thracian and Scythian neighbours), but rather with the powerful monarchies from the 
mainland: the Achaemenids and later the Mithradatids. Datames’ stratagem (PolyAen., 
7.21.2), in spite of its ingenuity, failed and the city maintained its independence. 
Mithradates II tried a less subtle approach, making his preparations in plain view and 
allowing the city to prepare adequately and benefit from a substantial aid from Rhodes, 
both material and diplomatic (Pol., 4.56.1-9), which illustrates very well the importance 
attached to this city by major players on the stage of international politics and how it was 
integrated in a structure of power gravitating around Rhodes and ultimately around Rome. 
The situation changed radically when Pharnakes came to the throne. More ambitious 
and apparently endowed with more military sense than his ancestor, the young king 
attacked the city before it had the time to prepare its defences properly and conquered it. 
The term used by Strabon to describe the process, ‘ἐδούλευσε’ (Str., 12.3.11), is rather 
harsh, though it is probably not meant to be taken literally: it is unlikely Pharnakes simply 
sold into slavery all the inhabitants and then transferred his capital to an empty city. What 
the geographer probably intended us to understand is that Pharnakes robbed the city of 
its independence and extracted it forcibly from the network of relations it had built over 
time, at least from the political perspective (although the sudden cessation of the amphora 
stamping habit may point to other sudden changes as well). While the city lost a great 
deal through this contest, there was a bright side to the process, as Sinope became the new 
royal residence: though it was excluded from one network of interconnectivity – Rhodes’ 
friends and allies –, it was introduced in a new one – the nexus that was represented by the 
Kingdom of Pontus –, enjoying a position of great renown if not of great authority. During 
97  Similarly, Sinope’s colony, Trapezous, had relations of proxenia with their own neighbours, the 
Mossynoikoi (Xen., Anab., 5.4.3).
98 doonAn, 2006, p. 52.
99  The same solution is proposed by A. Avram (AVrAM, 2007) for the influx of Thracian slaves on the Greek market.
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Mithradates VI Eupator’s reign, the city benefited greatly from its position as capital. Not 
only were the royal benefactions great (or so we may deduce from Strabon’s statement 
that “διαφερόντως δὲ ἐτίμησεν αὐτὴν μητρόπολίν τε τῆς βασιλείας ὑπέλαβεν”),100 
but people from the city were numbered among Eupator’s closest collaborators, such as 
Diophantos, the one who led the king’s expedition against the Scythians of the Tauric 
Bosphorus. Sinope’s position would once again alter after Mithradates’ downfall, this 
time becoming a part of the Roman provincial universe.
This short case-study has shown how a polis of Eastern Anatolia managed its natural 
position and how it created and used an extensive network of relations with surrounding 
communities in order to obtain wealth and influence. 
III.2.2. Γὴ πολιτική
The poor state of epigraphy in Eastern Anatolia, due to a good extent to the degree 
of penetration of the epigraphic habit, far less profound than in Western Anatolia, for 
example, makes it fairly difficult to assess the status of the land owned by cities, ‘γὴ 
πολιτική’, and it is only literary sources that help shed some light on the issue. For 
example, Strabon mentions that the inhabitants of Pharnakeia, although prevented from 
practicing the agriculture on a significant scale by the scarcity of lands, can still derive 
an income from working the iron mines in the vicinity (12.3.19), which implies that the 
mining region is part of the city’s chora. Scarcity of land appears to be the norm for the 
cities in this area, even if their geographic position would have allowed access to wider 
plains. Thus, Lucullus is said to have added 120 stadia to the chora of Amisos (Plut., 
Luc., 19.5), which is perceived as a significant addition, in spite of it being a relatively 
small gift (it is difficult to interpret the figure given by Plutarch, because the stadion is 
not a measure of surface, but of length, and must, therefore, indicate in this context a 
perimeter).101 Later, when Pompey decided to reorganise the land of Pontus for easier 
inclusion in the extended province of ‘Bithynia et Pontus’, he found it necessary to make 
substantial gifts of land to the existing cities or to the settlements he had just promoted to 
the rank of polis. 
The situation appears to be slightly different in Bosporus, where cities had enjoyed 
in the Classical period a more substantial territorial expansion and where the very density 
of poleis was greater than on the Southern shore of the Euxine. For example, the city 
of Theodosia, a medium-sized settlement by North-Pontic standards, controlled in its 
initial stages a territory of 300-400 hectares, which was later expanded when its power 
grew, so as to include “60 unfortified settlements, two shepherd stations, one town site, 
one fortified settlement, four small fortresses, necropoleis with or without tumuli as well 
100 Str., 12.3.11.
101 In a similar context, Strabon uses the phrase “προσώρισεν αὐτῷ χώραν δίσχοινον κύκλῳ∙ τοῦτο δ’ 
ἔστιν ἑξήκοντα στάδιοι” (Str., 12.3.34). Thus, a perimeter of approximately 21,000 metres corresponds to 
a surface smaller than 5 km2.
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as the remains of ramparts”.102 Even if during the Hellenistic period, the size of a polis’ 
chora tended to fluctuate depending on the intensity of the pressure exerted by Scythian 
and Sarmatian tribes,103 the extent of the γὴ πολιτική and its economic importance (in 
particular for grain production) remained substantial. 
iii.3. Temple estates and Γὴ ἱερά
While humans across time and cultures have been of the opinion that divinities 
must receive certain portions of land (groves, mountaintops, whole mountains etc.) on 
which regular human laws did not apply, the creation of highly complex administrative 
entities around temples seems a distinctive Oriental phenomenon, and may be observed in 
Egypt, in Palestine, in Mesopotamia and not least in Asia Minor. To describe this structure, 
scholars coined the phrase ‘temple states’, but this term, rooted in a distorted understanding 
of Sumerian documents,104 tends to be replaced by the more moderate ‘temple estates’. 
The latter term is to be preferred when discussing the situation of Eastern Asia Minor, in 
view of a notice in Strabon, who discusses the situation of the inhabitants of Cappadocian 
Comana: ‘Κατάονες δέ εἰσιν οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες, ἄλλως μὲν ὑπὸ τῷ βασιλεῖ τεταγμένοι, 
τοῦ δὲ ἱερέως ὑπακούοντες τὸ πλέον’ (Str., 12.2.3). Thus, if even the inhabitants of 
the most honoured temple precinct in Cappadocia were ‘in general’ or ‘in all other ways’ 
subject to the king, one must assume that the same was true of all temple-precincts. As 
the independence of these structures appears to be exclusively administrative, the phrase 
‘temple states’, which tends to imply other areas of independence, must be abandoned. 
Our most reliable guide through Eastern Anatolia, Strabon, is careful to mention 
and sometimes describe a number of temple estates: in Pontus: Comana (12.3.34-36), 
Ameria, near Kabeira (12.3.31) and Zela (12.3.37); in Cappadocia: Comana (12.2.3) and 
Ouenasa (12.2.6). For Commagene, one may reconstruct a very similar picture with the 
aid of the inscriptions set up by Antiochos I of Commagene (IGLSyr., 1, 1; IGLSyr., 1, 
47, IGLSyr., 1, 51 etc.). 
The temple communities have different aspects from the urbanistic point of view, 
ranging from a ‘κωμόπολις’ such as Ameria to a ‘πόλις ἀξιόλογος’ such as Cappadocian 
Comana. What they have in common is the fact that they hold land, which is worked by 
‘slaves of the sanctuary’, over whom the high-priest exerts his power within certain limits.
The sacred land, γὴ ἱερά or χώρα ἱερά, is rendered special by the fact that, being 
consecrated to the divinity, may not be subjected to taxation and may not (or should not) 
be expropriated. Thus, the high priest is often said to ‘enjoy the fruits of the sacred land’,105 
which probably means not so much that he keeps everything for himself, but rather that he 
does not have to pay taxes on this income. In this respect, the text of Antiochos I Theos’ 
102  gAVriloV, 2006, p. 254.
103  SAPrykin, 2006.
104 Sherwin-white & kuhrt, 1993, pp. 59-60.
105 “χώραν ἱεράν, ἣν ὁ ἱερώμενος ἀεὶ καρποῦται”, Str., 12.3.31.
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sacred law is even clearer: “The priest [...] released from all other preoccupations, will 
devote himself to the service of this temple unhindered and without any allowance for 
pretexts not to do so.”106 The inviolability of the sacred land was protected by royal and 
divine warnings, such as those launched by Antiochos: 
Likewise, with regard to the villages that I have consecrated to these divine beings, let 
nobody, whoever that may be, make them his own or alienate them or give them another 
purpose or injure in any way these villages or their income, which I have instituted as an 
inviolable property of the gods.107 
The kings appear to have been mindful of the right of these sacred properties, but 
in later times the Romans seem to have been less sensitive, at least in so far as the temple 
estate of Zela was concerned, whose land and whose sacred slaves were reduced on a 
number of occasions (Str., 12.3.37). 
The ‘servants of the sanctuary’, the ‘ἱεροδούλοι’ represent a special class. If 
Antiochos’ injunctions108 are indicative of the general custom, they inherited not only this 
position from one generation to another, but also the specialisation, e.g. as musicians. At 
the same time, they enjoyed many advantages, such as being exempted from corvée or 
being protected against enslavement to a person and being sold off as a consequence. As 
the same thing is mentioned about the hierodouloi from Pontic Comana, it must be taken 
to represent the norm across Eastern Anatolia.
Scholars have yet to identify with precision the origin of this important institution. 
There are certain parallels with practices from Mesopotamia and Egypt,109 and Hittite 
documents hint at similar phenomena.110 As Eastern Anatolia came under the Persian 
influence, the temple estates were integrated in a new system of power – the person 
of the high priest became either Iranised or was replaced with an Iranian and even the 
divine figures suffered the same fate, as the old gods were replaced with the Iranian 
divinities, such as Omanes (Iranian: Vahu-manah) and Anaitis at Zela.111 The political 
importance of the sacred precincts increased during the Hellenistic times when, as 
mentioned above, the kings respected the inviolable character of the sacred property. 
Moreover, the person of the High Priest became an important presence at the royal court, 
106 “ἱερεὺς […] ἐκεῖνος ἠλευθερωμένος ἄλλης / χρείας ἁπάσης ἀνεμπόδιστος ἀπροφάσιστός / τε 
ἱεροθεσίωι τούτωι προσκαρτερείτω.” IGLSyr., 1, 1.124-130.
107  “ὁμοίως δὲ / μηδὲ κώμας, ἃς ἐγὼ καθειέρωσα / δαίμοσιν τούτοις, μηδενὶ / ὅσιον ἔστω μήτε ἐξιδιά- / 
σασθαι μήτε ἐξαλλοτριῶσαι / μήτε μεταδιατάξαι μήτε / βλάψαι κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον κώ- /μας ἐκείνας 
/ ἢ πρόσοδον, ἣν ἐγὼ κτῆμα δαιμόνων / ἄσυλον ἀνέθηκα.”, IGLSyr., 1, 1.191-200.
108  IGLSyr., 1, 1.161-191.
109 Cf. supra, n. 105.
110 SökMen, 2009, p. 278, although the author is misled into believing the Hittite Kizzuwatna is in the Pontic 
region and Kummanni is the same as Pontic Comana, when in fact Kizzuwatna lay in the area near the 
Taurus and Kummanni is probably to be identified with the Cappadocian Comana.
111 Str., 11.8.4. For the process of Iranisation, cf. MitChell, 2007.
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being considered ‘second after the King’ (at least the High Priests of the two Comanas) 
and possibly acting as regional governor, if Mithratochmes (or Arsames) son of Iazemis, 
‘στρατηγον Καταονιας’ who is also the ‘priest of the Victory-Bearing Goddess’112 is to 
be identified with the High Priest of Ma at Cappadocian Comana.113 However, as a result 
of this integration in the political structures, the office of High Priest became the object 
of court politics and intrigues. The King had the authority to appoint the High Priest 
and, while the appointment was for life, nothing guaranteed that the life itself of the 
appointee would be long, as Dorylaos’ example demonstrates. The advent of the Romans 
would leave few things unchanged. While some important temple estates such as Pontic 
Comana continued to remain important (with the difference that the person of the High 
Priest would no longer be appointed by the king of the land, but by Roman generals, such 
as Pompey, who appointed Archalaos, Caesar, who installed Lycomedes, or Augustus, 
who gave the office to Dytetos),114 others were transformed into poleis, such as Zela. 
While this may have represented an improvement in the situation of the hierodouloi, it 
was certainly a blow to the reputation and influence of the High Priest and of the Temple 
Estate as an institution, whose relevance was limited to the provincial spectrum. 
iv. concLusions
As seen in all the cases examined above, power and wealth are interdependent. 
More importantly, it has become apparent that throughout Eastern Anatolia, Macedonian 
and Achaemenid structures (the king as owner of land, the aulic organisation, the dynasts, 
the temple estates etc.) combine to create a new system, whose persistence – even after 
the houses of the Mithradatids, Ariarathids, Ariobarzanids and Commagenian Orontids 
disappeared – is a testament to its solidity.
112 Or ‘High-Priest’: Tit.Coman.Capp., 2.04.
113 For the identification of Ma with Athena Nikephoros in Cappadocia, cf. supra, p. 131-132. 
114 Archelaos: Str., 12.3.34; Lycomedes: Str., 12.3.35; Dytetos: Str., 12.3.35.
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GenerAl conclusions
Throughout the analysis of the institutions from Eastern Anatolia during the Hellenistic Age, cultural osmosis or syncretism has always emerged as the defining 
trend. The two great cultures – Iranian and Greco-Macedonian – have interacted with 
each other and with local traditions, in a fruitful dialogue, which has produced interesting 
results. This process was sometimes organic, changing habits, ideas and mentalities in 
subtle, almost imperceptible steps; sometimes the pace of change was quickened and 
its course steered by the rulers, who perceived how important it was to forge an identity 
– both for themselves and for their subjects – that would embrace difference while 
smoothing out dissonances. Provided their subjects identified in the new identity some 
of the traits with which they were familiar, some of the characteristics they held dear, 
the process offered a useful means of unifying their realms and allowed them a more 
solid grip on power. 
Thus, in defining their identity, rulers took pride in their multi-ethnic background, 
cherishing the memory of both Dareios the Great and Alexander. This is all the more significant 
as the genealogies they put forward have weak points and are in all likelihood fabrications. 
The strategies for communicating this identity betray, in turn, influences from both areas, 
employing means specific to each, such as large-scale statuary or numismatic iconography.
Syncretism is present in the religious field. Not only in deciding how to engage 
the divine, but also in determining which divine figures to worship, kings of the region 
took extreme care to be inclusive in their approach, equating, whenever possible, Iranian 
divinities with Greek ones. 
Even in the military domain, in which successful patterns tend to be adopted quickly 
and in which, therefore, the tradition of the winners would be expected to replace that 
of the defeated, Eastern Anatolian rulers found it important to preserve the experiences 
of Achaemenid Persia and combine them with the latest developments occurring in the 
Macedonian universe. Thus, patterns of recruitment of cavalry specific of Achaemenid 
Persia, for example, coexisted with heavy infantry tactics perfected by Alexander’s 
successors.
In the organisation of their kingdoms, Eastern Anatolian monarchs showed equal 
concern for achieving a balance between the two traditions, being surrounded not only 
by Friends, according to the Macedonian fashion, but also by dynasts. Likewise, while 
they encouraged to some extent the process of urbanisation, promoting the Greek polis 
experience, they also showed considerable respect to the temple estates.
Pontus, Cappadocia and Commagene are such an interesting object of study because, 
while the processes of cultural osmosis and hybridity may be observed at work in a vast 
geographic area, throughout the Hellenistic Age, they are nevertheless individualised by 
the specific mix of cultures that interact. Thus, the Hittite substratum (which is visible 
particularly in the field of religion, but also in certain details of social organisation and 
possibly even language) is complemented by a Semitic element (probably noticeable in 
language, certainly in religion). The Achaemenid stratum has pervasive influence in most 
fields of social, political and military life. To these the Greco-Macedonian ad-stratum 
was subsequently added – again, with far-reaching influences –, introducing thus the area 
in the wide stream of the Hellenistic world. This combination of cultural components 
sets the three kingdoms apart from the other major kingdoms of the age: Macedon and 
Pergamon were not very interested in the Achaemenid inheritance, the Ptolemies were 
careful to cultivate the pharaonic traditions, and the Seleukids adapted to the numerous 
local specificities; in Bithynia the interplay was between the Thracian background and 
the Greek influences, while in Armenia the Greek element never penetrated too deeply. 
The result of this cultural convergence was durable. The strategic position in which 
Pontus, Cappadocia and Commagene lay, made it so that they continued to act as an 
interface between the Greco-Roman West and the Iranian East. 
The local aristocracy maintained its position, traditions and wealth based primarily 
on cattle-breeding, while becoming integrated in the Roman provincial system. All the 
while, the Persian inheritance was not forgotten, and even as late as the 3rd century AD, 
there were enough people in Cappadocia, for example, to feel affinities for their Iranian 
relatives so as to hail Shapur I’s campaign of as a liberation (or so it would seem from 
Shapur’s inscription at Naqsh-i Rustam, called Ka’ba-ye Zardošt), and in the 5th century 
there were enough magi there to warrant a diplomatic intervention of king Peroz, who 
wrote to Emepror Leo demanding that they be allowed to continue their ancestral practices 
(Priscus, fr. 41). 
Many of the royal innovations outlived the respective dynasties. Thus, the tradition 
of Mithradatid descent from the great Achaemenid kings was cherished by the Bosporan 
dynasty well into the Roman Age. Other examples can be found in the field of religion, 
where divinities promoted by the kings continued to be popular, as was the case with the 
cult at Nemrut Daği, which was continued for centuries.
However, it was the Greek culture that gained the dominant position. The seeds 
planted by the Hellenistic kings, who invited intellectuals to their courts in the attempt 
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to transform their capitals into hubs of Hellenic culture bloomed in later centuries. When 
Christianity became mainstream, Eastern Anatolian intellectuals were ready to speak up 
and to bring their contribution. Aquila of Sinope translated the Hebrew Bible into Greek, 
Evagrius Ponticus, born in Ibora, was a monk endowed with great oratorical talent, while 
Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa are recognised today 
as some of the most influential Fathers of the Church. Just as importantly, a Greek-
speaking population remained in Pontus and Cappadocia even centuries after the Turkish 
occupation, and remains there in spite of great cultural pressures exerted on them during 
the agitated 20th century. 
This field of study is far from having exhausted its possibilities. Further investigation 
and developments would be welcome. Thus, a more detailed study of the Hittite imprint, 
but also of the cultural interaction during Late Antiquity would be sure to illuminate 
greatly many of the issues dealt with throughout this thesis.
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